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Abstract: The Interface Is Obsolete: A Critical Investigation of the Digital 
Interface in Interactive New Media Installations 
 
My thesis proposes a critical framework for understanding the digital interface in interactive 
new media installations. I aim at dispelling the instrumental, cybernetic, “action-reaction” 
myth that surrounds the functions of the interface and that constitutes one of the main 
limitations in its conceptualization today.  I argue that a rethinking of the digital interface in 
terms of its aesthetic and cultural properties is essential if we are to take digital interfaces 
seriously as devices that inform or even, to some extent, structure our relationship with 
technology.  
 
Theorists who work in the interdisciplinary field of interface studies have historically been 
preoccupied with the technical and instrumental functions the interface performs – 
specifically with how it acts and reacts to pre-programmed information. To do this, they have 
predominantly drawn on computer science and engineering perspectives. Thus digital 
interfaces have commonly been understood as the symbolic software that enables humans to 
use computers.  My thesis approaches the digital interface from a different direction, 
concentrating on the aesthetic and cultural aspects of the digital interface, and drawing on 
scholarship from the fields of art history and media studies. In particular, I focus on critically 
examining how various interfaces are defined within art environments and how they 
influence the way subjects, objects, and the relationships and processes that exist between 
them are understood in these disciplinary fields and practices. Throughout, I propose a more 
expansive definition of the digital interface in interactive new media installations, positioning 
it as a dynamic, hybrid, aesthetic and cultural process.  I thus reformulate the problem of the 
digital interface as a problem of making the often invisible aspects of the device legible. 
 
Ultimately, I argue that the interface mediates, thus creates, to an extent, relationships 
between viewer/participants, artists and artworks as well as influences the movements and 
perceptions of those interacting with it. This reading enables me to conclude that the digital 
interface can be seen as an important actor in positioning and (re)shaping specific ways in 
which the self relates to technology, to artistic practice and to other human and nonhuman 
beings in the current media culture. At the heart of this thesis is the notion that the digital 
 
interface matters and that a critical exploration of it in aesthetic contexts can help us 
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Preface: What is the Interface in this Artwork?  
  
For the past two years, I have been taking a group of digital media arts students on a trip to 
the Victoria and Albert Museum, in London, UK.  The purpose of this visit is to get the 
students to engage with digital media art in person.  The trip begins with a guided tour of the 
museum’s computer art collection.1  It ends with a viewing of the interactive installation 
Swarm Study / III (2011) by new media art collective Random International.2  Commissioned 
by the museum, Swarm Study / III is installed in the ceiling directly above the stairway that 
connects the architecture gallery to the ceramics wing.3  The piece is visible from both spaces 
as well as from the stairway.4  My group approaches the installation from the architecture 
gallery.  We walk half-way up the stairs, look up – and there it is. (Figure 1) 
	
Figure 1:  Random International, Swarm Study / III, (2011). 
Swarm Study / III is aesthetically simple yet striking. It consists of a series of brass rods 
covered in LED lights, a computer and closed-circuit cameras.  The rods are arranged in a 
grid-like formation.  They are suspended from the ceiling and placed in four large cubes.5  
The students stand in the landing and stare at the work.  The most daring of the group step 
                                                
1 For information about the Victoria and Albert Museum’s computer art collections, please visit: 
http://www.vam.ac.uk/content/articles/t/v-and-a-computer-art-collections/  
2 Victoria and Albert Museum. Swarm Study / III (2011). Found online at: 
http://www.vam.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/179336/Random_international.pdf  
3 Ibid.,  
4 Ibid.,  




forward and slowly begin their ascent up the staircase.  The cameras immediately detect the 
student’s movements and the piece is activated –	its lights turn on. (Figure 2)  
	
Figure 2:  Random International, Swarm Study / III (2011).	
As the students walk up and down the staircase, the lights follow them, moving from rod to 
rod, from cube to cube, flickering off and on.  Soon, all students are interacting with the 
artwork.  Some even go so far as to attempt to “break”	it.  “Breaking”	the piece is relatively 
easy.  Swarm Study / III runs on a cybernetic action/reaction loop. It tracks and records the 
action occurring below it and then produces a pre-programmed reaction to it in real-time.6  
The action being tracked and recorded in this particular case is the students walking up and 
down the stairs at a standard gallery visitor pace. The pre-programmed reaction the artwork 
produces to this action takes the form of blinking lights, which resemble swarming patterns 
found in nature.7 Given this, all the students have to do to “break”	the work is intervene in the 
cybernetic action/reaction loop.  They do this by running up and down the stairs, instead of 
walking at a standard gallery visitor pace.  This action (running instead of walking) is a 
particularly effective form of intervention because if the students are moving too fast, the 
camera cannot track them and record data.  If there is no recorded data, then there is no 
action: therefore, there can be no reaction. If there is no reaction, then there is no art, as the 
art is the pre-programmed reaction (swarming) to the action (student movement) in this 
particular piece.  
                                                
6 Random International. Swarm Study / III (2011). Found online at: http://random-
international.com/work/swarm-study-iii/ 
7 Ibid.,  
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After interacting with Swarm Study / III for a short period of time, we begin to discuss the 
artwork. We briefly talk about surface-level aesthetics: we discuss representation (how well 
the piece represents the thing it is trying to depict, i.e. behavioral patterns in animals, 
swarming), expression (our emotional responses to the work, or “how it makes us feel”) and 
form (organization, unity, complexity, technical skill –	including, but not limited to, where 
the piece is installed in the museum and how its location affects the way we engage with and 
think about it).  These questions lead to a conversation around the conceptual idea behind the 
artwork: What is the aim of this work? What is its ultimate purpose? Why did the artists 
make it? What are they trying to achieve with it?  How is this idea realized and/or 
communicated through the artwork? And how effective is it?  
The exercise culminates in a discussion about interactivity and interfaces –	specifically, what 
interaction and interfaces mean to this work, what they signify and are significant of. The 
questions continue: How and why is interaction is deployed? What kind of change (to the 
artwork, to the way you think and act) does interaction cause? And, most important, what 
causes it to work?  That is to say, what is the thing that influences your movements and 
perceptions –	the thing that allows interaction to occur, that reveals the artwork to you? What 
is the interface in Swarm Study / III? The answer the students give to the final question,	
“What is the interface in Swarm Study / III?”	is always the same: “Our bodies,”	they exclaim,	
“are the interfaces in this work because our bodies are the things that make the lights on the 
piece turn on and off!”	 The students are, of course, correct.  Their bodies are the forms that 
mediate the relationship between them, the artists and the artwork. Their bodies are the 
things that allow them to interact with the piece, and reveal the artwork to them. Therefore, 
their bodies are the interfaces in Swarm Study / III. 
Swarm Study / III and my students’ responses to it are important to my thesis, as they not 
only serve as examples of what an interface is or could be, but they also show why the 
deployment of the interface in interactive new media installations matters to new media art 
and to contemporary society.  The interface matters because it is representative of the 
increasingly messy relationship between bodies, spaces and technologies in our culture. For 
instance, when embedded into environments and rendered imperceptible, like it is in Swarm 
Study / III, the interface allows us to reimagine what a body, be it human, technological or 
something in between, actually is, or can possibly become. Hence, the student’s response:	
“our bodies are the interface”.  Since the interface is representative of the reimagining of 
different types of bodies in interactive new media installations, its use is significant because 
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the interface, when utilized as a device that regulates and dictates movements and actions in 
space as explained earlier, rapidly becomes an issue of power, control and regulation of these 
types of bodies. Given this, what is at stake in my investigation of the interface is not what a 
technological device like an interface is or may be, but rather what bodies are and who 
regulates the shape or form they assume as well as who controls the narratives created about 
them. The issues around the control and regulation of bodies I briefly discuss above are 
exactly why the deployment of the interface in interactive new media installations is so 
important: the interface is important because it raises issues of control and the regulation of 
bodies. Thus the use of the interface in interactive new media installations highlights how the 
interface can serve as a potential site of intervention into the control that the interface exerts, 
as represented by the students’ attempts to “break”	the action/reaction loop that underlies 
Swarm Study / III.  
 
The Question of Digital Media Art 
My thesis explores a specific technology and its use in a particular subset of digital art: the 
digital interface and interactive new media installations. It examines concepts related to the 
aesthetics of the interface (chapter 1); the politics of the interface and the body and 
embodiment (chapter 2); as well as, the issues that notions such as instruction as deployed 
through the interface and the ubiquity of the digital interface raise around interactive new 
media art installations (chapter 3 & 4). The underlying argument that my thesis advances is 
that the interface establishes particular relations between technologies and bodies. In this 
way, I approach the digital interface in interactive new media art installations not so much in 
terms of what it is, but what it does, or what it may be. Five conceptualizations of the 
interface that emerge from recent literature and are prevalent in interactive new media art 
installations are introduced and discussed throughout my thesis. These five 
conceptualizations of the interface comprise the typology of interfaces (the aesthetic 
interface, the agential interface, the embodied interface, the cybernetic interface and the 
ubiquitous interface) discussed in the introduction.  They each address specific characteristics 
and challenges of the use of the digital interface in interactive new media installations, as 




However, compiling any kind of academic text on any facet of digital media art, as Christiane 
Paul (2016) tells us, is both a challenge and an impossibility.8 The field of digital media art, 
for example, is vast, the terminology used to describe it, constantly in flux –  inevitably, 
something (an artwork, a scholar, a theory) always gets left out. Given this, it is, as Paul 
writes: “inconceivable to cover all the histories, expressions and implications of digital art in 
one volume.”9  The first, and most significant challenge scholars encounter when creating 
these texts, as Paul rightfully states, is defining the art form (in her case, digital art, in my 
case, interactive new media installations and the interface) and delineating its territory.10  
 
Rising to the challenge, the aim of this section is to delineate the territory of digital media art 
I am exploring: the role and status of the digital interface in interactive new media 
installations. In order to do this, I have divided this section into three parts.  Each part 
addresses the challenges briefly discussed by Paul above (delineating the territory and 
defining the art form). In addition, I explain the criteria behind my selection of the artworks 
found throughout my thesis. In the first part, I clarify my motivation behind the selection of 
reviewed artworks. The claims to knowledge I make throughout my thesis – specifically 
knowledge about interactive new media installations – are partial, located, embodied and 
situated relative to personal, social and geographic contexts. That is to say, my thesis is not a 
detached, disembodied or objective way of knowing the digital media art world. Rather, 
drawing on Donna Haraway’s (1988) notion of Situated Knowledge, I argue my selection 
process was informed, in part, by my curatorial and educational experiences.   In the second 
part, I address the question of broader contextualization, in terms of the digital interface and 
digital media art history and theory.  I do this through a discussion around the positioning of 
the selected artworks and the particular approach I took to theorizing them. Specifically, I 
discuss my reasoning behind the non-linear and non-chronological approach taken in this 
thesis. This non-linear and non-chronological approach was informed, by Joanna Zylinska 
and Sarah Kember’s (2012) arguments around the problems that underlie progressive 
developmental narratives of media and technology and the notion of finality. In the final part, 
I explain the relationship between theory and practice, as well as, briefly discuss key 
literature about the digital interface and interactive new media art installations that was “left-
                                                
8 Christiane Paul. “Introduction” in A Companion to Digital Art. First Edition. ed. Christiane Paul. (London, 
UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), p. 1. 




out” from my thesis, and the reasons for their omission.  
 
When New Media was New 
My thesis spans several decades of critical theory and contemporary art, a period during 
which interactive new media installations and digital interfaces have evolved massively, as 
have the terms used to describe them. Originally referred to as computer art, then “cyberarts” 
(1960s-1990s), art forms incorporating digital technologies became known as “new media 
art” and more recently “digital media art” in the early 21st Century.11 The evolution of this 
term is reflected throughout my thesis. For example, when I submitted my thesis in the fall of 
2016 in London, England, UK, the art world was embracing the notion of “digital media 
art”.12 My thesis, however, was conceived eleven years earlier, in the summer of 2005 in 
Boston, Massachusetts, USA, a time when digital media art was called “new media art”, 
while new media art itself was considered by many to be “new”.13 I was working three days a 
week at the Boston Cyberarts Festival (Cyberarts).14 The rest of my time was spent at Axiom 
Gallery (Axiom) – a small non-profit art space I was co-directing and co-curating. 15  While 
working at Cyberarts and Axiom, I noticed that the primary mode of interaction – the digital 
interface– was starting to “disappear” from interactive new media installations. The 
installations that these disappearing interfaces were manifesting themselves in were, for the 
most part, visual and screen-bound.  
 
The digital interface, of course, was not disappearing, in the sense that the physical hardware 
(the keyboard, the mouse, the joystick) was gone forever. Rather artists were hiding digital 
                                                
11 The terms “digital art” and “new media art”, are now used interchangeably, however, the term “new media 
art”, as Paul tells us, is problematic. It is problematic because some of the concepts explored like immersion and 
interactivity are centuries old and have been addressed in various other traditional arts formats and movements. 
(Paul, 2016) Furthermore, there is the issue of the word “new”.  “The problematic qualifier of the ‘new’” as Paul 
writes, “always implies its own integration, datedness and obsolescence and, at best, leaves room for 
accommodating the latest emerging technologies.” (Paul, 2016. p. 1) 	
12 Digital media art is a term used to describe art that makes use of digital media or technology in its production. 
Digital media art used to be called “new media art”. For more information on the evolution of the terms used to 
describe this specific type of art, see Paul, (2008, 2016); Rush, (2005).  
13 While not new, new media art was considered to be “new” in the sense that most people had not encountered 
it in their daily lives at the time.  
14 I worked at the Boston Cyberarts Festival from 2003-2008.  I was the assistant to the director of the Festival, 
George Fifield.  The Boston Cyberarts Festival was a biennial arts festival focusing on new media art.  It ran 
from 1999-2011. For more information on the Boston Cyberarts Festival, please visit: 
http://bostoncyberarts.org/boston-cyberarts-festival/. 
15 I was the co-director and co-curator of Axiom Gallery from 2004-2008.  Axiom Gallery is now defunct and 





interfaces, obscuring them from view, embedding them in walls and ceilings or installing 
them behind television and projection screens. Since the digital interface was hidden from 
view, the viewer/participant was required to use her physical body to interact with the 
artwork.  The so-called disappearance of the digital interface from interactive new media 
installations and its replacement with the viewer/participant’s physical body inspired me to 
examine what I thought, at the time, was a linear shift in gallery-based viewing habits.  It was 
only later I realized how complex, interconnected and misleading the disappearance of the 
interface in interactive new media art installations actually was.    
 
My experience of working as a curator of digital media art in Boston, combined with a 
theoretical interest in the use of the digital interface in visual based, screen-bound interactive 
new media installations informed the selection of the core works found in this thesis. For 
example, installations created by contemporary artists I collaborated with during this time, 
like Camille Utterback, Brian Knep, Henry Kaufman, David Small and Scott Snibbe, 
comprise a third of the works discussed. For historical and cultural reasons, the most famous 
artists in new media were, and to an extent still are, North American.  With very few 
exceptions, their work is visual and/or screen-bound.  It is either located in or projected onto 
the exterior walls of cultural institutions.16 Young people working and studying in this area 
often know these famous names long before they realize that there are other kinds of new 
media art and artists that deserve attention too.  These North Americans, some of whom I 
have worked with, such as Lynn Hershman Leeson, Luc Courchesne, Natalie Jeremijenko, 
Ken Feingold, David Rokeby and Rafael Lozano Hemmer, make up another part of the works 
examined in this thesis. The final third of the works selected were created by the ‘other kinds 
of new media artists’: Carmin Karasic, Kelly Heaton and Feng Mengbo. These artists have 
made enormous contributions to new media art, and to my personal growth as a new media 
arts scholar, but for reasons like race, gender and geographic location are left out of the larger 
new media arts story.   
 
Given this, the examples discussed throughout my thesis – which, with few exceptions, are 
visual, gallery-based, screen-bound and created by North American artists – form a corpus of 
interactive new media artworks based on my situated knowledge.  Coined by Donna Haraway 
                                                
16 Exceptions to this statement exist. For example, two of the works discussed in this thesis, are not located in 
galleries. Natalie Jeremijenko’s Live Wire (1995) was installed in an office setting and Brian Knep’s Deep 
Wounds (2008) was installed in the foyer of an academic building. 
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(1988) in an article of the same name, situated knowledge, in very simple terms, refers to 
knowledge specific to a particular situation.17 Situated knowledge does not simply mean 
subjective, as in arbitrary or uninformed. Rather, it is a way of learning and seeing the world 
that emphasizes the importance of the subject (the author, the artist, the scientist) in terms of 
ethical and political accountability.18 Situated knowledge, according to Haraway, is a 
methodological approach to understanding the world that accounts for both the agency of the 
knowledge producer and the agency of the object of study. Thus it offers “a more adequate, 
richer and better account of the world in order to live in it well and in critical, reflexive 
relation to our own [selves] as well as others”.19 Hararway continues, writing that situated 
knowledge is positioned against notions of objectivity – specifically “Western cultural 
narratives about objectivity”.20 Haraway is against these narratives because they are, in her 
words: “allegories of the ideologies governing the relations of…mind and body, distance and 
responsibility”.21 Situated knowledge then, is not about transcendence and the splitting of the 
subject and the object, as these approaches to knowledge are, to use Haraway’s words, “truth 
claims”.22 Rather situated knowledge is an approach to knowledge that requires us to become 
ethically and politically accountable for what we learn and how we see the world. In short, 
situated knowledge is important to my thesis as it allows me to become accountable for how I 
construct knowledge. It also allows me to give an account of historical contingency for the 
claims I make throughout my thesis. It also lets me capture and convey, in writing, the 
vitality of individual interactive new media installations at the time I encountered them.  It 
also opens a space for meditation on my curatorial practice, whereby an act of making 
decisions between what was included and what was not is foregrounded in my choice of 
examples, as well as pairings of artworks for aesthetic reasons.  
 
A Non-linear Approach 
Haraway’s notion of situated knowledge discussed above, also informed, to an extent, the 
approach taken to the positioning of these artworks – an approach which is non-linear and 
non-chronological. Chronological and linear timelines of art movements, like digital media 
                                                
17 Donna Haraway. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective.” Feminist Studies. 14 (3). Autumn, 1988. pp. 575-599. 
18 Ibid. 






art, can be helpful in that they dispel, to an extent, notions of newness. They dispel these 
notions by historicizing artworks and concepts that, as Oliver Grau (2007) states, are 
“frequently encountered [by the viewer/participant] for the first time” and presented to them 
as utopian or visionary models of the world.23 Chronological and linear accounts of media 
and technology, of course, have their problems. The first problem is they limit, as Sarah 
Kember and Joanna Zylinska (2012) write, “the understanding of complex and multifaceted 
phenomena and processes by imposing clear-cut distinctions and categories all too early.”24 
The second, they state, is that they suggest finality, thus inscribing, to an extent, 
technologically based mediums like interactive new media installations, into linear 
developmental narratives of media and technology.25 Recognizing the limitations around 
linear and chronological timelines presented above, I chose to take a non-linear and non-
chronological approach to my topic. My primary reason for employing such an approach is 
similar to Kember and Zylinska’s: it allows me to raise questions about more traditional 
perceptions of technology, like interfaces, as a series of isolated, spatialized objects (a mouse, 
a keyboard). It also allows me to raise questions around traditional perceptions of digital 
media art as a medium – that is a linear outgrowth or by-product of technologically based art 
forms like photography and cinema only.26   
 
Digital media art is a hybrid medium. It has, as Paul tells us, an extraordinarily complex, 
cross-disciplinary and multifaceted history – one that interweaves several strands of artistic 
practice and artistic movements with different industrial and computer-based technologies 
and technological innovations.27 One of these histories, she writes, “can be traced from early 
instruction-based conceptual art to ‘algorithmic’ art and art forms that set up open 
technological systems. Another lineage links concepts of light and moving image from early 
kinetic and op art to new cinematic forms.”28  Another path, I would argue, connects notions 
of audience participation found in avant-garde movements such as Fluxus and early feminist 
performance and body art to more interactive art forms, like interactive new media 
                                                
23 Oliver Grau. “Introduction” in Media Art Histories. ed. Oliver Grau (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), p. 9.  
24 Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska. Life After New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process. (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2012), pp. 2-3. 
25 Ibid. Kember and Zylinska’s argument about finality is discussed in full in chapter 4. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Christiane Paul. “Introduction” in A Companion to Digital Art. First Edition. ed. Christiane Paul. (London, 




installations, that require the viewer to make a contribution of some sort to the completion of 
the art work.  
 
These lineages, of course, are not distinct strands and the artworks that compose the corpus of 
digital media art were not created in isolation. Rather, they run parallel to each other and are 
non-sequential.29 Thus, the history of digital media art should be seen, as Paul suggests, as 
interconnected narratives and processes that feedback on each other and intersect at certain 
points.30 For, by and large, digital media art works are experimental, and contain non-linear 
and open-ended narratives, forms, modes of interaction, interfaces and sometimes creators – 
or works in which these elements are put into different and critical relationships.  The artists 
creating these installations achieve this by creatively pushing forward both the technical and 
formal aspects of the medium through a juxtaposition of aesthetics, computation and bodies 
(both human and technological), and creatively exploring the relationship between the three. 
The interconnectivity and non-linearity of digital media art, is reflected in the positioning of 
the artworks in my thesis.  
 
For example, the artworks created by artists encountered in my thesis, which, span several 
decades, are often grouped together. Under-theorized artworks and artists are often given 
priority or over well-known artists and artworks. I discuss multiple artworks by the same 
artist throughout my thesis as well.  Given this, it could be argued that there is a seeming lack 
of discernment of historical, cultural and technical differences between the artworks chosen, 
forming a questionably arbitrary grouping. While these groupings and my selection criteria 
may perhaps seem confusing or skewed to some, as they do not provide a linear or 
chronological historical evolution of the interface or digital media art, they are actually 
intentional, in that they are a direct reflection of personal conversations with artists, fellow 
curators and media theorists. In other words, my practical experience as a curator, allows me 
to make connections between diverse groupings of artworks that are theoretical in basis.  
 
For instance, Lynn Hershman Leeson’s Lorna (1983) and Brian Knep’s Deep Wounds (2006) 
were created in different decades and utilize different technologies, but they are analyzed 
using the same theory (Sean Cubitt’s (2015) notion of digital aesthetics).  They are positioned 
                                                
29 Christiane Paul. “Introduction” in A Companion to Digital Art. First Edition. ed. Christiane Paul. (London, 




as such because, I encountered both of these works as well as Cubitt’s theory of digital 
aesthetics, at the same time in the same place (2006, Cambridge, MA, USA). In 2006, I was 
de-installing Deep Wounds at Harvard University.  At the same time, I was introduced to 
Hershman Leeson’s artwork by Bill Arning, (then curator of the MIT List Museum), who 
commented on the similarity between Deep Wounds and Lorna – specifically their treatment 
of time. The conversation ended with Arning referencing Cubitt’s 1998 text, Digital 
Aesthetics.  
 
As mentioned above, situated knowledge is an approach to knowledge that requires us to 
become ethically and politically accountable for what we learn and how we see the world. 
This ethical and political accountability towards the construction of knowledge, is evidenced 
my selection process through my decision to include interactive new media installations, like 
Hu^mann (2008). Hu^mann is an obscure installation with a short exhibition history created 
by a seemingly unknown artist – Carmin Karasic. It is screen-bound, visual and 
viewer/participant interactivity is limited.  Yet this work is theorized via Amelia Jones’s 
notion of the body and performativity and is positioned alongside seminal works by very 
well-known artists such as Victoria Vesna and Rafael Lozano Hemmer. Hu^mann is one of 
Karasic’s first interactive new media installations. Karasic, however, has been an active 
digital media artist since 1995. Karasic is a net.art artist (her hypertext artwork With Liberty 
and Justice For All, was created in 1998).31 She is also a founding member of the 
hacktivism/performance art collective, Electronic Disturbance Theater (she was their lead 
programmer and the creator of their software Floodnet).32 Despite this, Karasic’s name is 
conspicuously absent from the new media art cannon, her contributions to the field of digital 
media art, often wrongly attributed to her male collaborators. This absence is due, in part to 
issues around race, gender and age (Karasic is a woman, African American and was 
originally trained as a computer scientist, becoming an artist later in her life).   So, while 
                                                
31 Carmin Karasic. With Liberty and Justice For All. (1998). Found online at: 
http://www.carminka.net/wlajfa/pledge1.htm. The term net.art refers to a group of artists who worked in the 
medium of Internet art since 1994. The term is also used as a synonym for net art or Internet art, thus covering a 
broader range of artist practices.  In this broader definition, net.art refers to art that uses the Internet as its 
medium. For a detailed history of net.art and internet art, see Rachel Greene’s 2000 article “A History of 
Internet Art.”  
32 Electronic Disturbance Theater. FloodNet. (1997-1998). Found online at: 
https://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/floodnet.html. Electronic Disturbance Theater is a collective of cyber activists, 
critical theorists and performance artists. Their ultimate aim is to engage in the development of theory and 
practice of non-violent acts of defiance across and between digital and non-digital borders.  Founding members 
include Ricardo Dominguez, Brett Stalbaum, Stefan Wray and Carmin Karasic.  
12 
 
many readers may not recognize Karasic’s name immediately, her contributions to the field 
of digital media art – which are equal to and in some sense eclipse the contributions of the 
other artists she is positioned alongside – cannot be understated.  In short, including Karasic’s 
work in my thesis may seem arbitrary, but it is an example of my ethical and political 
accountability towards the construction of knowledge, in that it draws attention to under-
represented artists.   
 
What Remains  
My familiarity with the core-selected artworks directly informed the relationship between the 
theory and practice discussed throughout my thesis. In other words, the relationship between 
theory and practice is dialogical. It is dialogical in the sense that the artwork and theory speak 
back to, and with, each other in order to build the overarching arguments, as demonstrated in 
the rationale given for analyzing Hu^mann via Amelia Jones’s theory of the body and 
performativity briefly noted above. This dialogue could also be considered a form of situated 
knowledge, in the sense that it was influenced, in part, by my educational background and the 
associated epistemological leanings of the institutions I attended.   
 
For example, in 2008, I left Boston to pursue a Master’s Degree in Performance, Screen and 
Visual Studies at University of Manchester. Influenced by my MA advisor, Amelia Jones, my 
position was that interactive new media installations do not simply negate mainstream 
contemporary art and technological narratives. Rather my view was that interactive new 
media installations intervene in mainstream contemporary art and technological narratives 
through aesthetics. For instance, interactive new media installations emphasize the body via 
their focus on concepts such as viewer/participant interaction, indetermination and 
embodiment. Therefore, in my MA I argued that interactive new media art installations 
should also be analyzed in the context of more embodied or body-based arts practices like 
performance and body art, rather than simply theorized as an outgrowth of the technological-
based visual arts (cinema, photography). In the fall of 2010, I began my PhD. I made a 
conscious choice to work with Joanna Zylinska, in the Media and Communications 
department at Goldsmiths, University of London.  
 
In very simple terms, media studies, is a discipline that studies the history and effects of 
various media and technologies. Generally speaking, scholarship in media studies fits, as 
Kember and Zylinska (2012) write, into two methodological frameworks: Social science and 
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communication-based disciplines and the Humanities.33 The social sciences and 
communication-based disciplines, they argue “typically approach the media through a 
mixture of empirical research and social theory, with questions of political structures, 
economic influences, social effects and individual agencies dominating the debate.”34 
Whereas, those from the humanities, they continue, “predominantly focus on what different 
media ‘mean’; that is, they tend to look at media as texts and at their cultural contexts.”35 It 
was the second focus – the focus on what different media “mean” – that attracted me to the 
media studies field. This focus attracted me, as it resonated with my research question: “What 
is a digital interface in interactive new media installations? What does it signify and what is it 
significant of?” So while I touch upon performance and body art theories, and I am familiar 
with scholarship in this field, writings by contemporary live performance and body art 
scholars on interactive art, beyond those of Peggy Phelan and Amelia Jones, are absent from 
this thesis. Put simply, I have drawn on many important sources from the art history field in 
my thesis, and I have tried to account for them in the main chapters. However, there are many 
regrettable omissions.36 These omissions are related to issues around, scope, space and 
domain specificity. These issues have limited the artworks, artists and theories discussed in 
my thesis.   
 
A similar statement could be made around the inclusion of knowledge generated in the 
Human Computer Interaction (HCI) and design community around the use of interfaces, 
interactive art and ubiquity.  While not nearly as fluent in scholarship in the HCI and design 
domain as I am in other fields, I am, to an extent, familiar with core literature published in 
this area, as seen via references to works by scholars such as Louise Barkhuus, Alan 
Blackwell, Matthew Chalmers, Paul Dourish, Jennifer Rode and Yvonne Rogers.37 There are 
similarities and overlaps between my reading of the digital interface and theirs. This 
similarity in reading occurs in relation to critiques of Paul Dourish’s (2001) notion of 
embodied interaction and Mark Weiser’s (1991) notion of the invisibility of technology, as 
offered by scholars in the HCI field such as Louise Barkhuus and Matthew Chalmers. 
                                                
33 Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska. Life After New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process. (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2012), pp xiv-xv. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. xv.	
36 These omissions include scholarship by authors such as Gabriella Giannachi, Chris Salter, Freda Chapple, 
Adrian MacKenzie and Marquard Smith, among others.  
37 I am deeply indebted to my colleagues Louise Barkhuus and Jennifer Rode, who took time out of their busy 
schedules and patiently explained the complexities of their field (HCI) to me.  
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Barkhuus (2006), Chalmers (2004, 2006) and I all argue that the notion of invisibility, as 
currently theorized in the field of ubiquitous computing, is problematic.38 For example, 
throughout my thesis, I argue against notions of invisibility, suggesting that the 
disappearance of the interface in interactive new media installations, and the word invisibility 
itself is troublesome as it conflates invisibility with imperceptibility, agency with 
subjectivity, subjects with objects, and entities (subjects, plural) with individuals (the subject, 
singular).  This term also, I posit, creates separations between the interface (technology) and 
the ongoing and open-ended processes, entities and relations it brings into being. Chalmers 
and Galani (2004), in turn, argue that Weiser’s notion of disappearance is unachievable or 
incomplete as it underemphasizes the “interdependence of ‘invisible’ non-rationalizing 
interaction and focused rationalizing interaction with ongoing activity.”39 Our critiques differ 
in the sense that my thesis examines the use of the digital interface in interactive new media 
installations (the aesthetic realm), whereas they discuss the social implications of 
seamlessness and invisibility in the socio-technical realm. Thus their focus is on the technical 
aspects of technology, specifically the constitutive relationship between technology and 
society, whereas I focus on the aesthetic and cultural aspects of technology.40 In short I touch 
upon scholarship in HCI, however core theoretical texts generated in this field are absent 
from this thesis. While there are overlaps the reasons for these omissions, in short, are related 
to issues around focus and domain specificity: I focus on the aesthetic and cultural aspects of 
the digital interface in media studies, whereas scholars who borrow theory from the STS 
fields, like those working in HCI, focus on the bidirectional relationship between society and 
technology.41  
 
In conclusion, my thesis is not meant to be a chronological art historical survey or a linear 
report on the history of technology. Nor is meant to be a scholarly examination of the 
potential technical dimensions of the use of digital interfaces in interactive art. To do any of 
this would merely reinforce progressive developmental narratives of media, technology, and 
                                                
38 Matthew Chalmers, Bell, M., Barkhuus, L., Hall, M., Sherwood, S., Brown, B., Rowland, D., Benford, S. and 
Hampshire, A., “Interweaving Mobile Games with Everyday life.” In Proceedings of CHI 2006, pp. 417-426, 
Montreal, Canada.  
39 Matthew Chalmers and Galani, A. “Seamful Interweaving: heterogeneity in the theory and design of 
interactive systems.” In, Symposium on Designing Interactive Systems. 1-4 August, 2004. p. 243. 
40 There are, a few HCI scholars who focus on culture. The most prominent being Jennifer A. Rode, whose 
focus is on notions of gender, culture and technology. For more information, see Rode, 2010. 
41 Wiebe E. Bijker. “The Social Construction of Fluorescent Lighting.” In The Social Construction of 




art. These narratives are, as mentioned earlier, problematic, because they imply that artwork, 
technology and knowledge all evolve in a straight line, as I argue, via the work of Kember 
and Zylinska (2010), above and in chapter 4.42 Rather, my thesis should be seen as a critical 
exploration of the digital interface and its use in interactive new media installations from a 
media studies perspective – one that forms and is informed through situated knowledge.  
	
The Digital Interface and its use in Interactive New Media Installations 
The aim of my thesis is to offer a critical understanding of the digital interface and its use in 
interactive new media installations. I examine the interface from two angles: I look at how it 
is used in interactive new media art installations with its experimental, contemporary and 
“post-internet” extensions, and also how this use is perceived and analyzed in the theories 
that surround it.43 I see the interface in interactive new media installations as a form that has 
its own internal technical developments and most importantly, aesthetics.  
Placing emphasis on aesthetics rather than technical functions in a thesis about interfaces, 
which for many are first and foremost technical devices, may need some further justification. 
Yet interfaces most definitely have an aesthetic. Many scholarly books emphasize this point, 
from Lev Manovich’s The Language of New Media (2001) and its predecessors, to the widely 
used engineering-based course textbooks, such as Interaction Design (2007) by Yvonne 
Rodgers and colleagues.44  So the claims I make throughout this thesis –	that interfaces are 
important and that their aesthetic characteristics matter – are not new per se.  Rather, my 
view is simply that one way to understand the potential that the interface holds is to position 
it more firmly in the context of new media art, specifically in interactive new media 
installations. The originality of my position lies in my claim that the interface, its processes 
and relationships emerge out of, shape and are shaped by, our interactions with it in 
interactive new media installations.  Thus, I suggest, the interface holds the potential to 
(re)configure concepts of subjectivity, agency, the body, embodiment and aesthetics in these 
environments. Given this, I argue that the digital interface in interactive new media 
                                                
42 Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska. Life After New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process. (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2012), pp. 2-3. 
43 Coined by artist Marisa Olson in a 2008 interview with the online blog “We make money not art”, post-
internet art or “art after the internet” is a term used to describe art that is about the internet’s effects on 
aesthetics, culture and society. It refers to, in Olson’s words: “a mode of artistic activity drawing on raw 
materials and ideas found or developed online.” (Olson, 2008)    
44 Lev Manovich. The Language of New Media. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), Yvonne Rodgers, Helen 
Sharp and Jenny Preece. Interaction Design: Beyond Human-Computer Interaction. 3rd Edition. (Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley, 2011).   
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installations can be seen as a key site for the development of different understandings of our 
relationship to technology.  In suggesting this, my aim is both to locate the interface and to 
try to critically engage with it from outside of what could be considered its regular, or 
perhaps even instrumental, use (mobile devices, video games, interactive web-based 
advertisements, keyboards and mice). For, by and large, interactive new media installations 
are experimental artworks with non-linear and open-ended narratives, forms, modes of 
interaction, interfaces and sometimes creators – or works in which these elements are put into 
different and critical relationships.  The artists creating these installations achieve this by 
creatively pushing forward both the technical and formal aspects of the medium through a 
juxtaposition of aesthetics, computation and bodies (both human and technological), and 
creatively exploring the relationship between the three.   
In this thesis, I position the digital interface in interactive new media installations as dynamic 
and hybrid, while also highlighting the artistic and creative processes that bring it into being. 
This way of positioning the interface allows me to shift focus away from the instrumental 
uses of the interface (its ability to “act”	and “react”) and from claims made by the technology 
industry that surround it (“you are the controller”,	“interaction makes you creative”). It also 
leads me to begin to develop a different, less deterministic understanding of the digital 
interface.45  
The interface, however, is intimately entangled with mainstream commercial technologies 
(the iPhone, the Kinect, the Oculus Rift) and, therefore, with the narratives perpetuated by the 
technology industry briefly outlined above.  Yet, when used in interactive new media 
installations, the interface becomes a distinct form of aesthetic practice, with its own 
autonomy in relation to those commercial practices mentioned earlier.  For example, during 
the first half of new media art’s short history, the borders between art, experimentation and 
industry were particularly leaky. The majority of artists discussed throughout this thesis have 
computer science or engineering backgrounds.  Some, like Carmin Karasic and Brian Knep, 
come from the media and technology sector (Polaroid, Lotus, Lucas Film).46  Others such as 
Camille Utterback, Scott Snibbe and David Small began their careers as artists and their work 
has slowly become more commercialized.  A select few, like Jeffrey Shaw, Alan Dunning, 
                                                
45 In this thesis, the phrase technology industry refers to technology companies like Microsoft, Apple, IBM. The 
claims mentioned above are made by Microsoft in relation to their gaming device the Kinect. These claims will 
be discussed, in full, in chapter 4. 




Paul Woodrow and Lynn Hershman Leeson, have seen the interfaces they developed for their 
installations co-opted by corporations, re-tooled and then sold at a profit.47  
Therefore, the diverse interfaces created for the artworks that I examine throughout this 
thesis, which are co-extensive with their development and use in the commercial sector 
although they are deployed for different purposes, make up a tradition and are surrounded by 
theories of a complex and often-contradictory kind. Thus, a further notion pushed forward in 
this thesis is that the interface in interactive new media installations – an art form and a 
device located outside of, but always linked in some way to, commercial devices – has the 
potential to serve as a site of critical intervention into the contradictory and complex theories 
of new media, aesthetics and technology.48 In this way, the use of the interface in interactive 
new media art installations is important as it acts a mode of critique of our relationship to and 
our use of technology outside the art contexts. 
  
                                                
47 This notion of interfaces developed for new media installations being co-opted by for-profit corporations will 
be discussed, in full, in chapter 4.  
48 Again, this claim is not new. Artists such as Simon Penny (2013) and Michael Naimark (1998, 2006, 2016), 
among others, have remarked on the re-appropriation of technology developed in the arts field by large 
corporations. For a good overview of this topic, please see Simon Penny’s (2013) article: “Trying to Be Calm: 
Ubiquity, Cognitivism, and Embodiment”.  
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Introduction: Art at the Interface 
 
This thesis is concerned with the digital interface and its multiple uses in interactive new 
media art installations. The term “digital interface”	has broadly been understood as referring 
to the point of interaction between two or more parts of a technical system.49  A digital 
interface can thus be many different things: a doorknob, a socket, a keyboard, a screen or an 
operating system.  However, throughout this thesis I propose a more expansive definition of 
the digital interface in interactive new media installations, positioning it as a dynamic, 
hybrid, aesthetic and cultural process.  The interface then is a threshold, a mediator and a 
boundary, but in a more complex sense than something that simply allows a 
viewer/participant access to a distinct space,	a technology that controls an entity’s behavior or 
a device that shows us glimpses of something (an image, a snippet of code, an artistic 
practice).  With this, I draw on Lori Emerson’s (2014) definition of the interface as a 
technology that mediates relationships between entities and the aesthetic objects they 
produce, as well as the technical machine-based processes that take place below the surface.50  
I take Emerson’s definition further by suggesting that the interface mediates, and therefore 
creates, to an extent, relationships between viewer/participants, artists and artworks as well as 
influences the movements and perceptions of those interacting with it.   
In this way, my thesis does not just propose a more expansive definition of the digital 
interface in interactive new media installations, it also entails a critical questioning of the 
relationship between art, technology and viewer/participants. Specifically, I look at how this 
relationship establishes systems of interaction, forms of spectatorship, modes of thinking and 
conditions of contemporary new media artistic practice. I argue that in the past decade a 
significant transformation has occurred at the boundary of media studies and art history, 
regarding the way the digital interface has been understood in academic literature. I suggest 
that this shift in understanding allows what was previously thought of as a viewing subject to 
embody technology and become a viewer/participant. From here, I propose that this shift in 
perception and positioning of the subject results in the so-called “disappearance”	of the 
object-based digital interface and the emergence of the physical human body as the locus of 
interaction in interactive new media art installations. 
                                                
49 Seung-hoon Jeong. Cinematic Interfaces: Film Theory After New Media. (New York, NY; Routledge, 2013), 
p. 4.  
50 Lori Emerson. Reading Writing Interfaces: From the Digital to the Bookbound. (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. x. 
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The disappearance of the object-based digital interface and its emergence as human body in 
interactive new media installations is an important aspect of the interface to interrogate 
because, when interfaces are positioned as shape-shifting – when they disappear and then 
suddenly re-emerge as human bodies – they become a matter of control and regulation. 
Specifically, they become a matter of power	and control over bodies as well as a matter of 
regulation of communication, interaction, knowledge and movement in time and space in 
both interactive new media installations and in everyday life.51 By investigating how 
interfaces exert control over bodies, as well as regulate communication, interaction, 
knowledge and movement, I also examine what artistic experimentation with interfaces might 
reveal about the changing relationship between humans and technology.52 As such, my aim in 
this thesis is twofold: to look at the interface in interactive new media installations as actual 
art objects, but also to build on this positioning to analyze how contemporary subjects are 
shaped and defined, to an extent, by their interactions with interfaces, both within art contexts 
and outside them.   
The Disappearing Interface 
It is important to clarify what could potentially be seen as a problematic use of the word 
“disappearance”	in relation to digital interfaces.  When I say the digital interface has 
disappeared, I am not arguing that it is physically gone. The interface in interactive new 
media installations exists regardless of whether or not it is perceptible to those interacting 
with it. Instead, I use the term “disappearance”	as a way of signalling what I see as an 
unresolved difficulty in key texts in computer science, art history and media studies on the 
interface that conflate, among other things, invisibility with imperceptibility, agency with 
subjectivity, subjects with objects and entities (subjects, plural) with individuals (the subject, 
singular). This conflation, I suggest, is troubling, because it leads scholars to separate the 
                                                
51 The entity or entities that hold this power and control over bodies and regulates communication, interaction, 
knowledge and movement varies.  It can be a corporation specializing in technology, such as Microsoft, who 
exerts control over the body of the subject by dictating her actions via commercial gaming devices like the 
Kinect, and controls who she can or cannot interact and communicate with via the regulation of knowledge on 
online forums as discussed in chapter 4.  This entity can also be a singular human, like an artist, who determines 
what a viewer/participant can or cannot do, say or see when interacting in their interactive new media 
installation as illustrated in chapters 1-4. 
52 Issues around the body as the site of power and control and the changes to the relationship between humans 
and technology this particular configuration may create, are the focus of chapter 2.  These issues are also 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4 through a discussion of instruction (chapter 3) and ubiquity (chapter 4).  
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interface (technology) from the ongoing and open-ended processes, entities and relations it 
brings into being.53 
The Interface 
The term “interface”, Seung-hoon Jeong (2013) writes, became popular in the field of 
computer science in the 1960s, referring as it did to the “interface between machine 
components (hardware or software) and/or the point between these technical machines and 
human users”.54 What started out as a word that was used to describe a purely technical 
device studied by a closed circle of engineers and scientists, located in universities and 
laboratories, Jeong informs us, has now become a buzzword that has been applied to a variety 
of different entities, processes and relations.55 Interfaces, for example, can be anything from 
tangible objects (television screens, mobile phones), human body parts (the finger you use to 
tap an icon on a tablet), modes of interaction (you “interface”	with colleagues), means of 
connection (computers can “interface”	with other machines) and graphic designs (apps, 
icons).	“Interface”	can also denote methods of exchange (the “opening-up”	of an application, 
allowing a piece of software to initiate routines and share information within that 
application).  
Florian Cramer and Matthew Fuller (2008) provide a more detailed classification, identifying 
five different types of interfaces: (1) Hardware that connects users to hardware; (2) Hardware 
that connects hardware to hardware; (3) Software or hardware-embedded logic, that connects 
hardware to software; (4) Software that connects software to software (APIs); and (5) 
Symbolic and linguistic handles, which make software accessible to users via text, sounds, 
visual representations, or the reappropriation of familiar physical objects –	otherwise known 
as “the user interface”	(UI).56 Cramer and Fuller’s typology of the interface will be discussed 
below, along with a more in-depth theorization of the interface. For now, it is important to 
note that it is the last definition, the symbolic and linguistic handles which make software 
accessible to users, or the UI, that is the focus of this thesis –	simply because it is the most 
commonly deployed one in interactive new media installations.  
                                                
53 Other theorists and scientists who posit this include, but are not limited to, Pranav Mistry (2009) and Patty 
Maes, who, echoing theorists such as Mark Weiser (1991), argue that the digital interface as human body “frees 
information from its confines by seamlessly integrating it with reality thus making the entire world your 
computer.” (Minstry, 2009) 
54 Seung-hoon Jeong. Cinematic Interfaces: Film Theory After New Media. (NY, NY; Routledge, 2013), p. 4. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Florian Cramer and Matthew Fuller. “Interface” in Software Studies: A Lexicon. ed. Matthew Fuller. 
(Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 2008), p. 149.  
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Since opening up to a more general population, theoretical research on the interface has also 
seen a surge in volume. The result of this surge is that we now have access to a great deal of 
information about the interface in various contexts –	for instance, about what it is and what it 
does in computer science, in science and technology studies (STS) and, to an extent, in the 
humanities (Ishi et al., 1997; Blackwell, 2006; Cramer and Fuller, 2008). However, much less 
is known about the digital interface in interactive new media installations. Hence the 
following questions: What exactly is a digital interface in interactive new media installations? 
And what does it actually do in these artworks? Although earlier writings on this subject exist 
(Dinkla, 1994; Penny et al., 2001), and although new texts appear in this area yearly 
(Mondloch, 2010; Andersen and Pold, 2011; Galloway, 2012; Jeong, 2013; Emerson, 2014), 
as it stands, I argue that we simply do not know enough about the interface in interactive new 
media installations.  
 
The Interface in Interactive New Media Installations 
Yet what is an interactive new media installation? And why is an understanding of the digital 
interface in interactive new media installations important to the field of media studies? 
Nathaniel Stern raises a series of similar questions in his book Interactive Art and 
Embodiment (2013).  Is interactive art a genre, he asks? Is it a movement? A medium?57 Does 
the fact that these works are interactive and employ interfaces somehow make them more 
democratic, and subjects’	interactions with them more individualistic? Does a switch need to 
be thrown or a button pushed for the artwork to become interactive, or for the subject to 
interact with it? Are they institutionally based, screen-bound and purely visual? Or can they 
exist outside the gallery walls and engage all of our senses? The answers to these questions, 
as Stern rightfully concludes, are contextual.58 They are contextual because they provide 
descriptions of individual artworks, rather than concrete definitions of a medium or genre.  
Given this, the phrase “interactive new media art installation”	does not fulfil a unified set of 
technical or aesthetic criteria. Instead, the phrase could be seen as a blanket term that covers a 
broad range of complex and diverse gallery-based installations that incorporate digital 
technology and that require the subject to act, and the piece to respond, in various ways to 
this activity.  
                                                
57 Nathaniel Stern. Interactive Art and Embodiment: The Implicit Body as Performance. (Canterbury, UK: 
Gyliphi Limited, 2013), p. 5. 
58 Ibid.  
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For instance, some interactive new media installations, such as Char Davies’s Osmoses 
(1998), are site-specific, fully immersive, virtual-reality environments that require subjects to 
don head-mounted displays (HMDs) and data gloves to view and interact with them.59 
(Figure 3)  
	
Figure 3: C. Davies, Osmoses (1998).	
Others, like Feng Mengbo’s Q4U (2002), are large-scale, augmented reality-based 
installations that ask subjects to interact with the work through an object-based digital 
interface.60 (Figure 4)  
	
Figure 4: F. Mengbo, Q4U (2002).	
                                                
59 Char Davies. Osmoses. (1995). Found online at: http://www.immersence.com/osmose/  
60 Feng Mengbo. Q4U. (2002). Found online at: http://www.renaissancesociety.org/exhibitions/428/feng-
mengbo-q4u/. The object based digital interface is a remote control.  
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And some, like Janet Cardiff’s Experiment in F# Minor (2013), are mixed media installations 
that incorporate subjects into the installation through the deployment of technology like 
close-circuit cameras, light sensors and custom-designed algorithms.61 (Figure 5)  
	
Figure 5: J. Cardiff, Experiment in F# Minor (2013).	
While definitions and categories can be, as Christiane Paul (2008) explains, “helpful in 
identifying certain distinguishing characteristics of a medium”, they can also be detrimental 
in that they create limits for approaching and understanding a very diverse and complex art 
form.62  In light of all this, I would like to propose the following preliminary definition of 
interactive new media installations: interactive new media installations are technologically-
based artworks that require subjects to make a physical contribution to the completion of the 
artwork via interaction with a digital interface of some kind. While the interfaces located in 
these works can be defined as points of juncture or modes of communication between 
different entities, they encompass much, much, more.  
 
For example, digital interfaces are also symbolic in that they deploy visual and linguistic 
metaphors (file-folders as icons, the word “desktop”	to describe the objects located on 
computer screens) that, as Cramer and Fuller argue, are used to “hide, and condition the 
asymmetry between the elements conjoined”	as well as describe the “condensations of 
computational power that computers embody”.63 Thus, they posit	“the term interface 
                                                
61 Janet Cardiff, Experiment in F# Minor. (2013). Found online at: 
http://www.cardiffmiller.com/artworks/inst/experiment_in_f.html 
62 Christiane Paul. Digital Art. (New York, NY; Thames & Hudson, 2003), p. 71.  
63 Florian Cramer and Matthew Fuller. “Interface” in Software Studies: A Lexicon. ed. Matthew Fuller. 
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emphasizes the representation or the rearticulation of a process occurring at another scalar 
layer.”64 Interfaces, for Cramer and Fuller, are not just tools for facilitating connections; they 
are also processes that “articulate, filter, and organize the activities modelled and modulated 
by the interface.”65  
 
My own investigation into the interface in interactive new media installations builds on, and 
then augments, the research briefly summarized above.  It starts out, the way Cramer and 
Fuller’s work does, from an observation and recognition of the fact that the interface plays an 
increasingly important role in mediating and translating, and thus, to an extent, governing, the 
subject’s activities in interactive new media installations. Following from this, the main 
objective of my dissertation is to develop an understanding of how the interface can be seen 
as an important actor in positioning and (re)shaping specific ways of relating to the subject, 
to technology, to artistic practice and to others. In simpler terms, I am not so much concerned 
with providing a technical description of what the digital interface does or can do (although 
this issue is important and will be discussed).  Rather, I am primarily interested in examining 
what a digital interface may be, and in exploring potential ways of thinking and doing that it 
could possibly bring about when theorized in non-instrumental ways, from within aesthetic 
contexts.  
 
My intent in doing this is to contribute to a widening of the disciplinary focus of media 
studies by exploring the use of technology (such as digital interfaces) in aesthetic contexts 
(i.e. interactive new media installations.) Specifically, my thesis argues that the digital 
interface in interactive new media installations can be seen as a key site for the development 
of different understandings of our human relationship to technology. Given this, the main 
aims of this dissertation when it comes to its expected contribution to the field of media 
studies are: (1) to offer an understanding of the interface in aesthetic contexts; (2) to show 
how the interface –	its processes and relationships –	can be analyzed as potentially 
(re)shaping concepts of subjectivity, agency, the body, embodiment, ubiquity and aesthetics, 
relying on a critical reading of recent theories of the digital interface in the humanities and 
media studies; and (3) to advance an account of the digital interface –	one that positions it as 
a dynamic aesthetic and cultural process that emerges out of, shapes and is shaped by, our 
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interactions with it in interactive new media installations.  
 
My exploration of the digital interface is based on the assumption that the interface is an 
important concept and device in new media art. A proposition which, I argue, should form a 
significant part of any analysis of artworks that incorporate interfaces, interactive or 
otherwise. This assumption is based on Kate Mondloch’s (2010) statement:	“the interface 
‘matters’	for media installation art”.66 Mondloch’s statement resonates with some of the 
questions I have been contemplating around the importance of the interface in interactive new 
media installations: What types of relationships exist between artists, interfaces and the 
subjects interacting with them? Why do these relationships matter? Why does the interface 
matter in interactive new media installations? The overall aim of my dissertation is thus 
twofold: to introduce a different approach to the study of the interface by examining its use in 
aesthetic contexts, and to interrogate why the aesthetic processes that bring it into being 
actually matter in interactive new media installations. Throughout my study I have identified 
five distinguishable yet interrelated theoretical iterations of digital interfaces commonly 
deployed in interactive new media installations: the aesthetic interface, the agential interface, 
the embodied interface, the cybernetic interface and the ubiquitous interface.  These five 
types of interfaces, theorized below, directly relate to the five key concepts (aesthetics, 
agency, embodiment, cybernetics and ubiquity) that inform my thesis.  
 
The Aesthetic Interface 
Aesthetics in this thesis is very broadly defined as a philosophical mode of engagement with, 
and experience of, art. I draw on Sean Cubitt’s (1998, 2005, 2016) understandings of digital 
aesthetics to theorize this concept.67 These understandings will be discussed in more detail in 
the first chapter of this thesis, but to summarize: the term “aesthetic”, according to Cubitt 
(2016), finds its roots in ancient Greek, originally referring to “sensation”.68 Its meaning, he 
states, was broadened over time and has become attached to “the physical or phenomenal 
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sensations of the body as it senses in the world; the natural or artificial objects that give rise 
to such sensations (especially pleasurable ones); the specific qualities of beautiful objects, 
and the emotional and intellectual reactions we have to those objects and sensations.”69  In 
this way, aesthetics, Cubitt writes, has become connected to the realm of art in that aesthetics 
describes “a moment when objects and senses come into contact – generating forms, 
sensations and psychic events”.70  
Drawing on the work of philosopher Alain Badiou (2007), Cubitt historicizes aesthetics by 
suggesting that it can be roughly divided between two moments: the Classical, which 
revolves around past notions of transcendent, ideal beauty of singular objects; and the 
Romantic, which describes future realizations of this past beauty.71 And yet, if we accept, he 
argues, that aesthetics is the “moment when objects and senses come into contact	–	
generating forms, sensations, and psychic events then surely the aesthetic is par excellence 
the experience of the present?”72  But what is an aesthetics of the present? What does it 
entail? What form does it take? Is it digital? Interactive? How do we know what an aesthetics 
of the present actually is? Is it because it has the qualities of being art or it was made in the 
present day? The circle, as Cubitt rightfully states, “is logically vicious”.73 So if we are to 
begin to describe an aesthetic of the present, we must do something more radical than simply 
list off the formal attributes of art that connect one movement to another.  Cubitt does just 
this, suggesting that the thing that connects one digital artwork to another	–	the “digital 
aesthetic” –	 is the mediated experience of time.74  As he writes:  
 
If the aesthetic is the event that brings together objects, sensations and subjectivity	–	
the “aesthetic attitude”	for example – then it always involves mediation between the 
world and the mind. Aesthetics in the narrow sense of the appreciation of art, is 
dependent on mediation by the senses of vision and hearing; and with the benefit of a 
century of phenomenological studies, we must recognize that these senses are 
intrinsically temporal.75 
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Taking a similar stance to Cubitt, digital aesthetics for Christiane Paul (2016) is not about 
objectively describing the ideal beauty of a singular object, but about the mediation that 
occurs between that object, the audience and the world.76 Aesthetics, Paul continues, is a 
complex philosophical territory, especially when applied to digital artworks, like interactive 
new media installations, because the “hybridity of the digital medium makes it particularly 
challenging to develop a more or less unified aesthetic theory”.77 The development of a 
digital aesthetic, she continues, is commonly approached by examining the individual 
characteristics of a digital medium (temporality, duration, computation, interactivity).78  Yet, 
each of these characteristics do not necessarily appear in one work and can occur in varying 
combinations. As mentioned earlier, interactive new media installations are gallery-based 
artworks that incorporate digital technology and that require the subject to act, via an 
interface, and the piece to respond in various ways to this activity.  In this way interactive 
new media installations can be described as computational, abstract, temporal, durational, 
interactive, participatory, generative, ephemeral and performative all at once, or not at all.  
The fact that interactive new media installations are time-based and ephemeral further 
complicates any aesthetic theory of the interface because a viewer/participant who spends 
one or two minutes with an installation might catch a glimpse of only one version of an 
essentially non-linear, or generative, artwork.  
 
This argument is best explained by way of Lynn Hershman Leeson’s interactive new media 
installation Lorna (1983). Lorna is an interactive video disc. It consists of a television 
monitor and a remote control.79  These elements are located in a gallery that mirrors the set-
up of Lorna’s onscreen living room. (Figure 6)  Lorna’s narrative is, on the surface, simple: it 
tells a story about an agoraphobic woman named Lorna who sits in her apartment all day 
watching TV.80 (Figure 7)  We are invited into her home –	a tiny apartment filled with 
various objects (a telephone, a TV, a couch). Every object in her apartment has a number.81 
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We can click on these objects, via the remote control. Doing this allows us access to audio-
visual material. (Figure 8) 
 
	









Figure 8:  L. Hershman Leeson, Lorna (1985). 
The disc that Lorna is located on consists of 17 minutes of audio-visual material which is 
broken up into 36 chapters.82 These chapters can be sequenced differently and their meanings 
shift as they are recontextualized. For example, some chapters can be viewed backwards as 
well as forwards, at increased or decreased speeds or from different perspectives.83  
Furthermore, the artwork has multiple endings: depending the choices we make, Lorna may 
shoot her television set, commit suicide, or move to Los Angeles.84 (Figure 9)  
	
Figure 9: L. Hershman Leeson, Lorna (1985).	
                                                





Given the amount of complexity inherent in this work, we may only end up viewing one 
aspect of a very sophisticated, non-linear narrative.  Therefore, the actual meaning of the 
artwork may remain unclear to us. The same could be said for the interface.  
For instance, Lorna’s narrative is nonlinear, complex and its outcomes are dependent on the 
choices we make while interacting with it. Thus it is difficult to draw boundaries around what 
an interface actually is in this work because we are experiencing it in mediated time. 
Temporality in Lorna is produced via the interface, i.e. through our interactions with it, and 
with the work of art, as well as through the mediating functions it performs. Since we 
experience the interface in time, and since time is produced via the interface, the moment we 
point at an object (the remote control, the TV, the branching structures embedded in the disc, 
a human body) and we declare it to be an interface, that interface begins to undo itself and it 
becomes something else –	it becomes less an aesthetic process and more a technical device. 
And yet we need to reassert the existence of the interface as aesthetic process for the work to 
be called an interactive new media installation, as these types of artworks require interfaces. 
So we interact with Lorna and by doing so an interface is produced –	the remote control. 
Every digital artwork is embedded in a specific context and has a purpose, however, 
viewer/participants, as Paul reminds us, “require layers of contextual information, both 
relating to the materiality of the work and the logic behind its processes.”85 Here Paul is 
arguing that each digital artwork is unique and complex, therefore an understanding of the 
digital aesthetic of the artwork requires an understanding of the medium itself (in our case, 
interactive new media installations) and the conceptual idea behind it. So, what is the 
underlying idea behind Lorna? And how does this reflect the medium it is based in and the 
interfaces created for it? Well, Lorna combines performance, narrative, time, chance 
(indetermination) and audience participation.  These compositional elements are compressed, 
as noted above, into a pre-programmed disc which offers us multiple perspectives and allows 
us to make certain decisions for the main character.  The protagonist’s story and her 
adventures, however, do not take place in real life or real time.  They take place on a 
television set – in a heavily mediated, pre-programmed, time-based environment that is 
remotely controlled by its users. Yet, there is, as Hershman Leeson writes,	“no hierarchy in 
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31 
 
the ordering of a user’s decisions” in Lorna.86 Here, Hershman Leeson is stating that, while 
the disc is pre-programmed to play in a certain way, she is not trying to predict her users’ 
actions	–	nor can she in fact.87 “The lack of hierarchy in the ordering of a user’s decisions”	
simply means she is deliberately positioning the user as active and the main character, Lorna, 
as passive.88 She does this in order to comment on our consumption of media and technology 
–	specifically television	–	and how it directs our behaviors. “Lorna’s passivity”, Hershman 
Leeson writes, “is a counterpoint to the direct action of the player.  As the branching path (of 
the audio-visual media located on the disc) is deconstructed, the player becomes aware of the 
subtle yet powerful effects of fear caused by media and becomes empowered (active) through 
this perception.”89  
 
As an artwork, Lorna is inherently interwoven with features of computational structures –	
specifically the structures that underlie the mediums that it is created for (video disc, 
television). These digital structures (HCI, branching paths, flow charts) are not simply 
unknowable technical strategies of automation but they have cultural meanings and 
manifestations as well. For example, for its duration, Lorna allows us to explore, on a deep 
level, the whole screen and its aforementioned underlying computational structures. 
However, our attention is focused on the most active parts (the numbered objects that we are 
allowed to click on).  As we click on these items, which represent various chapters in Lorna’s 
life, we are repositioned, relative to television, identifying with the main character and 
reflecting the voyeuristic, fragmented gaze of the medium (television). The digital tools –	
including the branching paths of the chapters and the remote control – act as means towards 
other ends.  In an article on Lorna, Hershman Leeson states that: “Many images on the screen 
are of the remote control device Lorna uses to change television channels. Because 
viewer/participants use a nearly identical unit to direct the disc action, a metaphoric link or 
point of identification is established between the viewer and referent.”90  So, while it was 
made in 1983 for television and laser disc, Lorna is unmistakably an interactive new media 
installation	–	and not simply because of its visual appeal or its novel use of audience 
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participation. Lorna is an interactive new media installation for two reasons: because of the 
aesthetic interfaces developed for the manipulation and mediation of time (the branching 
narratives and pathways, and the use of the remote control); and because of the relationships 
between viewer/participant, artist and artwork that Hershman Leeson is able to intervene in 
through her deployment of these aesthetic interfaces.  
 
My interest in the relationships that the aesthetic interface creates builds on the work 
presented above.  It also feeds into a more theoretical concern around how we might begin to 
make sense of the interface in interactive new media installations as a field of critical inquiry, 
as a cultural problem to be examined, rather than simply a technology to be studied.  My 
exploration of the aesthetic interface is therefore not about the object itself; it is rather about 
the systems – technological, philosophical, embodied, and socio-political – that permit, shape 
and produce the interface and the wider issues such as interaction and (in)visibility that 
surround it. In short, aesthetics in my thesis is about the mediated experience of time that the 
relationship between the artist, the artwork, the interface and the audience creates. When 
applied to the interface, aesthetics then encompasses everything located below the surface of 
its glossy (or non-glossy) exterior, everything that is invisible to the human eye but that 
remains inseparable from the interface and without which the latter would not exist. In this 
way, I seek to contribute to an understanding of the aesthetics of the interface not in terms of 
what interfaces look like or do, but rather in terms of how they came to be and what they 
have or will become via a critical exploration of the processes built into them – as well as our 
comprehension of them as art objects.  
 
The Agential Interface 
Traditional conceptions of technology in Western philosophy, as Timothy Clarke (2000) tells 
us, have roots in Aristotelian thought.91  In Clarke’s words: “The traditional, Aristotelian 
view is that technology is extrinsic to human nature as a tool which is used to bring about 
certain ends.  Technology is applied science, an instrument of knowledge.”92 Here, Clarke is 
arguing that technology, when theorized from an Aristotelian point of view, is instrumental. 
It is considered to be separate from the subject, an extraneous tool used by humans to 
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accomplish specific goals. Expanding the criticisms of traditional theories of technology 
expressed above, Bernard Stiegler (1999) remarks that Western philosophy “at its very origin 
and up until now …	has repressed technics as an object of thought.  Technics is the 
unthought.”93 Using this proposition as a starting point, Stiegler proceeds to rethink the 
traditional conception of technology. In short, Stiegler posits that ideas about technology in 
Western philosophy are constituted on the basis of a false separation between the 
philosophical concepts of episteme (human knowledge) and tekhne (art or craft). This 
separation, he tells us, is troublesome because it has led Western philosophy to devalue 
technology and the technical.94  Be it a stone axe, a pencil or an interface, technology in these 
conceptualizations is simply considered a means to an end. The devaluation of technology, as 
well as the separation of episteme from techne, Stiegler writes, means, among other things, 
that “technical beings”	lack an ontological status.95  
 
Arguing against Aristotelian configurations of the relationship between human and 
technological beings above, Stiegler posits that humans have access to “originary 
knowledge”.96 Originary knowledge for Stiegler means that humans do not acquire 
knowledge from the outside world, but through acts of remembering –	acts which he argues 
are always already contaminated by technics. Hence, the history of the human, he writes, “is 
nothing other than that of the exteriorization of memory, or rather, of a memory become such 
only through exteriorization, constituting qualities and capabilities that only become human 
in this same originary supplementation and prosthesis.”97 For this reason, Stiegler posits that 
humans can experience themselves only through technology.98 No longer seen as a mere 
instrument tacked onto the outside of the body, technology, he suggests, destabilizes notions 
of the “originary human”, instrumentality and interiority. In this way, technology is 
positioned by Stiegler as the very condition of human existence.99 Thus he concludes that 
humans can never be, and have never been, separate from technology because they are 
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fundamentally constituted by, through and with technology (starting from early technologies 
such as fire or a flint stone).100  
 
Stiegler’s critique of traditional conceptualizations of technology assumes a particular 
importance in the context of this thesis. This is because his statements about “technical 
beings”	lacking an ontological status bring important questions about the agency of the 
nonhuman to the fore. Significantly, a central premise in both Stiegler’s argument and my 
thesis is that agency is not merely confined to humans in the classic Aristotelian sense, but 
encompasses the nonhuman and/or the technological as well. I turn to Lucy Suchman’s 
(2007) investigation into agency and nonhuman entities to develop this concept further.101  
 
Suchman (2008) argues for an expanded understanding of agency by including nonhuman 
entities in what, in her words, is “the question of just what constitutes agency…	for humans 
or nonhumans”.102 She continues, positing that “the prevailing figuration in Euro-American 
imaginaries is one of autonomous, rational, [human] agency”	and projects like interactive 
new media installations reinforce that very culturally specific imaginary.103  At stake, she 
suggests, is the exploration of “what other possible conceptions of humanness there might be, 
and how those might challenge current regimes of research and development”.104  Given this, 
questions I explore throughout this thesis that are related to the agency of the self and of 
others are complicated and, to an extent, reconfigured by the complex dynamics of both the 
nonhuman and human entities that make up the digital interface and interactive new media 
installations. In simpler terms, there are multiple agents and agencies (both nonhuman and 
human) at play in the construction and deployment of interfaces in interactive new media 
installations.  These agents and agencies, I argue, are not neutral.  Rather, following 
Suchman, I suggest that they aid in the articulation and construction of the way in which 
subjects conceptualize and classify entities, as well as the way they experience and interact 
with interfaces in interactive new media art installations. In this sense, my dissertation seeks 
to contribute an understanding of the multiple types of agency, as well as bodies, at play in 
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the articulation of the interface in interactive new media installations. Through this, it aims to 
offer an expansion of the notions of subjectivity and agency beyond their traditional humanist 
conceptualizations. Here, new media installations become a testing ground for this conceptual 
expansion. 
 
However, interfaces are, as stated above, a productive part of the phenomena they create. 
What subjects see, what they can do, or know, or what they cannot know by interacting with 
the interface, are all the result of complex material-discursive practices that involve both 
human and nonhuman actors. If we take this to be the case, if what subjects are able to see, 
know or do emerges out of and with their interactions with the interface, then it could be 
assumed that interfaces contain, among other things, normative and prescriptive structures or 
rules that instruct subjects’	behaviors in interactive new media installations. It is taken for 
granted, to an extent, that interfaces constitute and are constituted by power relations, in that 
they are created, as Suchman argues above, by “specifically located individuals.”105 Thus, I 
argue that the issue that needs to be addressed when discussing interfaces is not whether these 
power relations exist (they most certainly do), but rather how they are manifested, what 
exactly they control, and what the possibilities for intervention into and a resistance to them 
are. How do interfaces exert power?  Is it through instruction? How is this power 
transmitted? Through design? Theory? Language? What types of socio-cultural assumptions 
are embedded in instructions? What types of subject interactions do they bring to bear? How 
does instruction influence what a body, both human and nonhuman, does or becomes? That is 
to say, what kinds of bodies and subjects does instruction produce? What kind of bodies and 
subjects does it close down on? And who or what benefits from such instruction?  
 
The Cybernetic Interface 
Interfaces in interactive new media installations, as briefly discussed above, are multi-layered 
structures of code that allow two entities to communicate with each other.  While the bottom 
layers of this code communicate with the machine, the top layers are oriented towards, and 
communicate with, the subject. At each layer, the interface translates information, 
functioning mainly to visualize the meanings inside the system.  In order to accomplish this 
task, the subject must be able to read and interact with the interface easily. This is an act that 
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Alan Blackwell (2006) argues is achieved through the deployment of metaphors that depict 
the “real world”	experiences of the subject in order to help them understand the abstract 
operations and capabilities of the interface.106 These metaphors describe both the functions of 
the interface and the actions of the subject.  
	
Figure 10: J. Shaw, Place –	a user’s  
manual (1995).	
For example, the interface in Jeffrey Shaw’s installation Place –	A User’s Manual (1995) is a 
modified video camera.107 (Figure 10) The video camera is an interface because, by rotating 
and using its zoom and play buttons, the subject can interact with and view the artwork. 
(Figure 11) 
	
Figure 11: J. Shaw, Place –	a user’s  
manual (1995).	
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However, the video camera as interface not only allows the subject to view things, but it also 
acts as a metaphor that positions the subject as a cinematographer or artist. By presenting the 
interface as video camera, Shaw is both describing the role the subject will play 
(cinematographer, artist) and he is, to an extent, dictating the subjects’	movements as well as 
teaching her how to navigate and contribute information to the installation.   
Therefore the interface not only instructs but also mediates a conversation between the 
subject, the artist and the machine, while at the same time allowing the subject to question 
and experiment with the causes and effects that her actions have.  Although the subject’s 
intent is never completely reflected in the resulting actions of the interface, I argue that this 
experimentation and questioning of cause and effect has the potential to produce different 
types of communication, which ultimately afford the subject a chance to create different 
relationships to both the artwork and the interface.  
New media artist David Rokeby reinforces this point. In a conversation about his installation 
Very Nervous System (1986-1990) with Roberto Simanowski, Rokeby states that in the 
current model of HCI, any interactive system must “construct some sort of model of the 
user…	then in some way reflect this limited model of the user back to the user.”108 Rokeby 
argues this reflective effect creates, among other things, distance between the user, the 
interface and the artwork, as the user is not considered the locus of interaction in this 
particular instance. The user is instead viewed as an outside entity, whose actions are 
“constructed”	by the artist and then incorporated into the machine in order for it to work.109 
Separation is then amplified by what Rokeby terms the “feedback loop of interaction,”	which 
allows the whole system to operate as a type of filter, or mediator –	one that reinforces, 
restricts and reflects certain types of information.110 Over a period of time this type of 
instruction results in the creation or modification of certain types of behaviors.  
For example, after interacting with Mary Flanagan’s interactive new media art installation 
[giantJoystick] (2006), the subject is able to relate the images appearing in the installation to 
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certain types of movements (pushing, pressing, swaying, touching) that she makes with the 
interface.111 (Figure 12)  
	
Figure 12: M. Flanagan,  [giantJoystick] (2006).	
The subject can do this because when she touches different parts of the interface –	a 10-foot 
tall joystick –	images appear on the screen. (Figure 13) 
	
Figure 13: M. Flanagan,  [giantJoystick] (2006).	
Successful navigation of the installation is pre-programmed and based on the subject’s ability 
to easily understand and operate the interface.  Therefore, the subject’s interactions (touching, 
pressing) are not only prescribed by the shape of the interface and the way it is constructed: 
Flanagan also provides the user of her installation with a set of instructions allowing them to 
successfully navigate the installation. The fact that the interface resembles a familiar object (a 
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joystick), only reinforces these lessons. In this context, then, the subject has become an 
“object presser or toucher”	because her experience in the installation has taught her that 
touching and pressing objects cause images to appear on the screen.   
 
Scholarly debates on the use of the interface as a mode of transmitting instruction and the 
power that this instruction has in relation to subjects –	specifically, in relation to how subjects 
interact with artworks –	can roughly be loosely described as either positive or a negative 
camp.  The positive approach regards the ability of the digital interface to instruct as 
empowering.112 By placing emphasis on how the interface is able to draw on “elements of our 
daily experience.... [and] gain their meaning from the network of social interactions in which 
they figure”, instruction, Paul Dourish (2001) argues, has the potential to create more 
embodied, more “user-friendly”, and thus “better”	experiences for the subject.113 The more 
skeptical scholars position this ability as a sort of false-flag operation. These scholars see 
instruction as reinforcing, among other things, problematic definitions and concepts of 
interactivity and participation.114 In short, they argue, as Mondloch does, that the use of 
instruction creates active vs. passive dichotomies, in effect turning “open-ended participatory 
experiences”	into “environments of controlled passive response”.115 Despite the different 
analytical frameworks employed to understand the effects that instruction has on the subject 
and the differing conclusions that scholars studying it come to, a common denominator in 
research into instruction in interactive new media installations is the belief that the subject 
has the ability to resist or intervene in it, and thus generate moments of rupture in the spaces 
she is located in. While this ability exists, the model of an interactive subject briefly critiqued 
above, and the modes of spectatorship that scholars such as Mondloch claim it promotes, 
persist and can still be found both in interactive new media art installations and in the 
theories that surround them.116 One of these theories is ubiquitous computing (ubicomp).  
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The Ubiquitous Interface 
Ubicomp, according to Mark Weiser (1991), refers to the seamless integration of technology 
into every place, object, building and body.117 Weiser posits that technology must become an 
integrated tool through which we work, rather than an attention-grabbing machine that 
performs and dictates tasks and actions. He continues by stating that focusing the subject’s 
attention away from the “single box”	allows technology to “fade into the background”, thus 
rendering technology invisible.118  This invisibility, he states, results in the formation of 
“new”	relationships between humans and machines –	relationships that focus on smaller 
details instead of foregrounding the “attractiveness”	of the technology being used.119 
Attractiveness, for Weiser, refers to technology that makes itself the center of attention. Thus 
attractiveness of technology for Weiser is troublesome because attractiveness “is the opposite 
of invisible.”120   
 
In many ways, Weiser’s theory of ubicomp echoes the problems found in the traditional 
Aristotelian conceptions of technology discussed above.  For example, by arguing for 
invisibility, Weiser positions technology as something exterior to the human using it, thus 
creating a separation between the human and the machine.121 His specific configuration of 
invisibility denotes the disembodiment of the subject. Theories of technology that promote 
invisibility, as N. Katherine Hayles (1999) posits, are worrisome, because they render the 
human body as excess “meat”	and treat human consciousness as something separate from the 
human form.122  Yet the art world has adopted ubicomp narratives and applied them to the 
interface in interactive new media installations. Interestingly, here, narratives, in particular 
those around disembodiment exposed by Hayles in 1999, have resurfaced as notions of the 
disappearance and are used to describe interfaces in interactive new media installations.123  
The adoption of these theories is highly problematic, not only because of the disembodiment 
                                                
117 Mark Weiser. “The Computer for the 21st Century”.  Scientific American, September 1991. Found online at: 
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/ACMInteractions2.html. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Mark Weiser. “The World is not a Desktop”. ACM Interactions, November 7, 1993. Found online at: 
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120 Ibid.  
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122 N. Katherine Hayles. How we Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and 
Informatics. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999)  
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that comes with them but also because they erase the aesthetic processes and relationships 
(i.e. the attractiveness) that bring them into being.  This is an act that I suggest widens 
separation between the artwork and the subject, the artist and technology discussed above.  
Interfaces, as posited earlier, are not simply separate objects created by the artist that subjects 
use to navigate an installation or view images. Rather, I argue that the interface has 
productive capacities, and these capacities appear not merely through mediating “the 
world”, or disappearing from it, but through the subject’s ability to interact in conjunction 
with and embody it.   
 
The Embodied Interface  
Embodiment is, in simple terms, the process of uniting the Cartesian separation between the 
body and the mind. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) considers the concept of embodiment to 
be a human or nonhuman body that embraces and constitutes the world through perception.124  
As he writes: “by thus remaking contact with the body and with the world, we shall 
rediscover our self, since, perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self and, 
as it were, the subject of perception.”125 Donna Haraway (1991, 2007, 2008) builds on 
Merleau-Ponty’s theorization. Positioning the body as a cybernetic organism, “a hybrid of 
machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction”, Haraway 
argues that the insistence on behalf of scholars that the body ends at, or is encapsulated by, 
the skin, fails to recognize the body’s specific situatedness in the world.126 The term 
“situatedness”	for Haraway does not refer to a previously specified location in a reified body. 
Rather, she argues this notion is about conceptualizing the body as “nodes in fields, 
inflections in orientations, and responsibility for difference in material-semiotic fields of 
meaning.”127 Here, Haraway is suggesting that bodies are constantly in communication with, 
and are never separate from, the technology that aids in their production.128 Thus, 
embodiment she tells us “is about significant prosthesis.”129  
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Building on Haraway’s ideas, Bernadette Wegenstein (2008) argues that the “collapse of 
body, materiality of expression and environment”	irreducibly links technology to the 
embodied experience of the subject.130 She continues by claiming that this collapse is enacted 
in relation to the (re)medialization of the body and the increased use in meditative extensions. 
It is a process, she writes, that is	“marked by an eventual complete substitution of immediate 
and intimate bodies facilitated by the logic of new media.”131 In short, by engaging with 
technology, the subject, for Wegenstein, is not simply operating technology, but rather she is 
embodying it. The ability to embody technology emerges out of the fact that the subject can 
manipulate and create digital information in the space she is located in. The embodiment of 
technology thus represents more than the subject’s interaction with physical and virtual 
images in interactive new media installations. It also denotes the subject’s participatory status 
as an embodied subject, or viewer/participant in them.   
 
My use of the term “viewer/participant”	to designate a fully embodied and participatory 
subject is indebted to Mark Hansen (2004, 2006), who deploys it in order to foreground what 
he sees as the creative potential “implicit within the re-conceptualizing of (human) perception 
as an active (and fully embodied) rendering of data”.132 Drawing on Henri Bergson’s concept 
of the human body as the center of indetermination, Hansen believes that perception is 
embodied and affective. The subject’s interactions with technology alter its embodied and 
affective perceptions by reconfiguring the subject’s senses.  For instance, Hansen argues that 
rather than simply filtering a series of composed images, the subject is able to frame and 
create images out of “something that has no form”.133 The subject, for Hansen, has therefore 
become the “active source of framing,”	rather than being merely a “passive site of 
inscription.”134 The subject can thus now be considered a “viewer-participant”	because 
perception is understood as an embodied and affective experience, albeit one that has been 
modified by technology prior to conscious perception.135  
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While his theorization is important, I argue Hansen ends up creating an active vs. passive 
dichotomy through the designation of the Deleuzian account of the human body as the 
“passive site of inscription”	and the Bergsonian account of the human body as the “active 
source of framing”.136 He also mimics these same structures through the juxtaposition of the 
human body (an active entity) against an interface (a supposedly passive one) in interactive 
new media installations.  By doing this, he limits both embodiment and agency to the human 
domain. So, when I employ the term “viewer/participant”	throughout this thesis, I am moving 
beyond Hansen’s notion of the viewer/participant, signalling the fact that the 
viewer/participant is participating in the interactive new media art installation by 
contributing aspects of her own evolving material ontology to her experience through her 
engagement with, and embodiment of, technology.  I use the phrase “the embodiment of 
technology” here as a way of theorizing the subject’s relationship to technology as an 
engagement with, and integral part of, interactive new media art installations.  I posit that the 
embodiment of technology on behalf of the subject, and her ability to become an embodied 
viewer/participant, is not about control.  I do not believe that this ability facilitates a shift in 
control over the outcome of the interactive new media installation from the artist to the 
subject. Rather, I understand this as a shift in perception and position; one that focuses 
attention away from the technical features of a computerized device and onto what the 
subject can do in conjunction with technology when theorized as an embodied 
viewer/participant.  
 
Summary of Chapters  
To reiterate, my thesis has two overarching research questions, which provide it with an 
overall focus. First, I am interested in what a digital interface is and what it does in 
interactive new media installations.  By this I mean the way in which the interface signifies, 
and is suggestive of, other processes, subjects and objects in interactive new media 
installations. In many respects, my first question is thus concerned with relationships –	
relationships between the viewer/participant, the artist and the other human and nonhuman 
entities in interactive new media installations. My second question pertains to enquiring as to 
why the interface matters in interactive new media installations. That is to say, how does the 
viewer/participant make sense of the interface and the relationships, subjects and objects that 
it is suggestive of via her interactions with it? Why is it important? The core of my 
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dissertation is organized around four chapters that address concepts that I see as crucial to 
any study of the digital interface: aesthetics, instruction, the body and embodiment, and 
ubiquitous computing. These chapters examine how the interface informs and codifies modes 
of spectatorship, artistic practices and the discourses that surround it, how it aids in both the 
construction and reinforcement of regimes of visibility, and how the interface manages 
relationships between the viewer/participant and the artist.  
Chapter 1, Aesthetics and the Interface, situates my dissertation in the tradition of scholarship 
on new media art and digital technology in the humanities and media studies. It is first and 
foremost a literature review as it provides details of earlier research and analytical 
perspectives relevant to the digital interface. It also offers my attempt at rethinking the digital 
interface.  The interface is positioned as an aesthetic process –	an unfolding or translation of 
the multiple relationships and entities that it brings into being. My reconceptualization of the 
digital interface builds on what Andersen and Pold (2011) term “interface criticism”.137 
Interface criticism involves a critical investigation of how we humans perceive the physical 
and virtual environment we are located in through the interfaces available to us.138 The 
chapter furthermore provides an overview of some of the key concepts (subjectivity, media 
spectatorship, interactivity and aesthetics) used to discuss the digital interface.  
Chapter 2, The Body and the Interface, provides a conceptualization of the interface by 
discussing the relationship between the body and technology. In order to understand how the 
interface signifies and is suggestive of relationships and entities, and how the 
viewer/participant makes sense of them via her interactions with it, I argue for a post-human 
understanding of the relationship between the viewer/participant and the digital interface as 
relational and co-constitutive –	a mutually entangled and collaboratively produced 
experience. Theorizations of the relationship between the body and technology that position it 
in this way are not new to media studies or to the humanities. And yet, even though multiple 
discussions about the need to offer more entangled approaches to the relationship between the 
body and technology have taken place, I argue that we require a more detailed study of the 
potential effects that the relationship between the body and technology may have on the way 
in which the viewer/participant interacts with, and thinks about, the digital interface. This 
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chapter therefore attempts to offer a different perspective on what I see as necessary (but not 
yet sufficient) theories of the digital interface. In doing so, the chapter expands on the key 
literature discussed in Chapter 1 and provides a more detailed account of the debates and 
discourses around the digital interface.  
Chapter 3, Instruction and the Interface, explores the disciplinary aspects of the digital 
interface. This chapter thus addresses the question of what the interface does in interactive 
new media installations in terms of its instructional capabilities. My discussion around 
instruction is grounded in a close reading of Lucy Suchman’s (2007) book Human-Machine 
Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Actions and Norbert Wiener’s (1950) cybernetic notion 
of instruction as a method of controlling biological and technical systems.139 Building on 
insights around the relationship between the body and technology mobilized in chapter 2 – 
specifically notions raised by Amelia Jones (2000) around the relationship between power, 
resistance and the human body – my focus in this chapter will be on the destabilizing effects, 
as theorized in the previous chapter, that I see the resistance to, or the intervention into, 
instruction having on the way the viewer/participant both interacts with and thinks about the 
interface. Approaching the interface from this perspective will situate my theory of the digital 
interface in the larger context of media studies, as well as applying it to key issues of agency, 
autonomy and notions of instruction. This will enable me to begin to study a whole range of 
variations in behaviors that occur when the viewer/participant resists or intervenes in 
instruction, and how they affect the way she interacts with the interface in interactive new 
media installations.  Using the concept of instruction as an analytical framework, the 
argument is made that the viewer/participant’s resistance to instruction begins to challenge 
problematic concepts of separate, discrete, autonomous entities called humans and 
communicative machines, by presenting the viewer/participant with an opportunity to engage 
with and restructure (within certain parameters), the underlying narratives that shape her 
experience in interactive new media installations.140 This shifts focus away from theorizing 
the viewer/participant as an outside operational entity whose actions are structured and 
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defined as exterior to technology, towards considering her an integral part of the installation –	
an embodied subject whose bodily interactions with the digital interface have consequences 
in, thus matter to, interactive new media art installations.   
Chapter 4, Ubiquitous Computing and the Interface, provides a critique of the notion of 
ubiquitous computing defined above.  Taking the deployment of the digital interface in works 
by Brian Knep (2006-8), David Rokeby (2012), Natalie Jeremijenko (1995) and Scott Snibbe 
(1998, 2002) as its case studies, this chapter critically analyzes how theories around ubicomp 
shape the forms of visibility, interaction and participation in interactive new media 
installations. The questions addressed are the following: How are ubicomp systems 
embedded in the technical, cultural, aesthetic and political structures of society?  How does 
experimentation with these systems in interactive new media installations open them up for 
different ways of theorizing the digital interface? How does this experimentation affect a 
change in our conception of notions such as visuality and aesthetics, if it does at all?  
Taking inspiration from separate claims made by theorists such as Ulrik Ekman (2011), Lori 
Emerson (2014), Adam Greenfield (2006) and N. Katherine Hayles (2013) that interactive 
new media art installations and new media interface aesthetics are sites of actual ubicomp, I 
will suggest that ubicomp systems are being developed through artistic experimentation with 
these technologies. Thus these artworks, and the viewer/participants interacting with them, 
have the ability to intervene in, and possibly reconfigure, previously posited narratives 
around the body, technology and the relationship between the two. Approaching the digital 
interface in this way will situate my theory of the digital interface at the boundary of the STS 
and the humanities field, and relate it to issues of agency, autonomy, the body and instruction 
as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
Ultimately, my investigation into the use of the interface in interactive new media 
installations is a question of our ever-changing relationship with technology, one that 
provides an underlying question to the whole thesis.  This question around our relationship 
with technology returns in all of the chapters including the conclusion and introduction: 
through Sean Cubitt’s formulation of digital aesthetics as “a descriptor of the mediated 
experience of time”; as Lucy Suchman’s investigation into the agency of nonhuman forms; 
via Karen Barad’s theorization of entanglement and emergence as an enactment of 
boundaries between different entities; and as the designation of the human body as interface 
in interactive new media installations by artists such as Carmin Karasic, Brian Knep and 
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David Rokeby. However, since I am positioning the digital interface as a dynamic, hybrid, 
aesthetic process, it is also necessary to ask where exactly the interface is embedded and 
where concepts around, and accounts of, the interface go. What happens to the interface? 
Where does the interface end-up? What is done with it physically and conceptually? How do 
accounts and deployments of the interface operate as an engagement with and/or affect our 
human relationship with technology? 
 
In short, they go into the hands of a few people, commercial entities or academic institutions 
and are sometimes redeployed as commercial devices that will change our lives, for the 
better, forever. Thankfully, they also go into the hands of artists and viewer/participants who 
make their own, more creative, uses of them. Given this, a more fundamental question is how 
these commercial interfacial devices operate in relation to the artistic and creative 
deployments of the interface discussed throughout this thesis. In this case, the question is not 
how artistic deployments of the interface can somehow make our relationship with 
technology better, or simply make technology easier to use. Rather, I ask this question to 
develop a critical understanding of how the interface can be seen as an important actor in 
positioning and (re)shaping specific ways of relating to the self, to technology, to artistic 
practice and to others in both interactive new media installations and in the current media 
culture.  In the conclusion, I address these questions and concerns. I elaborate on the main 
contributions of my dissertation. I draw elements of my thesis together to outline how we can 
further develop the notions around the interface that I have presented, and provide 
suggestions for some further ways to think about the digital interface and its use in interactive 




Chapter 1: Aesthetics and the Interface: A Literature Review  
 
In this chapter, I propose a rethinking of the digital interface in interactive new media 
installations in aesthetic and processual terms. I will outline what is at stake in such 
rethinking by suggesting that the digital interface can be understood as an open-ended series 
of relational, co-constitutive processes that influence the movements and perceptions of the 
viewer/participant(s) interacting with it. With this theorization, I offer an alternative to 
previously posited notions of the interface outlined by scholars such as Jonathan Crary (1992, 
2002), Lev Manovich (1999, 2000), Paul Dourish (2001, 2011), Mark Hansen (2004, 2006, 
2013) and to a certain extent Anne Friedberg (2006) and Kate Mondloch (2010). These texts 
are invaluable to my research, as they begin to critically evaluate what it means to be a 
viewing subject in a modern technologically based society, as well as question the interface’s 
function as a device that facilitates yet also impedes interaction, mediates experience and 
attempts to maintain a fantasy of control over unpredictable computerized systems.141 
However, as briefly argued in the introduction, interfaces tend to be defined, and 
consequently positioned, by these scholars in binary terms (visible or invisible, open or 
closed, opaque or transparent).142 Thus the interface in their texts becomes either an active 
yet empty technological thing that simply provides instruction to semi-passive users, an 
isolated object framing the experience that an embodied but detached viewer/participant has 
in an installation, or something that acts as a boundary between the viewer/participant and the 
virtual world that the interface helps simulate.  
Before I expand my analysis, I would first like to examine in more detail what exactly is at 
stake in proposing an alternative theory of the digital interface.  How does theorizing the 
digital interface as a relational, co-constitutive aesthetic process that operates outside of the 
traditional action/reaction model of interaction in interactive new media art installations 
challenge previously posited notions of agency, subjectivity, interactivity and aesthetics? 
How might these challenges change the way we engage with and theorize the relationship 
between humans and technology in interactive new media installations? My primary goal in 
this chapter is to present my alternative theory of the digital interface in interactive new 
                                                
141 Friedberg and Mondloch’s texts critically rethink what it means to be a viewing subject in a modern 
technologically based society, whereas Dourish, Manovich and Hansen attempt to question the interface’s 
function in technological environments.   
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media installations. Therefore, these questions will be addressed through an analysis of how 
similar queries have surfaced in recent debates about the interface. In particular, I will focus 
on key issues such as the importance of aesthetic inquiry, the link between theories of media 
spectatorship and interaction, and on how these theories can be applied to the digital interface 
in interactive new media installations.143 Thus, this chapter serves two purposes: it aims to 
fulfil a role of critical intervention into thinking about the digital interface in interactive new 
media installations, and it acts as a literature review in the sense that it establishes a critical 
framework for the subject area discussed throughout my thesis (digital interfaces and their 
use in interactive new media installations). 
The individual sections of this chapter all delineate the issues that my theory of the digital 
interface addresses; they establish the key projects, frames of reference, vocabularies and 
debates that are significant to it. Each section focuses on concerns about the digital interface, 
specifically those raised by Christian Ulrik Andersen and Søren Bro Pold (2011), Branden 
Hookway (2011) and Alexander Galloway (2010). While their approaches to the digital 
interface differ, these authors all partake in a critical evaluation of theories of the digital 
interface. They then present alternatives, positioning the interface as an integral part of the 
space that it is located in.144 The significance of these theories to my research (and the 
underlying point that I believe they are trying to make, although none state it directly), is that 
many of the narratives that we employ to describe digital interfaces have become obsolete.  I 
will develop this line of thinking throughout this chapter by arguing that previously posited 
theories of the interface are inadequate, thus they need to be not so much revised, but rather 
critically repositioned in relation to the role that the aesthetics of the interface plays in 
interactive new media installations. This will allow me to propose a different approach to 
analyzing the digital interface in interactive new media installations –	one I am proposing to 
call, after Andersen and Pold, “interface criticism”.145 Approaching the interface from this 
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144 Galloway and Hookway propose approaches to the interface that move away from previously posited 
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perspective will situate my theory of the digital interface in the larger context of media 
studies, as well as applying it to issues of subjectivity, media spectatorship, interactivity and 
aesthetics. The issue of subjectivity is embedded in the notion of the digital interface as a 
self-referential cybernetic system as argued by Galloway, Hookway and Pold.  Questions of 
media spectatorship and interactivity arise in regards to what the interface is theorized as 
being by each of these authors, in reference to its visual presence in interactive new media 
installations and in relation to the viewer/participant’s interactions with it.  Finally, the 
aesthetics of the interface will be developed throughout this chapter in relation to Sean 
Cubitt’s (1998, 2005, 2016) understandings of digital aesthetics. 
The Interface 
The digital interface is the name originally given by computer scientists to both the hardware 
and/or the software embedded in a physical object that enables humans to use technology. 
Artists and scholars working in the humanities have creatively appropriated this term, 
expanded its definition and applied it to a variety of media and technologies used in their 
fields. In doing so, they have proposed different, more post-humanist theories of the digital 
interface –	ones that begin to take the cultural aspects of technology into consideration.146  
For example, for Pierre Lévy (1997) the digital interface is “a way of analyzing global socio-
technological systems…	that emphasizes the material and artificial components of human 
phenomena, and not [an] entity, which exists independently, has distinct effects, and acts on 
its own.”147 Here, Lévy is arguing that interfaces are products of a society and culture. 
Therefore, we cannot, he states, separate digital interfaces from the ideas and processes 
through which they are conceived, and from the humans who produce and use them.148  
Taking a similar stance to Lévy, interfaces for Manovich (2000) are not neutral devices.149 
They are, he tells us, created by humans, thus they provide us with a very narrow, and often 
very biased, model of the world.150 As he writes: “[t]he interface shapes how the computer 
user conceives the computer itself.  It also determines how users think of any media object 
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accessed via a computer. Stripping different media of their original distinctions, the interface 
imposes its own logic on them.”151 Digital interfaces for Manovich are therefore inherently 
world-forming processes that operate on a cultural and technical level. For instance, when we 
interact with an interactive new media installation everything we view – text, music, images, 
videos – passes through the physical interface we use to access the work (a mouse, a 
keyboard) and, in turn, the interfaces of its operating system and screen.  These interfaces, 
according to Manovich’s description above, “are created by humans”	in that they have been 
programmed in specific ways, by specific people.152  Therefore, interfaces provide their users 
with their own model of the world they create – a model that is based on the interfaces’ 
internal pre-programmed logical system and ideology. Given this, the subsequent information 
passed through these interfaces will reflect, and therefore will be limited by, the underlying 
system of the device and the ideological perspectives of the people who built it.   
But what about the human interacting with the interface? What about her interpretation of the 
information provided? What effect do her interactions have on the information that she is 
viewing? How does she shape the “conception of the computer”?  And what about the 
aesthetic processes embedded in the device? Answers to these questions are difficult to find 
in Manovich’s description of the interface. This is because emphasis in his description, as 
noted above, is placed on the internal machine-based processes of the interface, as it is these 
processes, not the end-users, that shape and therefore limit the information the user 
encounters when she interacts with the interface. As a result, the human using (not 
programming) the interface in Manovich’s theorization, has little effect on the information 
she encounters.  So while Manovich’s theory of the digital interface captures some of the 
spirit of the post-humanist analysis of technology (specifically via his acknowledgement of 
the cultural processes of the interface and the human’s ideological influence over it), he 
removes the critical theorization of it by focusing too much on the technical constraints of the 
interface. In doing this, the “aesthetic avant-garde strategies”	and any acts of human 
involvement beyond basic programming that he claims are “embedded in the commands and 
interface metaphors of computer software”	are ignored.153 Technicist by nature, Manovich’s 
theory of the interface eliminates the very element crucial to the artwork he applies his theory 
to –	the aesthetic.    
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The Problem with Aesthetics 
In this section, I will suggest that there is a lack of engagement with concepts of aesthetics in 
media theory, specifically in literature related to the digital interface where its relevance is 
regarded as a surface-level issue, if it is addressed at all. But why should we be concerned 
with aesthetics when theorizing the digital interface in interactive new media installations? 
And what is actually at stake when the aesthetic aspects of this device are ignored? For 
Christiane Paul (2008, 2016), the answer to these questions is as such: we should be 
concerned with aesthetics because it offers different approaches to, and perspectives on, a 
number of key issues in the philosophy of art and technology. These issues include, but are 
not limited to, artistic appreciation, notions truth as beauty, the value of art, aesthetics as 
ethics and aesthetics as politics. Speaking specifically to the aesthetics of new media art, Paul 
suggests that a critical investigation into aesthetics, alongside concepts like materiality and 
medium specificity, allows us to make distinctions between different artistic mediums and 
movements.154 In direct reference to new media art, aesthetics, she argues, helps us to 
distinguish between practices that use digital technologies as a tool to produce more 
traditional art objects (photographs, prints, sculptures) and what she refers to as digital-born 
art – that is “computable art that is stored, and distributed via digital technologies and uses 
the features of these technologies as a medium”.155  
Like Paul, I argue that a critical understanding of aesthetics is significant because it allows 
for a better theorization of the role that technologies, like digital interfaces, play in defining 
an art form (interactive new media installations) beyond their instrumental contributions.  
However, my motivation behind suggesting such an approach differs from hers. My aim in 
deploying aesthetics is not to make distinctions between one art form and another (i.e. to 
determine whether it is digital born or not).  Rather, the point of my exploration is to gain 
some insight into a particular condition of modern artistic practice: the use of the interface in 
interactive new media installations. More specifically, my aim is to explore how the use of 
the interface can act as a mode of critique of our relationship to technology and to reflect on 
the effects this critique has on how we represent ourselves, as subjects, with technology in 
interactive new media installations. In what follows, I argue that without a deeper 
understanding of aesthetics, the interface, as well as its functions and its purpose, would only 
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be discussed from a rather reductive technical-engineering perspective –	an approach that, 
Andersen and Pold write, has led to the “‘what-you-see-is-what-you-get’-text editors and… 
emphasis on user-friendly and transparent design”.156 This focus results in a very limiting and 
instrumental concept of aesthetics, the digital interface and interactive new media art in 
general –	one that I argue, echoing Andersen and Pold, reduces the interface to an issue of 
“look-and-feel”, therefore creating separations between the viewer/participant (the subject) 
the interface (the object) and the artwork.157 These are, I suggest, issues that a theorization of 
the aesthetic aspects of the digital interface will not solve, but will hopefully help clarify.  
However, the idea that any kind of aesthetic theory, let alone digital aesthetics, asks us to 
“know in some sense what we mean by digital art as anything other than a social category or 
works that circulate in the institutions and discourses of art”	opens up a number of problems 
because digital aesthetics, as Sean Cubitt (2016) argues, “is not something that can be 
captured the same way [digital] information can”.158 The key qualities (non-identity, 
ephemerality, unknowability) that Cubitt sees the aesthetic experience of the digital as 
entailing are not things that are easily quantified, commodified and privatized, despite our 
attempts to place value on them.159  Rather, digital aesthetics, according to Cubitt, is 
dependent on the mediation of the senses of vision and hearing – and these senses are always 
temporal. Thus the identity of aesthetics, he argues, is always rooted in the present.160 This 
fact leads him to begin to theorize aesthetics in such a way that it allows for “the co-presence 
of not only artwork and audience but also the social that forms both of them”.161 Here, Cubitt 
is arguing that aesthetic encounters occur in time and are durational, non-identical, non-
repeatable and subjective. They are not a “uniquely exclusive collision of perceiver and 
perceived”	and therefore are not located outside of or beyond history.162 Thus we must 
formulate this encounter, he writes, in such a way that it incorporates history, which is to say 
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that “we must recognize the aesthetic, as both property of a work and as an experience of it, 
as something giving body to (‘corporating’) the historical present”.163  
I draw on Cubitt’s theorization of digital aesthetics throughout this chapter.  Like Cubitt, I 
suggest that the term “aesthetics”	when applied to the use of the digital interface in 
interactive new media installations not only describes the characteristics of the artwork the 
interface is deployed in, but also encapsulates the characteristics of the interface. In this way, 
aesthetics does not just shape our experience of digital artworks; it also shapes our 
interactions with, and, by extension, our experience of the interface.  
The Aesthetic Experience of the Interface   
The phrase “digital interface”, as mentioned earlier, refers to hardware and/or the software 
embedded in a physical object that enables humans to use technology.  We know how the 
technical capabilities of the interface have aided in the emergence of experimental artistic 
practices such as the use of geographically distributed materials in a virtual space, visual and 
aural communication in real and asynchronous time, or data visualization and Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) in new media art. However, the aesthetic aspects of the interface 
are only just beginning to be analyzed. Aesthetics, in the very narrow sense of the 
appreciation of art, as stated earlier, is dependent on “mediation by the senses of vision and 
hearing”	and these senses, as Cubitt argues, are “intrinsically temporal”.164 Thus, aesthetics 
can be understood to serve as a descriptor of the mediated experience of time.165 Interactive 
new media installations, with their emphasis on viewer/participant action in virtual and 
physical space alongside their potential to highlight different, non-linear and non-visual 
modes of thinking and interacting, have the capacity to magnify the mediated experience of 
time Cubitt speaks of earlier. Here, I propose that new media artist Brian Knep’s interactive 
new media installation Deep Wounds (2006) provides a perfect example of art that magnifies 
the aspects of aesthetics discussed above.  
In 2005-6, Knep was commissioned by the Office of the Arts at Harvard University to 
produce an installation for the University.  He chose as a location Memorial Hall.166 This 
location was initially picked because of its surface-level aesthetic characteristics (stained 
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glass windows, marble floors and walls.) However, this attraction faded when Knep 
researched the building’s history.167  Built between 1874 and 1877, Memorial Hall honors 
Harvard graduates who died in defence of the Union during the American Civil War (1861-
1865.)168  Names of 136 deceased alumni, along with other identifying information (year of 
graduation, place of birth, battle/place of death), are inscribed in red into the 28 marble 
panels that line the walls of the hall. Information about Harvard graduates who fought and 
died for the Confederacy is omitted from the building.169  (Figure 14) 
	
Figure 14: B. Knep, Deep Wounds. (2006).	
With this in mind, Knep created Deep Wounds. Deep Wounds is installed in the transept of 
Memorial Hall – a dimly lit space designed for silent, sombre contemplation. The aesthetics 
of the installation reflect this atmosphere. There are no fast-paced moving images, blinking 
lights or loud audio tracks. Rather Deep Wounds consists of three large rectangular images, 
which are projected onto the polished white marble floor of the building.170 These images, 
which were created specifically to resemble the stained glassed windows located above them, 
are static and face the inscriptions on the wall.171 (Figure 15) 
                                                








Figure 15: B. Knep, Deep Wounds. (2006).	
However, it is impossible, as argued above, to understand the aesthetics of the interface by 
simply examining the aesthetic characteristics of the artwork that it is located in. While they 
may share a similar interface and be interactive in the same way, no two interactive new 
media installations are identical. Aesthetically, Deep Wounds is simplistic, computational, 
dynamic and generative. It employs a similar interface (the viewer/participant’s body) to 
many of Knep’s other installations – most notably, the works that comprise his Healing 
Series (2003-present) and Drift Series (2004-present). However, these works all have 
remarkably different aesthetic impact in the sense that the visuals they produce look different, 
as seen in the images below, and the pieces themselves are programmed to respond to 
viewer/participant action in different ways.172 (Figures 16 & 17) 
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Figure 16: B. Knep, Healing 1. (2003).	
 
Figure 17: B. Knep, Drift Wall. (2007). 
As mentioned in the introduction, interactive new media art installations depend on 
viewer/participant action in order to work and Deep Wounds is not an exception to this rule.  
To recap: Deep Wounds consists of three large rectangular images, which are projected onto 
the floor. These images are milky in color, yet transparent enough so that, on visiting the 
installation, I can catch brief glimpses of what lies below them.  These hints are enticing, they 
make me want to explore the work, and so I do. I interact with the work by walking onto the 
floor.  When I do this, the images covering the area of floor I am standing on begin to blister 
and open-up, revealing another layer of the artwork to me	–	snippets of blue colored text. 




Figure 18: B. Knep, Deep Wounds. (2006). 
I stand in silence for a few moments, examining the work, trying to make the connection 
between the imagery the piece has revealed to me and that of my surrounding environment.  
Making this connection is fairly straightforward: the text on the floor is written in the same 
font as the names of the deceased Union soldiers that line the walls opposite them, so I 
assume that they are somehow related.  I am correct: the text is an allusion to the dead 
Confederate soldiers, the implied other half of Memorial Hall.  As Knep’s artist statement 
reads: “The content of the text consists of descriptions of the [Harvard University] graduates 
who died fighting for the Confederacy.  Each man’s year of graduation, state, date of death 
and battle of death are projected onto the floor.”173 In lieu of a name, a word describing a 
relationship (father, son, classmate) is used to identify these soldiers. (Figure 19)  
 
Figure 19: B. Knep, Deep Wounds. (2006). 
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I spend a few moments reflecting on the text below me and then I move on. When I do, the 
blistered images slowly knit themselves back together, covering the blue text.174 Since I must 
walk across the images on the floor to reveal the full nature of the artwork (the blue text) and 
to experience the installation, my body functions as the interface in this work. Given this, it 
could be argued that viewer/participant interaction with the interface forms the backbone of 
the aesthetics of Deep Wounds. 
Katja Kwastek (2013) makes a similar argument about interactivity to the one I make above. 
Interactive art, she writes, “places the action of the recipient at the heart of its aesthetics”.175 
This is because the recipient’s action is the “activity that gives form and presence to the 
interactive artwork”.176  Thus action, she states, is “the primary source of his [the recipient’s] 
aesthetic experience”.177 Kwastek’s suggestion could apply to the majority of performative 
practices (happenings, performance and body art) that precede interactive art.  Kwastek 
acknowledges this fact, arguing that in contrast to performative art, interactive works 
“present an action proposition that is generally not modified by the artist while being 
exhibited”.178  For example, Kwastek states that both the production and the reception aspects 
of interactive art are distinct from each other, although the artwork, she writes, is involved in 
both aspects in that in interactive art	“production and reception aesthetics collide”.179 
However, interactive art –	and this is what she claims distinguishes it from traditional visual 
artworks and the more action-oriented variety listed above –	does not “manifest its gestalt in 
the absence of reception”.180 Given this, interactive works, Kwastek writes, are “conceived 
with a view to action, which is enabled and to an extent orchestrated by but not performed by 
the artist…	[i]n interactive art, the recipient becomes the performer”.181  Here, Kwastek is 
arguing that interactive artworks require the viewer/participant to perform, as well as view, 
the artwork, not the artist. And it is this characteristic, she suggests, that makes interactive 
artworks unique. The physical activity of the viewer/participant and her ability to become a 
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performer, Kwastek argues, “contradicts a fundamental condition to which the possibility of 
aesthetic experience of any art form is usually linked: that of aesthetic distance”.182  
According to the prevailing art theories, Kwastek tells us, the aesthetic object is “constituted 
only in the contemplative act of the viewer”.183 In order to achieve aesthetic distance and 
truly understand the meaning of the artwork, the viewer must be able to, in simple terms, 
detach herself from reality and immerse herself in the artwork.  Once immersed, the viewer 
can become an objective observer. She can then contemplate and reflect on the artwork free 
from any distraction.184 However, the notion of aesthetic distance, Kwastek writes, does not 
apply to interactive art.185 This is because the viewer must interact with the work before she 
can reflect on it, therefore making the requirement of aesthetic distance extremely difficult to 
satisfy.186  Thus, Kwastek concludes: “Physical action on the part of the recipient is 
indispensable for the materialization of the artistic concept, which the recipient must realize, 
experience, and reflect upon at the same time.”187  
I agree with Kwastek’s conclusions about viewer/participant interaction being a defining 
aesthetic characteristic of interactive art –	one that helps shape our interactions with, and by 
extension, our experience of, the artwork and the interface.  For example, production (the 
making of the artwork) and reception (the viewing of the artwork) of Deep Wounds are 
distinct elements. However, the aesthetics of both the aforementioned processes clearly 
manifest themselves in the artwork –	most noticeably via the blistering and knitting of the 
images. Yet, the installation does not work –	it is not art –	if nobody is there to interact with 
it. And while he is present and speaks to me during my various visits to the site, Knep is not 
modifying the artwork in real time. Thus, it could be said that Deep Wounds is conceived 
with a view towards viewer/participant interaction –	a view the artist (Knep) orchestrates, but 
does not perform, making interaction an important aesthetic characteristic of this installation. 
However, my interpretation veers from Kwastek’s analysis slightly in that I do not consider 
viewer/participant interaction to be unique to interactive art. The ability for the viewer to 
become a performer via interaction with the artwork is paramount to many different 
participatory art movements –	most notably Fluxus, Situationism and Body and Performance 
                                                








art.  Furthermore, while the artist may be present and performing the art piece, the majority of 
works created in the above-mentioned art movements are conceived with a view to 
viewer/participant action.  Rather, following Cubitt, I argue that the characteristic that makes 
interactive art unique is the mediated experience of time that viewer/participant interaction 
with the interface creates.188   
However, in order to fully theorize this concept and formulate an aesthetic of the interface in 
interactive new media installations, we must, as Cubitt argues above, incorporate the 
historical and the social into the aesthetic encounter.189 But what exactly constitutes the social 
and the historical for both artworks and its audiences? And how do the social and the 
historical relate to the mediated experience of time that interactive art creates? The answer to 
these questions, Cubitt states, lies “in the artworks themselves, that is if the theory is correct, 
we will discover the characteristic incorporation”	of the socio-historical aesthetic present.190  
As explained before, Deep Wounds is an artwork about the American Civil War. It is tucked 
away in a building located on an Ivy League University Campus – a building that is 
accessible only to students that attend the institution, its employees and their invited guests. 
Thus Deep Wounds is an artwork about inclusion and exclusion, the (post) industrial North 
and the (post) agrarian South, slavery, racism and reconstruction, forgiveness and 
responsibility, loss and regret. In a broader sense, it is about past conflicts, the present 
societal rifts that these conflicts create and our future attempts to reconcile them.  
Deep Wounds has received rave reviews from the art world. Public response to the work has 
not been as positive as it does not overtly acknowledge the underlying reason that the 
American Civil War was fought –	slavery. This lack of acknowledgement is reflected in 
comments made by members of the public. Members of the public have called the piece “yet 
another conversation between white men about the Civil War”, while one commenter referred 
to Knep as “literally Hitler”.191  In a rush to critique what could be seen as racist attitudes 
towards deeply complex and polarized subject matters (slavery, the American Civil War) that 
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still pervade American public consciousness and political rhetoric, one might neglect more 
basic questions about Deep Wounds. How do the conscious and unconscious aesthetic 
choices made by the artist (making the visuals pretty and interaction fluid instead of ugly and 
burdensome, selecting a memorial to house the work, making the Confederate soldiers who 
attended Harvard the subject of the installation instead of the African American slaves who 
worked there) affect the way the artwork is received by viewer/participants and art critics? 
Do all of them receive it in the same way? How might the terms of engagement and the 
underlying narratives of Deep Wounds change (or not) if the digital interface was something 
other than a human body? Something non-subjective, purely technical, pre-programmed, pre-
determined, something Knep could, to a certain extent, control?  
Cubitt contends that aesthetics is not simply a philosophical sub-discipline, but it is a 
particular way in which, in a given context, art is identified as art and, by default, a subject is 
defined as a subject to be discussed.192  For example, by interacting with digital artworks, he 
writes, “the viewer selects what not to see as much as what to see; and the installation 
evolves constantly whether viewers are present or not”.193 While made specifically about 
generative web-based installations, Cubitt’s point could arguably be extended to encompass 
interactive new media installations: how a viewer/participant interprets the narrative of the 
artwork is entirely dependent on her experience in the world and her interactions with the 
work. This point could also be extended to encompass the art world as a whole in which the 
institutions that host the work select, in terms of curation and distribution of funds, what an 
artist is not able to discuss and where she cannot exhibit as much as what she is able to 
discuss and where she can exhibit. The second point applies to Deep Wounds. 
For example, Knep originally wanted to list the actual names of the Confederate soldiers in 
his work.194 However, the Office of the Arts felt that listing these names was too 
controversial because it would call attention to the fact that Harvard, and many of its former 
graduates, used to own slaves –	a fact that the University has only recently publicly 
acknowledged.195 Thus listing the names of the Confederate soldiers would shine a light on 
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discontinuities between the University’s past and present socio-economic policies and create 
uncomfortable discussions around what type of subjects could and could not be 
memorialized, and thus should or should not be remembered. The question of who could or 
could not be memorialized became even more contentious due to the terms of the trust that 
endowed Memorial Hall’s construction: these terms implicitly stated that the alumni who 
fought and died for the Confederacy must never be enshrined there.196 It was only the erasure 
of the Confederate soldiers names, in combination with the facts that the installation was 
temporary (it was exhibited for only three weeks) and ephemeral (projected light) –	facts that 
the University believed would alleviate tensions between what was being shown and 
discussed in Deep Wounds and what was not –	that rendered the narrative of the artwork “less 
offensive”	to the University, thus allowing the project to move forward.197   
Trying to control how a viewer/participant will respond to the narrative of an artwork in the 
way Harvard tried to with Deep Wounds, however, is as impossible as trying to predict how 
she will interact with the work. These predictions never add up to the over-idealized 
cybernetic models of action and notoriously unreliable public opinion polls anyways. This is 
because the “‘gestalt moment’	of an ending, when the patterns of a narrative or the structures 
of melody and development make sense as a whole”	as Cubitt writes, do not happen in digital 
artworks (specifically those like Deep Wounds that are generative), as they conclude only in 
the sense that they can be switched off.198  Rather the freedom of digital artworks, he argues, 
“lies in their ephemeral temporality, their constant bubbling into and out of existence, and in 
the operations they perform on the accumulated data of the past to produce the emergent 
unknown future”.199 Following on from Cubitt, what is interesting about Deep Wounds’	
narrative and the polarized reactions that it elicits is the view of contemporary America that it 
depicts – a forward-facing, over-idealistic perspective around reconciliation, which is based 
on data (biographical information) from America’s not so utopian past. Instead of appearing 
as numbers, biographical information (dates of birth and death, full names of people) appears 
as relationships (Brother, Father, Son, Classmate). Since they are long gone, we know little of 
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the relationships the soldiers identified on the floor had to those listed by name on the wall. 
However, the work provides us with enough information to remind us that conflict creates 
hatred and hatred creates rifts between best friends, brothers and countrymen. Deep Wounds 
asks us to explore and respond to these conflicts and the rifts they create – to interact with 
and take responsibility for our previous actions in the now. In this sense, Deep Wounds is a 
deeply ethical work: it invites us to reopen old wounds and to reflect on the unacceptable 
positions of the past in the present day. Recast as relationships the biographical information 
of deceased soldiers from conflicts past and the values they held cease to be abstract. 
Through interacting with the work, we embody this information, relocate it into the present, 
experience it in time, and thus embrace it. By designating the viewer/participant’s body as 
interface, these past relationships become a personalized and subjective, albeit mediated, 
experience of time. The fact that we must use our bodies to interact with the work and in 
order to see the potentially inflammatory words that the piece, and the institution itself, 
attempted to obscure is an important aspect of the work. It makes, as mentioned above, the 
notion of aesthetic distance difficult to maintain, given that we must become physically 
involved in, experience, and reflect upon the work at the same time.    
Towards an Interface Criticism 
A critical reevaluation of some of the basic ideas of what a digital interface is and what it 
does in interactive new media installations presents a challenge to notions held by historians 
such as Jonathan Crary (2002), who posits that concepts such as interactivity, media 
spectatorship and subjectivity are predicated on “the relative separation of a viewer from a 
milieu of distraction and the detachment of an image from a larger background”.200  Crary’s 
interpretation fits the specific interface (the peep show) and time-period (19th Century) he is 
describing. However, I argue that notions of detachment and separation when applied to 
media theory and art, as they consequently have been, can be troubling.201 This is because 
they create interiorized and privatized experiences, thus positioning the digital interface in 
interactive new media installations as an unconscious, “accidental”	choice on behalf of the 
artist. Positioning the interface as such, I suggest, isolates the viewer/participant from the 
artistic process, ultimately creating separate objects and subjects in interactive new media 
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installations. Such a separation, as Andersen and Pold posit, perpetuates a model of aesthetics 
that favors “beautiful transparency over the sublime opacity of the hidden programming 
interface”.202 There are, however, ways to begin to bridge these boundaries between subjects 
and objects in interactive new media art installations. One such approach, as Andersen and 
Pold inform us, is interface criticism –	an approach that involves a “critical discussion of the 
computer and how it relates to art and culture today”.203  
While not clearly defined, interface criticism, they write, is: “intrinsically linked to our 
question of interface aesthetics”.204 Interface aesthetics combines art, media and computer 
science theory, and involves, among other things, “developing a critical vocabulary towards 
computers and interfaces”.205 Developing this critical vocabulary, Andersen and Pold argue, 
is significant, as it will allow us to “elucidate how interfaces can embed choices, conduct, 
languages, and ultimately, values, worldviews and aesthetics into technical 
infrastructures”.206 They continue by stating that an inquiry into, and criticism of, the digital 
interface involves more than the development of new discussions around the role that art or 
technology play in a “rapidly changing interface culture”.207 Interface criticism questions 
fundamental notions about the digital interface such as agency, medium specificity and 
aesthetics. Thus, interface criticism requires a critical discussion around how interfaces are 
related to culture and aesthetics, and how art has developed around interfaces. By doing this, 
Andersen and Pold argue, and I agree with them here, we can begin to develop an approach 
to analyzing the interface not as a “stable perspective”, but as a “critical paradigm”	in the 
media studies field.208 Taking seriously the aesthetic aspects of the digital interface in 
interactive new media installations then becomes important, as doing this could conceivably 
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allow us to enact what Karen Barad (2007) sees as an abrupt break with 
representationalism.209   
Representationalism, as Barad states, is the “belief in the ontological distinction between 
representations and that which they purport to represent; in particular that which is 
represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing”.210 This mode of 
thinking, she writes, is a “particularly inconspicuous consequence of, among other things, the 
Cartesian division between ‘internal’	and ‘external’”.211 Representationalist modes of 
thinking are problematic for Barad because they divide things (subjects and objects) into 
static, homogenous categories (digital interfaces and viewer/participants).212  In short, Barad 
believes that the “faith we place in our access to representations over things”	is a historic-
cultural belief that is part of “Western philosophy’s legacy and not a logic necessity; that is, it 
is simply a Cartesian habit of mind”.213 Paying critical attention to the aesthetic aspects of the 
interface, and specifically to those aspects of viewer/participant interaction with the interface 
that constitutes an abrupt break with representationalism, will be the starting point for my 
critique of Camille Utterback’s interactive new media installation Untitled 5 (2004). In what 
follows, I will suggest that a critical theorization of the aesthetic aspects of the digital 
interface in interactive new media installations will allow us to challenge (via 
viewer/participant interaction) representationalism and make an intervention in the “Cartesian 
habits of mind”	(such as belief in the need for aesthetic distance and the ontological 
separation of objects and subjects that follows from it).214  
 
In 2007, I had the good fortune to interact with Untitled 5 at Art Interactive in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. Untitled 5 consists of a closed-circuit camera, a computer and a large 
projection screen.215 When installed at Art Interactive, the projection screen took up the 
                                                
209 Karen Barad. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 46. 





215 Camille Utterback. Untitled 5. (2004).  Found online at: http://camilleutterback.com/projects/untitled-5/. 
Untitled 5 is the 5th installation in Utterback’s External Measures series (2001-2005). External Measures is a 
series of interactive installations that, in the artist’s words: “explore the possibilities of projected ‘kinetic 
sculptures’ or ‘living paintings.’” The positions, velocity and existence of various parts of the projected images 
in all of the works in the series rely on viewer/participant’s locations and movements in the gallery space. 
(Utterback, 2004). In this way, Untitled 5, and External Measures, builds on the artists earlier works such as 
Text Rain (1999). Text Rain will be discussed, in full, later in this chapter.   
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majority of the back wall of the gallery space. The screen was covered in a series of colorful 
lines, smudged dots and brush strokes. The brush strokes and dots splattered across the 
projection screen were visual representations of the past and current presence and movements 
of gallery visitors.  For example, when I entered the gallery, the camera detected my 
presence, along with the presence and movements of other visitors. This information was 
processed by the computer and projected onto the center of the screen as a set of brush 
strokes, or, as Utterback calls them, “painterly marks”.216 For instance, when I waved my 
hand, lifted a leg or jumped, a mark of a certain size and color appeared on screen. If I stood 
still a different type of mark appeared on screen. The more I interacted with the work the 
more marks appeared. (Figure 20)   
 
Figure 20: C. Utterback Untitled 5 (2007) 
In addition to the marks, a colored line appeared on the screen. Whereas the marks were 
visual representations of my presence and current movements in space, the line mapped my 
trajectory. So, when I moved to the left, the line followed me and moved to the left of the 
screen. If I moved to the right, the mark followed me and moved to the right of the screen. 
What emerged out of this interaction was, as Nathaniel Stern puts it, a digital painting that 
“continually transforms over time as layers of persistent marks and bodies feed-back between 
interaction, performance and image”.217 (Figure 21) 
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217 Nathaniel Stern. Interactive Art and Embodiment: The Implicit Body as Performance. (Canterbury, UK: 




Figure 21: C. Utterback Untitled 5 (2007) 
When a visitor left the installation space, the line that mapped her trajectory broke apart and 
became a set of spots. The size of these spots directly correlated to the “in-activity or 
stillness”	of that particular person.218  So, if a visitor spent three minutes interacting with the 
work, and then left, the line mapping her trajectory would become a set of imperceptible dots. 
If she spent one minute interacting with the work, two minutes standing still and then left, the 
line would become a set of large splotches. (Figure 22)  
 
Figure 22: C. Utterback, Untitled 5. (2007). 
                                                
218 Camille Utterback. Untitled 5. (2004).  Found online at: http://camilleutterback.com/projects/untitled-5/  
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As a current gallery visitor, I could push these splotches and dots around the screen using my 
body. As I pushed them, these dots and splotches began to blend into each other. If I did not 
interact with them, they attempted to migrate back to the center of the screen. (Figure 23)  
 
Figure 23: C. Utterback, Untitled 5. (2007). 
Together, these marks, lines, dots and splotches formed a composition that, Stern writes, 
create intersections between “movement paths and who does or does not follow them”	as well 
as connections between “different moments of time [and] different bodies in space”.219 In 
doing so, Stern argues that Utterback’s work creates “slightly different conceptual-material 
encounters”	by highlighting the multiple relationships that gallery visitors are able to form 
with Utterback’s “artwork, and with art- and mark making more generally”.220 
I agree with Stern’s reading of Untitled 5.  I believe the marks, lines, splotches and dots were 
and are acting in conjunction with each other (as well as in conjunction with the visitor) to 
create the on-screen composition. Collaborative making and an exploration into the creation 
of a different type of aesthetic system via embodied interaction are indeed, as Utterback 
writes in her artist statement, the main aims of her work.221 However, I argue that this 
exploration is only partially translated in practice. This is because the compositions that 
appear on the screen, as another visitor, Boston Globe art critic Ken Johnson, states: “are not 
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that captivating”.222 Additionally, I would argue that the aesthetic system that Utterback 
claims to create via viewer interaction does nothing different. Instead, I posit that the 
composition simply describes a finite and banal space bounded by the rules of its own 
system. 
For example, the ultimate goal of Untitled 5, as Utterback states, is to “create an aesthetic 
system which responds fluidly and intriguingly to physical movement in the exhibit 
space”.223 The visitors interacting with Untitled 5 are expected to engage with the on-screen 
images.  Meaning can be produced, on behalf of the visitors, through embodied interaction. 
Thus, meaning should emerge out of the visitor’s interactions with each other and with the 
artwork. I argue, however, that the human-to-computer interaction, and the resulting aesthetic 
composition that this artwork promotes, are too restrictive.  This is because Untitled 5 is 
organized from within, governed by internal lines of code and specific rules that Utterback 
has purposefully hidden from the public. Utterback has not revealed these rules to her visitors 
because she wants them to discover the internal structure and composition via exploration, 
believing that this will create a less prohibitive and more embodied type of interaction with 
and in her work.  As she writes: “[w]hile the specific rules of the system are never explicitly 
revealed to participants, the internal structure and composition of the piece can be discovered 
through a process of kinaesthetic exploration.  Engaging with this work creates a visceral 
sense of unfolding or revelation, but also a feeling of immediacy and loss.”224  
Concealment of the underlying rules, as Florian Cramer (2011) tells us, becomes an issue 
when applied to computerized devices (like interfaces) used in artworks, as he believes it 
implies “a separation of ‘users’	from ‘programmers’	based on different access privileges to 
machine functions granted by the respective interface”.225  In other words, the deliberate 
concealment of the underlying rules that govern the artwork, by Utterback, creates a 
separation of visitors from the artist, and in effect, the artistic process. Separation occurs 
because the visitor has no access to the technical or aesthetic systems she is interacting with, 
other than knowing that she can move the on-screen images around.  This separation, I argue, 
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is telling, as it indicates that Utterback expects her visitors to act, think and feel in a certain 
way, or that everybody interacting with her work shares a similar ontological system of 
representation. In assuming this, I posit that she is standardizing, and thus constraining, the 
interactions and experience that the visitor has in the installation. “Interactions”	in this system 
therefore become a series of pre-programmed behaviors mapped to the physical movements 
of gallery visitors. The regulation of visitor interaction not only undermines notions of 
subjectivity, but it also reveals a much more troubling inconsistency hidden in theories of 
interactivity. 
The Difficulty with Interactivity  
Some theories of contemporary aesthetics, as Mondloch (2010) tells us, consider the visitor’s 
active participation with art to be progressive because it engenders “an empowered, critically 
aware viewing subject”.226 The production of empowered and critically aware viewing 
subjects is important to interactive artworks, Mondloch states, because it allows artists to 
begin to counter theories that position their viewing subjects, and consequently their artwork, 
as “passive or resigned”	and reposition them both as interactive.227 Mondloch is skeptical of 
this automatic praise of participation and interaction lavished on installation art, as she 
believes it pits: “active, open-ended reception…	against passive consumption”.228  As she 
writes: “by necessitating active spectator involvement, whether implicitly or explicitly, 
installation artworks may simultaneously constitute environments of controlled passive 
response.”229 Simply put, Mondloch finds the glorification of interactive aspects of artworks 
on behalf of theorists and artists like Stern and Utterback disconcerting, as she believes this 
praise perpetuates, among other things, active vs. passive dichotomies in installation art.230 
While not applicable to every single interactive media installation, this dichotomy, I posit, is 
evident in Untitled 5.   
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Interaction in Untitled 5, for instance, is understood by Stern and Utterback to constitute an 
open-ended invitation from the artist to the viewer to create, participate and become, to a 
certain extent, co-creator of the work.231 Utterback, as Stern states: “invites participants to 
make and find meaning in and with and as an embodied and relational corpus”.232 Contrary to 
Stern, I argue that the invitation that Utterback extends to the visitor, while embodied and 
meaningful, is not reciprocal or interactive. Rather, the interaction occurring in her work can 
be understood as a set of semi-choreographed reactions performed by a subject who is 
responding to a very constrained set of computerized actions that have been pre-programmed 
by an active yet absent Artist. That is to say, the supposedly open-ended interactive 
exploration occurring in Untitled 5 is imposed on the visitor by the artist and the technical 
and aesthetic make-up of the installation itself.  In this way, Untitled 5 unintentionally creates 
an active vs. passive dichotomy by pitting an active Artist against a passive visitor. Untitled 
5, I suggest, is not, as Utterback and Stern argue, an open-ended participatory experience, but 
rather should be seen, to use Mondloch’s words, as a “controlled space of passive 
response”.233  
Given this, I posit that Untitled 5 is simply reinforcing a standardized vocabulary of visual 
motifs and modernist categories of art and technical production –	specifically an 
understanding of art as the manifestation of a detached, genius subject as raised by Amelia 
Jones (2006).234 Reinforcement of these notions is only exacerbated in Stern’s analysis of 
Utterback’s work –	particularly in his statement that the on-screen compositions in Untitled 5 
reference “the affective and performative…. possibilities of Abstract Expressionism à	la 
Jackson Pollock”.235 So, while Utterback is attempting to go beyond the surface of the 
machine by prioritizing the aesthetic aspects of her artwork, Untitled 5 could be criticized for 
replicating problematic representationalist systems and contemporary modes of artistic 
practice. 
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In a series of conversations and texts, Jacques Derrida (1992, 2000) addresses some of the 
issues discussed above –	specifically those around binaries, dichotomies and the 
contradictory nature of interactivity –	via notions of the gift and hospitality.  Derrida (1992) 
argues that the notion of the gift is a “transcendental illusion”.236 This is because a gift, in the 
true sense of the word, must be located outside a set of oppositional or binary demands (I 
give, you take or I act, you react) and beyond any self-interest or calculated reason (I am 
giving you X because I expect something in return or I am asking you to interact because I 
want you to contribute to the artwork).237  
Furthermore, for Derrida, a gift is a transcendental illusion because it is negated by anything 
that acknowledges it as a direct act of giving (monetary compensation, a simple thank you) as 
this acknowledgement presumes that one entity (the entity that gives or acts) is no longer 
indebted to the other (the entity that receives or reacts).238 Significantly, the entities involved 
in this transaction enter into an endless cycle of giving and taking in which a gift must be 
accompanied by an appropriate response. For Derrida, it is this part of the give/take cycle (the 
fact that a gift is associated with a command to respond on behalf of the receiver) that is an 
issue, as this response, he argues, is imposed on the receiver. Therefore, Derrida suggests that 
a gift, in its true form, is almost always impossible because it is almost always conditional.239 
Given this, Derrida argues that a gift, be it a present that you give to a friend, or the invitation 
that Stern claims Utterback (the giver) is extending to the gallery visitor (the recipient) 
described above, requires absolute anonymity of the giver to be unconditional. Absolute 
anonymity is important because it means that no one participating in the give/take cycle can 
claim any kind of benefit or is obliged to respond.  However, this requirement, for Derrida, 
can never be fulfilled. Thus, the notion of the gift, the act of giving and the possibilities that 
surround it are inextricably linked with their impossibility.240 In short, for a gift to be a gift, it 
must be given anonymously, without any expectation on behalf of the entity that is giving, of 
a response of any kind from the receiver, or that they (the giver or the receiver) will be able 
to gain some sort of benefit. A gift for Derrida then is almost always an impossible scenario, 
as genuine giving does not exist. 
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The same could be said for the use of interactivity in Untitled 5. When theorized in direct 
relation to new media, interactivity, according to Martin Lister (2009), signifies the users’	
“ability to directly intervene in and change the images and texts that they access”.241  Lister 
argues that: “In interactive multi-media texts there is a sense in which it is necessary for the 
user to actively intervene; to act as well as viewing or reading in order to produce 
meaning.”242 Given this, the subject interacting with new media, of any kind, becomes a 
“‘user’	rather than the ‘viewer’	of visual culture”.243 This is exactly the type of interactivity 
employed in Untitled 5. For example, I have the ability to directly intervene in and change, as 
noted above, the size, shape and trajectory of the images (the dots, the splotches, the lines) in 
this installation. I am thus interactive – I am a viewer/participant, rather than simply a viewer 
because I am directly affecting the outcome of the installation via my presence and 
movements in space.  However, there is an expectation of interaction on my behalf, 
embedded in this piece.  In fact, Untitled 5 demands that I interact with it in order for it to 
work – a demand that I am obliged to respond to. This expectation is reiterated in Utterback’s 
artist statement. “Integral to the piece”, she writes “are the animated mark’s cumulative 
interaction with each other over time. As a person moves through the space, a colored line 
maps his or her trajectory across the projection. When a person leaves the installation, their 
trajectory line is transformed by an overlay of tiny organic marks. These marks can now be 
pushed from their location by other people’s movement in the space.”244  In its constant bid 
for my active involvement, Untitled 5 and the invitation it extends to interact runs the risk of 
becoming a command, and in turn I run the risk of becoming a submissive user – an entity 
that must respond in a predetermined or compulsory way, rather than open-endedly explore 
and create. Given this, interactivity in Untitled 5, like the notion of giving as theorized above, 
is almost always an impossible scenario, as true interactivity does not exist in this work. 
This impossibility for Derrida is intensified in the concept of hospitality.245 The concept of 
hospitality, like that of the gift, for Derrida, contains a double logic, as he argues that 
absolute hospitality is not a possible scenario. Hospitality, Derrida writes, should extend an 
open-ended, unconditional invitation to those that request it.246 However, this invitation, he 
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tells us, is a paradox, in that it always comes with limitations.247 To summarize his argument, 
when theorized from within the context of immigration and the right to asylum in the 
European Union, absolute hospitality should offer an unconditional “right of refuge”	to those 
who request it.248  Yet, the right of refuge and immigration in general, he states, are always 
restricted by laws and other various mechanisms of control (citizenship, finance, religion, 
language, ethnicity) which are implemented by the State or nation.  These limitations can 
create tensions between groups of people (subjects who can and subjects who cannot 
immigrate) and contradictions between altruistic theories of hospitality and how this concept 
is enacted in practice.  
Derrida continues arguing that in order to be hospitable, to extend any kind of invitation, you 
must have the power to host –	to welcome visitors into your country, or as in this instance to 
extend an invitation to interact with your artwork.  In this way, hospitality is aligned with 
ownership and, to an extent, self-identity (I am a nation, I am an artist, I run a country so I 
can issue you a visa, I have created a work of art so I can ask you to interact with it).249 
Furthermore, in order to be hospitable, the host must place limitations on the behavior of their 
visitors (enter my country but have the correct papers, look at my art but do not touch it). 
Limitations are put into place precisely because if visitors are given complete unrestricted 
freedom, then the host is no longer being hospitable as the host is no longer in control of the 
situation. In this way, hospitality, for Derrida is inextricably linked to notions of power and 
control and therefore exclusion.250  
My argument is that the concept of interactivity, like the ideas of giving and hospitality, is a 
paradox. On the one hand, concepts of interactivity should, as Stern states, provide the visitor 
with an invitation to explore connections between physical bodies and representational 
systems and to create different ones; to become co-creator of an artwork.251 In fact, 
interactivity is essential to many new media artworks	–	especially to Untitled 5. For example, 
Untitled 5 would not work if a visitor was not present to interact with it, as the projected 
images depend entirely on visitors’	presence and movement in the gallery space.  So, there is 
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a degree of reciprocity, vis-a-vis interaction, happening in Untitled 5 and therefore the open-
ended invitation to become co-creator mentioned above holds some degree of legitimacy.  
On the other hand, interactivity in Untitled 5 is constrained.  What a visitor can or cannot do 
in the installation is regulated by the underlying technological and representational systems 
that allow the work to function, the interests of the artist and, to an extent, by the invitation to 
interact itself.  While they can be, at times, problematic, these constraints and limitations are 
of critical importance to the artwork.  For example, Untitled 5, as Utterback tells us, contains 
“custom video tracking and drawing software [that] outputs a changing wall projection in 
response to the activities in the space”.252 So, as discussed earlier, I enter the gallery space 
and move to the left of the screen. The aforementioned software records my presence and 
movements, processes this information and it is projected onto the left hand side of the screen 
as a mark, which I can move.  However, I have no control over the shape, size, color and the 
motion of this mark. Rather these attributes are pre-determined by the software –	software 
that was purposefully created by the artist for this particular installation. Nor am I given 
control over other attributes of the artwork (the size and shape of the screen, the placement in 
the gallery). These attributes are also determined by the artist, curators and preparators and 
by the limitations of the gallery space. Restrictions are put into place, precisely because if I 
was given complete, unrestricted creative freedom to interact then the artist would not be able 
to claim creative control over the artwork.  Given this, interactivity does not turn me into a 
co-creator. Rather I become an interloper, a migrant, a “gallery visitor”	who makes minor 
modifications to an artwork, which can ultimately be retracted by the artist (the sole creator) 
at a later date.  Simply put, without regulating visitor interaction, Untitled 5 would not be 
interactive new media art, rather, I argue it would be something akin to chaos.   
Interaction, especially interaction in Untitled 5, I argue, is a paradox, because it extends (or, it 
could be argued, imposes) an open-ended invitation to the visitor to explore and to create, 
while at the same time regulating and restricting their behavior. Interactivity then is presented 
in a relation of contradictions in which notions of unfettered creative freedom and concepts 
of cybernetic control remain irreducible to, yet also indissociable from, each other.  
Furthermore, the mere presence of restrictions in Untitled 5 creates contradictions between 
what interactivity is conceptualized as being (an open-ended, unconditional invitation to 
create) and what interactivity actually is in practice (closed, conditional and regulatory). 
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Thus, the use of interactivity in this work raises a series of questions: By asking a visitor to 
interact, is Utterback demanding a response?  If so, how should a visitor respond to this 
invitation –	especially if she does not have prior knowledge of the representational structures 
that underlie the artwork? Is the visitor actually “interactive”	or is she simply participating in 
a closed cybernetic feedback-loop consisting of pre-programmed actions and reactions? What 
these questions demonstrate is that interactivity is a contradictory, paradoxical concept that 
cannot be solved as it exists in a state of irreconcilable tensions. The difficulty of 
interactivity, I argue, like the difficulty of hospitality and giving, lies in the negotiation the 
viewer/participant performs between the two contradictory imperatives of interactivity: the 
invitation to unconditional creative freedom and the restrictive limitations set by the systems 
that it operates in.  
Representational systems, like interactivity, can be, as Barad writes: “sometimes explicitly 
theorized in terms of a tripartite arrangement… in addition to knowledge (i.e., 
representations), on the one hand, and the known (i.e., that which is purportedly represented), 
on the other, the existence of a knower (i.e., someone who does the representing) is 
acknowledged.”253 When the acknowledgement of a creator happens, Barad posits that “it 
becomes clear that representations are presumed to serve a mediating function between 
independently existing entities”.254 Barad argues that this assumption of mediation is 
significant, because, like the tensions and contradictions discussed above, it creates a gap 
between the subject and the object.255 This proposed gap raises more questions, this time 
around the accuracy of representations, concepts of mediation and of creation, creativity and 
creators in interactive media installations.  What exactly is it that is being mediated and why 
is it being mediated?  Who or what is doing the mediation? Who exactly is the artist in this 
installation?  Is it Utterback?  Is it the visitor?  Or a combination of both?  
In an attempt to explore similar questions, scholars and artists like Barad, Stern and 
Utterback struggle to develop understandings of the possibilities for interventions that move 
beyond the restrictive frameworks of representationalism. It is possible to construct coherent 
philosophical positions that begin to critically question the basic premises of these 
aforementioned notions. However, completely breaking the dichotomies ((inter)active vs. 
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passive), bridging the object/subject gaps and resolving the contradictions they create is not 
as simple as it appears. It requires, as Barad posits, “a rethinking of the nature of a host of 
fundamental notions such as being, identity, matter, discourse…and agency”.256  
I argue that one such rethinking occurs in Untitled 5. For instance, instead of trying to fill this 
gap between the subject and the object and resolve the tension it creates through the 
acknowledgement of the existence of a singular creator, or “artist”, Utterback exploits it. This 
exploitation occurs, as Roberto Simanowski (2011) states, because Utterback has turned the 
body of the visitor into a paintbrush	–	an artistic instrument employed in an ever-changing 
visual feedback system.257 In other words, the visitor’s body has become the primary mode of 
aesthetic expression in Untitled 5.  Designation of the human body as paintbrush is 
significant for Simanowski, because it breaks with traditional representational theories that 
treat the visual experience of the visitor as the object of perception.258 Thus, it enhances and 
critically examines, rather than suppresses, the human body’s role in the processes of 
perception and image making. As Simanowski writes: “Although traditional Western 
art…served the eye as locus of perception, in interactive art, the interface is no longer 
exclusively focused on vision but engages the entire body and turns it into a privileged site 
for experience.”259  
Following on, by engaging with Untitled 5 and the underlying technological and aesthetic 
systems that bring it into being, the visitor is not simply operating the artwork; rather, she is 
embodying it. The ability to embody technology emerges out of the fact that the visitor can 
manipulate information in Untitled 5. In this way, embodiment and the embodiment of 
technology represents more than the visitor’s interaction with physical and virtual images. I 
argue it denotes her participatory status as an embodied subject, or viewer/participant, in it.  
What is required, then, in Untitled 5 is not for the viewer/participant to become “interactive”, 
but for the viewer/participant to contribute aspects of her own evolving material ontology to 
her experience through her engagement with, and embodiment of, the artwork itself.  An 
understanding of Untitled 5 that takes account of the fact that the viewer/participant, the 
images projected onto the screen and the processes that bring them into being are not 
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ontologically separate entities, has the potential to open up a space for a different, more 
critical approach to thinking about the digital interface.  I argue it points to the development 
of different ways of working with, in and possibly, beyond, what could be seen as inadequate 
definitions of the digital interface in interactive media art installations. 
The Digital Interface is Obsolete 
Before I continue, it is important to clarify what I mean when I say that the term digital 
interface –	defined as a device that acts and reacts to viewer/participant interaction –	is 
inadequate when applied to interactive new media installations.  While I am positing that 
certain definitions of the digital interface are unsatisfactory, it does not mean that I am stating 
that the interface is not physically there, or that the processes that it embodies are nonexistent 
in interactive new media installations.260  The digital interface does physically exist, as will 
be demonstrated throughout this thesis. Rather, echoing new media artist Stelarc’s critique of 
assumptions about the body and technology in his technologized performances –	specifically 
his statement that “the body is obsolete”	–	I am arguing in very simple terms that particular 
understandings of what a digital interface is, its meaning, functions and physical form in 
interactive new media installations, have, to a certain extent, changed, resulting in the need 
for some new, more complex articulations.261 My intention in employing Stelarc’s theory of 
obsolescence is not to argue for “change”	via analogy –	to say that “old”	theories of the 
digital interface are a priori bad and “new”	rethinkings are “good”	simply because an artist 
advocates for obsolescence. My aim in engaging with Stelarc’s conceptualization is to reveal 
contradictions within traditional theories of the body and its relationship to technology, 
linking my analysis of the digital interface in interactive new media installations to a certain 
type of philosophical post-humanist critique of technology: one that complicates, and 
attempts to think beyond, humanist frameworks of the body, technology and art.262 In this 
way, Stelarc’s practice become a vehicle for me to think about the use of the digital interface 
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in interactive new media art installations with. For example, borrowing Stelarc’s theory of 
obsolescence, its particular linguistic figuration and his conceptualization of the body that 
underpins his statements and practice, and applying it to the interface, enables me to suggest 
that the digital interface is not a passive, technical device that merely registers the actions of 
the viewer/participant and then reacts to them. Therefore, any theorization of the digital 
interface that positions it as this type of device is obsolete in interactive new media 
installations.  
However, as Stelarc rightly points out, while the body, when theorized as “a kind of 
Cartesian theater of ‘I’”, may be obsolete, we (humans) “cannot discard the body.  It is not 
the object manipulated by the subject”.263 The body, instead, he writes, is a “…total 
physiological, phenomenological, cerebral package that operates in the world.  The body, for 
me, is an all-inclusive word –	not a word that splits from the realm of mind or that should be 
distinguished from the realm of the mind.”264 Here Stelarc is arguing for a theorization of the 
body as a relational site of possibilities –	one that positions, and thus reinforces, the co-
constitution of the human and technology. The body to Stelarc is “not merely a passenger.”265 
Instead, mirroring Bernard Stiegler’s (1998) theory of original technicity discussed in the 
introduction, the body, Stelarc writes: “has always been a prosthetic body.…	I’ve never seen 
the body as purely biological, so to consider technology as a kind of alien other that happens 
upon us at the end of the millennium is rather simplistic.”266 So, when Stelarc insists that “the 
body is obsolete”	or that “the self is no longer meaningfully located in the biological body”	
he is not stating that the physical body itself has disappeared.267 Rather, I understand him to 
mean that specific reconfigurations of the body (as separate biological subjects that use 
technologized objects), positionings of the physical body (as purely biological or located 
above or inside technology) and notions of the self (as a singular individualized Cartesian 
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agent) never actually existed as such. The deployment of the digital interface in Romy 
Atchuv and Camille Utterback’s interactive new media installation Text Rain (1999), and the 
resulting viewer/participant interaction that emerges out of it, is a paradigmatic example, for 
me, of Stelarc’s understanding and use of the notion of obsolescence.  
Text Rain consists of two large parallel walls located directly in front of, and behind, the 
viewer/participant.268 The wall located in front of the viewer/participant serves as a cinematic 
screen and features projected video. The other wall is painted white, with a wash of bright 
light down it.  Together these walls create a corridor in the gallery space.269 When a 
viewer/participant passes through the corridor, a closed circuit camera captures a 
photographic recording of her.270  This photographic recording is sent to a computer where it 
is processed and projected on to the screen. The recording is controlled by the 
viewer/participant.271 (Figure 24)  
 
Figure 24: C. Utterback, Text Rain. (1999). 
Thus, the projected photographic recording becomes the digital interface in this work. The 
recording is the digital interface because it is liminal; it acts as a mediator between entities 
(the viewer/participant, the on-screen images) and it allows the viewer/participant to, among 
other things, navigate the installation and engage with the visual information projected onto 
the wall.  One consequence of this designation is a more radical understanding of the digital 
interface. That is to say, the digital interface in this work cannot be defined principally by a 
                                                
268 Camille Utterback, Text Rain. (1999).  Found online at: http://camilleutterback.com/projects/text-rain/  
269 Ibid. 




medium (painting, sculpture, video) or an occupation with media itself, but should rather be 
defined by the operations of its own system. The digital interface then is not a particular 
object or a specific ephemeral artistic practice. I posit instead that the digital interface 
becomes a digital interface in conjunction with the interactions that the viewer/participant 
makes with it.  
 
Figure 25: C. Utterback, Text Rain. (1999). 
For instance, located on the wall of Text Rain are colored letters.272 (Figure 25) These letters 
fall down from above and gather around the edges of any entity projected on the wall. The 
letters are pre-programmed to take on the behaviors of physical phenomena that the 
viewer/participant is intimately familiar with	–	specifically precipitation.273  The letters are 
also pre-programmed to respond to physical forces such as gravity, as well as the movements 
of the viewer/participant.274 So, if a viewer/participant holds her arms out or lifts a leg and 
then stands still, the letters that accumulate around the edges of her limbs begin to form 
sentences.275   If enough letters accumulate along her outstretched limbs, she can catch an 
entire word, or even a phrase.  If she moves, the letters resume their fall.276  
Watching the letters pool around the edges of the photographic recordings, or fall off the 
surface of the screen, encourages the viewer/participant to, as Jay Bolter and Diane Gromala 
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(2005) state,	“instantly want to play, making visual and verbal patterns by holding the letters 
in their hands or along their arms”.277  (Figures 26 & 27) 
 
Figure 26: C. Utterback, Text Rain. (1999). 
 
Figure 27: C. Utterback, Text Rain. (1999). 
This simple, creative act of play performed by the subject in this work, they argue,	
“transforms the viewer into a user”	or viewer/participant.278 It also, as they suggest, changes 
the way we think about the digital interface. For without the viewer/participant the piece is 
incomplete –	there is nothing on the screen but the falling letters. As they write: “Text Rain is 
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a text that its viewer-users help to create, a text that they write in the process of reading.”279  
The “viewer-users” experience and the digital interface itself “comes from the interaction of 
the viewers with the creators’	design.  Text Rain is as much an expression of its viewers as it 
is of its creators.”280 Thus, they argue that Text Rain could be theorized as an artwork about 
the ongoing co-constitutive process of its own making.281   
The questions around the inadequacy of the digital interface that I am exploring via Text Rain 
are less directly about how interfaces have changed or how certain definitions of interfaces 
have become obsolete in a linear or progressive sense (i.e., the move from technical 
instrument, to symbolic screen, to abstract embodied organism). They rather revolve around 
how concepts that inform the digital interface and the digital interface as a physical entity 
itself are located and relocated in theoretical frameworks in the media studies field. I am also 
interested in the potential that creative rethinking and repositioning of the interface in 
interactive new media installations can have for breaking binary narratives around 
technology.  Returning to Stelarc’s theory of obsolescence will allow me to begin to suggest 
some alternatives in this regard.  
Rooted in discussions around human-machine interactions and the notion of the cyborg, 
Stelarc begins his exploration by asking the question of whether “a bipedal, breathing body 
with binocular vision and a 1400cc brain is an adequate biological form”.282 It is this 
naturalized definition of the human body, as Gary Hall (2002) tells us, rather than “some 
machinic post-human hybrid, which is Stelarc’s object for re-design”.283 Hall continues by 
adding that just because this particular definition of the body is obsolete does not mean that 
we can simply discard it.284 Doing away with it, he states, would reduce any creative 
(re)configurations of the body to a “linear teleological narrative, a narrative in which the 
biologically given human body is abandoned in favour of some post-human cybersystem”.285 
Stelarc’s notion of obsolescence, then, is not about the end of our physical bodies in lieu of 
some cybernetic other. It is rather, as Hall states, about “the end of technology –	or at least a 
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certain conception of technology which…	has dominated Western thought for almost three 
thousand years”.286 The specific view of technology that Hall is referring to here is the 
Aristotelian one.  
As mentioned earlier, Aristotelian positions on technology consider technology as separate 
from the human being. Thus technology, when theorized from an Aristotelian point of view, 
is considered to be an extraneous tool used by humans to accomplish specific goals. In these 
conceptualizations, technology is simply considered a means to an end. These theories create 
divisions between the human, technology and, by extension, the artwork by positioning 
technology as something exterior to human nature. Stelarc’s concept of obsolescence (and the 
resulting performances that emerge from it) then should not be seen as Cartesian high-tech 
fantasies of transcending the body via technology. Stelarc’s concept of obsolescence is about 
revealing the reductive nature of discourses about technology and our human relationship 
with it in the media studies field, and then about reconfiguring them.  
 
The notion of obsolescence exposes a fundamental problem with traditional theories of 
digital interfaces: the desire, on behalf of some theorists and artists, to position interfaces as 
technologized Others –	as empty alien objects that are separate from the human interacting 
with them.287  By critically questioning narratives about the relationship between the body 
and technology via notions of obsolescence, Stelarc is able to confront and undermine this 
position. He accomplishes this, as Hall states, by arguing, and then demonstrating in his art 
practice, that “technology is both fundamental to, and a disturbance of, our sense of the 
human”.288  In doing this, Stelarc enables the relationship between the body and technology 
to be seen, in Hall’s words “as an irruption of the other, the unforeseen disrupting the very 
criteria in which it would have been captured”.289    
In other words, Stelarc’s questioning of, and experimentation with, the idea of “the human”	
and its obsolescence dismantles naturalized descriptions of the human body, technology and 
our relationship with technology, exposing their simplicity and, in effect, their inadequacy. In 
doing so, our relationship with technology is not seen as one of opposites (a distinct human 
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self and an empty technological object) or antagonism (an “originary”	or pure human body 
vs. the alien technological Other) but as a relational and co-constitutive part of humanity. In 
this way, Stelarc’s concept of obsolescence can offer us a theoretical framework to analyze 
the relationship between the digital interface and the viewer/participant in interactive new 
media installations.  When the relationship between the human and technology is theorized as 
the merger of one human entity and one foreign technological object, what is at stake is 
neither futuristic ideology nor a repetition of a symmetrical past and future. Rather, it is 
similar to the contradictions referenced by Derrida above –	or as Hall terms it, 
“undecidability”.290  Instead of attempting to resolve this confusion by creating conceptual 
distinctions between objects and subjects, by conflating people (the subject, the artist, the 
theorist) and things (technology, the artwork), Stelarc, like the viewer/participant in Text 
Rain, described above, embraces it via playful experimentation.  “Undecidability”	then 
becomes important because it has the potential to produce different types of communication 
and interaction that allow for different, more performative and more productive explorations, 
and for potential repositionings of technologies such as the digital interface in interactive new 
media installations.291  
If we take this to be the case, if Text Rain can be seen, as Bolter and Gromala argue, as an 
installation about its own making, and if, as Stelarc argues, the concept of obsolescence and 
the process of art making itself are about “exposing, undermining and developing alternative 
strategies and aesthetics”	via exploration, then the interface in Text Rain cannot be positioned 
as a neutral object.292 Nor can the viewer/participant be theorized as a subject that has been 
absorbed into or negated by technology.  These specific understandings of the digital 
interface simply do not apply to this installation. Instead, I posit the digital interface in this 
work emerges out of, and in conjunction with, viewer/participant’s interactions with it and in 
doing this it generates contradictions and undecidability, thus providing us with alternative 
possibilities and strategies for conceptualizing and interacting with the digital interface.  
For example, the digital interface in Text Rain is not an illustrative or self-explanatory object.  
Rather, it builds on and remediates the aesthetic mediums (video, film, photography) that 
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precede it.  It also borrows from and remediates (not simulates) the “reality”	(the gallery 
space, the viewer/participant’s body). It shapes the information that it is conveying (the text, 
the images of the viewer/participant) and is shaped by the physical space and the 
viewer/participant interacting with it. So, when I state that certain theorizations of digital 
interface are inadequate, I mean that the digital interface may sit there, as a piece of 
preprogrammed hardware, or a projected image of the viewer/participant in an interactive 
new media installation. However, I argue the “essence”	of it – the thing that makes a digital 
interface a digital interface – does not exist before the viewer/participant interacts with it in 
interactive new media installations.   
My intention in the rest of this chapter is therefore not to argue that the digital interface as a 
physical object itself has disappeared.  It most certainly exists. Rather, I posit the term 
“digital interface”	is the name given to the active form by those that create, analyze and use 
it, and that draws upon, produces and constantly reproduces the complex and dynamic 
processes that constitute it.  In this way, I can begin to suggest that the processes that make 
up the digital interface, and to a certain extent the digital interface itself, become both 
reciprocal and open to reconfiguration. The digital interface, then, as exemplified above, 
becomes both an active and integral part of the relationships that it contains and remediates, 
as well as a deeply entangled part of the system that constitutes the interactive new media 
installation. This system includes the artists, the viewer/participant, the interface and the 
interactive new media installation itself.  By rethinking the digital interface in terms of its 
specific dynamism (as an object that acts and reacts) in interactive new media installations, I 
may begin to question how it is perceived by the viewer/participant, constructed and 
deployed by artists and utilized by the viewer/participant. It also allows me to begin to 
introduce a much more networked model of the digital interface in interactive new media 
installations –	one that (re)positions the relationship between the digital interface and the 
viewer/participant as co-constituted and relational. 
If the Digital Interface Is Obsolete, Then What Is a Digital Interface? 
The digital interface, for Galloway (2012), is the term used to describe the physical device 
that acts as the point of transition between the “different mediatic layers within any nested 
[technological] system”.293 He continues by positing that the interface is “assumed to be 
synonymous with media itself”	thus “any given format finds its identity merely in the fact 
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that it is a container for another format, the concepts of interface and medium quickly 
collapse into one and the same thing”.294 Digital interfaces, he states, are “effects,”	in the 
sense that “they bring about transformations in material states”.295 Therefore, echoing 
Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) famous phrase “the medium is the message”, Galloway posits 
that interfaces are “processes”, or more precisely, after-effects of these processes that “effect 
a result of whatever kind”	in the space that they are located in.296  
In his theorization, Galloway presents us with recognizable definitions of the interface: the 
threshold, the virtual window, the doorway, the cause and the after-effect. He then 
complicates them by acknowledging that the interface is not as rigid a form as his initial 
analysis may suggest.297  Through a close reading of François Dagognet’s book Faces, 
Surfaces, Interfaces (1982), Galloway admits that there are indeed “complex things that take 
place inside that threshold”.298  The interface, for Galloway, is not as transparent and simple a 
device as his examples (video games, commercial illustrations) and definitions (doorways, 
frames, windows) may indicate. Interfaces, he argues, exist on the boundary of “something 
else”, in that they construct and then maintain a “purely artificial distinction”	between “edge 
and center”.299 The interface is, he writes, “a fertile nexus…	a special place with its own 
autonomy, its own ability to generate new results and consequences”.300 By acknowledging 
the fact that the digital interface is an autonomous agent that has the potential to create 
change, Galloway recognizes (but does not actively articulate), the notion that the interface is 
a relational, co-constitutive form. Thus, he is able to offer a more media-ecological account 
of the digital interface.301   
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Branden Hookway (2011) builds on Galloway’s analysis, focusing on the digital interface 
and its uses in architecture and computer science.302  He describes the digital interface as a 
“theoretical mechanism: a form of relation defined by the simultaneity of processes of 
separation and augmentation”.303  He continues by stating that while the interface may seem 
to be a form of technology, it is “more properly a form of relating to technology”.304 
Therefore, the interface, to Hookway, is a biological and technical form of relation that is 
able to draw upon and produce both behavior and action, and to “ascribe meaning to the 
discrete elements it brings into relation as to the mutualism or system that is its end result”.305 
The direct acknowledgement of the relational qualities of the digital interface is one of the 
multiple things that differentiates Hookway’s definition from Galloway’s.306 I argue that it is 
precisely this acknowledgement that allows Hookway to begin to develop what he terms a 
more “rhizomatic”	theory of the interface.307  
Like Andersen and Pold’s notion of interface criticism, which advocates for a critical 
exploration of the relationship between the biological and the technological, Hookway’s 
theory involves an investigation into how “problems in the relationship between human and 
machine are worked through in the realm of the production of subjectivity and 
experience”.308 Contrary to Andersen and Pold, who believe that the essence of the interface 
lies in the fact that it is an assemblage, Hookway argues that the key to the interface rests in 
its ability to blur the boundary between the human and the machine.309  
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307 Branden Hookway. Interface: A Genealogy of Mediation and Control. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 
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309 Ibid., p. 290. Christian Ulrik Andersen and Søren Bro Pold. “Interface Criticism, Aesthetics Beyond 
Buttons” in Interface Criticism: Aesthetics Beyond Buttons. ed. Christian Ulrik Andersen and Søren Bro Pold. 
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While this blurring is of critical importance to the development of an interface theory, it can 
be, as Hookway cautions, problematic when directly applied to certain types of interfaces.310 
Blurring, he writes: “requires the adoption of an additional set of assumptions at a cultural 
level wherein humanness and machine-likeness are developed as metaphors to be applied to 
one another and the grounds of their essential difference are leveled.”311  Here, Hookway is 
stating that while very useful at times, the idea that the interface can blur the boundary 
between humans and machines can become highly contested when directly applied to certain 
deployments of the interface, as these theories are predicated on notions of sameness and 
employ normative definitions of intelligence.312 Echoing Lucy Suchman’s critical reading of 
the notions of symmetry and asymmetry, Hookway argues that a post-cybernetic interface 
theory must begin with the assumption that “an elision between the human and machine has 
already taken place, and that human subjectivity has already fully become a hybrid or cyborg 
subjectivity”.313  
 Additionally, the concept of blurring, as Hookway points out, also operates under the false 
assumption that the biological has seamlessly merged with the technological and become a 
hybrid form.314   Such an understanding of the digital interface, for Hookway, is questionable, 
because it positions the human and technology as equal.315 Not only that, but it takes for 
granted the hybrid nature of the digital interface and its ability to contribute to its 
environment. In doing this, I argue, and Hookway seems to agree, that the human and the 
nonhuman, their individual agencies and subjectivities, the differences between and their 
similarities to each other are sanitized and collapsed into a singular reified object, stripping 
away any possibility of hybridity from the interface other than through the actual rhetorical 
performance of it.316  
One way to combat the issues mentioned above, as Hookway informs us, is to make sure that 
this blurring is “always specific to its use within the interface where the issue of its 
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construction and transmission between human and machine is critical and problematic”.317 
Here Hookway is arguing for a theorization of the digital interface that takes its ability to blur 
the lines between the human and machine as medium- (or interface-) specific and 
inconsistent, instead of believing it to be a standardized, one-size-fits-all solution.318  The 
development of any interface theory that is predicated on the notion of the blurring of the 
human-machine boundary, Hookway explains, must begin “with an assumption of 
discontinuity”	between the two entities that are being analyzed.319 Analogous to notions of 
asymmetry as raised by Suchman, this discontinuity, as Hookway states, is described “not 
through similarities or as a smooth transition but rather as an encounter between entities that 
remain ultimately incommensurable and yet are nonetheless bound together”.320 
Incommensurability, he notes, does not equal illegibility, the way it does for Galloway.321 
The fact that the entities the interface consists of are all distinct from one another, for 
Hookway, does not render it unworkable.322  Rather, Hookway claims that the interface’s 
legibility lies in its “production of control”.323 Interface theory, to Hookway, then, is “not a 
study of how social and cultural factors have impacted the development of scientific methods 
of technology”.324 Instead, the interface (the technological), he states, enfolds the non-
technological (the human, the social).325  Enfoldment occurs in two ways: through the 
production of “a hybrid self”	and in its “operation upon its human subject”.326  By 
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approaching the notion of blurring as an integral yet problematic part of the digital interface, 
I argue that Hookway is able to position it as an asymmetrical form or medium. Thus, he is 
able to present a more dynamic theory of the interface –	a theory that I believe is far more 
meaningful and productive than its cybernetic predecessors.   
As mentioned above, Hookway states that the hybridity of the interface is produced through 
the maintenance of the boundary between the technical and the biological, while Galloway 
declares that the hybridity of the interface emerges through, and out of, its unworkability. 
This emphasis on the hybrid nature of the interface enables Galloway and Hookway to 
remain critical and avoid empty instrumentalism. However, I believe that their notions of 
hybridity when applied to the interface in interactive new media installations are troubling.  
This is because these notions assume intentionality (on behalf of artists and the 
viewer/participant) and suggest, among other things, that digital interfaces are produced, and 
thus become, hybrid forms through some sort of start-to-finish production process. In other 
words, I am arguing that Hookway and Galloway are conflating the open-ended nature of 
production and interaction –	processes, which Barad (2007) argues, are dynamic, complex 
and “continually reworked as a result of human, nonhuman and cyborgian forms of agency”	–	
with Fordist assembly line-like repetitions and maintenance of fixed mechanical processes.327 
So while they fit, to an extent, their specific fields and objects of study, Galloway and 
Hookway’s questions about the interface are more about how these hybrid commodities are 
produced, and the power that they may or may not carry, instead of hybridity itself. Suchman 
seems to confirm this line of argument: the power of technologies like digital interfaces, she 
writes, is attributed in part to their “transgressive hybridity, a ‘detached and machinist mode 
of production that provided intimate and private knowledge’	for anybody to see”.328 
Following on from Suchman, I suggest that the digital interface in interactive new media 
installations must not be understood in linear terms and reduced to a quantifiable mechanism 
of production, exchange, agency or power, but as consisting of multiple, open-ended centers 
of production, power and exchange.  More precisely, I argue that the digital interface should 
be seen as a relational and co-constitutive place of production, power and exchange existing 
among, and constantly communicating with, itself and with others.  Seen from this 
perspective, the digital interface is an integral part of the installation that it helps create.   
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Why, however, is it more productive to think about the digital interface in the terms described 
above? It is because thinking about the digital interface as a relational, co-constitutive entity 
that exists among and communicates with other similar, but different, entities allows me to 
begin to combat some of the more problematic aspects of theories of the interface, as well as 
provide some alternatives. For example, by conflating open-ended notions of production with 
linear cause and effect maintenance processes, Galloway and Hookway end up stripping the 
interface (the nonhuman entity) of agency.  They quantify and standardize, and thus erase, the 
differences that contribute to the construction of the digital interface as a hybrid entity. In 
doing this, they create boundaries between the human and the nonhuman, therefore their 
analysis of the digital interface reverts back to the same deterministic control paradigms that 
they criticize. Galloway and Hookway’s explorations then can not only be seen as theories of 
the digital interface, but I argue they can also, to an extent, be viewed as illustrations of the 
issues that occur when theorizing complex technological systems like digital interfaces.329 
However, what Hookway’s description of the interface and Galloway’s notion of 
unworkability do suggest is that the digital interface is “un-representable”	in the sense that 
the language used to define and describe the digital interface is in no way specific to it. This 
suggestion opens up possibilities for different theories of the digital interface to emerge –	
theories that position it, as Suchman does, as an “encounter among the efforts and effects of 
specifically situated persons and things”.330 These efforts, effects, persons and things operate 
in a specific cultural and historical framework that Suchman argues,	“takes autonomous 
agency not as an effect of cutting”	the system that they are a part of, but rather as “the 
precondition for participation in it”.331 Thus, the issue, as Suchman rightly points out, is less 
the attribution of agency to technology and more the fact that “our language for talking about 
agency… presupposes a field of discrete, self-standing entities”.332  As an alternative, she 
suggests we view interfaces as “entities achieved only through the on-going enactment of 
separateness and always in relation with others”.333   
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New media artist Daniel Rozin’s Rust Mirror (2009) provides one such example of 
Suchman’s suggestion above in the sense that it positions the digital interface as a hybrid 
entity –	one that is separate from (in that it is a different type of entity), but emerges out of 
and in conjunction with the viewer/participants’ interactions with it. Rust Mirror consists of a 
computer, mechanical motors, a camera and an audio system. It is rectangular in shape and its 
surface is covered in 768 rusted steel tiles.334 When a viewer/participant walks in front of 
Rust Mirror, the camera captures an image of her, which is sent to a computer, where it is 
processed.335  This newly processed data changes the state of the tiles. It sets them in motion 
causing them to tilt towards the light source, or down, towards the gravel, located at the base 
of the installation, which also reflects light.336 The tilting of the tiles creates an image of the 
viewer/participants’ body.337 (Figure 28) 
 
Figure 28: D. Rozin, Rust Mirror. (2009) 
If a viewer/participant walks directly up to the work to get a closer look, Rust Mirror is 
programmed to zoom in on the image of the viewer/participant and project an enlarged 
segment of the image onto its surface.338 The viewer/participant can control this image by 
moving her physical body. (Figure 29)   
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Figure 29: D. Rozin, Rust Mirror. (2009) 
For example, if a viewer/participant lifts a leg, or bends down to touch the gravel, the image 
located on the surface of the mirror also lifts a leg or bends down. In this way, the 
viewer/participant’s projected image becomes the digital interface.  This is because the image 
allows the viewer/participant to, among other things, navigate the installation and engage 
with the information projected onto the mirror. The more the viewer/participant interacts with 
the work, the more the tiles move or “rain”	until, as Rozin states: “the storm of rain droplets 
[the moving tiles] completely overcomes the image of the viewer, this also produces a loud 
rumble of rain produced by the motors and the tiles.”339 When the viewer/participant steps 
away from the work, the movement of the tiles settles and its surface returns to its original 
blank state.  
However, the projected image (the interface) is not a device that acts and reacts, or a 
transparent representation of meaning (of the artist) and intent (of the viewer/participant) and 
therefore they cannot be read in this way. Theorizing the digital interface like this is troubling 
as it simply replicates the notions raised above that interfaces, and their consequent functions 
and designs, are intentionally produced and then continually maintained as hybrid forms, that 
there is no real distinction between experiences and perceptions of the object, and thus it is 
simply the job of the media theorist to objectively examine them.340  It also imposes 
constraints on, as well as suppresses rather than promotes and encourages, creative 
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theorizations of the digital interface in interactive new media installations.  Instead, building 
on Suchman’s alternative approach to the digital interface briefly explained above, I argue 
that there is no ontological separation between the objects (the projected image, the tiles that 
make up the surface of the mirror, the gears and chips located in the mirror) and the subjects 
(the viewer/participant, the other human and nonhuman entities) located in the same space.341   
For instance, located inside Rust Mirror are a series of computer chips and mechanized 
motors.342  These motors flip the rusted steel tiles based on the pre-processed video stream 
that it has received from the camera, towards or away from the light source located directly 
above the piece.343 The image of the viewer/participant that appears on the mirror’s surface is 
based on the ability of the computer chips to break down an incoming, moving color video 
stream into a black-and-white image and then recreate and sustain this contrast between light 
and dark patterns. The digital interface in Rust Mirror then appears, but not through separate 
interactions of human and nonhuman agents or the maintenance of these interactions by some 
other invisible pre-programmed entity located inside the machine. Instead, it manifests itself 
through the interactions that the entities that constitute the artwork make in conjunction with 
each other. It is through this interaction that I suggest that each one of the 768 squares of 
rusted steel assumes a new identity and becomes a hybrid entity.  They each become a single 
pixel –	or a tiny digital interface –	working in conjunction with the other rusted steel sheets, 
gears, microchips, light source and the viewer/participant to become a part of a larger digital 
interface: the viewer/participant’s image.  
The fact that the each of these elements must interact in conjunction with each other to create 
the image suggests that the hybrid nature of the digital interface in this work is not inherent. 
For, as stated above, the image of the viewer/participant located on the surface of the mirror 
is the result of the open-ended and shifting interaction between the situated elements and 
entities located both inside and outside the installation space (Rozin, the gears, the rusted 
steel tiles, the viewer/participant interacting with the work and those observing it). Thus, the 
entities that form the mirror and their interactions with each other create change, or produce 
an image of a viewer/participant on the mirror’s surface. The image of the viewer/participant 
in Rust Mirror then, is called into being, becomes and is constantly becoming a digital 
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interface in and through the intra-actions (mutual co-constitution) that the viewer/participant 
makes with it.  Therefore, the digital interface in Rust Mirror can be seen as an example of 
Suchman’s understanding of interfaces as asymmetrical hybrid entities achieved through 
mutual co-constitution in the sense that they produce themselves. The digital interface is not 
only a reciprocal, active and integral part of Rust Mirror, but the projected image of the 
viewer/participant, as a digital interface, can be seen as a performative process –	one that 
emerges out of its similarities and differences in conjunction with itself.  
If the distinction between the digital interface and the viewer/participant in Rust Mirror is not 
inherent, and if the digital interface emerges as a performative process out of, and in 
conjunction with, itself, it could be suggested that the digital interface constitutes a 
relationship that is, as Hookway states,	“already given to be composed of the combined 
activities of human and machine”.344 A digital interface, he states, has “much to say about the 
processes by which it comes into being”.345  Thus, he rightly concludes, any attempt to define 
the digital interface would be difficult.  As he writes:  
What is essential in a description of the interface lies not in the description of the 
qualities of a substance or a thing but rather the qualities of a relation between 
substances or things; it is also to say that such a relating may have its own qualities 
and characteristics that are attendant to but otherwise independent of the substances or 
things that are brought into relation and that this relation may have its own tendencies 
and persistence such that it may be described as possessing a form.346  
Here, Hookway is suggesting that the interface is a form of relation –	one that draws upon its 
own effects, and the effects of others, and that performatively produces itself.347 When the 
digital interface is theorized as an active form of relation, it cannot be concretely defined as 
this or that. While the relationships and individual parts that make-up the digital interface can 
be stabilized or separated temporarily to fix a problem or conduct an investigation into how 
they work, the interface cannot be reduced down to its constituent elements. The digital 
interface only comes into being (it can be viewed as an entity in its own right) when the 
activity of the processes that it consists of “brings about the production of a state or system 
                                                
344 Branden Hookway. Interface: A Genealogy of Mediation and Control. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 
Princeton University. Ann Arbor: ProQuest/UMI 2011, p. 1.  
345 Ibid. 




that is mutually defined through the regulated and specified interrelations of those distinct 
entities or states”.348 Thus, Hookway argues, the digital interface is a paradox: one can 
describe, but cannot concretely define the digital interface.349  
An Exploration of its Processes 
Galloway reiterates Hookway’s sentiments, proposing a material and semiotic close reading 
of the interface.350 Yet Galloway’s aim is not to define or describe the digital interface.351 
Doing this, he suggests, would simply re-enact the specific historical relation that he sees the 
digital interface embodying.352 Rather, by proposing a material and semiotic close reading, 
Galloway hopes to “identify the interface itself as historical”, thus producing a perspective on 
how technical production and “the socio-historical situation”	can come together to create the 
form that is the digital interface.353  Galloway’s ultimate purpose, then, is to reveal that his 
specific approach to the digital interface “is itself an interface”.354  
To argue this point, Galloway embarks on his exploration of the digital interface from the 
perspective of its supposed significations, concentrating on the specific areas of storing, 
transmitting and processing.355  He continues by stating that these significations are not the 
conditions of media, rather they are modes of mediation.356 Drawing on the notion of 
dispositif as theorized by Giles Deleuze (1992), Galloway argues that digital interfaces are 
techniques or after-effects of the “physical systems of power they mobilize, that is more on 
the curves of visibility and lines of force”.357  Therefore, the movement from thinking about 
media to mediums, to mediation,	from defining digital interfaces as empty objects, to 
describing them as symmetrical possibilities, to exploring them as performative processes, as 
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linear as it may be, for Galloway is crucial.358 This is because this movement reveals, among 
other things, different modes of storage, transmission, processing and interacting that may or 
may not have been accessible or apparent before.359  Thus, he suggests a rethinking of the 
digital interface is not along the lines of “what is its definition?”	or “what are its 
possibilities?”360 This is because he argues that the digital interface is not “of an ontological 
condition, it is on that condition”	and, as such, the digital interfaces “does not facilitate or 
make reference to a specific arrangement of being, it remediates the very conditions of being 
itself”.361  
Therefore, Galloway finds notions raised by Manovich, and to a certain extent Andersen and 
Pold, mentioned above, problematic in that they hold that the digital interface must be 
defined in reference to a specific “language”	or described in terms of its material 
construction.  Defining the interface in reference to a language, among other things, leads to, 
as Galloway writes,	“a number of political and theoretical problems, the least of which is that 
it forecloses on contingency and historicity”	of the entity being studied.362 If we take this to 
be the case, if as Galloway and Hookway argue, the interface is not the definition of a 
condition, or a description of the possibilities of these conditions, but rather a critical 
exploration of them, then any attempt on my behalf to redefine the digital interface (as a sum 
total of its collective parts) or to separate it and then describe it based on the activities that 
these separate parts perform (communication, mediation, navigation), would only replicate 
the aforementioned dualisms that caused this definition to become inadequate in the first 
place.  
Despite these crucial elaborations of the interface as a form of relation, it is not clear if 
Galloway or Hookway succeed in escaping the determinist definitions that they claim their 
rhizomatic descriptions and methodological cocktail-like approaches of, and to, the interface 
avoid.  Although they protest against it, I argue that neither Hookway nor Galloway are fully 
able to avoid defining the digital interface as a sum total, or as an after-effect, of its relational 
parts. Thus, they end up reducing the digital interface to a facilitator: an epiphenomenon, a 
tool in service of “something else”	(in both cases the socio-political) that they deem to be 
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more important.  This, combined with the gap that exists in Galloway’s theorization of the 
digital interface, seems to leave a question mark over Hookway’s ability to articulate in clear 
terms how and why it is that the “interface as a form of relation emergent and operational 
from within a genealogy of mediation and control”	accounts for the way aesthetic and 
cultural experiences contribue to, thus (re)shape, the digital interface.363 Therefore, questions 
surrounding the artistic deployments and the power the aesthetic aspects of the interface hold 
seem to hang in the air, unaddressed, in both of these texts.364 While theorized as co-
extensive, the digital interface in their works functions as a symmetrical tool, a means to an 
end. Thus, these theorists do not so much remove, but ultimately alienate, the 
viewer/participant from the artistic process of both the artwork they are examining and the 
digital interface.  As such, Galloway and Hookway’s theorizations of digital interfaces only 
widens what Cramer (2011) sees as a rift between “the two cultures of science and 
humanities, engineering and contemporary art”.365  The type of interface that Galloway and 
Hookway propose, then, could be criticized for reducing the interface to a series of visual 
tropes, but also for perpetuating the notion that interfaces in fine art contexts are simply, as 
Cramer argues,	“[a] pleasing rendering of visible, audible and touchable controls”. 366 This is 
because Galloway and Hookway stretch the notion of the aesthetic in such a way that the 
examples they use to support their theorizations, to borrow Cramer’s words, “miss the mark 
of any critical contemporary aesthetics”.367 In this way, I argue that Galloway and 
Hookway’s analyses of the interface have, to a certain extent, removed themselves from 
contemporary aesthetic discourses, outside what is seen as functional play (video games), or 
utilitarian, craft-based systems (architecture, commercial illustration). Instead of being seen 
as aesthetic representations of interfaces operating from within a fine-art context (as both 
Galloway and Hookway claim they are), these examples become metaphors for the socio-
political and technical processes that they see the interface consisting of.  
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In summary, Galloway and Hookway correctly call for a relational theorization of the digital 
interface. Ironically, however, they seem to assume that this relation and its consequential 
descriptions are ultimately derived from the socio-political and technical realms. They then 
support this theorization with utilitarian or craft-based aesthetic examples. That is to say, in 
Galloway and Hookway’s aesthetic theorizations, there is very little fine art, and the fine art 
that does exist has been replaced with a socio-political ideology. I suggest that their theories 
of the digital interface fail to recognize, thus do not account for, the role that the aesthetic 
plays in the formation of the digital interface as an active and relational form. Hookway’s 
“rhizomatic”	descriptions and Galloway’s methodological cocktail-like approaches of, and to, 
the digital interface then become exactly what they attempt to avoid –	a reductionist 
definition of the interface as an after-effect of, or mediator between this and that, therefore 
simplifying the complex and ongoing relationships that the interface embodies.   
So if, the digital interface constitutes a mutually productive relationship between the social, 
the political and the technical, and if the digital interface produces and constantly is 
producing itself, then what aspects of these processes are theorists like Galloway and 
Hookway actually accounting for? Are their theorizations of the interface as simply a socio-
political and technical form the end result of a purely human or biological behavior?  If so, 
how can we begin to develop an understanding of the digital interface that takes into 
consideration the dimensions that were intentionally or unintentionally excised?  
To begin to unravel the meaning of these questions, we might consider Kelly Heaton’s 
interactive new media installation The Pool (2000-2001).368  The Pool consists of a 90”	x 90”	
custom-designed wall.369  The wall is painted white and shaped to resemble a meniscus.370  
Embedded into the wall are four hundred toy robots called Furby.371 The Furby have been 
modified from their original state.  Heaton has stripped them of their plush coverings and 
wired them together.  She has then encased them in the wall so that only their “eyes”	and 
“beaks”	are visible to the viewer/participant. The disembodied Furby parts are arranged along 
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the wall in such a way that they mimic a scientific diagram of the molecular structure of 
water.372 (Figures 30 & 31) 
 
Figure 30: K. Heaton, The Pool. (2000-2001).   
 
Figure 31: K. Heaton, The Pool. (2000-2001).   
Subjected to manipulation, each Furby is chopped-up, gutted, reconfigured and they assume 
multiple new identities: a molecule, a specimen, a pixel, a digital interface, a subject and an 
object. Heaton has literally dissected both the conceptual idea of “The Furby”	and the 
physical Furby itself, and corporeally transformed it, using its various parts to engender 
different artistic deployments of the digital interface. The Pool then explores notions about 
what the digital interface is, or could be, and by doing this Heaton reconfigures the digital 
interface as a source of uncertainty and potentiality. Although Heaton’s deployment of the 
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Furby as interface challenges us to think critically about notions like singularity (of the 
interface) and separation (of the object and the subject) in interactive new media art 
installations, her interface is a cybernetic one.373   
Coined by Norbert Wiener in 1965, cybernetics is a term that names a “very general science 
of control and communication in the animal and the machine”.374 Cybernetics is a way to 
regulate machine-based systems by measuring their actual performance in real-time and 
feeding the results of this performance back into the machine, creating a continual feedback 
loop.375 The purpose of this feedback loop according to Wiener, is “to control the mechanical 
tendency towards disorganization; in other words, to produce a temporary and local reversal 
of the normal direction of entropy”.376 Hayles (1999) critiques Wiener’s notion of 
cybernetics, arguing that the premise of Wiener’s cybernetic feedback loop (a way to control 
and manage information and interaction between the human and machine) disembodies the 
human subject, and creates boundaries between humans and nonhumans, thus exposing, 
among other things, an oppressive Cartesianism.377  As she writes: “When the physical 
boundaries of the human form are secure, he [Wiener] celebrates the flow of information 
through the organism.  All this changes, however, when the boundaries cease to define an 
autonomous self, either through manipulation or engulfment.”378  
These problems occur because the science of cybernetics, as Søren Brier (2008) states, 
“focuses not on being but on behavior: it does not ask, ‘what is this thing?’	but instead, ‘what 
does it do?’	Or how can we make a thing that does this?”379  Therefore, the technologies 
examined and developed in first-wave cybernetics are not self-referential or autopoietic.380 
The entities studied, as Brier argues, are “all allopoietic, that is created and made by 
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something else, some other system”.381 Echoing Brier, Hayles and Wiener’s theories and then 
building on them, a cybernetic interface from within the context of new media art, according 
to Pold (2011), is a form that is “constructed through a remediation of older representational 
forms… complete with their various traditions, genres and media characteristics”.382 It also 
incorporates cybernetic feedback and interaction, in that it allows the viewer/participant to 
“interact with its representations and it registers the user and his/her interactions through 
input devices, sensors and tracking”.383 Therefore, a cybernetic interface for Pold is a form 
that simultaneously builds on and incorporates “media history and aesthetic traditions of how 
to represent things in a way that are distinguishable and meaningful to human perception”, 
and a computerized mechanism that contains “an action-reaction pattern which, through 
sensors, input devices, tracking, data-mining and surveillance, registers the recipient and 
incorporates his/her responses and reactions”.384  In this way, the cybernetic interface in new 
media art, he argues, is able to construct its own perceptional and representational feedback 
loop.385   
Applying these notions to The Pool, the Furbys may exist as interfaces on many levels 
between hardware (physical motors, wires, computer chips), software (the layers of code that 
makes the installation and the interfaces work), human (the viewer/participant) and 
nonhuman (cybernetic robots). While they may demonstrate how art has the potential to 
critically explore and reconfigure notions of objects and subjects, and while they can be seen 
as a representational medium that is used for cultural production and experience, they are 
ultimately cybernetic toys. The digital interface (the Furby) is a cybernetic machine that, as 
Pold argues, treats all of the information in the installation “as sort of generalized, statistical 
text with no access to the ontology or semantics”	of the information that it is receiving and 
processing (such as the viewer/participant movements or the meaning of her speech).386 
However, in the specific context of The Pool, the interface can also become an aesthetic form 
that has the ability to allow the viewer/participant to make conscious and unconscious 
                                                
381 Søren Brier. “Cybernetics” in The Routledge Companion to Literature and Science. ed. Bruce Clarke and 
Manuela Rossini. (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 90. Allopoietic or allopoiesis refers to a system that produces 
something outside the system itself. (Brier, 2011) 
382 Søren Bro Pold. “The Cybernetic Mentality and Its Critics: Ubermorgen.com” in Interface Criticism: 
Aesthetics Beyond Buttons. ed. Christian Ulrik Andersen and Søren Bro Pold. (Arhaus, DK: Arhaus University 
Press, 2011), p. 91. This definition is applied directly to the interface in net.art artist Ubermorgen.com’s work.  
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connections between machine, representation and culture. Thus, the interface in this work is 
simultaneously a technical tool, functional medium and an aesthetic form. While this 
designation as both technical tool, functional medium and aesthetic form demonstrates its 
cultural potential, it needs to be examined critically. This is because the Furby is a cybernetic 
system that statistically measures, interprets and records all the information in the 
environment that it is located in, and the human interacting with this device is always a part 
of this information.  
For instance, each Furby in The Pool, according to Heaton, is “actuated by a motor to achieve 
two visible states, open (and talking) or closed (and silent)”.387  In addition, each Furby 
contains a microcontroller that prompts it to “speak”	in response to the proximity of the 
viewer/participant.388  To recap: when a viewer/participant walks into the exhibition space, 
she sees a large white wall covered from top to bottom with disembodied sleeping Furby 
faces. As she approaches the wall, a custom designed infrared detection system picks up her 
presence and causes the Furbys to open their eyes.  If she walks right up to the wall, the 
Furbys respond to her by opening their beaks and “speaking”.389  
Thus, the distinction between digital interface (the object, the nonhuman) and the 
viewer/participant (the subject, the human) becomes blurred.  Blurring occurs in this instance 
because the Furby is self-referential.  It has the ability to “speak”	and respond to speech.  In 
this way, the Furby can be perceived by the viewer/participant as “intelligent”	because it has 
displayed the elementary human-like ability of speech.  While this self-referential “talk”	may 
have the potential to encourage interesting types of human-to-human and human-to-computer 
interactions, the literal human-to-machine communication in this work can quickly become 
an issue.  Particularly because it creates, among other things, a highly constrained looped 
dialogue between the viewer/participant and the interface.  This dialogue, when theorized in 
combination with the blurring of the human-machine boundary, implies, as mentioned earlier, 
a generalized symmetry, rather than relationality between humans and technology.  And this, 
of course, creates a range of problems, one of which is the personification of machines. The 
personification of machines tends to occur because, as Suchman (2007) argues, humans have 
a tendency to “ascribe full intelligence [to computerized forms] on the basis of partial 
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evidence”.390 She continues by stating that as soon as these computational forms look, or act, 
remotely human, subjects will endow the computational form with other human-like traits 
and abilities. She further contends that subjects “take appearances as evidence for, or the 
document of, an ascribed underlying reality, while taking the reality so ascribed as a resource 
for the interpretation of the appearance”.391 
To put this differently, although the deployment of the digital interface in The Pool may 
highlight the uncertainty and potentiality that occur when objects and subjects are able to blur 
the lines between the human and the machine, the cybernetic character of the digital 
interface, as Pold states, “pervades both the machine and the medium”.392 Therefore, this 
particular deployment of the digital interface in The Pool could be read as problematic 
because the cybernetic functions of the Furby could be seen to influence the 
viewer/participants’ interactions with the digital interface and the way the viewer/participant 
and the digital interface are positioned and analyzed. In this sense, the relationship between 
the digital interface and the viewer/participant, while active, is not co-constitutive.  Rather, 
the aforementioned relationship in The Pool is presented to the viewer/participant as 
symmetrical.  This is precisely because the blurring of the human-machine boundary (which 
occurs when a viewer/participant attempts to “talk”	to the Furbys) incorporates the 
viewer/participant into it. Thus the viewer/participant becomes, to a certain extent, part of the 
interface’s cybernetic system herself.  
However, The Pool, with its dissected cybernetic interface, its symmetrical subjects and 
objects, and its self-referential dialogue, could be seen as an example of an artwork that 
critically questions concepts of equivalence, seamlessness and erasure, exposes their flaws 
and then turns them back against themselves. It does this not through outright opposition, but 
through replication and parody. In this way, I suggest that the digital interface in The Pool, 
and The Pool as an installation, is a playful cybernetic criticism of a cybernetic system. For 
example, rather than arguing against a system and a mode of thinking that it is an integral and 
active part of, The Pool, with its fragmented interface (the cybernetic Furby) and its 
underlying scientific significance (the shape of its wall, the arrangement of the Furbys and 
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Heaton’s dual role as artist and taxidermist), could be understood as questioning the validity 
of, and then poking fun at, this cybernetic system and its dubious claims of relation.  Instead 
of expanding discussions around seamlessness or how humans retain a distinct form that is 
categorically different from technology, even though the two can be “interactively coupled”, 
I argue that The Pool exposes the flaws in and around cybernetic systems and human-
machine couplings through parodying itself. In doing this, The Pool provides its 
viewer/participants with both an alternative and a means to exploit this goal-oriented 
cybernetic thinking.  
Galloway explores ideas surrounding cybernetics, mutual co-constitution and its associated 
issues discussed above and applies them to the digital interface in video games. He states that 
these concepts, operating in conjunction with the scientific disciplines of game theory, 
systems theory, information theory and behaviorism, all point to second-wave cybernetics.393 
He argues that with second-wave cybernetics, concepts such as play in video games, or other 
creative pursuits such as interactive new media installations, adopt	“a special interest in 
homeostasis and systemic interaction”.394 “The worlds’	entities”, as Galloway posits, “are no 
longer contained and contextless but are forever operating within ecosystems of interplay and 
correspondence.”395  As such, second-wave cybernetics, he writes, is an amalgamate of socio-
cultural production, romanticism and systems theory that is centered on “economic flows and 
balances, multilateral associations between things, a resolution of complex systemic 
relationships via mutual experimenting, mutual compromise, mutual engagement”.396  Thus, 
an interface in cybernetic terms is a place where information passes from one entity to 
another, from one node to the next, in a nested system.397  This definition is important for 
Galloway, as it allows him to suggest that the interface is first and foremost “a control 
allegory”.398 By control allegory he means that the digital interface in the context of second-
wave cybernetics is theorized as a networked, computer-centric mode of interaction –	one 
that allows subjects to move and act “freely”	and navigate without being confined, yet still be 
controlled (subjects actions are site-specific and constrained by the underlying rules of the 
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program itself).399 Digital interfaces, Galloway argues, can be seen as apparatuses of power 
and control because they regulate and confine communication and interaction between 
entities.400  Thus, he writes: “despite its unsexy presence informatics of control is precisely 
the most important thing… if one wishes to allegorize power today.”401  
However, the interface in acting as a control allegory, Galloway states,	“asks a question and, 
in so doing, suggests an answer”.402 If we take this to be the case, if the interface really does 
ask questions and suggest answers, thus indicating a way towards a specific methodological 
stance, then the main issue at stake when proposing an alternative theorization of the digital 
interface is to critically examine, and then attempt to answer, the question posed by the 
digital interface, whatever it may be, and in whatever context it is being studied.  I argue that 
the question that the anthropomorphized, cybernetic Furby in The Pool is posing to us (as 
well as the question that the digital interfaces in all the interactive installations explored in 
this chapter are also asking), is the following: What actually counts as a viewer/participant, 
and what actually counts as a digital interface in interactive new media installations?  This in 
itself, I suggest, is a question of agency and autonomy insofar as it aligns itself with what 
Suchman states is the “longstanding feminist concern”	with the problem of who and what is 
recognized as an autonomous subject, and who and what is not, in discourse in the STS and 
humanities fields.403  Following on from Suchman, I argue that my often repeated phrase 
“what exactly is a digital interface?”	is not so much a question about actions (of the 
viewer/participant) and responses to these actions by the digital interface. I posit it is a 
question of who or what is recognized as a digital interface (an object), who and what is not 
and how and why these interfaces emerge in interactive new media installations.  An 
investigation into this question points to some of the inadequacies in the theories of the 
digital interface discussed thus far, specifically to the manner in which their analysis of the 
interface as a socio-political after-effect or control allegory reinforces, among other things, 
the binary of visibility/invisibility.404  In this regard, Galloway’s interpretation of Norman 
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Rockwell’s iconic illustration Triple Self-Portrait (1960) serves as an interesting critical 
example to conclude this chapter with.405 (Figure 32)  
 
Figure 32: N. Rockwell, Triple Self-Portrait. (1960).   
Triple Self-Portrait, according to Galloway,	“presents a dazzling array of various 
interfaces”.406  By various interfaces, he is referring to the frame, mirror, canvas, the images 
of the artists contained in the illustration and to the illustration itself.407 The images of the 
frame, mirror and canvas, to Galloway, are interfaces because they perform (through the acts 
of framing and reflecting) a mediating function.408  The images located in the frame, mirror 
and the canvas, are interfaces as well because they depict information differently. For 
example, Galloway claims that the image located in the mirror is subjective because it is 
expressive, whereas the image located on the canvas is objective because it is presented to the 
viewer as technical or mechanic. The images on the sides of the canvas are also interfaces, he 
writes, because they are “a prototypical interfaces of early sketches…	serving as a prehistory 
of malformed image production”.409 In short, these images are interfaces because they are 
archaeological –	they provide the viewer with historical and theoretical background into the 
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art-making process.  Finally, the illustration itself is an interface because, Galloway argues, it 
augments the interaction occurring between the viewer and the magazine.410  
What Galloway is doing in his analysis is presenting us with four different types of objects: 
objects that mediate information (the frame, the canvas, the mirror), objects that interpret or 
translate information (the images of Rockwell), objects that act as a transparent layer between 
the processes that brings information into being and the information itself (the sketches of the 
artists on the side of the canvas) and, finally, objects that augment or supplement the viewer’s 
interaction with information (the illustration). He then positions these objects as interfaces 
precisely because they frame, mediate, interpret and supplement information. Thus, 
Galloway’s analysis engages the status of the interface (the iconic nature of certain types of 
interfaces: doors, windows, frames) but also the reification of it through the artistic process. 
The elements appearing in the illustration however do not become interfaces just because 
they have the ability to perform the aforementioned functions. Instead, Galloway rightly 
suggests that one must examine the “local relationships”	and ask how these relationships 
work together to produce objects (the interface) and subjects (viewer/participants) in 
artworks.411  
As argued at the beginning of this chapter, representationalist approaches are rooted in 
Cartesian modes of thinking in that they replicate notions of separation and distance. Due to 
the enforced fragmentation that they impose upon reality and that they then take for a 
supposedly objective picture of the world, they should be regarded, as Barad rightly states, 
with suspicion.412  Barad continues this line of thought via a close reading of Judith Bulter’s 
(1990) critique of representational systems. Simply put, representational systems, Barad 
states, form, define and reproduce subjects and objects, and they do this “in accordance with 
the requirements of those structures.”413 Representationalism, then (re)produces subjects and 
objects, and these subjects and objects reflect the underlying politics or beliefs of the 
systems, philosophies and philosophers they represent.  If we take this to be the case, then the 
system that Galloway employs to theorize and designate the objects in Triple Self-Portrait as 
digital interfaces is a result of a very specific representationalist politics.  In Galloway’s case, 
this representational politics revolves around how cultural production and politics are 
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interfaced together to produce a very specific socio-historical situation.  The specific socio-
historical situation that Galloway sees the digital interface reproducing is “the new 
economy”.414 The digital interfaces, and by effect the subjects viewing them, then, are 
products of that representational system. In this way, Galloway’s claims about the interfaces 
found in Triple Self-Portrait fall short of the arguments he makes about interfaces throughout 
his book	–	specifically his suggestion that the interface is not a thing, but is an effect of the 
larger forces that engender them.415 Hence, his refrain “not media but mediation”.416 
Galloway engages with these processes throughout his book.  He analyzes the aesthetic 
(artifice, the mediation of time, diegetic space), socio-cultural (via a comparison of Triple 
Self-Portrait and Richard A. Williams Untitled (Alfred E. Neuman Self-Portrait (2002)) and 
technical processes in his reading of Triple Self-Portrait. However, he is more concerned 
with designating the end products (which, ironically enough, are always images of objects or 
things) as interfaces than with interrogating how and why the underlying processes are 
significant to the creation of the artwork.  Given this, the images, frames, mirrors and 
canvases cannot be seen as interfaces because the processes that Galloway previously 
claimed are an integral part in the formation of the interface are tossed aside in lieu of a more 
important socio-political agenda. Thus, the digital interfaces become ciphers: empty, yet 
pretty vessels of Galloway’s unconscious disregard for the processual aspects of the interface, 
more than a visual articulation of the relations that bring it into being.  
So, Galloway’s analysis may interrogate what an interface actually is, and he may, to an 
extent, refigure notions of what an interface actually does in an artwork, but he does so 
through an erasure of the underlying processes that are significant to its creation. This erasure 
means that some subjects are considered important, thus the effects they have on the artwork 
they are located in are visible.  Others are deemed insignificant, therefore they remain hidden 
in the background of the work. In this way, it could be argued that the “interfaces”	in 
Galloway’s analysis of Triple Self-Portrait end up becoming singular and fixed things, 
because they are the results of a singular and fixed process.  This example then serves not 
only to elucidate what types of objects or subjects appear, or are visible, in artworks but also 
to articulate how particular theories of the digital interface themselves accept 
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representationalism unquestioningly, and thus work against notions of multiplicity and 
difference, in the sense of simply ignoring them in order to elevate certain types of subjects at 
the expense of others.  
While none of the above mentioned attributes (the interface’s ability to mediate, to frame, to 
act and react) and aspects (the biological, the technical, the socio-political, the cultural, the 
aesthetic) definitively represents, defines or describes the digital interface, they do contribute 
to its constitution. In a way they also extend its scope to encompass a wider range of forms 
by becoming part of the digital interface in and through the viewer/participant’s interactions 
with it in interactive new media installations. However, when the aesthetic aspects of the 
interface disappear from sight, critical reflection on and theorization of artworks and 
technologies becomes difficult – time becomes linear and, to an extent, serialized, thus 
exclusions are enacted.  This perhaps points to the main reason why the aesthetic aspects of 
the interface have been overlooked or misrepresented in academic texts on the interface: 
aesthetics, especially the aesthetics of the interface, as demonstrated throughout this chapter, 
is generally treated by theorists as a secondary characteristic. However, once made visible, 
aesthetics, as will be seen in the next chapter, can be used to intervene and produce ruptures 




Chapter 2: The Body and the Interface 
 
In the previous chapter, I explored recent scholarly texts that attempt to rethink the digital 
interface in the humanities.417 Narratives of the digital interface were presented and analyzed 
in relation to the previously posited theories around technology that they replicate, and the 
series of socio-political and cultural anxieties or concerns (automation, labor, interaction and 
control, inaccessibility, and incomprehensibility) that the digital interface comes to 
represent.418  Re-reading these narratives, I proposed an alternative theory of the digital 
interface –	one that positions it as an aesthetic process.  
I will develop this idea further, proposing a reconsideration of the relationship between the 
body and technology. Issues around the body as the site of power and control, and the 
changes to the relationship between humans and technology that the use of the digital 
interface in interactive new media installations may create, as posited in the introduction and 
preface, are the central focus of this chapter. I will present an analysis of the relationship 
between the body and technology as co-constitutive – a mutually entangled and 
collaboratively produced experience. I will outline what is at stake in this reconsideration, 
suggesting that the relationship between the body and technology in interactive new media 
installations is unstable, uncertain and, to a certain extent, open to reconfiguration by the 
viewer/participant. As mentioned earlier, the body in this thesis is theorized in posthumanist 
terms: as an unstable, open-ended hybrid of machine and organism, one that questions 
previously posited notions of power, control, agency and subjectivity.419 Technology, as 
discussed above, is understood in Bernard Steigler’s terms: it is seen as an integral part, and 
extension, of our humanness.420 The body and technology are theorized as such in order to 
signal the fact that the interactions that emerge out of the relationship between the 
viewer/participant (the body) and the digital interface (technology) are dynamic, open-ended 
and performed, to an extent, by the viewer/participant.  
Before I expand this theory further I would like to address in more detail, the potential and 
the challenges that my reconceptualization of the relationship between the body and 
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114 
 
technology poses to my alternative theory of the digital interface. Who or what constitutes the 
relationship between the body and technology in interactive new media installations?  How 
does the artist creating the digital interface and the viewer/participant interfacing with it 
reconfigure this relationship?  How might a more entangled reconceptualization of the 
relationship between the body and technology help us find alternative routes into, and 
different ways of thinking about, the interface in interactive new media installations?   
While a detailed study of the relationship between the body and technology will not provide 
concrete answers to the ontological questions of the digital interface discussed thus far (i.e. 
“what is a digital interface?”	and “why is a digital interface a digital interface?”), it is exactly 
these types of questions that should be asked and these types of relationships that should be 
explored if we are to adequately grasp the complex nature of the digital interface in 
interactive new media installations.  For as Joost van Loon (2008) writes, when it comes to 
(re)theorizing media-technological agents, we must pay particular attention to the 
relationships that bring them into being, as well as the specific contexts that they operate 
in.421 Following on, if we are to appreciate the complex nature of the digital interface in 
interactive new media installations, then what is needed is an in-depth study of the 
relationships that bring it into being and of how they manifest themselves in interactive new 
media installations. Specifically, I suggest, what is needed is a critical exploration and 
understanding of the relationship between the body and technology – one that approaches, 
and then analyzes this relationship as an entangled and performative experience in interactive 
new media installations. 
In what follows, I will discuss the interest expressed in the humanities in developing different 
understandings of the relationship between the body and technology.  In particular, I will 
concentrate on theories that offer, as mentioned above, a more entangled and performative 
approach to analyzing the relationship between the body and technology in media 
installations (Jones, (2000, 2006); Barad, (2003, 2006); Mondloch, (2010); Stern, (2013); 
Jeong (2014)).  What is at stake in proposing such an alternative of the relationship between 
the body and technology? What is it that makes a more entangled and performative approach 
to this relationship more appealing than other representational, phenomenological or 
psychoanalytical ones? And why is it important? 
                                                
421 Joost van Loon. Media Technology: Critical Perspectives. (Maidenhead: McGraw Hill/Open University 
Press, 2008), p. 10.  
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Both Nathaniel Stern (2013) and Karen Barad (2003, 2006) ask and then answer similar 
questions. Stern, for example, argues that the relationship between the body and technology 
is always “performed and always emergent”.422  He positions the notion of performativity in 
his text as a “figure of thought”, a “quality”	of entities and relationships in interactive new 
media installations, one that, he writes, “encompasses bodily emergence not in the between 
of pre-existing entities…but of the relation of them together”.423 A more performative 
approach to theorizing these relationships, according to Stern, is significant, as he believes it 
allows scholars in the humanities to develop a more processual understanding of concepts of 
the body, embodiment and their relationship to technology in interactive new media 
installations, one that takes into consideration the emergent qualities of the human body, 
interaction and their relation to technology.424  
Taking a different approach to these questions, Barad posits that the move towards more 
performative and entangled theorizations of the relationship between the body and 
technology is important, as it “shifts the focus from questions of correspondence between 
descriptions and reality… to matters of practices/doings/actions”.425 Here, Barad is arguing 
that a more performative understanding of discursive practices, like, HCI, presents a 
challenge to previously posited representationalist structures, and other similar modes of 
thinking.426 It shifts the focus of scholars away from thinking about technology in terms of 
perceived affordances and physical constraints towards a more entangled theorization, one 
that positions technology as inseparable from the human.427 In doing this, Barad argues 
performativity pushes against “traditional realist beliefs”	that she states are linked to “the idea 
that beings exist as individuals with inherent attributes, anterior to their representation”	or 
simply perpetuate an endless cycle of “unattainable options”.428 Thus, she brings important 
questions about key concepts of emergence, embodiment, agency and entanglement to the 
                                                
422 Nathaniel Stern. Interactive Art and Embodiment: The Implicit Body as Performance. (Canterbury, UK: 
Gyliphi Limited, 2013), p. 59. 
423 Ibid., pp. 59, 60.  
424 Ibid., pp. 60, 61.  
425 Karen Barad. “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of how Matter Comes to Matter.” in 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. vol. 28, no. 3. 2003, p. 802. Representationalism, for Barad, is 
the “belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they purport to represent; in 
particular that which is represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing.” (Barad, 2007) 
426 Ibid.  
427 Ibid., p. 822.  
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fore.429 I echo Barad and Stern’s theorizations, suggesting that a more performative and 
entangled understanding of relationships (like the one between the viewer/participant and the 
digital interface in interactive new media installations) is significant, as it allows these 
relationships to come into view not as pre-coded results of pre-programmed cybernetic 
systems, but rather as in-process happenings or doings that emerge out of, and with, the 
viewer/participants’ interactions with the digital interface in interactive new media 
installations.  
Notions of entanglement and emergence in this chapter are understood in Barad’s terms. 
Entanglement, Barad argues, is not a singular or individual occurrence, as entities such as 
human bodies and technological apparatuses are not ontologically separate. They do not pre-
exist their relations with each other.430 To be entangled is not simply to be intertwined with 
another, as in the joining of separate entities, but to lack, she writes, “an independent, self-
contained existence”.431 Similar to entanglement, the concept of emergence, for Barad, is not 
an event that “happens once and for all”.432 What often appears as separate entities with 
completely different concerns to the scholar studying them, she states, “does not actually 
entail a relation of absolute exteriority”.433 Rather this relationship, for Barad, is processual.  
It is a doing, an enactment of boundaries –	one that always includes exclusions.434  In Barad’s 
case, these exclusions include, among others, the agency of nonhuman entities.  In the case of 
this thesis, these limitations include the aesthetic processes, the relationships between them 
and most importantly, the possible effects that they may have on the viewer/participant’s 
experiences with the digital interface in interactive new media installations.   
Thus, more subtle but no less significant to this chapter is the potential that more 
performative and entangled reconsiderations of the relationship between the body and 
technology might have for interactive new media art installations. In particular, I will explore 
                                                
429 It is important to note that Barad expresses skepticism about the adoption of more performative approaches 
to theorizing discursive practices. These approaches, she warns us, are not an excuse “to turn everything 
(including material bodies) into words”. Rather, they are “a contestation of the unexamined habits of mind that 
grant language and other forms of representation more power in determining our ontologies that they deserve.” 
In simpler terms, discursive practices and discourses, for Barad, are not synonyms for language, but rather she 
views them as a set of constraints that dictate, to an extent, what can be said, who or what can say it and what 
counts. (Barad, 2007, p. 133)  
430 Karen Barad. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglements of Matter and 
Meaning. (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), Preface and Acknowledgements.  
431 Ibid.   
432 Ibid.  
433 Ibid., p. 135.  
434 Ibid., Preface and Acknowledgements. 
117 
 
the possibilities these reconsiderations have in opening up both spaces for criticism, and 
allowing for certain destabilizing effects to occur. These effects, include, but are not limited 
to: the possible creation of ruptures in traditional artistic practices and narratives, the 
destabilization of binary notions such as the division between the material and the 
informational, a rethinking of the boundaries between the artist and the viewer/participant, 
and a renegotiation of social and private space.   
Critical explorations of the effects that a more entangled and performative theorization of the 
relationship between the body and technology may bring about are already underway.435 
However, these understandings, when specifically applied to the digital interface and 
interactive new media installations, remain, to an extent, at a superficial level. I argue that an 
in-depth analysis of the potential effects that the relationship between the body and 
technology may have on the way the viewer/participant interacts with and thinks about the 
digital interface in academic literature is, to an extent, lacking. The way the 
viewer/participant interacts with the interface should have an effect on interactive new media 
installations, and the majority of the theorizations around this relationship state as such.  
However, how these effects are analyzed in these texts brings about a rather limiting concept 
of the relationship between the body and technology, one that positions it as static and 
representational, rather than ongoing or open to reconfiguration.  This limitation, I argue, is 
one of emphasis and focus. Specifically, it is a matter of what entity or relationship the 
scholar is placing emphasis on (the body or technology, the viewer/participant or the 
interface, the artwork, the artist or the subject’s experience) and what effect(s) of the 
aforementioned relationships or entities the scholar is interrogating (the socio-political, the 
technical, the biological).  
A good example of how this limitation manifests itself can be found in Galloway’s text on 
interfaces (The Interface Effect, 2010) and Stern’s book on interactive new media art 
installations (Interactive Art and Embodiment: The Implicit Body as Performance, 2013).436 
Interfaces, Galloway argues, are not things, but processes that “effect a result of whatever 
                                                
435 See Barad, 2003, 2006; Friedberg, 2006; Jones, 2006; Galloway, 2010; Mondloch, 2010; Jeong, 2013; 
Simanowski, 2013; Stern 2013.   
436 Alexander Galloway. The Interface Effect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), Nathaniel Stern. Interactive Art 
and Embodiment: The Implicit Body as Performance. (Canterbury, UK: Gyliphi Limited, 2013) I use these two 
books as examples because Galloway’s book is the most in-depth text on the use of interfaces in a cultural 
context. Stern’s book is the most recently published text on interactive new media installations.   
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kind”.437 To prove this, he provides an incredibly detailed, methodological account of how 
the socio-political and economic effects of the interface manifest themselves in various 
cultural contexts. However, his theorization of the relationship between the body and 
technology and his explanation as to how these effects affect the relationship between the 
body and technology, are reductive. Therefore, his rethinking of the interface, is not about 
what this device can become or the potential that it holds.  Rather, it is a very narrow 
description of what Galloway believes interfaces should be.  
Stern, on the other hand, devotes two chapters to the relationship between the body and 
technology in interactive new media installations.438 Drawing on Barad’s concepts of 
performativity and entanglement and then applying them to theories of the body and 
embodiment, the relationship between the body and technology in interactive new media 
installations is, for Stern, a “performed and emerging emergence”.439  It is a process that, he 
writes, “is constituted in and with and through its relations”.440 To support these arguments, 
Stern examines how bodies (of the performer, the viewer and the artist) are staged and the 
potential that a restaging of these bodies (as relational to the artwork) may have for 
interactive new media art installations.  While recognizing the importance that a more 
performative formulation of this relationship has for interactive new media installations, 
Stern does not address both the possibilities and the consequences that his approach may 
have on the digital interface.  In other words, the body, in Stern’s analysis of the relationship 
between the body and technology, takes precedence over the techno-material and aesthetic 
elements of the installations he is interrogating. The nonhuman entities and processes –	
particularly, the interface –	exist in the periphery. Thus, the effects that his more performative 
theorization may or may not have on the nonhuman entities that inhabit the installations he 
interrogates remain, to an extent, unexplored.  
In short, I believe that what is needed is a sustained and detailed engagement with, and an 
emphasis on, the relationship between the body and technology, coupled with a critical 
reflection on the important, possibly destabilizing, effects that a more entangled and 
performative approach to this relationship may have when addressing issues concerning the 
                                                
437 Alexander Galloway. The Interface Effect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), Preface. 
438 Nathaniel Stern. Interactive Art and Embodiment: The Implicit Body as Performance. (Canterbury, UK: 
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digital interface in interactive new media installations. This engagement is needed because if 
we fail to take into consideration all the aspects of the relationships or entities we are 
examining –	if we do not recognize the significance that both human and nonhuman entities 
and their relationships have in the space they are located in –	then our theories will ultimately 
reinforce the same binaries and object/subject, mind/body separations they argue against.   
To address this, I will begin my exploration in the first half of this chapter by interrogating 
different ways in which the relationship between the body and technology has been presented 
and critiqued in the humanities. In the second part, I will explore how a more entangled and 
performative approach to this relationship can be articulated via the interactive new media 
installations of Victoria Vesna (2005-7), Tmema (2006), Rafael Lozano Hemmer (2010) and 
Carmin Karasic (2008). These installations are crucial to this investigation as they position 
the relationship between the body and technology in their artworks as emergent and 
processual –	one that is produced by and is constantly producing, subjects, objects, meanings 
and, most importantly, effects. The artists creating these installations accomplish this by 
extending an invitation to the viewer/participant to explore and question her relationship to 
technology via interaction. My analysis of these works culminates at the end of the chapter in 
a reconfiguration of the digital interface as human body. This theorization will push us to 
reflect on, and then critically question, how we experience, interact and think with, and about, 
technology. This will ultimately open up a space for different narratives around and 
reconfigurations of the relationship between the body and technology in future interactive 
new media installations. 
The Viewer/Participant or the Interface?  
The relationship between the body and technology has been examined by theorists from 
many different disciplinary perspectives.  In the humanities, analyses of this relationship 
revolve, to an extent, around concepts of media spectatorship and the gaze.  Scholars such as 
Amelia Jones (2006), Vivian Sobchak (1992) and Laura Marks (2002) take a more 
phenomenological approach, critiquing the trajectory of what Jones terms “the complex 
interconnectedness”	of visual representation, technology and concepts of the self in Western 
representational structures.441 Others, like Anne Friedberg (2006), Kate Mondloch (2010) and 
Lori Emerson (2014), take a more media archaeological approach, examining how the use of 
                                                
441 Amelia Jones. Self/Image. (UK: Routledge, 2006) In Jones’ case, these Western representational models 
include, among other things Kantian models of aesthetics. 
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different types of technological interfaces influence the ways in which contemporary viewing 
subjects see the world.  
Friedberg, for example, investigates the literal and metaphorical concepts and functions of 
interfaces as well as our human experience of them.442 Friedberg theorizes interfaces as 
thresholds or liminal sites that mediate the “tensions between the immobility of a 
spectator/viewer/user and the mobility of images”	as well as the relationship between the 
spectator and the spectacle, the viewer and technology and the subject and representations.443 
Mediation, she argues, is an important aspect of this relationship as it relieves the 
aforementioned tensions by providing the “semi-immobile viewer with mobility in virtual 
terms”.444 In other words, the viewer’s body, for Friedberg, may be “fixed”	in front of a 
screen (an interface) but the moving images projected onto it become a virtual representation 
of their physical mobility.445 The viewer, in Friedberg’s theory, then, is not a passive 
observer, but a mobilized participant. This shift from passive observer to mobilized 
participant is important to Friedberg’s theory, as it results in the creation of different modes 
of spectatorship –	ones that she argues ultimately produce more spatial and temporal ways of 
thinking about our relationship with technology.446 While Friedberg’s text offers an 
incredibly important and comprehensive approach to the study of the interface, inasmuch as it 
highlights the significance of the interface by historicizing the interface and the relationship 
between the body and technology it creates, it is not without limitations.    
Mondloch pinpoints these shortcomings, focusing on Friedberg’s use of metaphors (the 
formalist model of the picture frame, the realist model of the window and Friedberg’s own 
formulation of the virtual window).447 While Friedberg is critical of these metaphors, the 
issue, as Mondloch sees it, lies in her (Friedberg’s) reliance on “dualistic”	thinking when 
applying these metaphors to the relationship between the viewer and the screen.448 This type 
                                                
442 Anne Friedberg. The Virtual Window: From Alberti to Microsoft. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006) The 
literal and metaphorical concepts Friedberg looks at include the pre-cinematic and cinematic window, frame and 
screen.   
443 Ibid., p. 161.  
444 Ibid. For Friedberg, the word virtual: “refers only to electronically mediated or digitally produced images and 
experiences.” (Friedberg, 2006, p. 7)  
445 Ibid. 
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447 Kate Mondloch. Screens: Viewing Media Installation Art. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
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of thinking, Mondloch argues, is troubling as it champions “the presumed criticality of the 
viewer’s encounter with advanced sculptural projects”	while at the same time expressing a 
disdain for	“the viewer’s allegedly uncritical and passive experience”	with interfaces.449 
Doing this, Mondloch argues, allows Friedberg to conclude that the relationship between the 
body and technology is an after-effect of “a new logic of visuality, a time-architecture, 
framed and virtual, on a screen”.450  
Here, Mondloch is arguing that Friedberg’s analysis of the relationship between the subject 
and the screen is a dichotomous one. It does away with “any remaining shards of spatial 
locatedness”	on behalf of the subject by pitting a “both here and there”	spectator against a 
“neither here nor there”	interface.451 The relationship between the body and technology, for 
Mondloch, is not a binary after-effect of an interface’s “remarkable capacity to reorganize 
time and space”	and identities.452 This relationship, she suggests, is rather an essential 
component of the space it is located in because viewer interaction with the interface is a 
phenomenal form in itself.453 As she writes: “The viewer-screen connection is a site of radical 
inter-implication: it… encompasses sentient bodies and psychic desires, institutional codes 
and discursive constructs.”454 In other words the interface, for Mondloch, is not simply a 
discrete object, known by the viewer visually all at once.  It is an activated space, a 
performative and phenomenological experience that foregrounds the relationship between the 
embodied viewing subject and the installation.  
Mondloch’s text is helpful in theorizing the relationship between the viewer/participant and 
the digital interface in interactive new media installations, because this relationship, she 
writes, “matters”.455 And the fact that it matters, she tells us,	“is more than a perfunctory 
observation.  It is a proposal for a theoretical model for assessing contemporary artistic 
production”.456  Yet the exact nature of this proposal remains, to an extent, unexplored, 
specifically how exactly the interface shapes, rather than determines or controls, the viewing 
subject’s experience and her interactions in media installations.457  This, I argue, hinders 
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Mondloch’s ability to theorize the potential that her rethinking of the body-screen 
relationship may have on media installations beyond simple shifts in modes of spectatorship. 
For example, Mondloch, on the one hand, is theorizing the interface as an aesthetic device 
whose “physical form shapes both its immediate space and its relationship to viewing 
subjects”.458 On the other hand, she is defining it as an instrumental object of power that 
matters, yet does nothing except constrain and control experience.459 Therefore, the actual 
identity of the interface in her theory, beyond its perfunctory functions (facilitation, 
mediation, translation), remains obscured. This is because the emphasis in her work revolves 
around how the interface functions as a disciplinary tool whose job is to regulate, and thus 
ultimately shape, the “volatile”	relationship between bodies and screens as well as the space 
that the interface is located in.460  
To summarize, Mondloch’s theory of the body-screen relationship is important as it 
reintroduces agency to the interface (“the interface matters”) in media installations. However, 
Mondloch places too much emphasis on the interface and its ability to control and regulate 
interaction and experience. In this way, the other entities located in the installation, 
specifically the viewer, and the relationality between the viewer and the screen is, at times 
obscured. Thus we could argue that her theorization ultimately strips the viewer of agency.  
Like the other key concepts discussed above, agency, in this chapter, is understood in Barad’s 
terms. Agency, Barad suggests, is not: “something that someone or somebody has. Agency 
cannot be designated as an attribute of subjects or objects (as they do not pre-exist as 
such).”461 Agency is therefore an enactment, a process; it does not encompass the human 
entity, the technological other and/or the relationship between them, but exceeds these 
entities.462 Thus, agency is not a condition that an entity must be conceptualized as having, a 
quality that it is endowed with, or something that occurs out of the blue, and changes it, 
shapes it into a more important or active thing. In interactive new media installations, I argue 
agency is a matter of how a viewer/participant consciously or unconsciously chooses to 
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position herself in relation to other entities (like the digital interface), the possibilities that 
these choices may entail and the events that these choices may bring about.463  
Taking this statement into account, I will continue my exploration of the relationship between 
the body and technology, examining the possibilities that a theorization of the 
aforementioned relationship as co-constitutive may have for interactive new media 
installations. My starting point lies in the implications, such as the obfuscation of agency (of 
both human and nonhuman entities) that theorizations like the ones discussed above may 
have on the relationship between the body and technology and the important effects that this 
relationship may have on interactive new media installations.464  To explore these 
implications and effects, I turn to Victoria Vesna’s interactive installation Mood Swings 
(2005-7.) In Mood Swings, the relationship between the body and technology is staged (by 
Vesna), and consequently theorized, here as co-constitutive and emergent.465 This is a staging 
that I suggest places emphasis on the relationship between the body and technology as an 
important agential process that not only shapes, but also is shaped by, the entities that 
surround it and the space that it is located in. Therefore, it is a staging that enables me to call 
attention to the processes, relations and entities this relationship enfolds and demonstrate the 
importance of the effects it has in interactive new media installations.  
Mood Swings consists of a video projector, a computer, a closed-circuit camera, an audio 
system and a projection surface.466 The camera records the viewer/participants’ actions. This 
performance is transmitted to a computer, which is located in the same space.  There it is 
processed, generating a pixelated image of the viewer/participant that is projected onto the 
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projection surface.467 Thus the pixelated image of the viewer/participant is the digital 
interface in this work.  This is because the pixelated image, like those in the previous chapter, 
allows the viewer/participant to navigate the installation and engage with the visual 
information projected onto the screen. (Figures 33 & 34) 
 
Figure 33: V. Vesna, Mood Swings. (2005-7).   
 
Figure 34: V. Vesna, Mood Swings. (2005-7).   
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The pixelated image is controlled by the viewer/participant. 
125 
 
The pixelated image and the viewer/participant as seen in the figures above and below are 
visually and physically distinctive. One is a biological entity and one is a technical entity. 
One exists on a computer screen and one exists in the physical world.  While they are 
physically distinctive, they do not have separate ontological existences, as these entities 
reproduce and are constantly reproducing each other.  The pixelated image and the 
viewer/participant exist, as argued earlier, in relation to one another. Given this, I suggest that 
they can productively be read through each other for similarities and differences, thus 
highlighting new possibilities for understanding their relationship to each other as 
performative and co-constitutive. 
For instance, when a viewer/participant walks across the floor, her pixelated image travels 
across the surface. This movement causes digital video trails to appear. These trails slowly 
erode the pixelated image and “poetic texts”	appear in its place.468 (Figure 35)  
 
Figure 35: V. Vesna, Mood Swings. (2005-7).   
If the viewer/participant moves back and forth in front of the projection surface a certain 
number of times, or if she stands still in front of it, the texts dissipate and her pixelated image 
reappears.469 (Figure 36)  
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Figure 36: V. Vesna, Mood Swings. (2005-7).   
In this way, the emphasis, in this work, via the dissipating pixelated images, is placed on co-
constitution, and on how the viewer/participant via her pixelated image is able to create, 
separate and playfully explore the poetic texts and the relationships that they represent, only 
to bring them back together, to dissolve them and to rebuild them anew.  The emphasis on co-
constitution in Mood Swings is significant because it acknowledges that both human and 
nonhuman entities have some form of agency. Thus, it allows the viewer/participant, the 
digital interface, their interactions with each other and the effects they have on the 
installation, to matter beyond mere representation.470  I also suggest this emphasis affords the 
viewer/participant the chance to begin to reconsider and possibly develop different 
understandings of her relationship to the digital interface in Mood Swings. These 
understandings allow both the viewer/participant and the interface to come into view as 
active and important agents that are deeply entangled with each other’s embodied being and 
that form mutually productive parts of the poetic texts that they help create. 
Recognizing the fact that the relationship between the body and technology is co-constitutive, 
as I do above, however, is not quite enough to adequately support and explain what is at 
stake, or why these relationships are important in interactive new media installations. It 
would be an oversight on my behalf to simply assume that these relationships are co-
constitutive	–	that I know what entities consist of and what effects they may have on others.  
Instead, I must engage with and further develop a theory of the relationship between the body 
                                                




and technology that takes into consideration and articulates, in clear terms, why exactly it 
“matters” in interactive new media installations. I suggest that a more entangled and 
performative theorization of the relationship between the human and technology allows us to 
recognize agency: both the agency of the human (the viewer/participant) and of the 
nonhuman (the interface) in interactive new media installations. Such an approach shifts 
focus from descriptive statements of entanglement and performativity as a static act, thus 
calling attention to the process of entanglement itself and the effects that this process 
produces in interactive new media installations. 
The Agency of Human and Nonhuman Entities, or Why the Relationship between the Body 
and Technology Matters  
One text that begins to make some inroads in this regard is Seung-hoon Jeong’s Cinematic 
Interfaces (2013), which focuses on the use of the interface in film and expanded cinema 
projects.471 For Jeong interfaces are cultural mediums whose agency emerges out of their 
own “flexibility”	and “morphology”.472 Interfaces are not single, unified apparatuses that 
have separate existences from their users. Rather, he believes they are assemblages, 
consisting of “at least three major interfaces –	camera, film and screen –	which place the 
same image into a process of differentiation, deferral and remediation”.473An interface, he 
writes: “would be found less between two entities than between two interfaces.  There would 
be no a priori essence outside of interfaciality.”474  
Interfaciality, as Jeong defines it, indicates “the state or function of interfacing on a surface 
between two entities”.475 The concept of interfaciality, for Jeong, is highly significant to any 
theory of the interface because it allows us to begin to think about the interface as “a specific 
material surface for contact that accompanies overlapping and distancing, a contact surface of 
mediation through interval and interstice –	however immediate it may look –	in terms of 
space (between object, medium and subject) and time (between recording, editing and 
                                                
471 Coined by Gene Youngblood in 1970, “expanded cinema” is a term that describes multi-screen and mixed 
media film-making techniques that utilize new technologies (Youngblood, 1970).  
472 Seung-hoon Jeong. Cinematic Interfaces: Film Theory After New Media. (NY, NY; Routledge, 2013), p. 11. 
473 Ibid., p. 15.   
474 Ibid. Jeong’s emphasis 
475 Ibid., p. 14. The two entities Jeong is referring to are the viewer and the screen. 
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projection; between perception and memory)”.476 Given this, interfaciality, he argues, implies 
relationality.477  
Relationality, Jeong states, is not a synonym for intersection or interaction. Instead, it is a 
precondition of interfaces. Therefore, relationality is “already imminently embodied in 
subjectivity and objectivity which are, simply put, nothing but interfaciality”.478 Interfaciality, 
then, is not purely representational, but rather, it is a quality of relationships and things. It is, 
he posits, an issue of “the body-subject in physical contact with the medium interface”.479 
This is because the interface, for Jeong, is an embodied agent.  Therefore it has effects (on 
the cinematic image, the viewer’s experience and the ideas and thoughts she forms around 
this experience) and is affected by other human and nonhuman entities.  
Jeong’s text is invaluable to the argument of this chapter as it recognizes the agency of the 
interface as well as examines the effects this agency may or may not have on the 
installation/cinematic space. However, I argue that Jeong’s formulation of the interface is 
constrained due to the fact that he views the interface, as mentioned above, as consisting of 
two sides. This definition, combined with his alignment of notions of interfaciality and 
relationality with subjectivity and objectivity, quickly becomes a cause for concern. It raises 
questions around key concepts such as subjectivity, relationality, interfaciality and interfaces. 
How can interfaciality encompass such a wide range of processes and relationships if the 
interface that contains and mediates them is two-sided? Why, exactly, is the interface two-
sided?  If interfaciality and relationality are qualities, inherent attributes, of entities and 
relationships, and if these entities and relationships are aligned with concepts like subjectivity 
and objectivity (in the sense that they affect and encompass them), then what of the entities’	
agency?  
Agency should not be understood as a quality or attribute of an entity. Rather, agency, as 
argued via Barad above, is an enactment.480 Thus agency is about change, or more precisely, 
the possibility of change that this enactment may or may not have. Given this, entities cannot 
be presumed to be the site of agency, and agency cannot be presumed to be a quality of an 
                                                
476 Seung-hoon Jeong. Cinematic Interfaces: Film Theory After New Media. (NY, NY; Routledge, 2013), p. 14 
477 Ibid., p. 11. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid., p. 77. 
480 Karen Barad. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglements of Matter and 
Meaning.  (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 235. 
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entity since entities do not have a stable existence prior to their interactions with others.481 
Barad builds on her theorization of agency, discussed earlier, via a close reading of Monica 
Casper’s (1994) article “Humans and Others: The Concept of Agency and Its Attribution”.482 
To summarize, Casper argues that when attributing agency to entities, theorists in the STS 
fields (and I would argue, to an extent, in the humanities as well) have “failed to consider 
how the very notion of human agency is premised on ‘a dichotomous ontological positioning 
in which [nonhuman] is opposed to human’”.483 The resulting works that these theorists 
produce, Casper argues, are problematic because the approach utilized to analyze these 
entities “excludes a crucial factor from analysis since ‘the attribution of human and 
nonhuman to heterogeneous entities’	is always the consequence of particular political 
practices’”.484  The crux of the argument that Barad is trying to make via Casper, and the 
ultimate importance of it to mine, is that how agency of nonhuman entities is constructed and 
consequently analyzed in some texts in the STS fields renders certain human entities that they 
come into contact with invisible, reducing them to empty operators.485  
Barad strongly agrees with Casper’s argument. However she takes issue with Casper’s 
conclusions.486 The critical issue, as Barad sees it, lies not so much in the attribution of 
agency to the nonhuman entity in question, but in “the framing of the referent of the 
attribution (and ultimately in the framing of agency as a localizable attribution)”.487  Here, 
Barad is suggesting that it is not the attribution of agency to nonhuman entities that is the 
problem, but rather the alignment of agency with subjectivity and the consequent attribution 
of subjectivity to nonhuman agents.488 Barad’s ultimate point is that the nonhuman entity 
should be “understood in relation to its referent”, in relation to the entities it emerges out of, 
rather than assuming that it is a preexisting entity with inherent properties.489  
                                                
481 Karen Barad. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglements of Matter and 
Meaning.  (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 235. 
482 Ibid., p. 215. 
483 Ibid., p. 215 
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid., pp. 215-216. This analysis, both Barad and Casper state, is politically motivated in the sense that 
agency is about who or what gets to be a subject and whom or what the theorist or scientist is accountable to. 
(Barad, 2007. p. 215) 
486 Ibid., p. 216. Barad calls into question the boundaries Casper draws around who or what gets to be an agent, 
her notions of accountability, and the exclusions that they result in. (Barad, 2007. p. 216)  





Following on, while Jeong is critical of concepts such as relationality and interfaciality, 
which enables him to trouble assumptions about the passive nature of viewing subjects by 
theorizing the interface as an embodied agent, I suggest that the paradoxical nature of his 
concept of interfaciality ends up creating a fixed relation between the subject and the screen. 
This is because Jeong is aligning notions of agency, via his theorization of relationality and 
interfaciality, with concepts of subjectivity. In doing this, Jeong assumes that interfaciality 
and relationality are inherent attributes of an entity, rather than one of the many possible 
effects of his reconfiguration of the body/screen relation. Thus, echoing Barad’s statement 
above about how the agency of the nonhuman entities (the interface) is constructed and 
consequently analyzed by Jeong renders the viewer invisible, reducing her to an empty 
operator. Consequently, she lacks a presence in the installation space. This is not to say that 
the viewer/participant is actually invisible.  The viewer/participant does physically exist; 
however, her contributions to the installation are, to an extent, not acknowledged in Jeong’s 
theory of the interface. Given this, the question “Why does the interface matter?”	turns into 
the following one: What does it actually mean to be present and matter in interactive new 
media installations?  
The Human “Me” and the Technologized “You”: Agency, Subjectivity and Presence  
To address the question asked above, I stage an encounter between Jean-Luc Nancy’s (2000) 
notions of “Being”	and the event as simultaneous, entangled feelings, on behalf of subjects, 
of perpetual presence and Tmema’s interactive new media installation Footfalls (2006). I do 
this to make sense of the effects that the viewer/participant’s movements and interactions 
have in Footfalls and of how the relationship between the body and technology helps bring 
the interface into being in interactive new media installations. In my analysis, I suggest that 
the specific events and effects that the relationship between the body and technology helps 
give the interface presence. These events and effects, I argue, bring the interface into being 
and allow it to actually “matter”	in Footfalls.490  
I will be referring to viewer/participant interaction using Barad’s term “intra-action”	in this 
section.  Intra-action, according to Barad, is a concept that assumes there is no in-between or 
object of mediation and, as such, entities are mutually co-constitutive.491 This relationship of 
                                                
490 By specific events, I am referring to the non-repeatable intra-actions that the viewer/participant makes with 
the digital interface and the images and experiences that these intra-actions bring about. 
491 Karen Barad. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), Preface and Acknowledgements.   
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intra-action, in Barad’s formulation, is primary and individuation is secondary.492  That is to 
say, in intra-action, entities only become meaningful and present through their relationship 
with one another.  Thus, intra-action differs from notions of interaction, because interaction, 
Barad argues, assumes that entities exist prior to each other.493  
Similar to Barad’s notion of intra-action, Nancy’s conceptualization of “Being”	relies on 
relationality.  “Being”, according to Nancy, does not exist without the “being-with”.494  The 
“I,”	he states, does not precede the “we”	because there is no existence without co-existence.495  
“Being”, for Nancy, is always already a process of becoming with others.496 As he writes: 
“Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as 
the with of this singularly plural coexistence.”497 What Nancy is proposing here is that being 
is not a stand-alone process produced by a solitary entity.	“Being”	instead suggests a 
simultaneous, entangled feeling, on behalf of the subject, of perpetual presence.498   
This feeling of presence, as Marie-Eve Morin (2012) tells us, is “a consequence of [being] 
‘singular plural’: there is no single independent truth that could be immediately identified as 
the beginning”.499 Morin continues by stating that “Being’, to Nancy, signals, “first of all that 
there is always by necessity more than one singularity”.500 Since “Being”, as Nancy writes, 
means “to be-unto-the limit or to be-opened-to”	then this opening, as Morin writes, “is 
necessarily ‘with’: it is impossible to open oneself to oneself without exteriority”.501	“Being”	
then, specifically being singular-plural, is not an attempt to position a concept or an entity as 
a singular, isolated or indivisible thing.502		“Being”	signifies a process of singularization, thus 
it suggests both an entanglement with and a differentiation from temporarily positioned 
                                                
492 Karen Barad. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglements of Matter and 
Meaning.  (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 33. 
493 Ibid. 
494 Jean-Luc Nancy. Being Singular Plural. tr. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne. (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 3. 
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499 Marie-Eve Morin. Jean-Luc Nancy. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), p. 3.  
500 Ibid., p. 36.  
501 Jean-Luc Nancy. Being Singular Plural. tr. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne. (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000).  Marie-Eve Morin. Jean-Luc Nancy. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), p. 
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502 This notion is very similar, as Morin notes, to Derrida’s concept of “n+one”.  N+one means no matter how 
many ones are gathered in n, there is always necessarily some other one to which n is exposed.  Hence, 
existence is never singular. It is always the experience of the other. (Morin, 2012). 
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others.503 In short, “Being”	is a non-linear, ongoing process and this process always consists 
of more than one thing. It is, as Nancy writes, “an excess of unity; it is one-with-one where 
its Being in itself is co-present”.504 Plurality and co-presence, as Nancy reminds us, should 
not be confused with notions of the eternal or transcendental.505 Rather, co-presence for 
Nancy denotes “the essential sharing of essentiality, sharing in the guise of assembling as it 
were”.506 So, when Nancy states that “being cannot be anything but being-with”, “the with”	is 
not exterior or prior to something else. It is not an addition to it, but rather “the with”	for 
Nancy constitutes “Being”.507 The use of the interface in Footfalls could be interpreted to 
serve as an illustration of Nancy’s ideas around “Being”, in the sense that its interface is not 
simply an addition to the installation. Rather, the interface, like “the with”	in Nancy’s 
theorization of “Being”, constitutes the installation itself.   
On its surface Footfalls is an incredibly simple work. Its aesthetic is reminiscent of seminal 
new media art works such as Simon Penny’s interactive art installation Traces (1998) and 
Myron Krueger’s interactive art installation, VideoPlace (1974). Their interfaces are similar 
too: projected images of the viewer/participant. (Figures 37 & 38)  
 
Figure 37: S. Penny, Traces. (1998). 
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504 Ibid., p. 40.  
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506 Ibid., p. 40. 




Figure 38: M. Krueger, VideoPlace. (1974).   
Footfall’s underlying idea, however, in some ways is more complex than its predecessors. 
Footfalls, according to the artists, is designed to provoke questions about the meaning of the 
relationship between the body and technology, and the effects that movement and interaction 
has on immersive environments.508  An outgrowth of their work Messa di Voce (2003), 
Footfalls consists of a wall, a projector and a computer.509 The wall is split into thirds: the top 
contains a series of black and white images that represent static spheres of varying size, the 
space in the middle is left blank and the bottom third of the screen consists of a projected 
shadow of the viewer/participant, which she can control by moving her body.510 Once the 
piece is activated, the balls stream down from the top of the screen. The viewer/participant 
can then interact with the projected balls – she can pick them up and throw them around the 
screen via her shadow. (Figure 39)   
                                                
508 Tmema, Footfalls. (2006.) Found online at: http://www.flong.com/projects/footfalls/ and at 
http://www.tmema.org/wordpress_test/footfalls 
509 Ibid. Tmema, Messa di Voce. (2003). Found online at:	http://www.tmema.org/messa/. Messa di Voce is a 
performance and installation in which sounds created by two vocalists are augmented in real-time via custom 
interactive visualization software. A variant of Footfalls appears in both the installation and performance 
versions of the work. (Tmema, 2003).  





Figure 39: Tmema, Footfalls. (2006). 
To activate Footfalls, the viewer/participant must step onto a platform located in front of the 
wall.511 When she	“stomps”	her feet, a circuit board embedded in microphones located inside 
the platform records these vibrations and transmits them to a computer for processing.512  
This data is sent to another computer connected to a projector where it is once again 
processed and then projected onto the wall.  The newly processed data changes the state of 
the projected spheres. (Figure 40)  
 
Figure 40: Tmema, Footfalls. (2006). 
 
                                                
511 Tmema, Footfalls. (2006.) Found online at: http://www.flong.com/projects/footfalls/ and at 
http://www.tmema.org/wordpress_test/footfalls. 
512 Ibid.   
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It sets them in motion, causing them to bounce back and forth. It also dictates the size, speed 
and the number of spheres appearing on the wall. Once the spheres gain enough velocity, 
they begin to cascade down from the top half of the wall towards the bottom, where they 
collect around the shadow.513  At this point, the viewer/participant can catch the spheres and 
throw them around or off-screen by moving her limbs. If another viewer/participant happens 
to be located in the same space, an image of her physical body will be captured and projected 
onto the wall as well. Both viewer/participants, via their on-screen shadow, can then intra-act 
with the spheres and with each other. (Figure 41) 
 
Figure 41: Tmema, Footfalls. (2006). 
When viewing Footfalls either online or in a gallery, viewer/participant intra-action feels 
spontaneous. While it may be so, intra-action is not a happy accident. Intra-action in 
Footfalls, like “Being”	in Nancy’s theory of the singular-plural, is an experimental, 
exploratory process that happens in conjunction with, thus is influenced by, others. That there 
needs to be others present for intra-action to occur does not imply that there needs to be a 
human “me”	and a technologized “you”, but also that there must be, in Nancy’s terms “a 
with”, or as Morin states, “an us and a something else, and that there needs to be a plurality 
                                                




within myself”.514 Given this, Morin argues that entities intra-act “in relation/exposition to 
you, an ‘event of me’	exists in relation/exposition to other events”.515  Hence, intra-action 
neither affirms symmetry between two or more entities, nor does it dissolve the boundaries 
between them.  Intra-action happens through exposition –	through an exposure to, and 
creative exploration with, other entities. So, how does viewer/participant intra-action occur in 
Footfalls? 
Viewer/participant intra-action in Footfalls occurs because the viewer/participant can 
manipulate and create information located in the installation via the presence of her shadow. 
She is able to, via her shadow, extend and expand her body into the installation –	an act that, 
as suggested in the introduction, links technology to the embodied experience of the 
viewer/participant.  The process of embodiment described above, however, is not a fully 
conscious one. It can be seen as primarily corporeal and affective, only later becoming 
theorized and reflected on by the media theorist and viewer/participant respectively.  This is 
because the relationship between the body and technology as it manifests itself in interactive 
new media installations like Footfalls is never self-evident, never concrete. Thus, the shadow 
(the interface) cannot be analyzed as a direct representation of the relationship, as intra-action 
between the body and technology, or, in Nancy’s terms, as	“the with”.516 Rather, I suggest 
these entities and the relationship between them should be theorized as happening or 
emerging out of and through “the with”	(the relationship between the body and technology). 
This is because the shadow in this work is not simply a representation of the 
viewer/participant, but a physical after-effect of the relationship between the body and 
technology.  
For example, when a viewer/participant picks up a sphere via her shadow and tosses it around 
the screen, she could be seen as expressing a trace of this “with” or the relationship between 
the body and technology. I argue that it is precisely this expression of the “with” via intra-
action, that enables the digital interface (the shadow) to become present and active in 
Footfalls.  However, just because something resembling an interface exists in the installation 
                                                
514 Jean-Luc Nancy. Being Singular Plural. tr. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne. (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 35, 62. Marie-Eve Morin. Jean-Luc Nancy. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
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515 Marie-Eve Morin. Jean-Luc Nancy. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), p. 36.   
516 Jean-Luc Nancy. Being Singular Plural. tr. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne. (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 35, 62 
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does not mean it automatically is an interface.517 For, as Nancy writes, the subject: “is not a 
‘subject’	in the sense of the relation of a self to itself.  It is an ‘ipseity’	that is not the relation 
of a ‘me’	to ‘itself.’…	It is being-a-part of Being itself and in Being itself, Being in each 
instant, which attests to the fact that Being only takes place in each instant.”518 If we take this 
to be the case, if, as Nancy argues, “the essence of Being only takes place in each instant” 
and if, as posited above, intra-action between two entities articulates a trace of “the with”, 
then when the viewer/participant “happens with” the digital interface in Footfalls, an area for 
experimentation, reconsideration and possibly criticism of their relationship to, and intra-
actions with, the digital interface appears.519 Or, in Nancy’s terms, a space of “betweens”	is 
opened up.520  
Nancy argues that:	“Everything…	passes between us. This ‘between,’	as its name implies, has 
neither a consistency nor continuity of its own. It does not lead from one to the other; it 
constitutes no connective tissue, no cement, no bridge.”521 So, when a link is created between 
the viewer/participant and the digital interface via embodiment, the movements that the 
viewer/participant makes in conjunction with the digital interface, while part of a larger 
ongoing process, are temporarily stabilized through the processes of representation.522  For 
example, when the viewer/participants stomps on the platform her actions are recorded, 
filtered and visual representations of her actions (the spheres) are projected on screen.  The 
very processes of emergence, embodiment and intra-action that bring these visual 
representations into being however involve human experimentation –	experimentation that is, 
as suggested above, accompanied (or in some cases proceeded, interrupted or followed) by 
technological forces. This process, as Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinksa (2012) write, is “a 
hybrid: it interweaves different entities, or, rather it stabilizes or ‘fixes’, entities in the process 
of interweaving them”.523 These temporary singular fixes, become events in the ongoing 
                                                
517 Tmema, Footfalls. (2006). Found online at: http://www.flong.com/projects/footfalls/ and at 
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processes of emergence and embodiment (which Nancy refers to as “the eventness of the 
event”	or “the fact that it happens”).524  
Nancy however argues that what makes an event an event “is not only that it happens, but 
that it surprises –	and maybe that it surprises itself (diverting it from its own ‘happening’, not 
allowing it be an event, surprising the “Being”	in it, allowing it to “be”	only by way of 
surprise)”.525  An event, for Nancy, is not a happening itself, but the “as it happens”, thus, “it 
is the ‘already’	that leaps up, along with the ‘not yet’”.526  Nancy continues, reminding us that 
while an event can be represented (in still or moving images or as verbal or written words), it 
primarily exists outside of the order of representation.527 For instance, the event is the 
moment when the leap –	or the relationship that emerges out of the leap –	surprises itself. It 
surprises itself precisely because it is, to an extent, un-representable, as the event is not an 
expression of “itself”	nor its surprise.528 In Nancy’s words: “the leap”	happens in conjunction 
with “the surprise.”529 It is, he states: “nothing but this surprise, which still does not even 
‘belong’	to it [the event itself]”.530  It is the interruption of this process that draws attention to 
the fact that the event is actually occurring. Thus, the event surprises itself through its own 
discontinuity, and it is this surprise that consequently allows the unrepresentable (the 
interface) to become present and to matter.  
Nancy’s notions of “Being”	and the event articulate exactly why the relationship between the 
body and technology is important in interactive new media installations. It is important 
because the digital interface in Footfalls emerges out of the viewer/participant’s multiple 
intra-actions and relationship with it (the event) and this emergence of the interface as an 
interface is the surprise of the event.  It leaps out of the relationship between the body and 
technology.  The emergence of the shadow as digital interface is the surprise that 
simultaneously pushes the digital interface outside of representation, and acts as the point at 
which it can become represented. The relationship between the body and technology 
constitutes the event; the fact that the shadow emerges out of and in conjunction with these 
intra-actions and relationships and becomes a digital interface is the surprise of its event. This 
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is because the movements that the viewer/participant makes with the shadow that the 
relationship between the body and technology brings about are precisely the events that 
constitute its emergence and allow it to become a digital interface.531 The surprise of this 
event is significant because it is the moment when the interface is revealed to be an 
important, active agent –	one that contributes to, thus has the ability to create change in, the 
installation. In other words, we can predict, to an extent, what will happen in Footfalls when 
we interact with the interface (thus predict, to an extent, how our interactions will change the 
installation). However, that is not what allows the interface to become present; the reason that 
it is present is not that it exists or that it can be represented. The overwhelming majority of 
interactive new media installations have interfaces. Rather, the interface in Footfalls has 
presence because it is an integral agent, an active part of a complex, open-ended, temporal 
aesthetic process initiated by the artists (in the past) and irrevocably shaped by the 
relationship between the body and technology (in the present) and those who encounter and 
interact with it in the future.  
 
Enacting the Agential Cut 
In what follows, I will develop my theorization of the relationship between the body and 
technology above through an analysis of Rafael Lozano Hemmer’s interactive new media 
installation, People on People (2010).  I have adopted this analysis in part from Barad’s 
theories of the agential cut, and N. Katherine Hayles’ (1999, 2003) theorization of the 
relationship between the body and embodiment. I draw on these texts in an attempt to 
advance my theorization of the relationship between the viewer/participant and the digital 
interface in interactive new media art installations. In my analysis, I shift focus, concentrating 
less on where the interface is located in the installation or on how changes to the artwork 
happen via viewer/participant interaction, and concentrate more on theorizing the network of 
multiple materialities, agents and agencies that compromise the installation.  
Rosi Braidotti (1999) argues that approaching the issue of technology in “post-modernity 
requires a shift in perspective… the technological factor must be seen as co-extensive with 
and intermingled with the human”.532  This “shift in perspective”	for Braidotti is more than 
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just a “move away from a technophobic towards a more technophilic approach”.533  Rather, it 
must be viewed as a move on the part of media theorists towards a more “nomadic”	
theorization of the relationship between the body and technology –	one that allows for, 
among other things, “shifts of location and multiplicity”.534 Unlike the binary shifts in 
spectatorship critiqued above, the problem, as Braidotti puts it, is no longer one in which 
media theorists attempt to explain how changes happen in relation to entities existing in 
extant positions as binary opposites.535 Rather, the issue, she argues, lies in exploring how 
these shifts help us make sense of the flexible and multiple practices and identities that they 
help reshape.536  Following on from Bradotti, I suggest that my reading of Hemmer’s 
installation affords me a chance to view the viewer/participant and digital interface as 
productive and positive parts of the phenomena that they create. Thus, a different story is told 
from the one offered by the overly determined, technophobic and technophilic approaches 
briefly mentioned by Braidotti above.   
The focus of Hayles’ investigations is on the “idea of relation”.537 This idea is a way of 
theorizing the relationship between entities as “the dynamic flux from which both the body 
and embodiment [or any two entities for that matter] emerge”.538 The “idea of relation”	thus 
suggests that the relationship between the body and embodiment (like the relationship 
between the body and technology) is defined by its openness to reconfiguration and 
uncertainty.  The body, for Hayles, is the physical human form that is seen by others “from 
the outside, from a cultural perspective striving to make representations that can stand in for 
bodies in general”.539 Regardless of how it is represented or analyzed, she argues, concepts 
about bodies are generated “from a group of samples, and in this sense always misses 
someone’s particular body, which necessarily departs in greater or lesser measure from the 
culturally constructed norm”.540  The body, then, is an abstract concept, one that is always 
culturally constructed by both the person inhabiting the form and the subjects that are 
                                                
533 Rosi Braidotti. “Cyberfeminism with a Difference”. (1996)  Found online at: 
http://www.let.uu.nl/womens_studies/rosi/cyberfem.htm 
534 Ibid. 
535 Ibid., Rosi Braidotti. The Post Human. (UK: Polilty Press, 2013)   
536 Rosi Braidotti. The Post Human. (UK: Polilty Press, 2013) This reshaping occurs, Braidotti writes, “by 
stressing heteronomy and multi-faceted relationality instead of autonomy and self-referential disciplinary 
purity.” (Braidotti, 2013) 
537 N. Katherine Hayles. “Flesh and Metal: Reconfiguring the Mindbody in Virtual Environments” in Data 
Made Flesh. ed. Robert Mitchell, (Psychology Press: 2003), p. 298.   
538 Ibid.   
539 Ibid.   
540 Ibid., p. 297. 
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observing or interacting with it.  Located at the other end of the spectrum, for Hayles, is 
embodiment.541 Notions of embodiment, like those related to the body, are culturally 
constructed, but as she states: “they are not entirely so, for they emerge from the complex 
interactions between the conscious mind and physiological structures”.542 Embodiment, then, 
is experienced internally.  It entails the feelings, emotions and sensations that “constitute the 
vibrant living textures of our lives”.543 The relationship between embodiment and the body, 
for Hayles, can then be seen as “emergent phenomena”	that we try to interpret by separating 
them into individual categories or concepts (the body, embodiment, the body, technology, 
viewer/participants, digital interfaces).544  
Veering between an understanding of the relationship between the body and embodiment as 
an emergent and fluctuating process on the one hand, and presenting the relationship between 
the two in terms of discrete (internal and external) entities on the other, Hayles stops short of 
embracing the full radicalism of her thesis.  Consequently, she has been criticized for 
reducing the relationship between the body and embodiment to interaction between isolated 
things.545  However, the analytical distinction that Hayles is making between the body and 
embodiment is not as binary as it appears. I do not believe that she is theorizing the 
relationship between the body and embodiment as a function of two separate (internalized 
and externalized) entities. Instead, I suggest that Hayles is breaking two entities apart in order 
to explore how their relationship with each other can begin to create change in the space they 
are located in.546 Recognizing, but not fully articulating, the fact that theorists who analyze 
this relationship are usually focused on whether things are “binary or not”, Hayles’ text hints 
at the fact that relationships, like the one between the body and embodiment, are not 
definable unities, but always a melee of hybrid entities with multiple traits.547  
Given this, I suggest that the separation of the elements that contribute to the relationship that 
Hayles is investigating is not an attempt to widen the split between the body and embodiment 
                                                
541 N. Katherine Hayles. “Flesh and Metal: Reconfiguring the Mindbody in Virtual Environments” in Data 
Made Flesh. ed. Robert Mitchell, (Psychology Press: 2003), p. 297. 
542 Ibid. 
543 Ibid.   
544 Ibid. 
545 For more information on these criticisms, see among others, Amelia Jones’s (2002) review in Signs, John 
Bonnett’s (2000) review in The Journal of the Association for History and Computing, Jeremy Tambling’s 
review in The Modern Language Review (2001).  
546 N. Katherine Hayles. “Flesh and Metal: Reconfiguring the Mindbody in Virtual Environments” in Data 
Made Flesh. ed. Robert Mitchell, (Psychology Press: 2003), p. 298.   
547 Ibid.    
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or a superficial reading of a complex and constantly fluctuating relationship. Rather, it is a 
theoretical strategy –	a reclamation of the body, agency and subjectivity in contemporary 
discussions of posthumanism. In doing this, Hayles is positioning the relationship between 
the body and embodiment as emerging out of a distributed series of biological, technical, 
aesthetic, cultural and socio-political processes. She does so not by simply linking them 
together via surface level representations (words, images), but also through, among other 
things, a decentering of classical notions of the human and an expansion of concepts of 
embodiment and the body to encompass nonhuman entities and processes.548 I argue that 
Hayles’	study of the relationship between the body and embodiment and her attempt to return 
agency to this process of becoming makes a significant contribution to future theorizations of 
the relationship between the biological and the technical as an exchange, a network 
comprised of multiple materialities, processes and entities that can been pulled apart, for a 
certain period of time, only to be put back together again.549 Hemmer’s People on People 
(2010) offers an interesting case study in this regard. Not only because of the notions 
explored or the problems introduced. Rather, a critical reading of this installation provides 
answers to some of the more critical commentary and concerns about the relationship 
between the body and technology in interactive new media installations discussed above.  
I first encountered People on People in 2011. It was included in Hemmer’s solo exhibition, 
“Recorders”, at Manchester Art Gallery. Located the back of the gallery, People on People 
consisted of two sets of projectors, high-resolution surveillance cameras and a computer.550  
When I entered the gallery, the cameras captured photographic images of me, which were 
projected onto a long, horizontal wall in the form of a black shadow.551 The shadow, like the 
others discussed in this chapter, was the digital interface in this work, as it was the means by 
which I interacted with and accessed information and images. However, the designation of 
                                                
548 N. Katherine Hayles. How we Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and 
Informatics. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 3. Simply put, the Posthuman, for Hayles does 
away with the false notion of a “natural” self and emerges when human intelligence is conceptualized as being 
co-produced with intelligent machines. (Hayles, 1999)  
549 One such theorization that owes a lot to Hayles study is Barad’s (2007) concept of the agential cut, which is 
discussed in full below.  
550 Rafael Lozano Hemmer. People on People. (2010). Found online at: http://www.lozano-
hemmer.com/people_on_people.php. People on People is an outgrowth of Hemmer’s urban projection system: 
Body Movies (2001). Body Movies consists of robotically controlled projectors, light sources, a computer and 
thousands of photographic portraits of people, which were taken on the streets of the host city. Body Movies 
captures an image of passers-by and projects it onto the exterior wall of a public building in the shape of a 
silhouettes, which measure between two and twenty-five meters depending on distance.  The previously 





the digital interface as shadow means that the digital interface is a digital image –	a 
virtualization of me and my movements and actions.  (Figures 43& 44)  
 
Figure 43: R. Lozano Hemmer, People on People. (2010). 
 
Figure 44: R. Lozano Hemmer, People on People. (2010). 
Virtualization, or virtuality, as Hayles states, is “the cultural perception that material objects 
are interpenetrated by information patterns”.552  She continues, writing that virtualization is 
normally associated with computer simulations such as the shadow in People on People that 
“put the body into a feedback-loop with a computer-generated image”.553  Drawing on Peggy 
Phelan’s (1993) ontology of performance studies, the material (the “real”) according to 
Hayles, implies physicality, and is characterized by presence and absence, as opposed to 
                                                
552 N. Katherine Hayles. How we Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and 
Informatics. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 13-14. Hayles’s emphasis. 
553 Ibid., p. 13.  
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information (the virtualization), which consists of bits of digital data that are then sequenced 
into forms and identified by the interrelation of patterns and randomness.554   
Similar to the way the Cartesian split used to dominate theories about the relationship 
between the body and the mind, Hayles believes that the dialectic of “pattern/randomness”	
(the basis of information) is beginning to overtake the dialect of “presence/absence”	(the 
basis of the material) as a way to theorize the relationship between the body and 
technology.555 Using the tension between the informational and the material as a starting 
point, Hayles develops a framework for understanding the “semiotics of virtuality”, in which 
the concepts of “presence/absence”	and “pattern/randomness”	are positioned as 
complementary and relational.556  She accomplishes this by positioning these two forms of 
dialectics as the “two axes”	of a semiotic square.557  Hayles then proceeds to connect them 
together, producing four synthesizing terms: materiality, mutation, information and hyper-
reality.558  Together, she argues, these terms produce the dominant characteristics of the 
“posthuman condition”	and create a framework for the semiotics of virtuality.559 
Kember and Zylinska build on this argument, applying it to the concept of mediation, stating 
that simulation “is founded on, and founders on, the collapsing of Cartesian divisions such as 
the one between the virtual and the real”.560  They continue, writing that mediation, like the 
relationship between the body and technology in interactive new media installations, “is 
positioned within a non-Cartesian framework (rather than an inverted or collapsed Cartesian 
framework in which the virtual does not absorb and negate the real)”.561  In short, the virtual 
does not act as a substitute for the absence of something real.  Rather, as they state, the real 
“produces it”.562    
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Following on, the digital interface (which is a digital image of my physical body) in People 
on People is not simply an on-screen representation of abstract information. Just because the 
digital interface is a virtualization does not mean that it is an inert object –	a supplemental 
body that is separate from me. A change in the physical state does not denote a separation 
between the material and the informational.  Rather, it suggests that the relationship between 
the material (me) and the informational (my shadow) is simultaneously a matter of being-in-
the-world (the physical) and a matter of imitating and providing meaning to it (the virtual).  
At this point, it is important to note that Hemmer does not aim to create a separation between 
the body and technology.563  In fact, he states just the opposite in his artist statement.564  
However, just because Hemmer writes that the installation is an exploration into the creation 
of “a platform for embodiment and interpenetration”	does not mean that the subject and the 
digital interface are positioned, or able to (re)position themselves, as relational, mutually co-
constitutive entities in it.565   For instance, when I entered the space containing People on 
People, a camera took a recording of me, which was sent to the projectors on the floor.  The 
projectors on the ceiling also received this information and projected enlarged color 
photographic recordings of past participants who had previously interacted with the 
installation onto the wall.  When my shadow passed over certain spaces on the wall, the color 
recordings revealed themselves.566 If I stood still for a moment, these recordings sprung to 
life, and began to “interact”	with me.567  When I moved on, the color recordings froze and 
slowly faded into the background of the installation.568 Thus the relationship between the 
body and technology in People on People was positioned by Hemmer and presented to me, as 
consisting of more or less self-contained objects or subjects who inhabit parallel, yet separate 
(physical and virtual) worlds.  (Figures 45 & 46) 
 
                                                
563 Rafael Lozano Hemmer. People on People. (2010). Found online at: http://www.lozano-
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Figure 45: R. Lozano Hemmer, People on People. (2010). 
 
Figure 46: R. Lozano Hemmer, People on People. (2010). 
In short, I was positioned in this installation, by Hemmer, as outside entity	–	a fixed operator, 
whose physical body needed to be incorporated into the interior of a machine, projected onto 
a surface and revealed to me in order for anything to work.  Therefore, I argue that the 
relationship between the body and technology in People on People, while not necessarily 
conceived of, is most definitely presented to me, by Hemmer, as an exchange occurring 
between detached, yet communicative entities.  This is precisely because People on People 
relies on the fact that I will recognize the narratives presented to me by Hemmer via the 
interface. These narratives include, but are not limited to, the notion that subjects and objects 
equally contribute to the installation, but are separate entities that occupy different worlds.  
This is an act of recognition on my behalf that caused me to physically enact a temporary 
separation, through the act of (re)positioning, between myself and the interface.  Given this, 
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when I was interacting with People on People I was not a viewer/participant; I was an 
observer.   
So, while Hemmer is careful to avoid empty instrumentalism, by ascribing agency to the 
digital interface, the interface in People on People could be criticized for, what Cramer 
(2011) calls, a focus on “look-and-feel”.569  By concentrating on the aesthetic appearance of 
the digital interface and the high-level technological aspects of the device (the fact that he can 
simulate a moving image of a subject in real time, project it onto a screen and make it 
aesthetically pleasing), Hemmer misses a fundamental aspect of HCI and digital interfaces in 
general: that they emerge out of and with the relationship between the body and technology.  
In doing this, Hemmer overemphasizes the importance of the digital interface and its 
technological functions, reducing it to both a synonym for simulation (the images of previous 
subjects as exact replicas) and a synonym of a perceptive medium or interactivity (the 
shadow of the current subject). The digital interface in People on People therefore becomes a 
metaphor –	a vague explanation or demonstration of human perception and behavior. 
Despite these limitations, the temporary analytical and physical distinctions that Hayles and 
the subject interacting in Hemmer’s installation make between the two entities that they are 
exploring could be seen in terms of Barad’s notion of the “agential cut”.570 The “agential cut”	
is a philosophical position, a material-conceptual device for knowing, seeing and 
understanding the world.571 Barad argues that the entangled relationship between any two 
entities emerges and is “iteratively reconfigured through each intra-action, thereby making it 
impossible to differentiate in any absolute sense between creation and renewal, beginning and 
returning, continuity and discontinuity, here, there, past, present and future”.572  
The deeply connected way in which everything is entangled with everything else, according 
to Barad, suggests that any act of observation or intra-action (on behalf of the subject or the 
media theorist) requires the subject to temporarily enact “an agential cut”	between themselves 
and the object they are studying within the larger material arrangement that they are located 
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in.573 Agential cuts then differ from other forms of thinking because the agential cut does not 
take this division for granted. As she writes:  
[T]he agential cut enacts a resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent 
ontological (and semantic) indeterminacy. In other words, relata do not pre-exist 
relations; rather, relata-within-phenomena emerge through specific intra-actions.  
Crucially, then, intra-actions enact agential separability –	the condition of exteriority-
within-phenomena.574 
Put simply, Barad believes that nothing located in “the world”	is inherently separate from 
anything else.575 However, separations are temporarily enacted, so a subject can examine an 
image, or explore a relationship long enough to gain some kind of knowledge about it. In the 
case of People on People, this separation occurs through subject interaction, thus determining 
my subject positioning in the installation (as viewer or observer, instead of 
viewer/participant). Thus the agential cut enacts a temporary separation between what is 
included in, and what is excluded from, the relationship or entity that the subject is observing 
and/or interacting with. The role of the agential cut is to untangle entities into separate 
objects and subjects, only to weave them back together later, as this act of unravelling is, and 
can only be, temporary. For, as stated above, while entities may be temporarily separated or 
stabilized, they cannot be disassociated from each other.  
If, as Barad argues, nothing located in “the world”	is inherently separate from anything else, 
and if, as Hayles argues, focusing on “the idea of relation”, “changes everything”; then I can 
begin to argue that, despite Hemmer’s focus on the aesthetic and technological aspects of the 
digital interface, the fact that I was able to physically enact a temporary separation (or an 
agential cut) between myself and the digital interface in People on People through the act of 
repositioning could be seen as an exploration, on my behalf, of how entities precede their 
existence with each other, and of how they emerge out of and with my relationship with the 
digital interface in interactive new media installations. It could also be seen as a mode of 
                                                
573 Karen Barad. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglements of Matter and 
Meaning. (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. 140. 




exploring, again on my behalf, what a body could or could not become (observer, viewer, 
participant, viewer/participant) in the installation space.576  
A focus on the “idea of relation”	between two entities in interactive new media installations 
allowed me the opportunity to (re)conceive my relationship and position to both, the digital 
interface and myself (as a viewer and/or viewer/participant) as in-process, thus unstable and 
open to reconfiguration.  This openness to reconfiguration not only confused the distinction 
between absence and presence, as well as the material and the informational, it also afforded 
me the opportunity to begin to experiment with the digital interface, to question and 
challenge the way in which the self/other, body/technology distinctions were presented to me 
in People on People, and to explore what the digital interface may become once I 
repositioned myself and my relationship to technology in interactive new media installations. 
In this way, I suggest that a reconsideration of the relationship between the body and 
technology (from separate objects and subjects to mutually entangled entities) highlights 
different, non-linear narratives, modes of communication and subject positionings. Thus it 
has the potential to open up a collective space for the exploration, criticism, reflection and 
reconsideration of the relationship between the body and technology in interactive new media 
installations. 
Collective Spaces of Questioning, Reflection and Reconsideration 
Amelia Jones (2000) writes that the body “is the means by which we produce ourselves as 
social beings, by which we produce ‘social space’”.577 Referencing Michel Feher’s (1987) 
formulation of power relations and the body, Jones argues that the body (when viewed from 
an art historical perspective) is not only the means by which we produce social space, but it is 
also the actualizer of power. The body, she claims, “functions as a kind of ‘resistance to a 
power’…	through its performance as socially determined and determining”.578 Therefore, the 
body, for Jones, has always been the site through which both public and private powers are 
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articulated; and if, as she argues, we take this to be the case, then the body can be conceived 
of as the site of power, and as the site of protest or resistance against those powers.579   
Although related to 1960-1990s feminist body art performances, the crux of Jones’s argument 
(the body is the site of power, protest and resistance) as well as her notion that radically 
disruptive and dislocative practices result in the intertwining of the “embodied selfhood”	with 
social and technological spaces, therefore creating a new type of subject position	–	“the 
body/self”	– can be applied to the relationship between the body and technology in interactive 
new media installations.580  For example, “the body/self”, for Jones, is a subject position that 
emerges out of the relationship between the body and social space.581  Thus, she writes, “the 
body/self can be understood as the social”	because it is formed through strategic corporeal 
acts of protest and/or resistance on behalf of both the viewer (who is observing and/or 
participating in the work) and the artist (who has both created and/or is performing the 
work).582 The renegotiation of this relationship on behalf of the subject means that the 
relationship between the social and the self is no longer solely conceived of by the artist or 
theorized in oppositional terms (public space vs. domestic or private space, the body vs. 
technology.) Instead, it suggests potential for rethinking the relationship between the body 
and technology as being “in process”	and open to reconfiguration in a way that both promotes 
and encourages behaviors that may deviate from the norm, and behaviors that may have the 
ability to cause dislocative effects in aesthetic contexts.583  
An example of this potential can be found in Carmin Karasic’s interactive new media 
installation Hu^mann (2008). Hu^mann consists of two components: technology (computer-
generated animations, a circular screen, a camera, a computer, motion detectors) and the 
human (the viewer/participant).584 (Figure 47)   
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Figure 47: C. Karasic, Hu^mann. (2008). 
The animations displayed on the screen are generated randomly from the Internet in real time.  
They consist of both abstract and literal depictions of states, processes or events that Karasic 
writes: “subtly hint at the effects that our [human] actions have on the world we occupy.”585 
The images located in the screen could consist of anything from a picture of the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina (a direct reference to global warming issues and civil engineering failures 
in the United States), to Disney World (an indirect reference to debates about fantasy and the 
real). They could be segments of a painting, a sculpture or an image of text that make direct 
or indirect reference to human actions and their effects on the world as well. When generated, 
multiple images are combined, distorted and then projected onto the screen in a kaleidoscope 
formation. (Figure 48)   
 
Figure 48: C. Karasic, Hu^mann. (2008). 
                                                
585 Carmin Karasic. Hu^mann. (2008). Found online at: http://humann.carminka.net/index.php 
152 
 
This was the state of the artwork when I first encountered it in 2008 in Kunst licht kunst in 
Eindhoven, NL.586 The images located inside the kaleidoscope remained static until the 
proximity sensors detected my movement. Once my activity was detected, the kaleidoscope 
began to spin based on my actions. For instance, when I moved to my left, the kaleidoscope 
spun left. If I walked directly up to the piece to get a closer look, Hu^mann would zoom in on 
one, or all, of the images and then project enlarged segments of them on screen.587  
When I entered performance range, the camera took a color photograph of me. This 
photograph was transmitted to a computer, where it was processed, distorted and then 
integrated into the images in the kaleidoscope in real time.588 While my image was distorted, I 
was able to recognize fragments of myself (my clothing) mixed with the other images 
appearing in the kaleidoscope. Since the actions that I performed (turning left, moving 
forward, moving backwards) caused a change in the state of the kaleidoscope, then it could 
be argued that my body was the means by which I produced the “social space”	of the image.   
Unlike the previously discussed interactive new media installations, Hu^mann does not 
contain a visible digital interface.  There was no pixelated image or shadow projected on-
screen for me to interact with.  Instead, I was required to use my body to interact with the 
installation. So, if as Jones states, the body is not only the “actualizer of power”	but also the 
“site of resistance”	to these powers, then it could be argued that my physical body was not 
only aiding in the production of the images and narratives and social space in Hu^mann, as 
suggested above, but it was also functioning as the site of resistance to the underlying 
narratives, images and relationships it helps create.589  In this way, it could be suggested that 
my body was the digital interface (the means of interaction and navigation) in this 
installation. This is precisely because in its triparte role as “creator of social-space”, 
“actualizer of power”	and “site of resistance”, the body, as Jones tells us, is able to become 
explicitly “non-universal”	and “non-transcendent”. In this ability to become this way lies the 
potential for radically dislocative practices which include, but are not limited to, a rethinking 
of the digital interface, as human body, in interactive new media installations.590   
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It is important to note here that when I posit that the digital interface had become my body, I 
am not referencing art historians John Chandler and Lucy Lippard’s (1968) notion of 
dematerialization.591 I am also not attempting to argue that I could simply merge with 
technology to become part of the installation. Nor am I equating the visual absence of the 
digital interface with physical disappearance. To argue any of these things is to misinterpret 
the relationship between the technical and the biological and ignore the fact that digital 
interface has not actually been physically removed. The relationship between the body and 
technology in Hu^mann is not about assimilation or removal but about coexistence between 
the multiple entities that exist there. By suggesting that the digital interface has become my 
body in Hu^mann, I am signalling the fact that the digital interface (as in the abstract, multi-
layered structures of code that allow two entities to communicate with each other and its 
consequent metaphorical significance as a mediator and translator) is no longer represented, 
or made tangible by, a physical object or a shadow projected onto a screen. The digital 
interface, the mode of interaction, communication, its metaphorical, aesthetic and cultural 
significance in Hu^mann, is now my body. Thus it is produced by and is constantly 
producing, subjects, objects and meanings.  In this way, the designation of human body as 
interface can be seen as emerging out of both the reconception of the relationship between the 
body and technology and the ongoing process by which the artwork, cultural meanings and 
interactions are collectively created and questioned. In the case of Hu^mann the dislocative 
acts of cutting (of images), the integration (of my photographic image with the other images 
in the kaleidoscope) and artistic experimentation with different configurations of the digital 
interface allowed me to explore and question my relationship to technology. These acts 
enabled me to examine my relationship to the content of the images (of events, processes or 
states of human actions) and begin to rethink the actions and decisions that I made both in the 
gallery space and in the world.   
In conclusion, whether understood as an “entangled intra-relating”	by Barad, a relational 
construction “that participates in distributed cognition dispersed throughout the body and the 
environment”	by Hayles or as “non-universal, “non-transcendental”	and “in process”	by 
Jones, the relationship between the body and technology in Hu^mann can be seen as both a 
                                                
591 Coined, by art historians John Chandler and Lucy Lippard, in 1968, dematerialism refers to an extremely 
diverse range of artistic practices and reflections that:“emphasize the thinking process almost exclusively” and 
“may result in the object becoming wholly obsolete.” (Chandler and Lippard 1968, p. 46) This notion is 
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mutually entangled and collaboratively produced experience.592  Hu^mann then not only 
opened up a space for me to begin to reposition and reconstruct myself in relation to 
technology, but it also opened up both a space for criticism (of the underlying structures and 
theories that dictate and define my movements and positions) and an area that allowed me an 
opportunity to begin to reflect on, re-evaluate, rediscover and possibly even redefine my 
relationship to the digital interface in interactive new media installations. These conclusions 
lead the way towards the next topic discussed in this thesis: Instruction.  The following 
chapter will introduce this concept and then explore the implications of the destabilizing 
effects (as described in this chapter) that resistance to, or the subversion of, instruction have 
on the way the viewer/participant both intra-acts with and thinks about the digital interface in 
interactive new media installations.  
 	
                                                
592 Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska. Life After New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process. (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2012), p. 7. Karen Barad. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Enganglements 
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Katherine Hayles. “Flesh and Metal: Reconfiguring the Mindbody in Virtual Environments” in Data Made 
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Chapter 3: Instruction and the Interface 
 
The digital interface in interactive new media art installations is commonly defined as both 
the hardware and software embedded in a physical object that enables humans to use 
technology. Its primary functions are to mediate communication and facilitate interaction 
between entities. While the interface certainly enables connections to be forged, these 
connections are preprogrammed by the artist(s) creating the interface, and they occur, as 
previously argued, in spaces of predesigned experiences. In this way, the functions that the 
interface performs (facilitation, mediation, translation, communication) can be seen, to an 
extent, as problematic due to the fact that they create active vs. passive dichotomies, resulting 
in, as argued in Chapter 1 and 2, environments of controlled passive response. However, as 
Mondloch (2010) states, it is not so much the dichotomies associated with screen-based 
artworks that require scholarly attention, although she believes they are important and should 
be examined. Rather, she rightfully suggests it is the processes that bring these dichotomies 
into being –	specifically “the disciplinary aspects of screen-based visuality”	that should be of 
concern to any theorist examining them.593  
The phrase “disciplinary aspects of screen-based visuality” for Mondloch refers to how the 
“technological structures and control mechanisms of late capitalism”, such as cybernetics and 
new forms of visually-based media communications like the Internet, influence or effect the 
relationship between humans and technology.594  Thus, she writes that while critical accounts 
written about interface-reliant installations in the humanities fields have developed “more 
nuanced theories of attentive regulation and control as potential sites of cultural 
contestation”, the majority of these texts fail to appreciate the role that interfaces play in 
administrating and controlling interactions between subjects and media objects.595  Given 
this, in any investigation into the use of the digital interface in interactive new media 
installations, it is of vital importance to develop a critical understanding of the means and 
mechanisms through which viewer/participant interactions are shaped via the digital interface 
to attain certain results.  I will do just that in this chapter, focusing on the concept of 
instruction and instructional processes.  Particularly I will examine how instruction is 
transmitted to the viewer/participant via the digital interface, as well as how and why it is 
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employed in interactive new media installations. My exploration of instruction is structured 
around three questions: Why is the use of instruction important in interactive new media 
installations? How and why is instruction employed in them? And for what means and to 
what ends are the results of this instruction used? 
My understanding of instruction and the instructional process is informed by a close reading 
of Norbert Wiener’s (1989) cybernetic notion of instruction as a method of controlling 
biological and technical systems and Lucy Suchman’s (2007) critique of instruction as a 
rhetorical device that reinforces problematic modes of communication between humans and 
machines. I draw on these texts in order to explore the implications that the use of instruction, 
as provided to the viewer/participant by the artist and deployed via the digital interface, has 
for interactive new media installations.  How we learn to interact in interactive new media 
installations can be accomplished in multiple ways: instruction can occur through reading and 
following written instruction manuals, watching other viewer/participants interact with the 
artwork, or through direct experimentation with the installations themselves. Rather than 
addressing written and oral instructions (user manuals or verbal directions) provided by the 
artist or venue to the viewer/participant, I am concerned with instruction as it is conveyed 
through the use of rhetorical devices in interactive new media installations.596 
In this way, this chapter addresses instruction, not as an order or command, but as a method 
of arranging and then transmitting explanatory or directional information to the 
viewer/participant. My ultimate aim in theorizing instruction as such is to take a step back 
from proliferating utilitarian accounts of instruction and interfaces that concentrate, for the 
most part, on the undesirable effects of instruction when transmitted via technology to the 
subject (Galloway, 2013; Hookway, 2012). In taking this step back, I aim to provide a 
different, hopefully more productive account of how instruction manifests itself and can be 
used in interactive new media installations.597 While the effects that the aforementioned 
theorists concentrate on in their work may be undesirable, they are, for the most part, 
ideological in nature.  That is to say, they are the effects of a normative vision – socio-
political, moral or ethical beliefs or ideas around how to behave –	that are transmitted to the 
viewer/participant via the digital interface and that structure her experience in interactive 
                                                
596 Instruction in human-machine interaction is subject to historical context, and consequently the efficacy of 
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installations. So, while these effects are not the focus of this chapter, they are important to 
any conversation around instruction and must be briefly discussed. 
The Ideological Effects of Instruction 
Some instruction, when transmitted through technology, is, according to Alexander Galloway 
(2012), always binary and always political.598 Instruction, for Galloway, is binary in a 
computational sense: its dissemination hinges on the abilities of various technological and 
cybernetic systems to transmit a very small amount of information from one entity to another 
and to “operate smoothly without obstruction”.599 It is political, he writes, simply because the 
information being transmitted is produced by specific people for specific purposes. Thus this 
type of instruction, Galloway tells us, is similar to propaganda in that it is meant to be 
consumed by the public, taken as fact, without critically thinking about it.600   
Galloway takes issue with this particular type of instruction (instruction as propaganda) as he 
believes it is used (by those designing the devices) to influence the actions of the subject via 
the prohibition of specific types of narratives, modes of production and moral frames.601  In 
this way, instruction, especially instruction transmitted through technology, for Galloway, is 
problematic because it prohibits the existence of “alternate moral frames”	and different ways 
of thinking and acting.602 Given this, instruction, he writes, can be seen as “disingenuous 
informatics”	because it is used, by those who create it, to transmit ideological propaganda to 
the public.603   
Suchman (2008), notes that digital technologies “include relations between the sites and 
interests within which coordinative artifacts are generated and those of their use.”604  Such 
technologies, she continues: “presuppose an open horizon of socio-material practices that 
inevitably exceed their representational grasp.  At the same time, those practices reflexively 
constitute themselves as implementation of actions prescribed.”605  However, she 
writes:“[the] frequent presence of multiple, often contradictory, agendas…on the one hand, 
and the work required to enact an orderliness…on the other lead to various forms of both 
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breakdown and creative resistance.”606 Here, Suchman, like Galloway, is arguing that people 
(engineers, artists), or institutions (both commercial and non-profit) produce technologies to 
perform very specific computerized tasks for very specific reasons.  They are then sold to and 
used by the public for various purposes that the device’s creators may or may not have 
originally intended.607 Suchman continues, stating that the people who consume technologies 
and the institutions and people who create them, of course, hold specific, often conflicting 
interests or agendas. The presence of multiple, often contradictory interests, combined with 
the fact that these technologies are ultimately preprogrammed to perform specific task(s) can 
lead to both breakdown situations (the technology simply will not work) and/or resistance to 
the instruction given by the subject interacting with it (using it for other, unrelated purposes).  
Therefore, Suchman’s analysis differs from Galloway’s in the sense that she believes 
instruction, as transmitted to the subject via technology, may influence a subject’s behavior. 
It also may suggest actions or propose strategies for the completion of a goal, but it does not, 
as Galloway’s analysis above may suggest, determine it. That is to say, instruction for 
Suchman can be ideological in some cases, thus it may restrict, but it does not prohibit, as 
Galloway argues above, the emergence of alternative narratives, modes of production and 
moral frames.  
Suchman’s critique of instruction as a process that determines behavior assumes a particular 
importance in the context of this chapter, as her interpretation does not only focus on the 
undesirable ideological effects instruction may have, but she provides her reader with 
examples of the subject’s subversion and resistance to it.  Drawing on Suchman’s work, in 
this chapter, I focus on the destabilizing effects that the resistance to, or the subversion of 
instruction on behalf of the viewer/participant has in interactive new media installations. 
Doing this will enable me to study a whole range of variations in behaviors and interactions 
that occur when the viewer/participant resists or subverts instruction, and how this resistance 
or subversion affects the way the viewer/participant views and interacts with the digital 
interface in interactive new media installations.  The pertinent questions to be asked at this 
point then are: What are the potential consequences of subversion or resistance of instruction 
on behalf of the viewer/participant for the interface in interactive new media installations? 
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And how does this instruction change when the viewer/participant resists or subverts it?  My 
reasoning behind asking these questions is to develop a critical understanding of the power 
that instruction has in controlling the actions of its subjects and how the nature of this 
instruction may change when deployed in interactive new media installations. Subjects, as 
Suchman writes, have the ability to resist or subvert instruction and generate moments of 
rupture in the spaces they are located in.608 Building on Suchman’s argument, the 
contribution that my analysis of instruction adds to discussions on this topic is that it directly 
addresses the potential that the subject’s resistance to and subversion of instruction has in 
allowing for different modes of thinking, doing and interacting in the specific context of 
interactive new media installations and in the world at large.  
Discourses around the regulatory nature of instruction have recently re-emerged among 
scholars, in order to posit that the interface is unworkable.609 I say, “re-emerged”	because 
these arguments echo, to an extent, Norbert Wiener’s cybernetic notions of instruction. I 
discuss Wiener’s notions of instruction in detail below, but in brief: instruction, for Wiener, is 
a method of controlling biological and technical systems –	one that takes information learned 
from past experiences and reinserts it into the system to influence similar situations 
encountered in the future.610  The focus of his research, is on the control of system behaviors 
via instruction. Specifically Wiener focuses on how fast the system adapts to and modifies 
previous behaviors based on the current information it is receiving. Any moments of rupture 
that may occur if and/or when the subject resists instruction in his theory are dismissed, as 
they exist outside the cybernetic feedback loop of control.611 By dismissing these moments, I 
argue that cybernetic notions of instruction, as theorized by Wiener, foreclose on any 
possibilities for subversion or resistance to the information or instruction being transmitted to 
the subject interacting with the system as this theory relies on the false premise that the 
systems being analyzed are a part of a closed signalling loop.612 So, while efforts by scholars 
like Galloway (who theorizes the interface as unworkable) and Wiener (who theorizes 
instruction as an integral part of a closed feedback loop) make a considerable contribution to 
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humanistic and post-humanistic understandings of the interrelation between instruction, the 
viewer/participant, the artist and the interface, I argue that their theories can be seen as 
problematic. They are problematic because the ability (on behalf of the viewer/participant) to 
resist or subvert instruction is not so much ignored, but left behind by scholars like Galloway 
and Wiener in favor of a critique of the socio-political propaganda that instructional 
processes purportedly transmit or utilitarian studies of the regulation of behaviors.    
With some exceptions research into the use of the digital interface in the humanities fields, 
has, to an extent, adopted the prevailing and dominant cybernetic views on instruction briefly 
described above.613 Given this, the question should be asked of how a conceptualization of 
instruction would operate in interactive new media installations if we were to focus our 
examinations of it on other aspects of the instructional process. That is to say, to focus our 
investigations into instruction on the notion that the viewer/participant has the ability to resist 
or subvert the instruction given to her, instead of concentrating on its ability to allow the 
artist to control or manipulate viewer/participant interactions.  By shifting focus in this 
manner, I do not mean to say that we should be unconcerned with developments in the 
computer science and humanities fields around instruction, or that artists should not critically 
interrogate or deploy instruction as a method of controlling viewer/participant interactions in 
their works.  Rather, I suggest that something is needed to complement the notion of 
instruction as a cybernetic method of controlling the actions of biological entities in 
computerized systems, as well as to provide a different analytic framework for investigating 
how instruction is executed and inscribed in interactive new media installations.  This chapter 
is my attempt at providing such a framework	–	one that places importance on, thus allows 
moments of experimental resistance and subversion on behalf of the viewer/participant to 
come into focus. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first provides a theoretical base from which to 
understand instruction in interactive new media installations.  It suggests that the digital 
interface in interactive new media installations mediates a relationship between the 
viewer/participant and artist. By this I mean the digital interface translates and then transmits 
instructional information provided by the artist about the installation to the 
viewer/participant. I then argue that these processes occur, in interactive new media 
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installations, through the reappropriation and designation of common objects (bicycles, 
telephones, books, microphones, human bodies) as digital interfaces in order to reinforce and 
regulate, to an extent, viewer/participant behaviors by providing them with something 
familiar and recognizable. This is done to manage and sometimes to limit communication 
between the viewer/participant and the other entities located in the same space.  The 
viewer/participant then interprets these objects as instruction –	an action which I posit 
enables the viewer/participant to (re)orient themselves in the installation through the 
duplication and reconstruction of familiar processes, spaces and entities (reading, cycling, 
recording studios) that they may encounter on an everyday basis in the physical world. I build 
on this theorization in the second half, examining how viewer/participant resistance and 
subversion to instruction affects interactive installations, what it means and why it is 
important. In it I suggest that the viewer/participant’s resistance to, or subversion of 
instruction begins to challenge concepts of separate, discrete, autonomous entities called 
humans and communicative machines by presenting the viewer/participant with an 
opportunity to engage with and restructure (within certain parameters) the underlying 
narratives that shapes her experience in interactive new media installations. I posit that this 
resistance and subversion begins, to an extent, to shift focus away from theorizing the subject 
as an outside operational entity whose actions are structured and defined as exterior to 
technology, towards considering her an integral part of the installation –	an embodied and 
active viewer/participant whose interactions with the digital interface have consequences in 
interactive new media art installations.   
This notion of an embodied viewer/participant whose interactions have repercussions in 
interactive new media installations is highly significant to this thesis because it enables me to 
theorize the encounter between the viewer/participant and the digital interface as generative –	
as an ongoing, open-ended process. From this perspective, the interface in interactive new 
media installations can be said to be unstable, uncertain and, to a certain extent, open to 
reconfiguration, as the designation of the viewer/participant as locus of interaction means that 
the illusion that the artist has complete control over the action occurring in the installation is, 
to an extent, broken.  
Instruction, Learning Processes and the Cybernetic Feedback Loop of Interaction 
Instruction, for Wiener (1989), as mentioned earlier, is: “a method of controlling a system by 
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reinserting into it the results of its past performance”.614 Wiener continues, positing that if 
this reinserted information is able to modify the patterns of the performance of the system, or 
the user’s past actions, then we are presented with “a process which may well be called 
learning”.615 Instruction, then, for Wiener, is a system that influences the learning process, 
and the learning process is a method that relies on information learned from past experiences 
influencing or feeding-back on similar situations encountered in the future.  
An example of how instruction and the learning process works, Wiener informs us, can be 
found in the way a lab rat is taught to navigate a maze.616  The scientist places a rat in a maze, 
and in order to find food, or to avoid electric shock, the rat must be able to remember if its 
actions have been successful.617 Did it get food? Or did it get shocked? The rat must be able 
to use this learned information to change its plan to avoid past mistakes (remembering which 
paths lead to shocks) and successfully navigate the maze (remembering which paths lead to 
food).618  Wiener writes that the learning process described above is different from other 
instructional processes, like those that deal with simple performance-based successes or 
failures (the ability to grasp a straw).619  He calls this instance a “feedback on a higher level”, 
as the way the rat is able to navigate the maze is a reflection of disciplinary instructions used 
to restrict or reinforce behaviors, not of simple learned actions (again, the ability to grasp a 
straw).620   
I want to concentrate, for a moment, on some of the problems in Wiener’s statement on the 
flow and regulation of information in cybernetic systems – specifically, those found in his 
description of instructional and learning processes as a feedback loop. I argue that Wiener’s 
theorization is limited because he is treating the biological and technical aspects of these 
processes as predetermined and constrained. In doing this, I suggest he ends up denying 
agency. That said, Wiener does concede, later in the same text, that if scholars treat the 
outcomes of the instructional and learning processes as purely quantifiable –	as a detailed 
string of numbers that merely control action –	without being critically questioned or 
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contextualized, then the information received about the system being studied is flawed.621 
This is because these outcomes do not account for more subjective things like human bias or 
human and nonhuman error.  As he writes: “If the results [of instructional processes] are 
merely used as numerical data for the criticism of the system and its regulation, we have the 
simple feedback of the control engineers.”622  
How information flowing through these feedback loops behaves, moreover, is not the same, 
for Wiener. Wiener does not believe that all biological processes act alike, or respond to 
information in the same way, if they respond at all.  Rather, the transmission of information, 
he argues, relies on: “a complicated pattern of responses in which certain combinations of 
incoming [information]…will cause the message to go further, while certain other 
combinations will not.  These combinations are not a thing fixed once for all, nor do they 
even depend solely on the past history of messages received. They are known to change.”623 
These notions of change lead Wiener to explore the limitations of instructional and learning 
processes.624  However, some of the conclusions he comes to in his study are flawed. These 
conclusions are, in simple terms, that the functions of biological systems (humans) are 
synonymous with those of technical systems (computers). Given this, humans are primarily 
seen, by Wiener, in the context of cybernetics, as self-regulating, information-processing 
things that are essentially the same as machines.  
The instructional process, for Wiener, is predicated on the assumption that there is symmetry 
between biological and technical entities. This assumption implies that the human and 
nonhuman subjects participating in the instructional feedback loop lack agency.625 Not only 
does instruction describe, and consequently, fix the embodied actions and perception of 
subjects in specific positions (spectator, observer, viewer, participant) but, by assuming that 
biological and technical processes are the same (thus stripping away any semblance of 
agency from the entities that actively contribute to them), Wiener’s theorization of the 
instructional process is positioning the human as operational entity and technology as a 
passive tool. In this way, I argue that Wiener’s theorization of the instructional and learning 
processes, in a round-about way, is reinforcing notions of the separation between the human 
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and the machine. His theorization does this via the creation of an active vs. passive 
dichotomy (active, operational entity vs. passive tool.) The issues (separation of the human 
and the machine; active vs. passive dichotomy) found in Wiener’s conceptualization are 
similar to those Brian Massumi (2011) sees occurring in theorizations of interactivity.  
Massumi argues that despite the word interactivity, “the emphasis is rarely placed on the 
dynamic form of the [subjects’] experience”.626 Rather, the emphasis, he writes, is placed on 
the series of back and forth actions and reactions that interactivity provides to the subject. 
Massumi believes that interactivity in art should be all about this “dynamic form of the 
experience”.627 But instead interactivity, he tells us, “tends to get reduced to the instrumental 
affordance as concretized in the actual form of the technical object. It gets reified in an 
objective function”.628 So how do these issues around interactivity and instruction manifest 
themselves in interactive new media installations, if they do at all? A good place to start 
would be to examine media artist Luc Corchesne’s installation McLuhan’s Massage Parlor 
(2011-2012). 
In 2011, Courchesne was commissioned by the city of Toronto to create a video installation –	
McLuhan’s Massage Parlor	–	as part of their celebration of media theorist Marshall 
McLuhan’s (1911-1980) 100th birthday. The Toronto-based version consisted of four large 
rear projection screens. The screens were arranged in a square formation and covered from 
top to bottom in textual, image and sound-based data taken directly from McLuhan’s book 
The Medium is the Massage (1967).629 Courchesne also created interactive versions of this 
work.  They were installed in the Society for Arts and Technology’s (SAT) interactive 
environments in Montreal.630 Like their Toronto-based counterparts, the interiors of the 
interactive environments are covered with data taken from the same text.631 (Figure 49) 
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Figure 49: L. Courchesne, McLuhan’s Massage Parlor. (2011). 
The video installation does not contain a digital interface; the interactive versions, however, 
do.  The digital interface in the interactive versions is a hand-held controller similar in shape 
and size to a smartphone.632 To navigate the installation and engage with visual and textual 
information, the viewer/participant must hold the interface in her hands and point it up at the 
ceiling or down at the floor. To zoom in on a particular image or piece of text, she must press 
a button on the interface with her finger and move it back and forth as if she were turning a 
page in a book.  Finally, to activate sound or video, she must tap an icon located on the 
interface’s screen.633 (Figure 50) 
 
Figure 50: L. Courchesne, McLuhan’s Massage Parlor. (2011). 
                                                





How the viewer/participant uses the digital interface in McLuhan’s Massage Parlor is based 
on information that she has learned from past experiences with similar items (tapping icons 
opens relevant applications on a smart phone). In this way, Courchesne does not have to 
provide a detailed list of predetermined steps for the viewer/participant to follow in order to 
activate the installation (and he does not.) Rather, similar to Wiener’s example of rats 
navigating mazes above, Courchesne can assume that the viewer/participant remembers, to an 
extent, previous experiences with books or smartphones and will use the interface provided in 
a similar manner to the way she would use the aforementioned items.  
Given the shape and size of the interface and the tacit instruction provided to the 
viewer/participant by Courchesne, it could be argued that emphasis, in McLuhan’s Massage 
Parlor, is placed on the series of back and forth actions of the viewer/participant (pressing a 
button, swiping a finger) and responses to these actions by the installation (the revealing of 
the artwork).  For example, the viewer/participant can do a lot with the forms and imagery 
located in the installation. She can make an image appear, hear sounds and read text and she 
can do all of this by touching the interface.  Given this, the interface, and by extension the 
installation, feels action-packed.  However, the sense of action that the viewer/participant 
experiences when participating in artworks that employ this type of interaction, Massumi tells 
us, “is constrained, subordinated to functional circuits of action-reaction that are to a large 
extent predetermined to respond to what are taken to be existing needs or wants [of the 
subject]”.634  In constraining interaction in this way, Massumi states:	“What is concentrated 
on [by the subjects participating in the artwork and the artist programming the interface] are 
instrumentalized action-reaction feed-back loops and, what gets foregrounded is the element 
of nextness in the flow of action.”635 In this way, interactivity, he writes, “backgrounds its 
own artistic dimension when it concentrates on the function of the instrument to the detriment 
of the semblant expression”.636 Here, Massumi is arguing that when interactivity is theorized, 
and consequently deployed in artworks, as a series of actions and reactions, the 
viewer/participant’s embodied experience of and creative expression with the work takes a 
back seat to the computerized functions of the technical devices located in the installation. 
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Given this, the experience the participant has in artworks that employ this type of 
interactivity, Massumi tells us, is akin to playing a video game.637  The viewer/participant 
discovers and then masters “a trick”	and once she’s done that, she quickly loses interest and 
walks away because she knows how the installation works.638  
Following on from Massumi, I argue that the experience that the instruction affords to the 
viewer/participant in McLuhan’s Massage Parlor is constrained in the sense that it describes, 
and consequently fixes, the actions and perception of the viewer/participant through the 
reinforcement of questionable and contradictory notions of interactivity (touch a button, see 
images, become more active). This is because the instructions given to the viewer/participant 
are, as mentioned above, limited to simple actions (touch this, swipe that, see an image or 
piece of text).  Given this, interaction, in McLuhan’s Massage Parlor, operates more on a 
level of instrumental function than the embodied experience of the viewer/participant or the 
aesthetic dimensions of the interface. By limiting interaction in this way, McLuhan’s 
Massage Parlor inadvertently creates an active vs. passive dichotomy by positioning the 
viewer/participant as passive entity and the interface as operational tool. And it is this 
limitation around interactivity that I suggest ultimately reinforces, in the same roundabout 
way as Wiener’s theorization of instructional and learning processes mentioned earlier, the 
separation of the human and the machine.  
Suchman confirms my argument: reinforcement of the separation of the human and the 
machine occurs, she states, through the deployment of technologically based metaphors and 
models (such as the term “interactivity”	or a digital interface shaped to resemble a phone, 
used to describe, represent and fix actions) that incorporate the subject “into the socio-
material assemblage that comprises a functioning machine”.639 These metaphors and models, 
she tells us, ultimately instrumentalize the actions of human entities, while simultaneously 
celebrating the “liveliness”	of the nonhuman ones.  This happens, Suchman writes, because 
agency, when theorized using Wiener’s cybernetic definition of instruction, is a singular, 
internal attribute. It is “something that comes from ‘inside’”.640 By “something that comes 
from inside,” Suchman is referring to the fact that agency, specifically the agency of 
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nonhuman entities, in texts on cybernetics, is conceived of as “prespeicified”	or “hard-wired”	
into the machine.641 Suchman is skeptical of this particular configuration of agency as it 
hinges on what she sees as contradictions in Wiener’s formulation of cybernetics and 
instruction – contradictions that she believes still exist today.642  If we take this to be the case, 
if the instructional process can never fully depart from cybernetic understandings of it as a set 
of prescribed directions for controlling actions in closed systems, then what can be said of its 
use in interactive new media art installations?  
Hayles, like Suchman, highlights the contradictions in the treatment of biological and 
technical entities that underpin Wiener’s cybernetic ideas of instruction and their application 
in the humanities fields and fine arts. She argues that: “[f]rom Norbert Wiener on, the flow of 
information through feed-back loops has been associated with the deconstruction of the 
liberal human subject.”643 Such deconstruction of the human subject is, of course 
problematic; it is a process that, Hayles argues: “presumes a conception of information as a 
(disembodied) entity that can flow between carbon-based organic components and silicon-
based electronic components to make protein and silicon operate as a single system.”644 What 
are the consequences of instruction when used as rhetorical device in interactive new media 
installations beyond the reinforcement of the separation between the human and the machine 
and disembodiment? To what extent can it be argued that the resistance and subversion of 
instruction by the viewer/participant ends up challenging notions of separation and 
disembodiment in interactive new media installations? How are these challenges able to 
reshape the way the viewer/participant interacts with the digital interface? And how effective 
are they?  
Pre-Programmed Actions and Unexpected Experiences: Instruction as a Rhetorical Device 
Critical investigations into the use of instruction as a rhetorical device that reinforces 
traditional modes of communication and interaction and implies separation and 
disembodiment are not new in the humanities and computer science fields. Suchman, for 
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example, argues that plans, like instructions, are “conceptual and rhetorical devices (often 
materialized in various ways, as texts, diagrams and the like) that are deeply consequential 
for the lived activities of those of us who organize our actions in their terms”.645  
To summarize her argument, Suchman takes issue with previously held ideas in the computer 
science field about the concept of planning as it relates to artificial intelligence and 
cybernetics.  Plans, according to Suchman, are not simply scientific models of action; they 
also act as “resources for people’s practical deliberations about action”.646  While plans are 
used in the aforementioned disciplines as resources for action, they do not, she writes, 
determine its course, as they do not fully represent the embodied practices and ever 
fluxuating circumstances of the user’s action in concrete detail.  A plan’s purpose, she 
suggests, is to orient the user in such a way that they can “obtain the best possible position 
from which to use those embodied skills on which…	success depends”.647 Here Suchman is 
arguing that a plan of action in the computer science fields is a set of movements that are 
utilized by the user to achieve a desired state or goal. However, this plan does not determine 
the exact action of the user. Rather, it recommends courses of action, which are often based 
on basic assumptions about the user (humans are bipedal) and/or pre-detected behaviors and 
basic assumptions around them (this person purchased diapers, she must have an infant).  Its 
success relies on the user’s knowledge of, and embodied response to, the conditions and 
entities located in their environment, not on the successful completion of the predetermined 
steps provided to them.   
If we apply this notion to interactive new media art installations, then a plan of action is 
something the viewer/participant consciously forms based on instruction the artist provides to 
her via the digital interface.  This is done in order to navigate the various images and 
narratives that the viewer/participant encounters in the installation.  The fact that the artist is 
providing the viewer/participant with instruction via a navigational device (the digital 
interface) however complicates this process because, as argued above, a plan of action is not 
a series of predetermined steps executed to accomplish a goal (touch a button, activate an 
installation). The actions that the viewer/participant makes are reliant on her intentions or 
purpose in the installation. That is to say, the viewer/participant’s interactions with the digital 
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interface reflect and represent, but do not replicate, her specific purpose (press a button, 
activate graphics, experience artwork) in interactive new media installations. Given this, the 
way the viewer/participant interacts with and navigates the installation is not a direct result of 
the instruction provided to her. Instead, echoing Suchman, I posit that it arises from her 
situated actions with the forms that occupy the same space.648 Thus the concept of 
interaction, when deployed in certain installations, can provide options for viewer/participant 
intervention, via resistance and/or subversion of this instruction. 
A very good example of how intervention may occur can be found in Rafael Lozano-
Hemmer’s interactive new media installation Microphones (2008). The digital interface in 
Microphones is a series of 1939 vintage Shure brand microphones.649 To activate the 
installation, the subject must approach a microphone and speak into it. The microphone then, 
to use Hemmer’s words, “speaks back”	to her.650 (Figures 51 & 52)  
 
Figure 51: R. Lozano Hemmer, Microphones. (2008). 
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Figure 52: R. Lozano Hemmer, Microphones. (2008). 
The types of responses the microphones give are varied –	half the time they play back what 
was just recorded, half the time they reproduce a recording of a previous subject.  This 
distribution of responses, according to Hemmer, serves two purposes: it allows the subject to 
“understand the interaction”	occurring in the installation; and it “creates an experience that is 
outside his or her control”.651   
The way the installation is staged in the gallery may help the subject understand the 
interaction occurring in it on a deeper level, however, based on personal experience, 
Microphones does not create an experience outside the subject’s control insomuch as it 
creates, to an extent, an experience outside the artist’s control. I argue that it is this lack of 
control on behalf of the artist that ultimately provides the subject with options to subvert and 
resist the instruction dictated to her. For example, my interaction with the interfaces in 
Microphones and my ability to navigate the installation were not dependent on a deep 
understanding of external technical conditions (the ability to use a microphone in the physical 
world, prior knowledge of sound production) of the form that the digital interfaces represent. 
My actions with the digital interface were instead dependent on my intentions, or purpose 
(speak into the microphone, hear my amplified voice).  My consequent position in relation to 
the digital interface (orator) was a representation of both my previous interactions in similar 
situations and the role Hemmer has instructed me, via metaphors and models (microphones, 
the word interactive), to play in the installation.  
                                                




At this point it is important to note, as Suchman does, that plans are not located outside 
action.652  They are, she states, “moments of situated activity (activities of planning, 
remembering, etc.), displaced in time and space from the occasion anticipated or 
recollected”.653  Following on from Suchman, the instruction provided to the subject in any 
situation should not be understood as the cause of action. It should be seen as a resource that 
can be employed by the subject in order to achieve action.654 Given this, it could be assumed 
that when a subject interacts with the digital interface in Microphones, she is not necessarily 
following the predesigned trajectory of the installation provided to her by Hemmer. For, as 
argued earlier, a plan does not determine the action of the subject.  It relies on her ability to 
recall previously learned information and apply it to the situation at hand. This then suggests, 
among other things, that when I approached the microphone and spoke into it, I was 
navigating the installation based on information (how to use a microphone, how to behave in 
a museum or gallery setting) located outside of Hemmer’s control.  In other words, Hemmer 
does not know who will be visiting the gallery and interacting with his work, therefore he 
cannot predict the behavior of every single subject in the gallery space. Thus he cannot 
control every aspect of the way they interact with his installation. This lack of control 
suggests that I could subvert the narrative or resist the instruction provided to me by 
Hemmer, and, to an extent, modify it.  
For example, Hemmer is unaware if I had, among other things, used a microphone in a 
professional setting, been to a museum or seen an interactive installation before. Nor did he 
have any prior knowledge as to what I would do or say when I approached the microphone. I 
could have, for instance, screamed into a microphone from far away, instead of speaking 
directly into it or simply refused to speak –	all actions that have the potential to modify the 
predetermined narrative of the installation by breaking the rigid feedback loop of human-
machine interaction that it relies on.  If I am not able to hear the microphone “speak back”, 
then I am not receiving a response. Thus I am participating, but not interacting. The fact that I 
was engaging with and consequently applying my prior experiences with interactive artworks 
–	experiences located outside Hemmers’	control –	to Microphones furthermore suggests that I 
could alter, to an extent, the outcome of the installation.  For, as mentioned above, Hemmer 
cannot predict, therefore cannot program, all of these experiences into the installation.  
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How the subject then creates a plan through situated action is not only viewed as a way to 
complicate the notion that a plan is just a detailed set of instructions that is controlling the 
action in the computer science field –	this perspective can also be seen as a way for the 
subject to resist or modify instruction in interactive new media installations. For example, by 
recalling my past experiences in similar situations and then implementing them in 
Microphones, I was able to challenge some, but not all, of the underlying concepts dictated to 
me by the instruction given and begin to reshape my experience in the installation. I was able 
to do this because, as mentioned above, my intent or purpose (which was to interact) was 
never completely reflected in the movements I made with the digital interface (not speaking 
into it, just listening thus not receiving a response). The lack of response to my actions lead 
me to begin to experiment and question notions surrounding the cause and effect my 
interactions may have in the installation.  
Peripheral Actions and Unintended Consequences: Instruction and the Filtering Process 
Suchman is skeptical of the instructional process and our ability to subvert or resist it due to 
the fact that the main goal of instruction is ultimately to bring “canonical descriptions of 
objects and actions to bear on the actual objects and embodied actions that the instructions 
describe”.655 Instruction, she writes, is a practical tool used to guide action in virtual and 
physical environments. It relies on the subject’s ability to recognize symbolic representations 
and act on them. Therefore, instruction not only acts as a framework, or set of prescribed 
directions for controlling actions in closed systems, but it also serves, as Suchman tells us, 
“as resources for retrospective accounts of what has happened”.656  Hence, the success of 
instruction not only lies in the subject’s ability to recall previously learned information and 
apply it to the task at hand, it is also, in her words: “a matter of constructing a particular 
course of action that is accountable to the general description that the instruction provides. 
The work of constructing that course is neither exhaustively enumerated in the description, 
nor completely captured by a retrospective account of what was done.”657  Here, Suchman is 
suggesting that instruction acts as a resource for describing what type of action happened. 
This description, which is formed based on previous accounts of interaction, serves as a guide 
for the course of action that the subject takes. Such a description however is not 
comprehensive because it treats the actions and decisions that the subject makes in the 
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periphery of the installation as unimportant to the completion or activation of the artwork, 
specifically the actions and decisions that the subject makes that the instruction views as 
inconsequential.  
So, when the viewer/participant interacts with the digital interface –	an M-16 rifle –	in Lynn 
Hershman Leeson’s interactive new media installation America’s Finest (1993-4) the 
instruction that she receives from Hershman Leeson via the digital interface could be 
interpreted as a plan for action by both the viewer/participant and the observer.658 (Figure 53) 
 
Figure 53: L. Hershman Leeson, America’s Finest. (1993-4). 
This is because the instruction the viewer/participant is receiving describes the way she 
should act: walk up to the rifle, look into the sight and pull the trigger in order to view an 
image; or press the trigger down for an extended period of time to hear a sound and view an 
image sequence. It dictates the role(s) that the viewer/participant should play in the 
installation as well (aggressor before the trigger is pulled and victim afterwards). (Figure 54) 
                                                





Figure 54: L. Hershman Leeson, America’s Finest. (1993-4). 
The instruction however does not take into consideration all of the actions and their 
consequences (both intended and unintended) of the decisions that the viewer/participant 
makes when she uses the rifle.  These include simple shifts in movement, variations in 
activity, and any ethical objections she may have to the form (a weapon) that the interface 
represents or the positions (aggressor and/or victim) that she assumes upon interacting with 
it.659  In the case of America’s Finest, these decisions and their consequent results are 
explicitly intended to be seen as pointless, due to the fact that they do not follow the 
instruction provided to the viewer/participant by Hershman Leeson via the digital interface.  
In being this way, the interface is acting as a filter, much like Hansen (2004, 2006) believes 
the human body in virtual environments does, selecting, subtracting, processing and then 
reflecting information relevant to the narrative of the installation back on to the 
viewer/participant, while filtering out the rest as noise.660 Hansen’s notion of the filtering 
process, as argued in Chapter 1, is used as a way to regulate the viewer/participant’s actions 
and behaviors in interactive new media art installations. This regulation can be deliberate as 
illustrated by America’s Finest or unintentional as illustrated in Microphones. Suchman 
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confirms my argument: there is, she writes: “a determinate relationship between certain un-
interpreted actions by the user, read as changes to the state of the machine, and the machine’s 
transition to a next display.  By establishing a determinate relationship between detectable 
user actions and machine response, the design unilaterally administers control over the 
interaction, but in a way that is conditional on the actions of the user.”661 Here, Suchman is 
stating that technology is able to filter information, and that the relationship between the 
human and the computer is contingent on the user’s actions.  If the computer is unable to 
process the user’s actions, she writes, then the computer will take control or regulate 
interaction.662 So, if, for example the interface in Hershman Leeson’s installation cannot 
detect or interpret the viewer/participant’s movements in a particular sequence, then it could 
exert control over interaction (and by default the installation) by predicting the 
viewer/participant’s current action(s) based on previously detectable and interpretable ones.  
After that it would proceed to the next step.   
Based on this predetermined information (pull the trigger of the rifle in order to view and 
change images, hold the trigger down for a period of time in order to view a sequence of 
images), the software that allows American’s Finest to work, filters out the action(s) of the 
viewer/participant that are deemed unnecessary to the completion of the installation (fiddling 
with the sight, performing outside the video cameras’	range) and move systematically to the 
next step, reflecting information relevant to the completion of the installation back on to the 
viewer/participant.663  Thus, I argue Hershman Leeson is not only able to designate which 
actions will affect the installation (look into the sight, pull the trigger), but she is also able to 
regulate and, to an extent, fix the viewer/participant’s movements (stand in a specific place, 
swivel the rifle) and position (aggressor and then victim) in the installation as well. (Figure 
55)    
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Figure 55: L. Hershman Leeson, America’s Finest. (1993-4). 
How instruction is deployed to regulate actions and behavior, however, is much more 
complicated than the filtering process described above.  There is confusion between how the 
viewer/participant acts, how she interprets these actions, how the digital interface is 
programmed to interpret action and how these actions are viewed by others who occupy the 
same space.  For instance, just because the viewer/participant believes an action that she 
makes in the installation (pulling a trigger on an automatic rifle) will mimic the way she 
perceives the outcome of her action in the physical world (shooting, either offensively or 
defensively, in order to maim or kill) does not necessarily mean it will. And in America’s 
Finest it does not, as pulling the trigger of the gun causes the viewer/participant to become 
the victim of her own actions.664 Nor does it mean that others located in the same space will 
view these actions as offensive or aggressive ones. They could easily be understood as 
defensive ones, by either the viewer/participant performing the action, or by those observing 
it.  For, as stated above, there is confusion between how the viewer/participant perceives her 
actions, how her actions affect the underlying narrative of the installation, and how the others 
who occupy the same space see them.  
Suchman addresses this point, raising questions about the relationship between how projected 
or reconstructed courses of action in situations –	specifically the relationship between 
deliberation and reflection –	are both viewed and formed. She contends, in short, that 
confusion occurs because directed action is always integrally yet problematically related to 
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two types of activities: situated ad-hoc improvisation, that she defines as “the part of us, so to 
speak, that actually acts”	and the other, which she writes is derived from these ad-hoc 
improvisations and includes “our representations of action in the form of future plans and 
retrospective accounts”.665 These descriptions, she tells us, are formed either before or after 
the action performed by the subject in the form of imagined projections (the plan created 
before the action based on the instruction given) and recollected reconstructions (descriptions 
of past actions).666  
Suchman continues, stating that this method of representation relies upon “the recipient’s 
ability to do the implicit work of anchoring descriptions to concrete objects and actions”.667  
Thus, plans and retrospective accounts of plans are distinguished from action because, she 
argues, in order to “represent our actions we must in some way make an object of them”. 668 
Following on, I argue that to provide an accurate account of the abstract nature of the digital 
interface in interactive new media installations, we must be able to make sense of the actions 
we perform with it and the interactions we observe others making when using it, and in order 
to do so, we must be able to connect them to something tangible (often times a preexisting 
cultural form) and familiar. 
Abstract Descriptions and Familiar Forms: The Relationship between Form and Content 
The digital interface in David Small’s Illuminated Manuscript (2002) is a hand-bound 
oversized book containing 26 seemingly blank pages.669 A single projector hangs above the 
book, illuminating it. When a viewer/participant opens the book and moves her hand over a 
blank page, projected text appears on its surface.670 The text directly corresponded to the 
page in the manuscript the viewer/participant turned to. As Small explains: “The book begins 
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with an essay on the four freedoms –	freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom 
from fear and freedom from want. Each page explores a different text on the topic.”671  
When the viewer/participant moves her hand over the text or touches a word, full sentences 
break away from the paragraphs they are embedded in and run from one side of the page to 
the other. Text also overwrites itself and circles around the page in a tube-like formation.  
Given this, the digital interface not only resembles a book in form (it has a spine and pages) 
but its content (readable narrative text) mimics one as well. (Figures 56 & 57) 
 
Figure 56: D. Small, Illuminated Manuscript (2002). 
 
Figure 57: D. Small, Illuminated Manuscript. (2002). 
                                                




Despite its visual appearance, the manuscript is a digital interface. It is a technical device, 
shaped to mimic a cultural form. It has been fitted with electronic measurement devices and 
has been preprogrammed to perform specific functions. Specifically it mediates the 
conversation between the viewer/participant and the artist, makes text-based information 
appear on its surface and allows interaction to occur.672 Since the instructional method relies 
on the ability to anchor abstract descriptions to concrete forms and actions, it could be argued 
that the relationship between form (the way something looks) and content (the message 
something transmits) in Illuminated Manuscript allows the viewer/participant to make the 
actions of abstract technological systems (the projector, algorithms and sonar sensors that 
control the movement of the text and make it appear on the page) tangible and relatable. This 
is because the digital interface is acting as a metaphor for a book through the relationship 
between form and content that it provides, the connection it creates to similar objects in the 
physical world and the viewer/participant interaction that it facilitates.  
The fact that the shape the digital interface in Small’s installation takes is a familiar one does 
not necessarily mean that the viewer/participant can predict the type of response that her 
actions will elicit, although in some cases she can. For example, we can predict, to an extent, 
what will happen when we flip a page of a book (readable text will appear.)  However, a 
book has multiple functions and its content, like its technical counterpart in Illuminated 
Manuscript, is open to interpretation. This openness, combined with the fact that the 
viewer/participant can manipulate and reconfigure the structure and meaning of the text in 
Illuminated Manuscript, means that the ability on behalf of the viewer/participant to navigate 
the installation is not a precondition of the digital interface or the form it takes.  Rather, it is 
the product of the viewer/participant’s embodied experience with it. And, it is this embodied 
experience, I posit, that allows the viewer/participant to begin to rethink her relationship to 
the interface and interact with it in different ways. For, it is through the act of creative 
manipulation that the viewer/participant can begin to modify the underlying narratives of the 
texts embedded in the book and create different structures, forms and meanings with them. In 
this way, the viewer/participant’s relationship to, and interactions with, the interface 
constitutes her experience in Illuminated Manuscript. Thus, it affects the way she reorients 
and consequently repositions herself in the installation as well.   
                                                




Paul Dourish (2001) echoes my sentiments, stating that instructional processes act as 
metaphors, allowing the subject to visualize and interact with computational systems. The 
ability to anchor abstract descriptions to concrete forms, he writes, also involves: “being able 
to reorient ourselves towards the technology turning it from an object of inquiry and 
examination, into a tool that can be used”. 673 Dourish continues, stating that while 
computational systems incorporate elements from the physical world such as shared 
ontological systems, intentionality and intersubjectivity, “computation is fundamentally about 
representation”. 674 Here, Dourish is arguing that the elements that make up technological 
systems are both virtual and physical.  They are abstract phenomena, a series of programmed 
numbers and visual signs or representations that refer back to, and consequently feedback on, 
the form that the software designer or artist has chosen to model.  
If the key feature of a technological system is that it symbolically refers back to, as Dourish 
states, “elements in the world of human experience”, then it could be argued that when a 
viewer/participant uses a digital interface, she is not simply interacting with a replica of the 
form that the technology represents, she is also interacting with all of its underlying socio-
political, cultural and aesthetic connotations as well.675 The fact that the viewer/participant is 
able to connect the interface in Illuminated Manuscript to previous encounters with similar 
forms (books) in the physical world suggests that her experience in the installation is both 
constructed by the physical appearance of the interface, as well as shaped through previous 
and current interactions with it.  Furthermore, I posit that the way the viewer/participant 
orientates herself in relation to the digital interface is shaped by the underlying cultural 
significance that these forms carry as well.  For, as Dourish states, the key feature of 
interaction with technological systems does not solely lie in the operational capabilities of the 
system, but rather it is an issue of transparency –	that is, how easy the technological system 
and its computerized processes are to use and understand.676  Importance, he argues, is not 
about what technology does, or can do but rather “how we act through it to achieve effects in 
the world”. 677 So, when a viewer/participant flips a page of Small’s book, the fact that the 
sensor embedded in the page is sending a signal and activating algorithms located in a 
computer is not of paramount importance to her experience (although it does matter, as these 
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algorithms do dictate and control, certain key actions.)  What is significant is that her actions 
allow her to see images and, to a certain extent, manipulate them. 
Dourish is right when he calls for transparency. Designers, artists and engineers should focus 
on transparency, as a “good”	interface should be easy to use. It should let us concentrate on 
the task at hand, rather than its technical functions. Furthermore, the metaphors and models 
deployed to describe action in technological systems, as Dourish rightfully points out, do 
affect the way we reorient ourselves in relation to technology because they provide us with 
instruction, as argued above. However, Dourish and I differ in regards to his statement that it 
is the way we act “through technology”, that allows this reorientation to occur. The trouble 
with his analogy is that it prioritizes an abstract notion of transparency, or ease of use, over 
the subject’s embodied actions and her access to the inner workings of the computer, thereby 
simplifying, to an extent, a very complex, multifunctional and consciously negotiated process 
and turning the technology used into an instrumental thing.  More importantly though, I posit 
Dourish’s statement suggests a certain kind of finality to a relationship that is generative in 
the sense that it is constantly reproducing subjects, objects and processes. Contrary to 
Dourish, I argue it is the way we act in conjunction with technology, as in what we, as 
embodied beings, are able to do with technology that allows this repositioning to happen. The 
difference between these two statements lies in the fact that the digital interface is more than 
a metaphor for human vision, or a tool used to easily navigate an interactive installation, and 
the human body is more than just an operational vessel for consciousness, identity and 
technological innovation. The digital interface and the subject’s interactions with it 
constitute, or aids in, the articulation and construction of the way in which the subject 
conceptualizes and classifies entities and experiences in space.  
The distinction between acting through and acting in conjunction with technology and the 
consequent metaphors, models and positions that are a result of these frameworks, as slight as 
they may be, I suggest are not so much binary, but rather a matter of significance. For 
instance, by stating that it is how we act through technology that matters, Dourish is 
prioritizing the technological operations and constraints of the interface. Therefore, its 
instrumental uses (the technical ability to transmit information and the subject’s capacity to 
easily act within the predetermined confines of the technological system) become significant. 
Whereas, emphasizing how the subject acts in conjunction with technology means that 
importance is placed on the intelligent interplay, or the relationship between the human and 
the machine.  By placing importance on intelligent interplay and the relationship with 
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technology, the subject’s situated and embodied actions with, and future reactions to, other 
entities that occupy the same space become significant. Furthermore, it allows our 
relationship to technology to become significant in that it begins to shift focus away from the 
capabilities of the technological form onto what the viewer/participant can do in conjunction 
with it in interactive new media installations. I posit that this particular way of theorizing the 
relationship between the body and technology as an engagement with, and an integral part of, 
interactive new media art installations, has the potential to begin to reshape the way 
technologies are used and theorized in interactive new media installations. Thus, by 
emphasizing what the subject can do in conjunction with technology rather than through it I 
can begin to theorize the viewer/participant and the digital interface in interactive new media 
installations as relational and co-constitutive, rather than separate objects and subjects that 
are working through, or against, each other to accomplish a mutual goal. 
Acting in Conjunction with the Computer 
In order to develop a more critical understanding of what it means to act in conjunction with 
technology in interactive new media installations, I turn to Martin Heidegger’s (1927) theory 
of technology. Here, my notion of acting in conjunction with technology rests alongside 
Heidegger’s notions of “ready-to-hand”	and “present-to-hand”, which for him are some of the 
preconditions of technology and our relationship to it.678  I say preconditions because the 
concepts of “ready-to-hand”	and “present-to-hand”, for Heidegger, in simple terms, refer to 
the fact that technology has, to an extent, agency or “Being-in-itself”.  Thus it affects the 
space or place that it is located in.  
The phrase ready-to-hand, for Heiddeger, means using a piece of technology and 
concentrating on the task at hand (writing text, exploring an interactive new media 
installation), rather than the actual technology.679  As he writes: “[W]hat is proximally to 
hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must…withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite 
authentically.  That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools’	
themselves.  On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work.”680   
The concept of present-to-hand is more complex than the concept of ready-to-hand.  
According to Heidegger, technology becomes present-to-hand when the subject discovers its 
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“unusability”.681 This discovery usually occurs during some sort of breakdown situation: the 
interface will not turn on, Microsoft Word crashes mid-edit, or something less drastic like a 
mouse hitting the edge of a mouse pad. Technology, specifically the functions of the 
technology used (navigation in the case of interfaces, writing in the case of Microsoft Word), 
then, becomes apparent or “conspicuous”	to the subject using it.682 Thus, the subject’s focus 
is on the technology itself, rather than on the task at hand. This “conspicuousness”	on behalf 
of the ready-to-hand technology, as Heidegger argues foregrounds its present-to-hand 
qualities.683  As he writes: “This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in 
a certain un-readiness-to-hand.  But this implies that what cannot be used just lies there; it 
shows itself as an equipmental Thing which…. in its readiness-to-hand has constantly been 
present-in-hand.”684  
In this way, present-to-hand is not a notion that is in contrast to ready-to-hand, but an integral 
part of technology, something that has been there all along. 	The distinction between present-
to-hand and ready-to-hand, like the distinction between acting through technology and acting 
in conjunction with it, then is not binary. The difference, instead, lies in the fact that when 
technology has broken down, the present-to-hand aspects of technology become readily 
apparent or significant to the subject. This is because the existence of entities –	be it a 
subject, an object, a digital interface or a viewer/participant –	according to Heidegger lies 
precisely in the way those moments make technology apparent.685 Let me explain this 
concept by way of the following example of Bernie Lubell’s interactive new media 
installation A Theory of Entanglement (2009).   
 
A Theory of Entanglement consists of an oversized loom.686 The loom is fragmented, divided 
into individual, yet interconnected sections (harnesses, beams, spindles) and spread across the 
gallery space. In addition to the loom, a large tube of knitted black fabric descends from the 
ceiling into the area directly below it. To activate the installation to knit, the 
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viewer/participant must sit on one of the two stools shaped to resemble bicycles (the bikes) 
and push their pedals.687 (Figure 58) 
 
Figure 58: B. Lubell, A Theory of Entanglement. (2009). 
Since the viewer/participant must push the pedals of the bikes to activate the piece, thus make 
things appear, one might assume that the digital interface in this work is the bikes.  However, 
as Lubell states: “Only the right combination of actions by participants pedalling bikes 
(Labor) and sitting on a couch in the Café	(Capital) will produce the knitting (Craft).”688  
(Figure 59) 
 
Figure 59: B. Lubell, A Theory of Entanglement. (2009). 
                                                





Given the fact that multiple elements (the bikes, the loom the viewer/participants) must be 
present to produce the artwork (the tube of fabric), then what is the digital interface in this 
work? Is it the bikes, as the viewer/participant needs to use them in order to activate the 
mechanical gears of loom? The viewer/participants sitting in the café, because without them, 
the tube of fabric would not be knitted, thus the ‘art’	would not be made? Or is it the 
viewer/participants sitting in the café, the viewer/participants using the bikes, the bikes and 
the loom working in conjunction with each other?  What are the consequences of each of 
these designations?  In order to explore these consequences and the distinction between 
working through and working in conjunction with technology further, I will set up a dialogue 
between A Theory of Entanglement and Heidegger’s notions of present-to-hand and ready-at-
hand.  
 
To recap, A Theory of Entanglement consists of an oversized loom, a tube of knitted black 
fabric, two bikes, and three or more viewer/participants, two of which use the bikes and one 
who sits in the gallery’s café.  If there are two viewer/participants pedalling bikes, and one 
sitting in the café, the tube of fabric is being knitted. Thus the technology being used (the 
bikes, the loom) could be seen as ready-at-hand in the Heideggarian sense. For, as mentioned 
above, the viewer/participants are using technology (the bikes, the loom) and concentrating 
on the task at hand (knitting the tube of fabric) rather than their actions with them (pedalling, 
knitting.) If there is no viewer/participant sitting in the café, then there is no change in the 
tube of fabric despite the fact that there are multiple viewer/participants on bikes, pedalling 
away. Thus technology in this specific instance could be called present-at-hand. This is 
because the multiple viewer/participants on the bikes are concentrating on technology and the 
actions they are making through them, rather than the underlying goal of the piece –	knitting 
the knot.  Given this, the digital interface(s) could be considered to be the bikes, as the 
emphasis in this particular instance is placed on the bikes and their ability to mediate, 
translate and facilitate communication, interaction and information and, most importantly, 
allow the viewer/participants to contribute to the creation of the artwork (knit the tube of 
fabric).  
 
However, when the bikes become present-at-hand, they are not suddenly revealing 
themselves as, or becoming digital interfaces, nor is the viewer/participant simply walking up 
to the bikes and using them to activate the piece as if the bikes were waiting there to be 
discovered as interfaces. Rather, the uncovering or revealing of an aspect of an entity (in this 
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case the interface) is also a covering of another aspect of that same entity.  As Heidegger 
writes: 
Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure; but in 
such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, 
nor is the equipment-structure known as such an event in the using…. In dealings 
such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-
order-to’	which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the 
less we just stare at the…Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more 
primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it 
encountered as that which it is –	as equipment.689  
Following on, when the viewer/participant interacts with one of the bikes, she is using it in a 
particular way (pedalling), for a particular reason (in order to knit the tube of fabric).  This 
understanding is further embedded in the installation through the instruction provided to the 
viewer/participant by Lubell: the viewer/participant must pedal the bike to activate the loom 
to contribute to the knitting of the tube of fabric. Included in this instruction are other rules: 
to knit the tube of fabric a third person must sit on a couch in the gallery’s café. (Figures 60 
& 61) 
 
Figure 60: B. Lubell, A Theory of Entanglement. (2009). 
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Figure 61: B. Lubell, A Theory of Entanglement. (2009). 
A Theory of Entanglement’s narrative –	a comment on capitalism and its links to 
industrialization –	appears in this context: because of the underlying instruction given, the 
bikes are presented as a metaphor for labor and the viewer/participant pedaling it positioned 
as laborer. Additionally, the café	in this context is presented as a metaphor for capital, 
because it belongs to the gallery that controls access to the artwork. The viewer/participant 
sitting in the café is therefore positioned as consumer.690 In this way, the digital interface(s) 
could be considered to be the viewer/participants (both on the bikes and in the café), as the 
emphasis above is placed on the human and their ability to communicate and interact with 
each other and with the artist (via the instruction he provides) to understand the conceptual 
meaning of the piece.  
In understanding the digital interface from within the context of A Theory of Entanglement 
however, certain labor-based aspects of the technology employed come to foreground, while 
other aspects (the use of bikes as exercise devices, the use of a loom for enjoyment rather 
than commercial profit) are obscured, as they are not important to the completion of the 
installation.  Therefore, when the digital interface reveals itself and becomes present-at-hand, 
it is doing more than simply sitting there waiting to be found. And the viewer/participant is 
not blindly following the instructions provided by the artist or aimlessly communicating and 
interacting with people sitting in the café.  Rather, as Heidegger argues: “When we deal with 
them [technology] by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it 
                                                




has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its 
specific Thingly character.”691 
Inherent within the above analysis, then, is what Heidegger terms “Umsicht”, looking around 
or circumspection –	a careful observation of their surroundings on behalf of the 
viewer/participant. 692   Circumspection for Heidegger is not a purely mental activity; it is 
also a phenomenological process.  As Michael Wheeler (2005) states, Heidegger’s analysis of 
technology includes both “the appropriate uses to which an item of equipment can be put, and 
the normatively constrained public practices that shape the human agent’s acts of 
projection”.693  Given this, Wheeler argues that circumspection emerges “not only as a form 
of awareness, but as an action-oriented form of knowledge (‘sight’)”.694 In this way, I argue 
that circumspection, like the tube of fabric in Lubell’s installation and the process that creates 
it, becomes an entangled, interwoven, embodied process that includes the 
viewer/participant’s knowledge of how to use technology as a form of embodied and 
perceptual awareness. Theorizing the viewer/participant’s relationship to the digital interface 
as an ongoing process then prioritizes, thus it allows the actions that the viewer/participant 
makes in conjunction with, rather than through technology to always remain at the center of 
activity.   
Accordingly, it is in this moment of becoming present-at-hand, and through the embodied 
circumspection that accompanies it, that the multiple viewer/participants, the bikes and the 
loom reveal themselves as the digital interface.  I suggest this because the viewer/participant 
and technology must work in conjunction with each other to reveal the full nature of the 
artwork (the underlying concept) and to complete the artwork (knit the knot). In revealing 
itself as both biological (viewer/participant) and technological (bikes and loom) the interface 
takes on an existence as an active entity that has agency –	that affects the outcome of the 
installation –	thus is profoundly significant to the installation and the viewer/participant’s 
experience of it.  
Representational Systems and Instruction 
In what follows I turn to four interactive new media installations that integrate found objects 
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that resemble representations of the human form: Ken Feingold’s Interior (1997), Jeffrey 
Shaw’s conFIGURING the CAVE (1996) Alan Dunning and Paul Woodrow’s The Einstein’s 
Brain Project: The Madhouse (1995-2001) and Henry Kaufman’s The Lightness of Your 
Touch (2004). The aforementioned installations were chosen because they critically question, 
via artistic experimentation, cybernetic notions of instruction and the relationship between 
the human and machine that this type of instruction promotes. They then provide the 
viewer/participant with the means to resist and subvert this instruction, via the deployment of 
an interface shaped to mimic a human form. Given the underlying purpose of the 
installations, the following questions are asked: If instruction presents the viewer/participant 
with a blueprint for interaction in interactive new media installations, then what happens to 
the artwork, and the underlying narratives and meanings that it promotes, when the 
viewer/participant subverts or resists it?  Furthermore, does viewer/participant subversion and 
resistance of instruction equal viewer/participant intervention? Or does this process simply 
reinforce the same cybernetic notions of instruction that the artist is asking the 
viewer/participant to resist and/or subvert?  Each installation examined addresses these 
questions in a different way: Kaufman’s work sheds light on concepts of immediacy and how 
the use of instruction exacerbates the confusion between the “real”	and the representation 
through the reproduction and presentation of an enlarged copy of a human torso positioned as 
digital interface. In The Einstein's Brain: The Madhouse, the artists explore how the 
subversion of normative representational systems and representations of the body affect the 
viewer/participant’s perceptual and physical expectations in interactive new media 
installations. Feingold’s use of the digital interface (a medical doll, combined with the 
graphic images) found in his work examines notions of the body as a site of potentiality 
through the resistance to instructions that both promote and project normative positions and 
representations of the human body in relation to technology. I will conclude this chapter with 
a short analysis of Shaw’s conFIGURING the CAVE illustrating the limitations of a digital 
interface shaped to mimic the human body.  Specifically, I will highlight the problems that 
arise when shared, singular ontological systems are in play.  
“The Real” and the Representational 
 In Gender Trouble (1990), Judith Butler develops a theory of corporeality as performativity, 
in which she provides a critique of concepts around heteronormativity and the function of 
gender in the modern world. Butler views the body as fluid, performative and open to 
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reconstruction and reconfiguration.695  The fact that the body is performative, she states, 
suggests that it “has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its 
reality”.696 The various acts that the body performs, for Butler, not only constitute and 
articulate its reality, but they also suggest “an openness to re-signification and re-
contextualization”.697 Put simply, the body, to Butler, is a repetitive act of identification and 
imitation of both public and social norms, and these actions imply, among other things, that 
gender and sexuality are open to reconstruction and reconfiguration. 
 
Although related to notions around gender and sexuality, I believe the crux of Butler’s 
argument (corporeality as performativity) can be applied to the way the viewer/participant 
relates to reappropriated representations of the human body in interactive new media 
installations. For example, Butler states: “The body is a historical situation…a manner of 
doing, dramatizing and reproducing a historic situation.”698 This is because she believes that 
identities are formed through strategic corporeal acts that are deeply social and continuously 
reiterated.699 Thus, she writes: “the body is always an embodying of possibilities”, the site 
where subversive acts carry not only personal effects but also carry public and social effects 
as well.700 The fact that Butler believes that the human body is a historically constructed site 
of possibilities suggests that the viewer/participant has the ability to subvert and reconstruct 
dominant narratives and positionings of the body, and instantiate a change in the way she 
positions herself in relation to the digital interface in interactive new media installations 
through the performative medium of her physical body. 
 
Peggy Phelan (1993) echoes, to an extent, Butler’s sentiments about the body as a site of 
possibilities and expands on them through an investigation into the distinction between the 
representation and “the real”	as it relates to visual power and visibility in photography.701  
There is, as Phelan states, confusion between the representation and the “real”	on behalf of 
the subject who is viewing the photographs. In Phelan’s theory, the “real” is the subject and 
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the representation is a photograph of the subject. In the case of my thesis, the “real”	is the 
viewer/participant and the representation is the interface shaped to represent a human form. 
Confusion between the “real”	and the representational occurs, Phelan writes, because there is 
an insufficient understanding of the relationships between “visibility, power, identity and 
liberation”	among other things, and this misconception leads the subject to mistake the “real”	
for the representational and vice versa.702 Phelan’s analysis is similar to that of Suchman’s 
theorization of plans and action. Phelan, like Suchman, believes that the confusion between 
“the real”	(the subject or in Suchman’s case, the action) and the representational (the 
photograph or in Suchman’s case, the plan) happens precisely because: “The real is read 
through representation and representation is read through the real… Each representation relies 
on and reproduces a specific logic of the real; this logical real promotes its own 
representation.”703 With this in mind, I can explore how confusion between the “real”	and the 
representational manifests itself in interactive new media installations as well as begin to 
examine some of the issues around, and possibilities for, resistance and subversion on behalf 
of the viewer/participant that follow it. A good place to start this exploration is Henry 
Kaufman’s interactive new media installation The Lightness of Your Touch. 
In 2006 I exhibited The Lightness of Your Touch as part of the group show “Capturing Time 
and Space”	at Axiom Gallery.  The only part of The Lightness of Your Touch visible to the 
viewer/participant was a large-scale custom-made curved projection screen. The screen 
doubled as the digital interface. Projected on to the screen was an image of an oversized 
human torso.704 To interact with the work, I had to place my hand on the torso. When I did 
this, the “skin”	of the torso shook. If I placed my hand on the screen for an extended period 
of time an “impression”	of a hand appeared on the torso. The brightness and clarity of the 
“impressions”	directly correlated to the forcefulness and duration of my touch.  After a 
certain period of time had passed, the handprints lifted off the screen, faded away and the 
torso returned to its original, unmarked state. (Figures 62 & 63) 
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Figure 62: H. Kaufman, The Lightness of Your Touch. (2004). 
 
Figure 63: H. Kaufman, The Lightness of Your Touch. (2004). 
The designation of the digital interface as human torso caused confusion, for some visitors, 
between “the real”	(the visitor’s body) and the representation (the on-screen torso). This 
confusion occurred, because the appearance of the digital interface (the representation), its 
movements, actions and the consequences of these actions (the “skin”	moves when touched, a 
forceful and prolonged touch leaves a colorful mark) resembled, to an extent, the visitor’s 
body (the real). 
For example, on the night of the opening at Axiom Gallery, I encountered a visitor who was 
repeatedly touching her arm, touching her colleagues arm and then touching the screen. She 
was doing this to show her colleagues how the piece worked. If she touched her arms or her 
colleague’s arms with a lot of force for a prolonged period of time, she said, a red mark 
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would appear on their arm, just like it would on the screen. The comparison between her 
physical body (the “real”) and the on-screen imagery (the representational) the visitor was 
making, worked. Soon everybody was touching the screen and their arms and exploring the 
similarities and differences between the two. The shaking of the skin and the marks, 
combined with the fact that the interface is designated as the locus of interaction, which 
mimics the visitor’s position (the locus of interaction and sensation) in the physical world, 
only exacerbated the confusion between the two.  
In her discussion of photography, Phelan argues that: “[r]epresentation follows two laws: it 
always conveys more than it intends; and it is never totalizing.  The ‘excess’	meaning 
conveyed by representation creates a supplement that makes multiple and resistant readings 
possible.”705 In other words, representations, be it a photograph or a moving image projected 
on a screen may mimic the “real”	thing they are representing but these representations are 
flawed due to the fact that they do not provide an exact replica of “the real”. And it is through 
this failure to represent things perfectly that representations can create resistance, on behalf 
of the subject, and possibly produce change.   
So, if as Phelan states “each representation relies on and reproduces a specific logic of the 
real” and “this logical real promotes its own representation” then it could be argued that the 
reappropriation and use of representations of the body as digital interfaces, like the one 
deployed in The Lightness of Your Touch, not only means that the subject in the installation is 
doubled (i.e. the subject is the viewer/participant and the computerized representation of it, 
the interface), but that these representations filter information, reproduce it and then reflect it 
back onto the subject.706 Thus, the interface (the representation) is not only providing 
instructions for how the viewer/participant (the real) should interact in The Lightness of Your 
Touch, it is dictating how her body should look (flawless, unless touched), what her body 
should be (male, white and powerful) and how her body should behave (like a machine in all 
instances) in these environments as well.  
However, if as Butler argues, the body is fluid, performative, and has the ability to subvert 
and reconstruct dominant narratives and positionings, and, following Phelan’s argument, 
reproductions have the ability to generate ruptures and gaps in dominant narratives, produce 
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resistant readings and create change, then it follows that the viewer/participant has the 
potential to subvert the instruction provided to her via the digital interface (the 
representation), and alter the dominant metaphors and models used to describe actions and fix 
identities in interactive new media installations in a similarly profound way.  
While the potential to subvert or resist the instruction on behalf of the viewer/participant 
exists, it is not without limitations. I turn to Alan Dunning and Paul Woodrow’s interactive 
new media installation The Einstein’s Brain Project: The Madhouse (2001) as a means to 
help develop an understanding of these limitations –	specifically notions around the liveliness 
of nonhuman objects and problems like the personification of machines and 
anthropomorphism that follow them.   
Liveliness, Anthropomorphism and Symmetry 
The digital interface in The Einstein’s Brain Project: The Madhouse is an anatomically 
correct life size model of a male human body. The artists call it ALIBI (Anatomically 
Lifelike Interactive Biological Interface).707 ALIBI is placed horizontally on top of a white 
table and is located in a darkened gallery space. (Figure 64)  
 
Figure 64: A. Dunning & P. Woodrow, The Einstein’s Brain Project: The Madhouse. (1995-2001). 
There are two different sets of subjects participating in the installation: one set (the 
viewer/participant) that interacts directly with ALIBI via a heads-up display (HUD) and 
another set (the audience) that observes the interaction from another part of the gallery or via 
online video documentation. (Figure 65) 
                                                





Figure 65: A. Dunning & P. Woodrow, The Einstein’s Brain Project: The Madhouse. (1995-2001). 
The aesthetics of the installation (the sterile room, the shape and position of the interface, the 
type of interaction the viewer/participants perform, the type of subjects present) resembles, to 
an extent, the medical operating theaters of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and their 
slightly less performative and more sterile modern-day counterparts – medical operating 
rooms. The aesthetic comparison is confirmed by the artists in a statement about ALIBI.  
ALIBI, they tell us, was “never conceived of as an interface per se but rather as a sensory 
blister”.708  This	“blister”, they state, calls attention to our immediate technological past 
(operating theaters in which bodies and technologies are at odds) and our immediate 
technological present and future (operating rooms, in which humans and machines are 
inextricably enmeshed, yet separated by space, skill/profession or technology from each 
other).709   
Unlike their medical counterparts (“the real”), The Einstein’s Brain Project is an interactive 
new media installation and ALIBI is an interface. That is to say, the installation and the 
interface are artistic imaginings of physical environments, objects, entities and things.  They 
are representations.  This notion of representation is reflected in ALIBI’s appearance. ALIBI 
is covered in a layer of translucent thermochromatic blue paint, which the artists refer to as 
“skin”. ALIBI’s skin changes color, fluctuating from dark to light when touched by the 
viewer/participant.710 The “skin”	serves two purposes: it allows the viewer/participant and the 
audience to visually see the effects interaction has (via the change interaction makes to 
                                                






ALIBI’s “skin”	and the images it produces); and it allows the viewer/participant visual access 
to the organs, muscles and tendons located inside it.711  To interact with ALIBI, the 
viewer/participant must touch ALIBI with her hands. Touching ALIBI not only causes a 
change in the color of its “skin”, it causes sounds and images to appear as well. These images 
appear directly in the viewer/participant’s line of vision and are projected onto the walls of 
the theater for the audience to see.  Sometimes, as the artists write, the images directly 
correspond to the organ or body part touched, other times “they are related to metaphor and 
simile”.712  For instance, if the viewer/participant touches an area located over ALIBI’s 
circulatory system, an abstracted image of the human circulatory system, or a sequence of 
metaphorical images representing the circulatory system (waterfalls, electrical circuits) 
appear.713 (Figures 66 & 67)   
 
Figure 66: A. Dunning & P. Woodrow, The Einstein’s Brain Project: The Madhouse. (1995-2001). 
 
Figure 67: A. Dunning & P. Woodrow, The Einstein’s Brain Project: The Madhouse. (1995-2001). 
                                                






The viewer/participant can then interact with the images and sequences as if they were 
physical objects or occurrences and the audience can watch her do so from afar.  In this way, 
the digital interface takes on a dual significance, and in doing this it serves a dual purpose: It 
is a representation of a human body, therefore it is acting as an example of how a subject 
should look and/or think of herself as an embodied human being; and it is a teaching tool, 
therefore it is instructing the subject, showing her how to interact with other human-like 
entities in similar settings.  
I argue that the instructional aspects of the digital interface combined with both the 
separation between participants the installation creates and the metaphors that the images 
allude to allows for something quite interesting to happen: it causes the audience observing 
the action to confuse “the real”	(the operating theater/room, the surgeon/nurse, the patient) 
with the representational (the gallery space, the viewer/participant, ALIBI/the interface). This 
confusion leads the audience, and to an extent the viewer/participant, to believe that the 
digital interface is a “live”	agent –	a deceased, yet human character –	who contributes to the 
installation just as much, if not more than the human interacting with it. Just as one set of 
subjects must be designated passive observers for the other set to become active participants, 
as argued in previous chapters, the representation (the digital interface), in The Einstein’s 
Brain Project must be deemed lifeless (and to an extent it is as it is colored blue), by the 
artists so that the subjects participating in the installation can reanimate it (via interaction 
experienced first-hand or observed second hand) for it to become “the real”. The reanimation 
of inanimate technologized entities that the confusion between the real and the 
representational begets of course creates a range of issues, one of which, as Suchman tells us, 
is the “personification of machines”.714 
Suchman argues that humans have a tendency to “ascribe full intelligence [to computerized 
entities] on the basis of partial evidence”.715 She continues, stating that as soon as 
computational forms look, or act, remotely human, the subject will endow it with other 
human like traits and abilities.716  She further contends that subjects “take appearances as 
evidence for, or the document of, an ascribed underlying reality, while taking the reality so 
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ascribed as a resource for the interpretation of the appearance”.717 In short, Suchman believes 
that humans have a tendency to anthropomorphize certain types of technological forms; we 
assume that a computerized system has sophisticated human-like abilities (speech, emotions, 
intelligence) after it has displayed elementary ones (shape, size, presence of internal 
organs).718   
Wiener provides an interesting counterpoint to Suchman’s analysis in his writings on 
cybernetics.  Less skeptical of the concept than Suchman is, Wiener argues that 
anthropomorphism is a tool used to describe and/or emphasize the importance of affective 
instructional processes, situations or experiences.719 He suggests that anthropomorphism is 
purposefully employed by those creating technology to illicit strong preconditioned reflexes 
or learned responses on behalf of the subject interacting with it.720 These reflexes are formed 
in response to what he terms “trigger situations”, which are actions that initiate a reaction or 
series of reactions.721 A trigger situation can be summed up as such: if I touch the flame of a 
candle (the trigger situation or action) I will burn my finger and feel pain (the reaction or 
response). Trigger situations, for Wiener, do not have to have physical consequences; they 
can have mental or psychological ones as well. Given this, trigger situations could encompass 
interaction in interactive new media installations in that the images that a viewer/participant 
receives is a reaction or response to her touching a digital interface (the trigger situation, or 
action). Wiener contends that a subject should, to an extent, know how trigger situations 
work, not because she has a deep understanding of the underlying processes that allow them 
to operate, but because she has developed a “conditioned reflex”	through previous 
interactions in similar settings with similar entities, both physical and virtual.722  
Mondloch combines Wiener and Suchman’s views on this topic, focusing on how trigger 
situations influence the viewing habits and experiences of subjects in museum and gallery 
settings.723 Mondloch posits that artists tacitly instruct subjects on how to interact with 
screen-based visual artworks and purposely structure their physical and psychological 
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718 Ibid., p. 14. 
719 Norbert Wiener. The Human use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society. (London: Free Association, 




723 Kate Mondloch. Screens: Viewing Media Installation Art. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
2010), p. 26. 
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experience with them “by playing on the learned conventions of screen-mediated 
communication”.724 Instruction, she states, occurs because artists rely on and incorporate “the 
generalized tendency of viewers to turn their attention toward video monitors, their desire to 
see comprehensible screen-mediated representations (or, perhaps more accurately, 
‘conformations’) of themselves”	into their works.725 Mondloch contends that the 
effectiveness of instruction in moving image-based installations is a direct result of a 
presumption made on behalf of a subject surrounding the “liveness”	of moving images.  The 
phrase, “liveness of moving images”, for Mondloch, refers to the fact that some subjects 
assume that some moving images projected on screens are of “live events”	happening in real-
time. This assumption, she argues, is conditioned by, among other things, subjects’	
continuous access to mass media.726 Mondloch postulates that misunderstandings around the 
liveness of images lead the subject to believe that she is involved in an open-ended 
participatory experience, as this expectation of liveness, Mondloch writes, confirms, to an 
extent, the subject’s presence in the space or geographic area they are located in. However, 
the subject’s participation in the installation is, she states, actually a combination of 
conditioned habits, underlying expectations for and predetermined assumptions around 
technology.727  
While Mondloch’s conceptualization of screen-based instruction can lead to the 
aforementioned misconceptions, evidenced by the installations she applies it to, I suggest that 
some digital interfaces can present a challenge to some of the conditioned habits, underlying 
expectations and predetermined assumptions around technology that Mondloch discusses –	
specifically the separation between the body and technology. These interfaces do this, I 
argue, by playing on conceptions of liveness of images and turning them on their head. For 
example, the audience in The Einstein’s Brain Project assumes, to an extent, that interaction 
is occurring between two humans, even though one (the viewer/participant) is “real”	and one 
is a representation (ALIBI). This assumption occurs because ALIBI is shaped to resemble a 
human being, thus the audience is anthropomorphising ALIBI.  They are assuming that the 
ALIBI is live –	that it has sophisticated human-like abilities because it has displayed 
elementary ones.  In assuming liveness, I suggest that the audience is unconsciously ascribing 
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agency to technology.  This ascription of agency made on behalf of the audience is of critical 
importance to the instructional process in this installation. Not because it widens or narrows 
the boundary between the human and the machine, like it did in McLuhan’s Massage Parlor, 
but because it affords the subject a chance to critically examine and then compare the 
behavior of the digital interface to her own behaviors, allowing her to understand whether the 
images presented to her in the installation are accurate or real.  
It is important to note that the interface in The Einstein’s Brain Project is an inert male body 
covered in bright blue paint, located on a table in the center of a gallery space shaped to look 
like an operating room. So while the audience may be able to ascribe agency to the interface, 
the representation of the human body that it reflects back onto them could be seen by some 
viewer/participants as disorienting.  While disorientating for some, I do not think the shape 
and size of the interface is detrimental to the instructional process.  I argue that whatever 
disorientation experienced on behalf of the participant aids in the reversal of liveness 
described above, as it reveals the differences between the representation (the digital interface) 
and the “real”	(their physical body.) This revelation, in turn, undermines the audience’s 
perceptual and physical expectations of the representations of the human body that the digital 
interface presents, allowing them to begin to critically question and resist, to an extent, the 
underlying notions of separation and sameness that the instructional and representational 
processes in this installation relies on.  
The Reuse of Cultural Forms: Practice, Potentiality and Instructional Processes 
Nicolas Bourriaud (2004) reiterates some of my points, in a conversation about the use of 
reappropriated cultural forms in contemporary artworks.  Bourriaud argues that cultural 
forms carry a set of visual and cultural expectations and experiences (the shape of a head, the 
placement of hands, the way legs move) that we are intimately familiar with.728 The use of 
these forms, he states, makes it easier for a subject to connect to artwork. It also leads, he 
writes, to the “eradication of traditional distinctions between production and consumption, 
creation and copy, readymade and original work”.729 Eradication of traditional distinctions 
occurs because the reappropriated form, for Bourriaud, is “no longer primary”.730 That is to 
say, the reappropriated form is not original.  Instead it is an object that is, in his words, 
“working with objects that are already in circulation…which is to say objects already 
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729 Ibid. 
730 Ibid. Bourriaud’s emphasis.  
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informed by other objects”.731 The reuse of these forms should, as Bourriaud argues, 
complicate the conventional notions of artistic production through the eradication of the 
traditional distinctions between original and copy. 
Yet Suchman contends that this need to eradicate distinctions between the human and the 
computer or the original and the copy, on behalf of some scholars, is part of a need to 
naturalize: “to disappear and put in one’s place something transcendent, existing 
independently of one’s actions”.732 And this need to naturalize, Suchman states, is 
troublesome, as it is directly related to the notions of separation and symmetry.733  As she 
writes: “[h]aving systematically established the division of humans and machines, 
technological imaginaries now evidence worry that once separated from us, machines are 
rendered lifeless and, by implication, less. They need to be revitalized, restored to humanness 
–	in other words, to be made like us –	in order that we can be reunited with them.”734 
However, how does this naturalization process Suchman discusses manifest itself in 
interactive new media installations? How does it relate to the reappropriation of human forms 
used as digital interfaces? And what possibilities for subversion or resistance on behalf of 
subjects and artists exist, if they do at all? 
An example can be found in Ken Feingold’s installation, Interior.  Interior consists of a 
projection screen, a digital interface and a table. The digital interface is a plastic medical 
model of a truncated human torso, whose organs, spine and brain are exposed.735 The torso 
rests on top of the table, which is located in front of the projection screen. Although the 
organs are exposed both in the front (facing the screen) and rear (facing the 
viewer/participant) of the torso, only those situated in the rear are fitted with touch sensors. 
When the viewer/participant touches the interface, animated graphic representations of 
human body parts and red-lipped doll heads appear on the screen.736 These images slowly 
emerge, drifting from side to side until they disappear against the changing background of the 
pictorial scenes projected onto the screen.737 (Figures 68 & 69)   
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Figure 68: K. Feingold, Interior. (1997). 
 
 
Figure 69: K. Feingold, Interior. (1997) 
Each body part appears according to what area of the torso is touched, and operates 
differently according to physical function (what its real life equivalent does) and bodily 
language (how and where it is touched). For instance, if the viewer/participant touches the 
torso’s liver, a representation of a liver appears on-screen.738  If the viewer/participant 
touches the torso’s liver and brain at once, then two representations, one of a liver, one of a 
brain, appear on-screen. (Figure 70) In order to transition between pictorial scenes, the 
viewer/participant must keep her hands on one organ for an extended period of time. If she 
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places her hands on two or more parts of the torso for a prolonged period of time, dozens of 
organs and heads float forward and arrange themselves into monstrous human-like forms that 
sometimes babble incoherently.739 (Figure 71)  
 
Figure 70: K. Feingold, Interior. (1997) 
 
Figure 71: K. Feingold, Interior. (1997) 
Thus, the physical human body, as represented by the digital interface and the abstracted 
human-like on-screen images, is cut up, dispersed and then repositioned by the 
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viewer/participant in the process of artistic creation.740  But what is this dispersal suggestive 
of? What kind of assumptions do the representations of the body in this installation embody? 
What is the relevance, or importance, of these representations? What type of instruction do 
they provide to the viewer/participant interacting with them? And, finally, what types of 
possibilities or alternative readings do they open or close?  
Interior is an installation that is infused with images of bodies that are medical and 
technological in nature. The interface is a plastic medical model of a truncated human torso 
that is plugged directly into a machine. In being this way, the aesthetics of the interface gives 
the impression of neutrality and objectivity (of behalf of the artist) and a certain 
standardization or wholeness (of the human body and the human experience) yet the interface 
is carefully crafted and put into play by Feingold. For example, the digital interface visually 
traces concepts of the human body (technology) as symmetrical to the physical body (the 
human). However, the representations of the body that appear on-screen when the interface is 
touched by the viewer/participant are not naturalized. They do not look like, nor do they 
attempt to mimic, the behaviors of the viewer/participant’s physical body in the way the 
interface does.  In stark contrast to the interface, the on-screen representations of the body are 
abstracted, unsettling, uncanny and always in excess.  
For instance, the on-screen representations	–	the red-lipped dolls heads, the disembodied 
livers and spleens – are not exact reproductions of the body. Nor are they presented as stable 
or unitary. They are mutated, fragmented and dispersed across a variety of digital spaces and 
temporalities.  By doing this, Feingold creates a tension between the embodied “realness”	of 
the viewer/participant’s physical body and the artificiality of the representations (the organs 
and body parts located on-screen and the digital interface). I posit that the tension between 
the real and the representation in Interior presents a significant challenge to notions of 
separation or eradication (of the boundary between the body and technology) and 
naturalization (of the human body) discussed above.  
They create, in Deleuzian terms, “bodies without organs”	(BwO) in the sense that the 
representations and the viewer/participant’s consequent reconfigurations of them 
acknowledge the existence of many different versions of the self yet these images cannot be 
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reduced to either a technological or a biological thing.741 No configuration of the body in 
Interior can be claimed as the original, as “the real”	or as the representational. For, as 
Rosalind Krauss (1999) states, the BwO “produces nothing; it reproduces.  It is the domain of 
simulation, of series crossing one another, of the possible occupation of every place in the 
series by a subject forever decentered.”742  
Since the BwO, as Krauss argues, lies in the domain of simulation, it becomes the place of 
textual and semiological inscription.743 The BwO, for Krauss, then, is an entity with no 
underlying organization or instruction.  It is a series of processes, multiplicities or “crossings”	
that are constantly interrupting, intersecting and reproducing each other, and that are always 
both original and in excess.744 In this way the “logic”	of the BwO is not that of 
representation, in the sense that it is a reproduction of an autonomous original object.  
Instead, Krauss suggests that it is “the logic”	of open-ended, variegated “flows of 
information”.745 Thus, she concludes, the content of the product (the representation) is the 
expressive medium of the producer (the artist, the viewer/participant).746 As she writes: “[the 
BwO’s] logic is not that of the signifier, that of representation.  Rather it is the logic of ‘flows 
of information’	in which the content of the first flow (its product) is the expressive medium 
of the second (its producer).”747  
I posit that the same logic, or chaotic processes of consumption, reproduction, remediation 
and reconstruction of the relationship between the body and the machine and the real and the 
representation via the digital interface and the on-screen images are at work in Interior via 
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the appearance of the monstrous human-like forms.  Embedded into Interior, then, is a 
narrative surrounding notions of the body as changeable and the representation as always 
being in excess –	one that explores the way technological representations of the body reflect 
and then reinforce fixed positions onto the viewer/participant, as well as one that suggests 
that there is room for resistance to, and subversion of, this instruction by offering the 
viewer/participant a chance to destabilize, reconstruct and reposition the on-screen 
representations via the digital interface.   
Shared Ontological Systems and the Emergence of Different Dialogues 
In conclusion, I would like to critically interrogate some of the limitations surrounding the 
designation of familiar forms as digital interfaces in interactive new media installations –	
specifically those around the transmission and interpretation of instruction that these forms 
may bring about.  Of particular concern is the loss of information that occurs through this 
process and the effects that this may have on how the viewer/participant translates the 
instruction that the artist is trying to convey via the digital interface. As argued above, 
instruction relies on the viewer/participant’s ability to connect intangible descriptions of 
actions and movements to tangible signs and forms. In order to then accomplish a task, the 
viewer/participant first must be able to interpret the information she is presented with. As 
Wiener writes: “The amount of information carried with actual terminal equipment depends 
on the ability of the [subject] to transmit or to employ the information received.”748 Put 
simply, the amount, and type of information transmitted by the digital interface (and by 
extension the artist) is reliant on the ability of the subject to process present information and 
then act upon previous instructions provided to her.749   
On this point, Dourish argues that the loss of information is a direct result of the use of 
certain types of ontological systems of representation. Dourish is specifically concerned with 
how these systems are used as a basis for designing interactive systems in the computer 
science field.750 Ontological systems, in the computer science field, he tells us, are structures 
of meanings, which programmers use to assess their relationship to physical forms and 
conceptual theories in order to digitally reproduce them in machines.  These systems, he 
                                                
748 Norbert Wiener. The Human use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, (London: Free Association, 
1950), p. 104.  
749 Ibid. 
750 Paul Dourish. Where the Action is. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 129. Ontology is a system of 
meaning concerned with philosophical questions regarding entities, in particular, which entities exist or can be 
said to exist and how they are grouped. An ontological system groups these entities in order to provide us with a 
structure from which meaning can be constructed. (Dourish, 2001, p. 129) 
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writes, are used to address questions like: “how we can individuate the world, or distinguish 
between one entity and another; how we can understand the relationships between different 
entities or classes of entity.”751 Echoing Suchman’s argument surrounding intelligent and 
embodied action, Dourish states that the use of ontological systems of representation as the 
basis of design for interactive systems are detrimental to the instructional process due to the 
fact that there is “imbalance between the situated organization of practical action and the 
regimented models that systems embody”.752 He continues, arguing that when designing 
complex computerized systems, like digital interfaces, major issues, such as the loss or 
miscommunication of information, manifest themselves quite quickly as they are 
“consequences of assuming that ontological structures are shared and static”.753 Here Dourish 
is arguing that while a design element may reflect the programmers’	specific ontological 
system, it does not necessarily provide meaning for the subject. Not only does the use of an 
ontological system assume shared meaning, but it also promotes, he writes, “the idea that 
there is only one ontology in play”.754 In short, the concept of a single, shared ontology 
presents issues because it implies that systems of meaning are stable.  Furthermore, it 
suggests that the subject and the programmer share the same model of both the physical and 
virtual world despite the fact that they have very different experiences of it. So how does this 
limitation manifest itself in, and what does it mean for, interactive new media installations? 
A good place to begin this investigation is Jeffrey Shaw’s conFIGURING the CAVE (1996). 
The digital interface in this installation is a near life-sized replica of a wooden artist 
mannequin located in the center of a CAVE environment.755 The mannequin is shaped to 
resemble a human body and has a head, a torso and movable appendages. The mannequin is 
outwardly genderless and is fitted with electronic measurement devices, which are embedded 
in its moveable joints.756 (Figure 72) 
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755 Jeffrey Shaw. conFIGURING the CAVE. (1996). Found online at: http://www.jeffrey-
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and out of the environment. (Shaw, 1996) 
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Figure 72: J. Shaw, conFIGURING the CAVE. (1996). 
A single viewer/participant outfitted with a HMD controls its motions.757 In addition to the 
interface, conFIGURING the CAVE consists of seven differentiated pictorial and audio 
domains that display, in Shaw’s words, an “emergent complexity of mutable forms and 
organic abstractions which are conjoined with representative and symbolic images”.758 These 
domains are generated through custom algorithms, and each one is distinctive.  To access 
them, the viewer/participant must interact with the digital interface.  (Figure 73) 
 
Figure 73: J. Shaw, conFIGURING the CAVE. (1996). 
                                                                                                                                                  
CAVE into two overlapping planes, with images projected on top of each of them.  The images are a three-
dimensional satellite photograph of the geographical area around Hiroshima, Japan and a Daguerreotype of two 
nude women. (Shaw, 2016). Viewer/participant interaction with the interface – specifically tilting it vertically 
and horizontally – causes the images of the women to move up and down in an erotic manner. So, while wooden 
and technological, the interface in this work is not neutral: it is a representation of a responsive, yet submissive 
woman. For more information on how technology becomes gendered, see Rode, 2011; van Oost, 2003; Berg 
and Lie, 1995.   
757 Jeffrey Shaw. conFIGURING the CAVE. (1996). Found online at: http://www.jeffrey-
shaw.net/html_main/frameset-works.php There is only one viewer/participant interacting with the work at a 
time. Thus, the very fact that this apparatus is needed in order to interact with the work could be viewed as a 
limitation of the digital interface, and of the piece in general, as it limits the amount of subjects who have access 
to the work.    
758 Jeffrey Shaw. “Movies after Film – The Digitally Expanded Cinema.” in New Screen Media 
Cinema/Art/Narrative ed. Martin Rieser/Andrea Zapp.  (London: British Film Institute, 2002), p. 271. 
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However, if the viewer/participant is unable to identify the mannequin as interface, then she 
simply will not be able to interact with it as such, which means she is unable to activate the 
piece.  Similarly, if she misinterprets or does not understand the metaphors (touching equals 
activity, a head denotes vision) that Shaw has deployed to supply her with navigational 
information in the installation, or if she is unable to connect the movements of the limbs of 
the interface to the movement of the images in the CAVE, she will be unable to transition 
between domains or scenes. Thus she will be unable to navigate the installation.  
The inability to process instruction on behalf of the viewer/participant due to the deployment 
of unsatisfactory metaphors by the artist can result in miscommunication –	an act that Wiener 
argues, means “information may be lost which can never be regained”.759  Wiener continues 
by stating that process of transmitting information in technological systems may involve 
“several consecutive stages of transmission following one another in addition to the final or 
effective stage; and between any two of these there will be an act of translation, capable of 
dissipating information”.760  In short, Wiener is arguing that the transmission of instruction is 
a multifaceted and sequential, but not necessarily linear, process that relies on, among other 
things, the act of translation, and because of this, the loss of information can occur. 
Loss of information is of course detrimental to conFIGURING the CAVE.  It can lead to 
confusion surrounding the operations of the installation, disorientation of the 
viewer/participant or, as exampled above, the viewer/participant, unable to navigate the work, 
may give up and leave –	an action that results in the complete failure of the installation. The 
fact that information may leak out of the system, never to be seen again, however, is not an 
issue for Wiener.  As he states: “That information may be dissipated but not gained is as we 
have seen the cybernetic form of the second law of thermodynamics.”761  Here Wiener is 
arguing that the loss of information is not detrimental, but a natural part of the instructional 
process.  Thus he does not consider it to be a major problem.  Building on Wiener’s assertion, 
I argue that it is possible for this loss of information to yield more interesting results in 
interactive new media installations.  For example, if the viewer/participant is unable to 
process instructions, or operate the digital interface properly, she may begin to explore the 
artwork from a different vantage point, or experiment in different ways with the tools 
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provided.  Take, for instance, the second domain of conFIGURING the CAVE. When the 
viewer/participant enters this domain, layered images of text, characters and hieroglyphs 
appear.762  (Figure 74)  
 
Figure 74: J. Shaw, conFIGURING the CAVE. (1996). 
When she moves the mannequin’s limbs, the graphic and text change.763 If she is unable to 
connect the movement of the mannequin’s limbs to the movement of the text and images, 
these images remain static. Failure to process instruction and activate the images in the 
installation however may prompt the viewer/participant to begin to experiment with the 
mannequin in different ways. (Figure 75) 
 
Figure 75: J. Shaw, conFIGURING the CAVE. (1996). 
                                                





Instead of lifting the legs of the digital interface up and down (an action that imitates walking 
in the physical world), she may begin to experiment and tilt the artist doll completely upside 
down, or move its head around –	actions which cause a circular three-dimensional 
representation of an ancient Chinese rubbing-stone carved with text to appear on the floor.764  
I argue that experimentation with, and a critical interrogation of, actions of the digital 
interface allows the viewer/participant to concentrate on the creation or alteration of forms 
that differ from those that would have appeared if there was no loss of information.  By 
selecting a familiar cultural form and designating it, a digital interface, Shaw is tacitly 
acknowledging his relationship to a set of publicly available and organized series of signs, 
forms and actions. However, this relationship is fraught due to the fact that it presumes and 
then promotes the idea that systems of meaning and representation are both stable and shared, 
when in fact they are flexible, they fluctuate and are open to interpretation.  
Despite this, the digital interface in Shaw’s installation is a representation of a human form –	
a representation, that Phelan and Butler argue has the ability to generate ruptures and gaps in 
dominant narratives and to produce resistant readings. Given this, by interacting with this 
form, I argue that the viewer/participant is able to begin to subvert the instruction provided to 
her via the digital interface and begin to modify the underlying narrative of the work 
(originality, being at the origin of and creation or constructing something out of nothing). 
Thus she is able to begin to reposition herself as creator, or co-creator, and by extension the 
locus of interaction in conFIGURING the CAVE.  In this way, the subversion of instruction 
by the viewer/participant allows a different dialogue between the human and the machine to 
appear –	one that points towards the emergence of multiple perspectives and different 
theorizations of the relationships and narratives that Shaw is presenting her with.    
The emergence of a different type of dialogue between the viewer/participant and the digital 
interface does not occur because the actions that the viewer/participant makes with the digital 
interface have changed (as those are, albeit within very narrow limits, predetermined by the 
algorithms that the artist employs, as well as the environment that the viewer/participant is 
acting in). Instead, as Amelia Jones (2001) suggests, this dialogue has appeared because the 
way we think about and discuss the relationship between the body and technology has, to an 
                                                




extent, changed.765  This change in thinking, Jones states, has occurred, in part, because of the 
proliferation of digital technologies in the early 20th Century, which allow different types of 
thinking and “technologically mediated modes of being”	to emerge.766   
Jones argues that the concept of translation (reading and writing) was the principal technique 
used by artists at the height of the industrial revolution to connect the body with the new 
industrialized technology, thus translation was, the “primary mode of interface between body 
and technologized world”.767  Jones continues stating that due to the proliferation of concepts 
like cybernetics and commodity culture that occurred after World War II, the view of the 
relationship between the body and technology described above, alongside the primary 
techniques used to articulate this relationship, collapsed.768  This collapse, Jones tells us, 
combined with the “growing awareness of the brutal potential of technology in its military 
forms”	lead to enactments of the human body as performance of the work of art.769 And, 
artists employing this practice, “insisted on the coextensivity of body/machine and 
vision/machine, of artist and interpreter”.770	 This focus on the body, embodiment and 
coextensivity of the human and the machine, Jones states, meant “enactment, or performance 
replaced translation as modes for articulating the hinge between body and technology”.771 In 
this way, representation, Jones argues, is no longer theorized as static, thus it is no longer 
articulated through images or words, but rather it is seen as processual. It is articulated 
through the embodied performance of the viewer/participant.772  
Jones’s rethinking of performance as the primary mode of communication between the body 
and technology allows me to argue that the digital interface as an individual computerized 
device – a visible technological thing	–	that provides instruction and mediates a relationship 
between the viewer/participant and artist, that while important and physically there, is no 
longer necessary in interactive new media art installations as it is, and has always to an extent 
been, the viewer/participant themselves that performs these acts.  The reconstitution of the 
interface as the human body in interactive new media installations points towards the next 
thematic discussed in this thesis: ubiquitous computing (ubicomp).   
                                                










Coined by computer scientist Mark Weiser in 1991, ubicomp refers to the seamless 
integration of technology into every place, building and body.773 Taking Jones’s notion of 
enactment as replacing translation as the primary mode for articulating the hinge between 
body and technology to the extreme, theories of ubicomp position the interface as an invisible 
object –	something that has disappeared so far into the background that it no longer exists. 
Ubiquitous interfaces, Emerson (2014) writes: “share a common goal underlying their 
designs: to efface the interface altogether and so also to efface our ability to read, let alone 
write…definitively turning us into consumers rather than producers of content.”774  Chapter 4 
interrogates the claims surrounding the erasure of the interface, through an examination of 
the use of ubicomp systems as interfaces.  It provides a critique of how these devices are 
theorized and understood in the media studies and humanities fields and the utopian and 
dystopian stories these theories promote. After interrogating these claims, I explore the 
potential that artistic and collaborative experimentation with ubiquitous interfaces in 
interactive new media installations has for destabilizing and reconfiguring theories of 
ubicomp and the interface.  
	 	
                                                
773 Mark Weiser. “The Computer for the 21st Century”.  Scientific American, September 1991. Found online at: 
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/ACMInteractions2.html. 
774 Lori Emerson. Reading Writing Interfaces: From the Digital to the Bookbound. (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. xvii. 
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Chapter 4: Ubiquitous Computing and the Interface  
 
The aesthetic of Scott Snibbe’s interactive new media installation, Boundary Functions 
(1998) is a minimalistic one.  The gallery was dark when I entered, the walls bare and other 
than a blank projection surface covering the floor, the space was empty. When I walked onto 
the surface, it remained blank. When another viewer/participant joined me, a closed-circuit 
camera began to record our action, ultimately activating the piece. Our captured performance 
was transmitted to a computer, where it was processed, generating a white line, which was 
projected onto the surface. The line produced a real-time Voronoi diagram that temporarily 
divided the surface into autonomous regions, based on our physical location in the 
installation.775 (Figure 76) 
 
Figure 76: S. Snibbe, Boundary Functions. (1998). 
For example, when I walked onto the surface with another viewer/participant, the line 
bisected it. If three of us walked onto the surface the line divided it into thirds. The line was 
not static; it was animated and mobile.  If I stepped directly on, or attempted to jump over the 
line, it moved out of the way or followed me. No matter what I did (jump, step, move left), 
the line responded dynamically, keeping an even distance between me and other 
viewer/participants. (Figure 77) 
                                                
775 Scott Snibbe. Boundary Functions. (1998). Found online at: 
http://www.snibbe.com/projects/interactive/boundaryfunctions/ A Voronoi diagram is a partitioning of a surface 




Figure 77: S. Snibbe, Boundary Functions. (1998). 
The line not only visually divided the surface of the piece, but it acted, as the name of the 
artwork suggests, as a boundary. Its purpose was to obstruct me, to stop me from gaining 
access to other viewer/participants. In this way, the line was regulatory –	it was used to 
control my actions in the installation.  It did this by reinforcing specific notions of what a 
subject was (me), what an object was (the line, others interacting with the piece) and what 
our relationship to each other was or could be (one of opposites). However, just because this 
boundary existed and was visible did not mean I could not subvert it.   
I did just this. I worked together with other viewer/participants and eliminated the line. All I 
had to do to accomplish this was hold hands with another viewer/participant and the 
boundary between us disappeared. The principle interaction in Boundary Functions, was not 
of repetition or reproduction of previously posited theoretical frameworks or behaviors as 
discussed in earlier chapters.  Instead, it was about rethinking and rebuilding spaces and the 
human and nonhuman relationships that exist within them.  Boundary Functions did this by 
allowing me to think seriously about the restrictions, constraints and potential possibilities of 
the representational and technical systems I was interacting with. I could then intervene in 
these systems and the underlying meanings and stories they promote, destabilize, to an 
extent, and rewrite them through creative and experimental collaboration with others. 
This chapter builds on my experience with Boundary Functions. It examines the use of new 
interface technologies in interactive new media installations, the utopian and dystopian 
stories told about these technologies and the consequent meanings attributed to them. I 
specifically look at installations that intervene in these stories, critically examining the claims 
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about technology they make, the human and nonhuman relationships that these claims 
promote and the potential that artistic and collaborative experimentation has for destabilizing 
and reconfiguring them. I turn to a recent story being told around our human relationship to 
technology: ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) and its flourishing, yet fragmented and 
contradictory image of the “invisible”	digital interface and HCI.  
Ubicomp, as briefly discussed earlier, is a “post-desktop”	paradigm for HCI.776 It refers to the 
seamless integration of technology into every place, object, building and body.  These 
technologies are deemed “invisible”	by the scholars writing about them and the engineers or 
artists creating them, because their inner workings, as well as junctures and communications 
with other entities are concealed, hidden away and thus become imperceptible to the user. I 
argue that the invisibility of the interface, as it is presented in some texts on ubicomp, is 
problematic because the word invisible is used to position the interface as a natural, neutral or 
value-free boundary between humans and machines. The interface, as mentioned in previous 
chapters, mediates, frames, constrains and thus determines, to an extent, our experience in the 
space we are located in. Given this, there is nothing neutral or natural about the interface, 
even if we have become naturalized to it. Rather, I posit the word invisible, when applied to 
the interface in ubicomp contexts, is used to mask closed and regulatory computational 
systems that control users’	access to content and their creative experimentation with the 
interface. I will outline what is at stake in this argument, suggesting that the so-called 
invisibility of the interface standardizes and sanitizes viewer/participant experience with 
technology in interactive new media installations. In doing this, I posit that viewer/participant 
behavior and experience in interactive new media installations is, among other things, 
reduced to an algorithmic commodity, ultimately creating a single, stable, unified perspective 
of what the interface, and interaction with it, are rather than what they could become.777  
                                                
776 Mark Weiser. “The Computer for the 21st Century.” Scientific American, September 1991. Found online at: 
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/ACMInteractions2.html  
777 My critique of Weiser’s concept of invisibility is similar to critiques presented in the HCI and design fields 
around Weiser’s notion of disappearance and Paul Dourish’s notion of “embodied interaction” – specifically 
those offered by scholars such as Chalmers (2004) and Chalmers and Galani (2004) For example, Chalmers, 
argues that Weiser’s notions of transparency and invisibility are “unachievable or incomplete ideal[s]” 
(Chalmers, 2004).  They are unachievable and incomplete, because they “underemphasize the interdependence 
of ‘invisible’ non-rationalizing interaction and focused rationalizing interaction within ongoing activity.” 
(Chalmers and Galani, 2004).  Instead Chalmers advocates seamful design.  Seamful design, according to 
Chalmers, “involves understanding and accepting ‘seams’ such as gaps and breaks in functionality, and the 
limits of sensing, communication and representation” (Chalmers, 2004). 
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What is Ubiquitous Computing? 
Ubiquitous computing, as mentioned above, is a term describing the seamless integration of 
computers into everyday objects, bodies, artworks and spaces, thereby creating environments, 
objects, bodies and installations that are completely saturated with technology.  It is a concept 
that details, as Adam Greenfield (2006) succinctly puts it, “computing without computers”.778 
Ubicomp takes many different forms across cultural, aesthetic, socio-political and technical 
landscapes. It encompasses everything from the mundane (subway passes), to the aesthetic 
(technology in artwork like Boundary Functions), to the outrageous (talking doors and toilets 
found in science fiction books and movies) to commercial products (video game consoles like 
the Kinect). These devices, as Lori Emerson (2014) writes are sometimes referred to as 
ubiquitous interfaces, as they are the point of interaction between two or more entities of a 
ubiquitous computing system.779 Ubiquitous interfaces, as mentioned above, are deemed 
“invisible”	by the scholars writing about them and the engineers or artists creating them 
because they are imperceptible to the person using them.  
The invisibility of the interface will be understood in this chapter with reference to texts on 
ubicomp, particularly those written by computer scientist Mark Weiser (1988-1996). I draw 
on Weiser’s definition of invisibility in order to explore the implications that the invisibility 
of the interface has on viewer/participant interaction, and for interactive new media 
installations in general.  Furthermore, I use Weiser’s definition of invisibility because, as 
Emerson rightly points out, Weiser’s theories are responsible for introducing it into the 
lexicon of interface design, defining this term “as a device’s ability to be simultaneously 
everywhere yet also unexceptional in how it ideally lacks an identity”.780  
 
Invisibility, according to Weiser, is the main characteristic that differentiates ubicomp from 
the personal computer (PC) and other modes of HCI.781  Invisibility is such a significant 
characteristic for Weiser that he returns to this point repeatedly throughout his essays on the 
                                                
778 Adam Greenfield. Everyware: The Dawning Age of Ubiquitous Computing. (Berkely: New Riders, 2006), p. 
11.  
779 Lori Emerson. Reading Writing Interfaces: From the Digital to the Bookbound. (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. x.  
780 Ibid., p. 5.   
781 Mark Weiser. “The Computer for the 21st Century.” Scientific American, September 1991. Found online at: 
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/ACMInteractions2.html   
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topic.782 It is imperative, Weiser argues, to “conceive of a new way of thinking about 
computers in the world…that takes into account the natural human environment and allows 
the computers themselves to vanish into the background”.783 In doing this, he suggests that 
interfaces in ubicomp contexts will become “so unobtrusive we will not even notice our 
increased ability for informed action”.784  Weiser continues his theorization, stating that 
interfaces should be analogous to the written word; they should be “an integral, invisible part 
of the way people live their lives”.785 In this way ubiquitous interfaces provide a more 
“natural”	type of interaction because they “get out of the way”, allowing the user to focus on 
other, more important, things.786  
Given the importance Weiser places on invisibility in his essays, the majority of my questions 
in this chapter will revolve around this concept. They are as follows: Why make technology 
like interfaces invisible? What exactly is the word “invisibility,”	when used in a ubicomp 
context, trying to hide? What relationships, processes and structures is it suggestive of? What 
relationships, processes and information does it conceal or reveal? And how does ubicomp, 
and the claims it makes, change via artistic experimentation in interactive new media 
installations, if it does at all?    
In order to fully understand the concept of invisibility as well as the possible change in 
thinking artistic experimentation with ubiquitous interfaces may or may not enable, it is 
necessary to explore both what the ubiquitous interface is positioned as becoming, as 
referenced in texts on ubicomp, and how we experience these positionings in interactive new 
media installations. I use the word becoming here not merely in the sense of a set of linear 
changes culminating in the realization of semi-realistic potentialities or commercial products, 
but more in the sense of what these future positionings may or may not signify (helpfulness, 
user-friendliness, inaccessibility, erasure) and how they connect to past imaginings of 
ubicomp.  In this chapter, I will focus on three interconnected concepts that Weiser and other 
scholars use to describe ubiquitous interfaces: invisibility, calm and attractiveness, and the 
                                                
782These essays include, but are not limited to: The Computer for the 21st Century (1991), Some Computing 
Problems in Ubiquitous Computing (1993), The World is not a Desktop (1994), Designing Calm Technology 
(1996), Open House (1996).     
783 Mark Weiser. “The Computer for the 21st Century.” Scientific American, September 1991. Found online at: 
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/ACMInteractions2.html   
784 Mark Weiser. “Open House.” ITP Review 2. March 1996. Found online at: 
https://makingfurnitureinteractive.files.wordpress.com/2007/09/wholehouse.pdf  
785 Mark Weiser. “The Computer for the 21st Century.” Scientific American, September 1991. Found online at: 
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/ACMInteractions2.html  
786 Ibid.  
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claims they perpetuate.787  I say these concepts are interconnected because they are used in 
texts on ubicomp to describe the same thing –	the disappearance of the interface.  
Concepts of calm and attractiveness, will be understood in the first instance in Weiser’s 
terms, because like the notion of invisibility discussed above, Weiser is responsible for 
introducing these concepts into the lexicon of interface design.  Attractiveness, for Weiser, as 
briefly mentioned in the introduction, refers to technology that makes itself the center of 
human attention. Technology should not be, he argues, something “I need to talk to, give 
commands to, or have a relationship with.”	788 Rather, technology should disappear into the 
background. In this way attractiveness, for Weiser, is an undesirable trait because 
attractiveness “is the opposite of invisible”.789  The notion of calm, Weiser tells us, refers to 
technology that is free from excitement and that does not require the full attention of the 
person using it. Calm technology does this, he states, by engaging both the center and the 
periphery of the user’s attention, moving back and forth between the two depending on the 
context, thus leaving the user, not the computer,	“serene and in control”	of the situation or 
task at hand.790  I will treat the three concepts mentioned above as necessary conditions of 
ubiquitous interfaces only in that these concepts are the foundations on which the theory of 
ubicomp is built –	they are necessary, but not sufficient or definitive. I do not suggest that 
ubiquitous interfaces can be reduced to these concepts. I do however believe that these 
concepts and the claims that they generate are significant enough to merit a critical 
investigation into what their nature is and how they manifest themselves in interactive new 
media installations.   
This investigation is important because, like most popular computer science-based concepts 
proposed in the past decade (virtual reality, artificial reality, artificial life), ubicomp, as 
Christiane Paul (2013) observes, is	“surrounded by a certain amount of hype and invites a set 
                                                
787 The claims that these concepts perpetuate, I argue include, but are not limited to: the eradication of the 
boundary between the human and information; separation between content and the user; the artist and 
technology; Aristotelian notions of the relationship between the body and technology; the disembodiment of the 
subject. 
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of critical questions”.791 In other words, ubicomp, or more precisely, the scientists, engineers 
and artists who produce ubiquitous interfaces and the theories around them, make claims and 
promises that these devices do not, cannot, or in certain cases will never be able to, deliver. 
These include, but are not limited to, evoking a state of calm, improving our lives or simply 
making them easier. Thus, as Ulrik Ekman (2011) argues: “ubiquity and ubiquitous 
computing remain potentialities of whose actualization we are not yet sure.”792  
In the past decade, considerable effort has gone into realizing Weiser’s vision of ubicomp 
including, but not limited to, the development of ubiquitous frameworks, interfaces and 
infrastructures. As advanced and impressive as these endeavors have been, there remains, as 
Yvonne Rodgers (2006) states,	“an enormous gap between the dream of comfortable, 
informed and effortless living [as proposed in Weiser’s papers] and the accomplishments of 
Ubicomp research”.793 This gap exists, Rodgers argues, because ubicomp involves, among 
other things, “solving very hard artificial intelligence problems”	such as harnessing the huge 
variability around human motivation and intention as discussed in chapter 3.794  So while it 
has been possible to develop a range of simple ubicomp systems that can remind us of events 
or recommend products, it is, she writes “proving to be much more difficult to build truly 
smart systems that can understand or accurately model people’s behaviors, moods and 
intentions”.795 Following Rodgers, I argue the importance of a critical engagement with 
ubicomp, the theories that surround it and the interfaces that it generates, not because of its 
concreteness (the objects that it produces) but because of the stories around technology that it 
tells. 
My inquiry into the stories above raises interesting questions around the foundations on 
which ubicomp is based. In doing this, my inquiry will require an in-depth discussion of the 
foundational papers of ubicomp –	one that highlights the (dis)continuities between discourses 
found in the foundational papers to the current institutions, texts and theories that promote it. 
It will focus specifically on how these newer texts echo, as Emerson writes, the techno-
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determinist assumptions embedded in the foundational papers “about how ubicomp-related 
devices will be deployed everywhere in the future”	and how this imagined deployment 
implies, to an extent, the inadequacy of traditional interfaces.796  
I draw heavily on Emerson’s theorization of ubicomp throughout this chapter, but offer an 
approach and framework that extends beyond a critique of techno-deterministic imaginings of 
disappearing technology and marketing rhetoric (although I do critically examine them). I 
argue that the word invisible, when applied to the interface in interactive new media 
installations not only represents the commodification of bodies and things; it also represents 
erasure. In particular I refer to the erasure of the multiple agencies that contribute to and help 
shape the interface and the relationships between them –	relationships between human 
individuals (viewer/participants, artists, theorists, engineers and scientists) and relationships 
between nonhuman actors, like the ubiquitous interface and the aesthetic, algorithmic and 
technical processes that allow it to work. The question then becomes: How can I call 
attention to the multiple agencies, entities and relationships that bring the interface into being 
when the ultimate goal of the system being used is “invisibility”	or disappearance?  
Taking this question into account, I will suggest that the relationship between computation, 
aesthetics and the interface should be understood as an interwoven and multifaceted process 
that questions the ways in which ubicomp systems are theorized and deployed. It is a process 
that looks towards interactive new media installations not as a mode of opposition, but as a 
mode of intervention, a way to critically question commonly held assumptions about the 
interface and call attention to, and then dispel, myths and claims of ubicomp such as 
invisibility, neutrality and naturalness.  
Ubiquitous technologies are, of course, present well beyond new media art, but I contend that 
interactive installations can become a good entry point to look at such systems as they 
construct situations and then ask us to participate –	to physically perform –	in and with 
technology, and thus they afford us a chance to critically experience and re-examine our 
relationship to technology. As mentioned earlier, interactive new media installations draw on 
and remediate cinematic and other art historical practices, processes and traditions –	
specifically those of technological experimentation, creative collaboration and audience 
participation. Therefore interactive art provides us with strategies –	with a means to 
                                                
796 Lori Emerson. Reading Writing Interfaces: From the Digital to the Bookbound. (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. 8.  Emerson’s emphasis.  
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undermine the claims of invisibility and neutrality that ubicomp promotes. In direct relation 
to ubicomp, interactive art does this, I suggest, by intervening in, via mimicry, resistance, 
opposition and/or rejection, the same regulatory principles and claims that engineers and 
scientists producing and marketing ubiquitous interfaces employ for commercial gain.  
For example, Brian Massumi (2011) states: “the regulatory principles of the technical process 
in the narrow sense are utility and salability, profit-generating ability. Art claims the right to 
have no manifest utility, no use-value, and in many cases even no exchange value. At its best, 
it has event-value.”797 By event-value, Massumi is referring to the fact that interactive art is 
experiential and exploratory, unbound and unsubordinated by and to external finalities.798 It 
is precisely this “event-value”, or open-endedness, Massumi argues, that allows interactive 
art to intervene in previously posited modes of thinking and begin to reframe them.799 
Interactive art, he writes, “can push further to the indeterminate but relationally potentialized 
fringes of existing situations, beyond the limits of current framings or regulatory 
principles”.800  Following on from Massumi, the notions of experimentation, collaboration, 
and audience participation embedded in new media art’s history become important to any 
study of ubiquitous technology, because the aesthetic practices that underpin it have the 
potential to create encounters between entities and facilitate creative action on behalf of the 
viewer/participant. In doing this, I argue interactive new media installations can reposition 
the instrumental and invisible ubiquitous interface into a creative and visible technology, 
bringing the role of the artistic and the aesthetic to the fore. In short, to think about the use of 
the ubiquitous interface in interactive new media art installations is to acknowledge the role, 
both positive and negative, that artistic experimentation has played, and still is playing, in the 
development of new technologies.   
Intervention, of course, has its limitations. One of these limitations is that it can inadvertently 
reinforce that which it seeks to intervene in.801 In the case of this thesis, intervention is seen 
as creative experimentation, by new media artists, with ubiquitous technology in interactive 
new media installations. The “thing”	that artists are trying to intervene in is, among other 
                                                
797 Brian Massumi. Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts. (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2011), p. 53.  Massumi’s emphasis.  
798 Ibid.  
799 Ibid.    
800 Ibid.   
801 Another limitation of intervention is that it can be exploited by corporations. It can be co-opted, re-packaged 
and leveraged for profit.  This notion of intervention being co-opted and leveraged for profit is discussed, in full, 
in my analysis of David Rokeby’s interactive new media installation Hand-held (2012). 
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things, the commodification of aesthetic content and innovation by the technology industries.  
The notion of intervention, via artistic experimentation in interactive new media installations 
and the limitations that surround it, will be discussed in full in the second half of this chapter, 
but to summarize: according to Simon Penny (2013), media arts practitioners working in the 
1990s played (and are still playing) a key and vigorous role in the development of new 
technologies –	specifically, ubiquitous interfaces.802 Driven by “the traditions of open 
intellectual inquiry and interdisciplinarity in the arts and by the previous thirty years of ‘art 
and technology’	practice” the underlying goal of some artists developing these technologies, 
Penny writes, was to critically question and intervene in the popular rhetoric of the time 
(Cyberculture, Virtuality).803  
Nurtured in environments that rewarded aesthetic experimentation, creative risk taking and 
radical intervention the ubiquitous interfaces created for interactive new media installations 
in the 1990s have been repurposed and turned into commercial devices that now dominate the 
21st Century (iPads, the Kinect, VR Headsets).804 Stripped of their aesthetic functions, some 
of these technologies have been co-opted by large conglomerates (Microsoft, Apple, Google). 
They have been sanitized and instrumentalized, sold back to us as serialized products that 
will “expand your creativity”	and/or “change the way you use technology forever”.805 The 
commodification of aesthetic content raises questions around artistic experimentation by new 
media artists in interactive new media installations. I will address these questions by critically 
examining the use of ubiquitous interfaces in interactive new media installations, positioning 
them as mediums through which notions of creativity and aesthetic content become 
commodified, asking whether artistic experimentation with ubicomp technology is actually 
the instrument of intervention that artists developing ubiquitous interfaces, like Penny, see it 
as, or more of a continuity of the same. 
I begin my exploration of ubiquitous interfaces in the first section of this chapter, critically 
examining how ubicomp is framed and presented to us in the foundational papers. In the 
second and third part, I draw on more recent theories of ubicomp directly related to the 
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humanities fields as offered by Greenfield (2008), Hayles (2011), Sarah Kember (2013) and 
Emerson (2014) and apply them to the use of the ubiquitous interface in interactive new 
media installations of David Rokeby (2012) Scott Snibbe (2002) and Brian Knep (2006-8). In 
these sections, I argue that an investigation into aesthetic experimentations with ubiquitous 
systems is important because these experimentations not only affect the interfaces used in art 
but they influence those developed elsewhere. These aforementioned humanities-based texts, 
and the consequent interactive new media installations that I apply them to, are invaluable to 
my research as they critically evaluate the principal claims and question the foundations on 
which the concept of ubicomp is based. Thus I posit they offer an important and much-
needed critical perspective on ubiquitous technologies –	one that seeks to challenge the 
hegemony of ubicomp theories by intervening in normative assumptions concerning the 
interface. Specifically, I will call attention to how the ubiquitous interface is being marketed 
as a natural, intuitive feature by corporations that will transform the way we interact with 
each other forever. These interventions happen, via critique (Hayles, Kember, Greenfield, 
Emerson), presence or visibility (Rokeby, Knep), disruption (Snibbe), resistance (Rokeby), 
critical reflection (Knep) and creative play (Snibbe, Knep). I argue that it is precisely the 
aforementioned scholars’	and artists’	awareness of the fact that the claims require critical 
attention and intervention, rather than tacit acceptance, that differentiates the more recent, 
humanities-based discourses on ubicomp and artworks from both the foundational texts and 
those written and created by scholars working in other fields.   
My analysis of ubicomp culminates in an alternative theorization of the relationship between 
aesthetics, computation and the interface in interactive new media installations via a re-
reading of Natalie Jeremijenko’s Live Wire (1995). My re-reading of Live Wire is important 
because I believe it pushes us to reflect on, and then critically question, how we encounter, 
experience and think about technology, ultimately opening up a space for different narratives 
around, and reconfigurations of, the ubiquitous interface and ubicomp to emerge. 
Approaching ubicomp from this perspective will situate my theory of the digital interface at 
the boundary of the STS and humanities fields as well as apply it to issues of invisibility, 
aesthetics, interactivity, agency and autonomy. The issue of invisibility is embedded in the 
notion of the interface as a calming, unattractive technology, as theorized by Weiser in the 
foundational papers and consequently adopted by some artists, engineers and scholars in the 
humanities and STS fields. Questions around agency and autonomy arise in regards to the 
reappropriation and commodification of experimental ubiquitous interfaces created for 
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interactive new media installations by corporations and the normalization of bodies and 
behaviors that follow. Finally the concepts of aesthetics and interactivity will be developed in 
relation to notions of viewer/participant creativity and choice. 
A ‘Shift’ in Computing  
In his 1988 article “The Computer for the 21st Century”, Mark Weiser defined ubicomp as 
“the method of enhancing computer use by making many computers available throughout the 
physical environment”.806 The availability and integration of technology into the physical 
environment is significant for Weiser as he believes it will result in a space in which “each 
person is continually interacting with hundreds of nearby wirelessly interconnected 
computers”.807  However, there exists, as Paul Dourish and Genevieve Bell (2011) argue, a 
multitude of complex interactions “between space, technology, culture and experience”.808 
The spaces in which ubiquitous technologies are being deployed and the interactions that they 
enable “are neither stable, uniform, nor given”.809  Ubiquitous technology, they continue,	
“can destabilize and transform”	these interactions and mediate space, but they “will only ever 
be one part of the mix”.810 This is because ubicomp, Dourish and Bell state, was “from the 
outset, a proposal not for how technology should be but instead how it should be 
experienced”.811  
Dourish and Bell’s conceptualization of ubiquitous technology –	specifically, their statement 
that ubicomp was, from the outset, a proposal for how technology should be experienced –	is 
helpful to this chapter as it exposes a major contradiction in the foundational papers. 812  For 
example, the main characteristic of ubiquitous technology, as described above, is invisibility. 
As Weiser states,	“a good tool is an invisible tool”	and “the most profound technologies are 
those that disappear”.813 However, if, as Weiser claims, the best technology is invisible, then 
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how is ubicomp “an experience?”	How do we experience invisibility? How can we 
experience something that we cannot see?  
In order to address this contradiction and these questions, I must return to the foundational 
papers of ubicomp. This return is necessary because these papers, as Dourish and Bell state, 
begin “to shape an argument for the future of ubicomp as inevitable; it is already on its way, 
delivered by the people who brought you the personal computer”.814 The foundational papers 
of ubicomp helped create both the possibility of ubiquitous interfaces and their limits. To 
understand the potential that ubiquitous interfaces may hold, I must explore what made the 
emergence of ubicomp possible and the motives behind it. By examining the foundational 
papers, I do not seek to offer a judgment on the “effects”	that the use of ubiquitous interfaces 
and their proposed invisibility have in interactive new media installations. I return to them to 
explore how the aesthetic and cultural aspects of ubiquitous interfaces are situated in, and 
respond to, the aforementioned claims, like invisibility, that surround them.815  In attempting 
to critically examine these claims, I gesture towards discourses in the STS and humanities 
fields that are larger than and encompass more, yet still feedback on, and are important to, 
interactive new media installations and new media art.   
The ultimate point of creating ubiquitous environments, for Weiser, is twofold. I say twofold 
because ubicomp, as it is presented to us by Weiser in the foundational papers, has two 
seemingly interrelated, yet contradictory goals: one humanist and one technicist. The first 
goal is humanist as ubicomp is centered on users and their interactions with technology. For 
example, the point of ubicomp, in Weiser’s words, is to:	“create a new kind of relationship of 
people to computers, one in which the computer would have to take the lead in becoming 
vastly better at getting out of the way so people could just go about their lives.”816 Here 
Weiser is advocating for what he believes is a better way of interacting with technology, one 
that shifts attention away from technology (via the integration of multiple small, unobtrusive, 
or “invisible”	interfaces into environments) onto the user and their interactions with other 
humans.817 Given Weiser’s emphasis on the human here, it is easy to see how Dourish and 
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Bell would suggest that the foundational papers were proposals that detailed how users 
should experience ubiquitous technology mentioned above. 
The other goal of ubicomp is technicist. It is technicist in that it is technologically driven and 
focused on technical knowledge. The point of ubicomp is, as Weiser writes,	“to achieve the 
most effective kind of technology, that which is essentially invisible to the user”.818  In order 
for ubiquitous systems to become invisible, and thus effective, those designing them need to 
find, Weiser states, “the right balance of features”.819 This balance must meet the specific 
“niche”	for which the device is being designed. For example, if the device is being designed 
for a sound system in an interactive new media installation, then it would have to meet the 
technical requirements (power amplification, signal processing, other additional aural 
requirements) aesthetic needs of the installation (adapt to the gallery space and the 
installation, complement on-screen visuals) and the needs of the user (be easy to activate and 
audible).  
However, the only features that ubicomp devices must include, according to Weiser, are 
“display size, bandwidth, processing and memory”.820 Given this, an artist designing an 
interface for a sound system would not have to consider the aesthetic aspects of the device 
(what it looked like, how it fit in the gallery space and the installation, how it complements 
the on-screen visuals). They only have to take into consideration the technical requirements: 
its size (can it fit into a speaker or a microphone?) bandwidth (what frequency is it operating 
on? what is its data transfer rate?) and its processing and memory capabilities (how much 
information can it store and how fast can it process?).  
So, ubicomp, as described in the foundational papers by Weiser, is seemingly focused on our 
relationship to and interaction with technology. Yet, the features and relationships Weiser 
discusses throughout his texts are mostly instrumental ones. As he writes: “The balance for us 
emphasizes communication, ram, multi-media, and expansion ports.”821  Furthermore, in 
order to be effective, these features (ram, multimedia, expansion ports) must be inexpensive 
and easy to acquire, or “off the shelf”.822  Central to ubicomp then is the development of 
affordable, embedded and invisible technology (sensors, motors, processing units) and the 
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different types of interaction and relationships between machines and machines that these 
devices may bring about.  In short, what appears to be humanist, in Weiser’s writings, is 
actually technicist. I say technicist because the focus of ubicomp is not on what it can do for 
us, but on the technology itself, and what it can do in the space it is located in. I suggest this 
because Weiser’s emphasis is on the size, speed, power, performance and affordability of the 
technology developed, not on the relationships that people have with their machines.  
While Weiser acknowledges that this balance of features includes communication, the type of 
communication he promotes is not human-to-computer or human-to-human. Rather, it is 
communication between computers and computers (pens, boards, tabs, pads) and the 
underlying software and hardware (ram, expansion ports) that enable them to function.  In 
this way, I posit that the goals that Weiser’s theory of ubicomp is based on, are predicated on 
false divisions between the biological, the technological, and the economic(al). Or, to put it 
more simply: capital, computers and consumers.823  
Kember (2013) confirms my suggestions: ubiquitous technologies, she writes, are based on 
false divisions in the sense that they “articulate and disarticulate, avow and disavow”	the 
entanglement of life, technology and capital.824 Significantly for Kember, the entanglement 
“of technologies and users”	in ubicomp discourses “belies the false divisions that persist 
through new, social and what is sometimes referred to as cross media”.825  While directly 
related to ambient intelligence, photography and face recognition technology, the point, for 
Kember, and the importance of her argument to mine, is that technoscience industries “are 
taking on the media industries, incorporating them in ways that are utterly asymmetric and 
exploiting our agential intra-actions or dynamic relations with technology in order to derive 
value from them”.826 They do this, she writes, in multiple ways: by reviving and repackaging 
e-commerce strategies (the replacement of venture capitalists and bankers with “prosumers”), 
reviving and repackaging previous scientific research into the intersection between life, 
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technology and media (artificial life, artificial intelligence), and by “making direct claims on 
the everyday and on social environments constituted by users and intelligent artifacts 
alike.”827  
The direct claims that the technoscience industries are making on the everyday, Kember 
explains, are often contradictory.828 They cross already unstable boundaries between the 
public, the personal and the private, as well as the professional and the amateur, and the 
human and the nonhuman. They come in different forms, depending on the particular type of 
discourse, technology and environment they are associated with and the scholars or 
corporations writing about, designing or promoting them.  Some, like discourses around 
Ambient Intelligence, as Kember discusses in her article, are created for specific sectors or 
audiences and deemed ordinary or helpful, whereas other more interfacial products, like 
Google Glass or the Apple Watch, are called extraordinary and life changing. While these 
discourses and devices have their own unique vision and version of media, technology and 
computing, they all have, Kember tells us, one thing in common: they all emerge out of 
research conducted in the realm of ubicomp.829 Thus, they are “incorporated within the 
claims and innovations associated with the wider discourse of ubiquitous computing”.830 As 
she writes: “Such claims have come from research in ubiquitous computing and they 
materialized through new discourses and innovations that, by means of the media and 
technologies of (everyday) life, seek to change the very meaning of it.”831 So, how should we 
understand the relationship between the future of ubicomp that Weiser predicted and its 
present state as detailed by theorists like Kember? Well a good first step in developing this 
understanding would be to examine the underlying goals of ubicomp. A second good step 
would be to explore how these goals have changed since Weiser wrote the foundational 
papers.  
One of the main goals of ubicomp is to bring about a “shift”	in computing –	one that Weiser 
believes will allow human-to-human interactions to become dominant over individual users’	
interactions with personal computers.  Thus it is a shift that I argue suggests a very subtle 
move, on Weiser’s behalf, from analyzing the relationship between the biological and the 
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technical as separate (one isolated human and one isolated computer that sometimes talk to 
each other) towards theorizing the human and technology as entangled entities (entities that 
do not pre-exist each other’s existence).832   
For example, the idea of ubicomp, Weiser writes, first came about via personal research into 
“the place of today’s computer in actual activities of everyday life”.833 Citing academic 
studies into situated learning in classroom- and office-based settings –	specifically those 
conducted by Lucy Suchman (1985) and Jean Lave (1991) –	people, Weiser states “primarily 
work in a world of shared situations and unexamined technological skills. However the 
computer today is isolated and isolating from the overall situation and fails to get out of the 
way of the work”.834 The goal of ubicomp, for Weiser, is to rectify these problems: to make 
the computer less isolating and to get it out of the way.835  Accomplishing this goal, he states, 
is not an easy task. It is not a multimedia, GUI or interface problem. Nor is it a matter of 
symmetry –	that is making computers more human like or turning them into “autonomous 
agents that take on our goals.”836 Hence his question: “Why should a computer be anything 
like a human being.”837  Rather, the challenge, for Weiser, is to “draw computers out of their 
shells”	and to better integrate them “into human activities, since humans are of and in the 
everyday world”.838 In other words, computers are not isolated things, singular or individual 
entities that pre-exist their relations with humans, or autonomous agents that act alone. 
Instead computers, for Weiser, are made by humans and exist in the physical world. 
Therefore they should invisibly enhance, rather than simulate, or isolate us from the world.839 
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In this way, the computer, albeit invisible, is positioned, by Weiser, as entangled with its 
human user in the foundational papers of ubicomp.  
While advocating for what he truly believed was a better form of HCI, the relationship 
between the human and the machine that Weiser’s shift in computing subtly hints at, is false.  
Despite his best efforts, I suggest that Weiser is positioning the relationship between the 
human and technology, via notions of invisibility, as fixed and static rather than entangled, 
and as such the user, in his theory, becomes pliable rather than open to change.  In doing this, 
I argue that Weiser’s theory of ubicomp creates boundaries and separations between the user, 
ubiquitous technology and other subjects and objects.  Like the computer itself, any notion of 
relation between the human and the machine, in Weiser’s shift in computing, fades into the 
background and disappears, only to be replaced, in more recent texts on ubicomp, with the 
same notions he was advocating against: simulation (of the users movements by the machine) 
and symmetry (between the human and the machine).840  
Weiser’s proposed shift in computing and its problems raise questions specifically pertaining 
to ubiquitous interfaces and interactive new media installations.  How does the relationship 
between the human and the machine detailed above manifest itself in interactive new media 
installations? What version or vision of ubicomp and the interface do these positionings of 
the relationship between the human and the machine present and promote? Do interactive 
installations provide the viewer/participant with any means of intervention into these 
positionings?   
To begin to answer these questions, we might consider David Rokeby’s interactive new 
media installation Hand-held (2012).841  Hand-held consists of two projectors and a Kinect 
depth sensor.  When the viewer/participant walks into the installation and holds out her 
hands, the piece is activated. Once activated, the space is filled with 80 layers of three-
dimensional images of everyday objects.842 (Figure 78)  
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Figure 78: D. Rokeby, Hand-held. (2012). 
Not all of the images contained in these layers are perceptible –	some float, suspended in 
space, unseen until the viewer/participant interacts with them. The exact images the 
viewer/participant receives upon interaction, according to Rokeby, are dependent on the 
height of her hands.843 (Figure 79)  
 
Figure 79: D. Rokeby, Hand-held. (2012). 
For example, if the viewer/participant holds her hands at waist level, a field of images 
containing objects like coins or paper money emerges. If she holds her hands at eye level, a 
field of images containing objects like apples or mobile phones appear. The quality of the 
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images received is dependent on the viewer/participant’s location.  The closer she is to the 
center of the installation, the more in focus the images are, the farther away, the blurrier they 
are.844  If the viewer/participant moves her hands directly through an object, cross-sections of 
the interior of that object materialize. The objects are held in a set of disembodied virtual 
hands and they appear, upon interaction, in the viewer/participant’s physical hands. (Figure 
80)   
 
Figure 80: D. Rokeby, Hand-held. (2012). 
As the viewer/participant moves her hands through the various layers of the installation, the 
disembodied hands “touch”	her. They pass objects between and interact with her, thus 
making, as Rokeby argues “the invisible communications through which we increasingly 
convey information, conduct transactions and relate to each other”	visible.845 Since the 
viewer/participant must move her hands in order to view the images and since the virtual 
hands must “pass”	the viewer/participant objects for the underlying meaning of the piece to 
be revealed, the hands (both virtual and physical) become the interface in this installation. 
The virtual and physical hands have an interfacial significance because they help create and 
form relationships and facilitate communication between entities. Instead of depicting these 
relationships in full, however, Rokeby has visually reduced them to a series of iconographic 
symbols. (Figure 81) 
                                                





Figure 81: D. Rokeby, Hand-held. (2012). 
Here Rokeby is reappropriating the imagery, and, to an extent, the language of digital 
capitalism –	the images look like apps located on mobile devices and the viewer/participant 
must “touch”	the objects with her fingers in a similar manner to the way she would touch 
apps on a phone, to open and view them. In doing this, Rokeby provides the 
viewer/participant with a specific context to interact in (digital capitalism), and thus he offers 
specific possibilities for viewer/participant intervention into thinking about ubiquitous 
technologies (disruption, resistance, disturbance, destabilization). 846   
Stern discusses how viewer/participant intervention into the rhetoric of “digitally-enhanced 
capitalism”	occurs and the opportunities for re-evaluation and resistance (of and to narratives 
or objects) that it affords.847 Drawing on Milla Tiainen and Jussi Parikka’s (2012) 
theorization of choreographer Tero Sararinen’s dance piece, Hunt (2002), Stern argues that 
living bodies, like that of the viewer/participant, “continuously connect, perceive and act with 
a difference”.848 Given this, he states: “we must recognize their variability as a political 
existence for both exploitation [by corporations] and resistance [to this exploitation].”849 
Stern continues, stating that when corporations advertise technology they “no longer need to 
recognize ‘particular target groups’	in that they can tap into the ‘sensation of an excess of 
possible meanings with respect to a given image/product.’”850 So, rather than selling an actual 
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product or marketing it towards a specific demographic, advertisers can sell an “abstract idea 
of fulfilled desire through their product”.851 Couple this power (the supposed fulfillment of 
our every desire that advertisers purport their product will bring about), he writes,	“with the 
supposed infinite choice of interactivity, and credit card details will be very forthcoming”.852 
Interactive new media installations, Stern goes on to state, can “speak back to such 
exploitation”	because they remind us of the human body’s power and resistance to the 
dominant market’s regime.853  
Following on from Stern, I argue that while the images located in Hand-held may be 
representative of digital capitalism (in the sense that they look like apps on mobile devices) 
the experience the viewer/participant has with them signifies something different: resistance, 
on behalf of the viewer/participant, via her physical presence in the installation, to the 
invisible and sometimes inaccessible relationships between entities (bodies, technologies, 
spaces, images and more) that ubicomp promotes. In this way, my designation of the virtual 
and physical hands as interface, takes on a dual significance: the hands perform interfacial 
functions (they facilitate communication and interaction) but they also act as an intervention 
into the dominant discourses of ubicomp –	specifically notions of invisibility and 
inaccessibility mentioned above.   
We are surrounded by ubiquitous interfaces (closed-circuit cameras, biometric and video-
surveillance technologies, geolocation devices) that constantly monitor, collect and share 
information about us, and our interactions with each other. Like the images in Hand-held, this 
information is invisible or unreadable to us without the right device or digital access code.  In 
the case of Hand-held, the right device is the viewer/participant’s hands; in the case of 
commercial ubiquitous devices, it is a key code that only the manufacturer has access to.854 
Unlike commercial ubiquitous devices, however, the objects in Hand-held contain a degree 
of ambiguity –	they move in and out of focus, their relationship to each other is confusing and 
often contradictory. Rather than minimizing the complexity of these relationships, stabilizing 
and then standardizing their meanings (as biometric technologies, geolocational and mobile 
devices often do), the objects revealed to the viewer/participant (as well as their underlying 
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meanings and connections to each other) are left undetermined –	open to reinterpretation by 
the viewer/participant.  
The amount of agency and ambiguity that the images and interfaces may hold, and the exact 
type of intervention that the viewer/participant can make in Hand-held is limited by the 
cultural and institutional agency that hosts it, the viewer/participant who experiences the 
work, the artists, theories and theorists that create, frame and interpret these experiences, and 
the technical capabilities of the artwork. Moreover, viewer/participant intervention in Hand-
held may have multiple targets (a company, an individual, a slogan, a philosophy) therefore it 
may not offer a solution, let alone resistance to anything. What viewer/participant 
intervention does, I argue, is begin to provide us with a vocabulary for critically re-evaluating 
discourses about ubiquitous interfaces –	one that I believe starts with a rethinking of Weiser’s 
proposed “shift”	in computing and the notions of invisibility and inaccessibility that 
accompany it. 
A Restructuring of Interfaces  
In this chapter, I will refer to the shift in computing that Weiser outlines as a restructuring of 
interfaces. I refer to this shift as such, in order to highlight what I see as an unresolved 
difficulty in the aforementioned texts on ubicomp that conflate linear and progressive notions 
of technological evolution (the movement, in a straight line from a, to b, to c) with the open-
ended and hybrid nature of the relationship between the human and technology. Furthermore, 
I believe the phrase “restructuring of interfaces”	is important to use when referring to the 
digital interface in ubicomp contexts, simply because it allows me to begin to counteract 
claims made in texts on ubicomp around the invisibility and disappearance of interfaces and 
the notions of inaccessibility that accompany it.  The phrase “restructuring of interfaces”	
counteracts these claims by drawing attention to the interface and the processes and entities 
that contribute to its being instead of allowing them to disappear behind, or become black-
boxed into, some mythical linear “shift”	in computing. Rather than disappear, I suggest that 
the form that the digital interface takes in ubicomp has been restructured both physically (its 
shape and size) and theoretically. 
For example, the digital interface, in a ubicomp context has physically shrunk in size and 
embedded into the environment, where it is locked down, by the designer or manufacturer, 
via various black-boxing techniques. Thus, the interface has been physically restructured –	it 
has become both imperceptible and inaccessible to the user interacting with it. The 
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imperceptibility of the digital interface is conflated with, and then referred to as invisibility or 
seamlessness in some texts on ubicomp, in order to reposition relationships between humans 
and computers and information and technology. Thus the interface has been theoretically 
restructured –	everything about it, other than a conversation around its technical functions, 
has disappeared, to an extent, from discourses on ubicomp.  The fact that the imperceptibility 
of the interface is conflated with invisibility, therefore disappearance, is troubling because the 
word “invisibility”	is misleading. Invisibility, I argue, is deployed not only to make hardware 
(computers and interfaces) disappear; it is employed to make aesthetic information 
subordinate to the computational processes that allow the interface to run. The word 
invisibility is also used to justify Weiser’s “shift”	in computing.  Both Greenfield and 
Emerson confirm this argument.   
Greenfield argues that the claims made by the computing industry and computer scientists 
around the invisibility of the interface (which he refers to as “the discourse of seamlessness”) 
are of grave concern because they deprive “the user of meaningful participation in the 
decisions that affect his or her experience”.855  These discourses do this, he posits, by placing 
value on interfaces that recede from view and then embedding them into the environment, 
forcing the user to “inadvertently, unknowingly or even unwillingly”	interact with them.856  
Greenfield continues, stating that by valuing seamlessness over visibility, scholars in the 
computer science, engineering and to an extent the humanities fields are homogenizing the 
deeply heterogeneous infrastructure of interfaces and our experiences with them.857  This 
homogenization occurs, he says, because “without seams…it’s hard to tell where one thing 
ends and something else begins –	points of difference and distinction tend to be smoothed 
over or flattened out”.858 In short, Greenfield is arguing that discourses describing seamless 
interfaces are inherently flawed. The rhetoric is dishonest (it claims ubiquitous interfaces are 
simple and easy to use when in fact they are complex and often inoperable) and paternalistic 
in nature (it dictates, to an extent, what will happen when users interact with technology 
instead of allowing them a choice). Furthermore, Greenfield believes, by placing value on 
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notions of seamlessness, the rhetoric around ubicomp is simplifying and then standardizing 
deeply complex human and nonhuman processes.859   
Emerson echoes Greenfield’s concerns, applying them directly to the use of ubiquitous 
interfaces in humanities contexts. To summarize her argument, Emerson suggests that the 
word invisibility when used in a ubicomp context, and then applied to the interface, is 
disingenuous.860 Users, she argues, are told by those working in the computing industry that 
the invisibility of the interface is a good thing because invisibility denotes accessibility to 
information that did not exist in previous modes of HCI.861  Moreover, words like invisibility, 
Emerson states, are deployed to make users believe that interfaces have “successfully bridged 
the gap between the human and the computer”, and that “the boundary between human and 
information is eradicated”	because the interface they are using “just works”.862   
These claims of eradication, like the term invisibility, she writes, are a myth that the 
computing industry “rides on as it attempts to convince us that the dream [that the boundary 
between human and information is eradicated, the gap between the human and the computer 
is closed] is now reality through sophisticated sleights of hand that take place at the level of 
the interface”.863 Contrary to what the computing industry would like us to believe, the 
boundary between the human and information has not been eradicated and the gap between 
the biological and the technological has not been closed. Nor do users, as Emerson states, 
have more access to information than they did before, and computers are not more “natural”	
because we can touch their screens with our fingers.864 The boundaries and gaps between 
human and information and the human and the computer, according to Emerson, have only 
been widened, and more have been created, through notions of invisibility.865   
I agree with Emerson and Greenfield’s critiques of ubicomp provided above. Echoing and 
then augmenting their critiques slightly, I argue that the word invisibility, when deployed in 
the context of interactive new media installations and then applied to the digital interface, not 
only widens the boundary between the human and information and the human and the 
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computer, but the word invisibility also denotes finality. And I believe it is this notion of 
finality that we should be most concerned with, as finality, in a ubicomp context, implies, 
among other things, inevitability.  
While digital interfaces, like most biological and technological entities, have a lifespan, the 
notion of finality as it is presented to us in texts on ubicomp is of grave concern. It is 
concerning because it suggests that invisibility is the material and theoretical end-point (for 
the user, not the designer) in the development of the ubiquitous interface. It implies that there 
is only one final, definitive or “good”	version of the ubiquitous interface –	the closed, 
restrictive and predetermined one –	and that no major improvements need to be made to its 
design, just minor tweaks or upgrades. In short, by suggesting finality we are told that 
invisibility is compulsory –	invisible technology will be everywhere and everybody will be 
using them so we have no choice but to interact with them unless, of course, we have 
something to hide.  
Furthermore, the notion of finality inscribes, to an extent, ubiquitous interfaces, into what 
Kember and Joanna Zylinska (2012) call a “progressive developmental narrative”	of media 
and technology.866 By “progressive developmental narrative”	of media and technology, 
Kember and Zylinska are referring to claims made in some texts in the media theory field that 
media technologies are said to evolve, or progress, in a straight line.867 When applied to the 
interface in interactive new media installations, this evolution entails the progression from 
technical instrument, to symbolic screen, to abstract invisible organism as detailed in chapter 
1.  
In Life After New Media, Kember and Zylinska employ the phrase “progressive 
developmental narrative”	in reference to commentaries on emerging media (iPads, Facebook) 
created by those in the media and computing sectors.868  These commentaries, they state, 
perpetuate, among other things, false divisions and binary and oppositional thinking (old vs. 
new, subject vs. object, virtual vs. material).869 Similar sentiments around linear thinking to 
those made above, they tell us, inform academic arguments around media and technology.870  
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Therefore, the aforementioned “progressive developmental narrative,”	is not only “restricted 
to feelings about new media: it also structures many ontological conceptualizations of 
them”.871 This narrative, and the commentaries on emerging media that it perpetuates, for 
Kember and Zylinska, are troubling for a number of reasons, most importantly because they: 
“introduce the question of time into debates on media while simultaneously freezing this 
question by immediately dividing media time into a series of discrete spatialized objects, or 
products that succeed one another.”872  
The trajectory of progressive media development narratives, as detailed by Kember and 
Zylinska above, is evidenced in Weiser’s writings on ubicomp and has consequently been 
projected onto ubiquitous interfaces in interactive new media art installations.  For instance, 
ubicomp is a “next generation computing environment in which each person is continually 
interacting with hundreds of nearby wirelessly interconnected computers.”873 Technology in 
this environment will require, as Weiser states, “radically new kinds of computers of all sizes 
and shapes to be available to each person”.874  Here Weiser is stating in very simple terms 
that in order for ubicomp environments to succeed, we must radically change the way we 
think and interact with interfaces, as well as the actual interface itself. For an interface to 
become a ubiquitous interface, according to Weiser, it must be different than its predecessor, 
it must be “new”. However, stating, as Weiser does, that for ubicomp to work, the interface 
needs to be “newer”, thus better, than its predecessor, implies some difficulties in regards to 
my theorization of the digital interface in interactive new media installations as an ongoing 
and dynamic process, as it suggests some sort of ontological end to the digital interface.  
Furthermore, it suggests that “newness”	is the totality of all the interfaces created in the STS 
and humanities fields as well as all the written texts related to its use. In this way, I argue that 
Weiser’s theory of ubicomp not only promotes chronological narratives of new media, but 
suggests that a linear change in technology (the move from desktop to ubiquitous computing) 
will cause a (positive and progressive) change in culture and society.  
Reopening the Question of the Interface: Linear Timelines and Finality  
In what follows, I will discuss the linear timelines and progressive narratives that theories 
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around ubicomp promote, via the notion of finality, through an analysis of the use of the 
ubiquitous interface in Scott Snibbe’s interactive new media installation Deep Walls (2002). 
Deep Walls has been called a social cinematic space produced by a creative community, a 
new and improved way for a new media artist to engage viewers and a demonstration of 
exciting interactive technologies that will positively affect the way art is made and 
experienced in the future (Stern (2013), Witton (2005), Paul (2003, 2005), McQuaid (2005), 
Simanowski (2011)).875 I agree with some of the conclusions offered above, but my analysis 
veers from the interpretations of this artwork that position the relationship between the 
viewer/participant and the ubiquitous interface as linear and stable, and the interaction 
occurring with it as isolated and determined. I veer from these interpretations, because they 
are inadvertently perpetuating the chronological and deterministic narratives of new media 
discussed earlier. This perpetuation is concerning, as these narratives tend to leave things 
(entities, processes) out that do not fit into the story critics or theorists are trying to tell. In 
doing this, they foreclose on possibilities for different interpretations, and inevitably erase the 
subjects, processes and entities that contribute, thus matter, to the interface and interactive 
new media installations. 
I suggest that Deep Walls could be seen as way to intervene in the linear and progressive 
narratives of new media that ubicomp promotes and the consequent deterministic, cause-and-
effect interpretations of technology they bring about. Deep Walls does this by presenting the 
viewer/participant with “a projected cabinet of cinematic memories”	–	one that requires her to 
interact with multiple timelines (past, present and future) at once.876  By asking the 
viewer/participant to act in terms of the past and future, rather than simply the present, I 
argue that Deep Walls has the potential to disrupt linear and progressive narratives of 
technology by allowing the viewer/participant to intervene in them and create different ones.  
In this way, I argue Deep Walls provides us with a way to counter notions of finality, linear 
progression, newness and change by reopening the question of the interface.  
Deep Walls consists of a computer, a closed-circuit camera and an enlarged rectangular 
projection screen (the main screen), which is divided into 16 smaller projection screens (the 
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smaller screens).877 The closed-circuit camera records the actions of the viewer/participant 
moving in front of it. The recorded performance is then transmitted to a computer located in 
the same space, where it is processed, generating a shadow of the viewer/participant that is 
projected onto the main screen.878 (Figure 82) 
 
Figure 82: Scott Snibbe, Deep Walls. (2002). 
Each of the smaller screens contains pre-recorded performances of previous 
viewer/participants. These performances are looped and then repeated until a newer recording 
is available to take its place.  When a viewer/participant stands in front of the main screen 
and moves, a shadow mimicking her actions appears.879 The shadow lacks any physical detail 
other than size and shape and is controlled by the viewer/participant. Thus it is the shadow 
that becomes the digital interface. The shadow overlaps and sometimes obscures some of the 
action occurring in the smaller screens.  Each interaction performed, as Stern states,	“is thus 
suspended, stored and re-involved in one of its comic book-like squares. Each supplants an 
animation that was there before, put alongside 15 others similar to, but different from, it.”880  
The performance that Deep Walls’ loop of action creates, combined with the fact that there 
are no other on-screen images for the viewer/participant to control, means that the shadow 
becomes the initial focus of her attention. (Figure 83) 
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Figure 83: Scott Snibbe, Deep Walls. (2002). 
After interacting with the work for a short period of time, the viewer/participant’s initial 
fascination with her shadow wears off and she begins to focus on the pre-recorded actions 
occurring within the 16 squares.  The action occurring in the smaller screens provides her 
with, among other things, instruction. It becomes a visual manual for how she should move in 
the installation.  For example, if the viewer/participant notices that the shadow in one of the 
squares raises its arm, she may mimic this action by raising her arm. Conversely this 
movement could be interpreted as a message (from the artist, from somebody else) to stop 
moving, causing the viewer/participant to cease her actions and leave the installation.  
Based on personal observation and experience with Deep Walls, the content of the projected 
performances located in the smaller screens seems to suggest that interaction with the piece is 
seen by the current viewer/participant as a visual message, left by past viewer/participants, 
for future ones to view or interact with. For example, the current viewer/participant might 
discover previously recorded performances located in the small screens where shadows 
address the audience directly (waving their hands), or address each other (two shadows 
located in parallel squares getting into fights or dancing). (Figures 84 & 85) 
 




Figure 85: Scott Snibbe, Deep Walls. (2002). 
Deep Walls then not only requires the viewer/participant to interact with the other entities 
who are presently located in the same space, but the addition of the performances in the 
smaller screens enables her to interact with the installation in terms of the past (with or 
against pre-recorded images), the present (with others located in the same space at the same 
time) and the future (recording a performance in order to communicate with somebody in the 
future, or thinking about her actions in terms of their deletion and replacement). Both Stern 
and Simanowski echo my sentiments in their analysis of the work. Even though users, 
Simanowski argues, “do not have specific addresses in mind, the movies generated suggest 
that users understand this interactive installation as an arena where they can stage filmic 
messages for subsequent users.”881 The visual messages that current users leave for future 
ones, Stern suggests, are “artifacts of the past, of those who have passed through the space, 
the shadows are a part of our present, and our presence as we engage with them again”.882  
Building on Stern and Simanowski’s interpretations, I argue that Deep Walls can be 
theorized, in terms of Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) notion of “all-at-onceness”; that is, a 
rejection of thinking of technology as a series of orderly, determined and linear progressive 
developments, to an emphasis on the interconnectedness between, and extension and 
expansion (rather than isolation or invisibility) of, the human and their interactions with 
technology.883 A McLuhanite emphasis on technology as an extension of man is important to 
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my conceptualization of the ubiquitous interface, because it enables me to counter notions of 
finality, progression and newness that ubicomp theories promote. Thus it enables me to 
suggest that the relationship between computation, the interface and aesthetics is a dynamic, 
temporal and performative unfolding, rather than a purely instructional or representational 
event. 
Kember and Zylinska seem to confirm this argument, writing that the McLuhanite notion of 
“all-at-onceness”	poses a challenge to “many forms of conventional media analysis –	in 
which problems such as technology, use, organization and production are frequently studied 
in isolation”.884  It poses a challenge, they state, because:	“It is not simply the case that ‘we’	–	
that is, autonomously existing humans –	live in a complex technological environment that we 
can manage, control and use. Rather we are –	physically and hence ontologically –	part of 
that technological environment.”885  Thus they conclude:	“If we take this process of 
technological extension seriously enough –	not just on the level of theoretical argument, but 
also through our experiential being with technologies and media…we are obliged to 
recognize that we human users of technology are not entirely distinct from our tools.”886 
If we take this to be the case, then Deep Walls is more than a demonstration of exciting 
ubiquitous technologies that will positively or negatively affect the way art is made and 
experienced in the future.  I argue that by allowing the viewer/participant to intervene in, and 
disrupt via creative play, the progressive narratives of new media, Deep Walls allows her to 
create, to an extent, different, non-linear ones. In this way, Deep Walls becomes a liminal 
space. By liminal space I mean the installation becomes an area of social exploration, 
enabling the viewer/participant to separate, for a temporary period of time, the human and 
nonhuman entities that congregate there, only to mix them back together again through acts 
of unconscious and conscious questioning. Deep Walls becomes an area where the narratives 
and myths that theories of ubicomp promotes can be explored, critically questioned, 
redefined, repositioned and reconfigured by the viewer/participant(s) participating in it.  
“You are the Controller”: The Instrumentalization and Commodification of the Ubiquitous 
Interface 
The digital interface in interactive new media installations is a threshold; an open-ended and 
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generative process that consists of multiple, co-constitutive agencies.  What an interface 
should do, Emerson states, is “grant access, it also inevitably acts as a kind of magician’s 
cape, continually revealing (mediatic layers, bits of information, etc.) through concealing and 
concealing as it reveals”.887  Ubiquitous interfaces, she tells us, do the exact opposite –	they 
obscure more information from the user than they actually reveal.888 The obfuscation of 
information on behalf of interfaces, Emerson argues, is done deliberately.889 For instance 
certain information (functions, technical make-up), she states, is purposefully hidden from 
the user. This concealment of information is rationalized by those in the computing industry 
who create and market ubiquitous interfaces “in the name of ‘invisibility’	and the ‘user-
friendly’	with what’s fast becoming an ideology.”890  Emerson clarifies her use of the word 
ideology, writing: “I use ideology not merely in the sense of the adamant belief in making the 
computer more approachable but more in the sense that user-friendly is used quite 
deliberately to distort reality.”891 This clarification, for Emerson, is important because she is 
making the argument that the computer industry deploys the words	“invisibility”	and “user 
friendly”	with the specific intention of convincing users that a very particular version of a 
ubiquitous interface is “inherently better”.892  Invariably this version is one that relies on and 
then promotes to the point of celebration the fact that its inner workings are closed-off and 
imperceptible to the user. 
The conflation of the words invisibility and user-friendly with imperceptibility is highly 
problematic because it alienates, as Emerson states, the user from the underlying 
computational processes of the device. This alienation occurs, Emerson writes, because the 
user is denied access to the underlying workings of the device.893  Building on Emerson, I 
will suggest that the concealing or “black-boxing”	of computational processes forecloses on 
change, consequently resulting in a very limited, thus highly questionable, concept of 
ubicomp, aesthetics and the interface in general.  I maintain that this approach 
instrumentalizes the digital interface, reducing it and its multifunctional and generative 
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processes and agencies into a tool for consumption, rather than creation of aesthetic and 
cultural content.  
The digital interface however has always been and, to an extent, will always be, a technical 
device. As stated in the introduction, the word “interface”	refers to the point of interaction 
and communication between two or more entities, usually a technical device and its human 
user. Furthermore, interfaces have always been, to an extent, a commodity –	that is, 
something of value that can be bought, sold or traded. If the digital interface has always been 
a highly saleable technological device then what exactly is the problem with the 
instrumentalization and commodification of the ubiquitous interface?  
The problem, I argue, is that texts on ubicomp claim that the user interacts with ubiquitous 
technologies through “natural”	interfaces (Johnson (1997); Vertegaal & Poupryrev (2008); 
Saffer (2010)).894 By natural interfaces, these texts are referring to the physical gestures 
(waving an arm, clapping a hand) and spoken commands (turn on, turn off) that the user 
makes. These gestures however are not natural, but naturalized. This point is made clearer if 
we return to Lynn Hershman Leeson’s interactive new media installation America’s Finest 
(1993-4) discussed in the previous chapter.895 (Figures 54-57)  
The interface in this installation –	an M-16 rifle –	is programmed to recognize and then 
reward “normal”	actions that somebody would make with a rifle (pull the trigger) and ignore 
those located outside of the pre-set selection.896 The viewer/participant can do anything she 
wants with the interface, but she will not see an image unless she performs the prescribed, or 
normal, action of the object. She must pull the trigger of the gun. In this example, the “thing”	
being instrumentalized and commodified is not a technical device (the rifle, a computer) or 
some ephemeral quality of a human being that we deem to be valuable (creativity).  
Furthermore, despite the fact that the rifle is part of an artwork that has monetary worth, the 
rifle is not the thing that has value in this particular context, thus it is not the thing being 
commodified. I argue that the thing being instrumentalized and commodified is the 
viewer/participant and her movements. This is because the thing being rewarded in America’s 
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Finest is the viewer/participant’s ability to perform the prescribed actions (pull the trigger of 
the gun).  
Given this, I posit that the instrumentalization of the digital interface is not just a question 
around the commodification of a singular technical device or an issue of information 
(movements and gestures and the visuals they bring about) becoming an object or a thing, but 
rather of the normalization and commodification of individual users and their behaviors. Put 
in simple terms, the “thing”	being turned into a valuable object and subsequently sold to the 
highest bidder in a ubicomp context is not the interface, but the human being. This is because 
the human is positioned as the means of interaction, translation and navigation in the space 
they are located in. She is the digital interface in these installations, and is consequently 
described as such in the texts that surround them.  How this occurs is best explained by way 
of example. 
In November 2010, Microsoft revealed a new interface to the general public: the Kinect.897 
On their website, Microsoft describes the Kinect as a device that “gets everyone off the 
couch. Moving, laughing and cheering”.898 The Kinect consists of a webcam-style, black-
boxed peripheral interface which enables users to interact with computers with their bodies 
(moving a limb, speaking) rather than with a visible, hardware-based controller.899 As 
Microsoft puts, it, the Kinect:	“brings games and entertainment to life in extraordinary new 
ways with no controller required. Simply step in front of the sensor and Kinect recognizes 
you and responds to your gestures.”900 Microsoft goes on to celebrate this device that is 
“inspiring”, “extraordinary”, “natural”	and “controller-free”	(the words “natural”	and 
“controller-free”	repeated at least six times on one page).901 Most telling, however, 
throughout their website, Microsoft explains that the Kinect “could quite conceivably pave 
the way for new developments in human/computer interaction”, that it can “transform how 
people interact with technology”	and that it “enables the creation of real solutions”	including, 
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but not limited to, helping users “explore their creativity”.902  This subtle reminder that 
ubiquitous technology has supposedly eradicated the boundary between the human and the 
computer by transforming how people interact with technology is echoed in Microsoft’s 2009 
concept announcement for project natal (the codename Microsoft used for the Kinect while 
under development) and their 2011 television ad for Xbox Kinect.903    
The 2009 concept announcement begins by reminding the viewer that the Kinect is “new”	
and “controller free”. We then see a teenage boy, walking past a television set in his living 
room. Located on the television set is an avatar.  The avatar senses the boy’s presence and 
addresses him by name. Upon hearing his name, the boy stops, turns his full attention to the 
television and begins to play a video game, sans controller. As the boy moves his arms and 
legs, the avatar does the same.904  Here Microsoft is clearly positioning the human body, the 
boy, as interface. This is because the boy, according to Microsoft, is able to navigate the 
video game and engage with the visual information presented to him.  In case we were not 
convinced, the words “You Are the Controller”	appear on-screen while the boy plays.905 
(Figures 86 & 87) 
 
Figure 86: Microsoft, Project Natal. (2009) 
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Contrary to Microsoft, the boy, I suggest, is not the digital interface in this context, rather his 
on-screen avatar is.  For, as mentioned above, when the boy moves his arms and legs, the 
avatar mimics him.  In this way, the avatar, not the boy, is the interface in this specific 
context.  This is because the avatar is acting as a mediator between entities (the boy, the on-
screen images) and it allows the boy to navigate, communicate and engage with information. 
 
Figure 87: Microsoft, Project Natal. (2009) 
Moreover, the Kinect, I argue, is not controller free. Although it may seem like the boy is 
making the on-screen visuals appear, it is the Kinect itself that makes this happen. The Kinect 
consists of a series of webcams, microphones, motion sensors and software located inside its 
black box.906 This hardware and software has the ability to recognize and process a limited 
set of verbal and gestural commands that then appear as actions on-screen.907  The viewer, 
however, is never told that this is how the Kinect works, or what the interface is. Rather, 
controller-free, full-body interaction just happens. The phrase “you are the controller”	is 
repeated in various iterations (“controller free”, “full body scanning”, “use your whole 
body”) at least five times throughout the three-minute video in order to reinforce this point.908  
The video then cycles through all the fun things users can do with the device (young boys can 
be Godzilla, teenage boys can skateboard, teenage girls can play dress-up, adults can watch 
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movies) briefly pausing to tell the viewer about its interesting new features –	specifically the 
fact that it is controller free.909 (Figures 88 & 89)   
 
Figure 88: Microsoft, Project Natal. (2009) 
 
Figure 89: Microsoft, Project Natal. (2009) 
This is exactly where the obfuscation of information, or as Emerson calls it “the magic”, 
happens –	through the supposedly invisible and the everyday.910 The Kinect’s outer 
packaging (which is minimalist, sleek and black) and the device’s marketing rhetoric are 
crafted to make it look special and enticing, yet accessible and user-friendly.  Microsoft does 
this, I argue, in the hopes that the user will willingly suspend disbelief and accept the 
impossible: that they will buy into the aforementioned claims around the naturalness and 
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newness of the HCI Microsoft purports is occurring, regardless of their actual experience 
with the Kinect. The suspension of disbelief on behalf of the user, Emerson states, is akin to 
the way an audience reacts to a magic show.911  
The audience attending a magic show, she writes: “wants to be amazed by feats that are 
seemingly impossible.”912 Their amazement, according to Emerson, depends on two key 
interdependent factors: “They must believe that the magician’s assistant is not being sawed in 
half or that a dove is not actually being turned into a handkerchief, and yet they must remain 
in the dark (literally and figuratively) about exactly how the trick works.”913  The same logic, 
I posit, is at work in the Kinect. The user wants to be amazed by seemingly impossible feats 
(the eradication of the boundaries between the human and technology and the human and 
information) and then actually do the impossible (control technology with a wave of their 
hand). Their amazement and consequent participation in this magical feat, however, relies on 
two interrelated components: the user must believe that Microsoft’s claims around HCI are 
not true (and to an extent they do, as they are physically hooking the Kinect up to their 
televisions or computers and then interacting with on-screen information via an avatar) and 
they must remain in the dark about how exactly the device works, and to an extent they are. 
Microsoft never explains how the Kinect actually works to the average user.914    
The 2011 television ad for the Kinect is essentially the same as the concept announcement 
with two modifications: the first is that the 2011 ad contained no spoken words and very few 
text-based elements. Unlike the 2009 announcement, Microsoft no longer feels the need to 
convince users that their body is the interface.  The user’s body simply is the interface. In this 
way, it could be argued that the user’s body is treated like an object, packaged up with the 
technological device and sold back to them for a price. The instrumentalization and 
commodification of the body is reflected by the fact that the phrase “you are the controller”	is 
no longer repeated over and over again. Instead this phrase is now treated, by Microsoft, as 
an indisputable fact, something users already know and must tacitly accept if they want to use 
the Kinect.  
                                                
911 Lori Emerson. Reading Writing Interfaces: From the Digital to the Bookbound. (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. 14.   
912 Ibid.    
913 Ibid.   
914 I say average user because the software that allows the Kinect to run is open source. For more information on 
how the Kinect works, see: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/kinectforwindows/develop/default.aspx  
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The second modification revolves around notions of creativity –	notions that were seemingly 
non-existent in the 2009 announcement. For example, the 2011 ad featured a family putting 
on a digital shadow puppet show.  They have made a shape of an elephant with their bodies 
in their living room. This shape is reflected on-screen.915  (Figure 90) 
 
Figure 90: Microsoft, Kinect Ad. (2011). 
Instead of the shape appearing on a television set in a living room, it appears on a canvas in a 
virtual artists’	studio.  The family is then allowed to get creative. If used correctly, the Kinect 
offers to turn the family into artists by letting them paint the shape that they created. The 
family does this by “throwing”	grey paint on the elephant-like shape. They are then rewarded 
for their creativity: their picture is placed in front of a landscape background and the phrase 
“Work of Art!”	is overlaid on top of it.  The family can then save their ‘Work of Art!’	in a 
photo album application and/or share it with their friends.916 (Figure 91)  
 
Figure 91: Microsoft, Kinect Ad. (2011). 
                                                





This specific part of the 2011 ad is telling in that it reveals an inconsistency hidden in 
Microsoft’s claims around the Kinect and HCI –	one that echoes, and then expands upon the 
inconsistencies in the foundational papers exposed above.  Like Weiser’s claims around 
ubicomp, Microsoft claims the Kinect is focused on us and our interactions with technology.   
Given their humanist focus, the Kinect, according to Microsoft, is a creative device, one that 
implies active learning and making. After all, it is the user, not technology that is creative.  
The Kinect just aids in, among other things, the creation of an open-ended, participatory and 
user-centric experience.   
This claim is reinforced on their website: The Kinect allows you to “unleash your 
creativity”.917 Based on the action occurring in the advertisement, however, creativity with 
the Kinect, from within a gaming environment, is not an open-ended, participatory and user-
centric process.  It does not denote the creation or production of content. Nor has it 
transformed how people interact with technology, thus enabling users to “unleash their 
creativity”	as I lay out above.  Instead, I suggest that the type of creativity Microsoft is 
promoting, is a restrictive, flat or two-dimensional version that amounts to little more than 
the consumption and surface-level manipulation (via surface-level changes or flipping 
through pre-programmed settings) of predetermined textual, audio-visual and algorithmic 
based content that is exploited by Microsoft, repackaged and then sold back to its users for 
profit.  
Microsoft exploits this content in multiple ways: they do it subtly, by releasing the code as 
“open-source”	and then selling access to the community of makers, that Microsoft has 
deemed “creative” back to its users (inaccessibility becomes exclusivity in this example); and 
they do it blatantly, by directing content creators to webpages, via drop-down windows titled 
“monetize”	and “publish”	which provide detailed instructions on how to sell user-created 
content and by placing watermarks on user-generated images.918 In this way, I argue, 
                                                
917 Kinect. Found online at: https://dev.windows.com/en-us/games  
918 Microsoft. Found online at: Found online at: https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/kinect and 
https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/store/monetize Every Kinect includes a software development kit. This 
kit is located on Microsoft’s website and is free to the public. It includes tutorials and downloads that help users 
create content.  It also includes a link to an area titled “community additions”. The community additions section 
allows users to connect with and help others and share the work they are creating with “the world”.  The tutorial 
sections of the development kit are available to the public. The “community additions” are only accessible to 
those with a Microsoft Kinect login.  Located on the same page is a drop-down menu titled “Docs”.  Clicking on 
this menu allows users access to different areas of the website. These areas relate to other Microsoft products 




Microsoft has not only instrumentalized the user and their consequent actions by turning 
them into an interface (“you are the controller”) it has co-opted the term “creativity”, 
commodified and then exploited it, turning it into a term that is leveraged to drive profit.   
The instrumentalization of the ubiquitous interface and the resulting commodification of 
human beings and aesthetic content, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, raises 
questions around artistic experimentation: namely artistic experimentation by new media 
artists, with ubiquitous interfaces in interactive new media installations. For example, 
companies like Microsoft are co-opting experimental ubiquitous interfaces that were 
developed for interactive new media art installations in the early 1990s for capitalistic 
purposes.919  These interfaces have become commercial products and are marketed to users, 
as detailed above, as “innovative”, “creative”	and “natural”. While their technical make-up is 
similar, the commercial interfaces discussed above differ enormously, on practical, creative 
and theoretical levels, from those created for interactive new media installations in the early 
1990s. They differ on a practical and creative level in the sense that the normal roles for 
computers at that time, as Penny (2013) tells us,	“did not call for such interfaces”.920  All that 
was required (and, to an extent available to the general public) to interact with a computer 
were mice, keyboards and joysticks/video game controllers.  While not necessarily new, the 
interfaces created for interactive installations were novel –	specifically in terms of what the 
viewer/participant could actually achieve (physically contribute to the creation of a virtual 
environment without high-level technical knowledge) and the type of interaction afforded to 
them (unencumbered, full-bodied interaction in immersive, (semi)virtual environments).921  
Interfaces created for interactive installations differ from commercial interfaces on a 
theoretical level in the sense that the interfaces of the early 1990s were developed and then 
deployed to combat and sometimes attempt to correct, as Penny argues,	“the notion of the 
(computational) virtual and the confused rhetorics of virtuality”	attached to media and 
technologies like virtual reality and the Internet.922 The 1990s, Penny writes, saw an 
                                                                                                                                                  
“promote,” and “publish”. Clicking on these links takes the user to webpages where they can sell their content. 
(Microsoft, 2016) 
919 The interfaces I speak of have been created by artists discussed throughout this thesis such as Rokeby, Shaw, 
Feingold, Penny and Hershman Leeson.  
920 Simon Penny. “Trying to Be Calm: Ubiquity, Cogntivism, and Embodiment.” in Throughout: Art and 
Culture Emerging with Ubiquitous Computing. ed. Ulrik Ekman. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), p. 263. 
921 Ibid. 
922 Ibid. By ‘rhetorics of virtuality’, Penny is referring to claims surrounding the disembodiment of the subject 
and information in virtual environments discussed in Chapter 2.     
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“explosion of creative research in interactive and immersive art”.923 This explosion, he states, 
was fueled by the availability of affordable domestic, computer-based media technologies, 
the burgeoning rhetoric of cyberculture and the utopian and dystopian narratives that 
followed it.924 Given this, new media art, he writes, became “a highly charged vortex”	for the 
development of interfaces “as the traditional commitment [of the fine arts] to material 
immediacy and finely crafted sensorial effect abruptly confronted a technology framed as 
abstract immaterial manipulation of information”.925  In this way, the reconciliation of “the 
sensibilities of arts practices and the capabilities and constraints of emerging computational 
media technologies”	was, as Penny explains, just as important to new media artists, if not 
more important than a technical exploration of new technology itself.926   
Since then, ubiquitous interfaces that mimic those created by new media artists for interactive 
new media installations have been developed and are for sale by commercial entities, like 
Microsoft, Google and Apple. However, their reliance on, in Penny’s words: “virtual reality’s 
stock-in-trade tracking and simulation techniques indicates that ubiquitous computing is less 
the kind of antithesis of virtual reality that Weiser envisaged and more of a continuity.”927  
Thus, the co-option and consequent commercialization of experimental ubiquitous interfaces 
by the computer industry, Penny argues, has had the effect of reintroducing rhetoric 
surrounding “the virtual”	into discussions around media and technology.928  In doing this, 
commercial ubiquitous interfaces like the Kinect perpetuate the exact same narratives about 
the digital interface that new media artists in the 1990s were attempting to correct. In 
particular those around disembodiment as perpetuated by science fiction writers and other 
scholars.929 
The disembodiment that this rhetoric promotes remains one of the principal concerns raised 
by ubiquitous interfaces, which have, as demonstrated above, become so small and 
inexpensive that they can be embedded into a wide variety of objects and spaces.  More 
subtle, however, are the effects that the ubiquitous interface may have and the role that it may 
                                                
923 Simon Penny. “Trying to Be Calm: Ubiquity, Cogntivism, and Embodiment.” in Throughout: Art and 
Culture Emerging with Ubiquitous Computing. ed. Ulrik Ekman. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), p. 263. 
924 Ibid., p. 265.  
925 Ibid. 
926 Ibid.  
927 Ibid. p. 263. 
928 Ibid. 
929 See Morevec (1988); Gibson (1981, 1984, 1986, 1988); Wiener (1948, 1952); Keller (1992); Doyle (1997). 
Hayles (1999) provides a thorough discussion of the notion of disembodiment and dispels this myth in her text 
How We Became Posthuman.  
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play in creating, in Hayles’	(2011) words, “an animate environment with agential and 
communicative powers”.930 Hayles continues, arguing that issues that have been raised 
around the effects ubiquitous technologies may have “are primarily epistemological (who 
knows what about whom).”931 However, the “political stakes”	of these environments, she 
states, encompass much more, including “the changed perceptions of human subjectivity in 
relation to a world of objects that are no longer passive and inert”.932  Thus, she concludes, 
the questions raised around ubiquitous technologies are not only confined to epistemological 
concerns, but they envelop ontological issues as well.933   
For example, the Kinect, as a ubiquitous interface, operates not only in the realm of 
commercial gaming and computer science practices as in the sensing, recording and 
identification of humans, but also in what Hayles, borrowing Nigel Thrift’s terminology, calls 
the “technological unconscious”.934  The Kinect operates in this way, I argue, by working in 
subtle (“you are the controller”) and not-so-subtle ways (“the Kinect transforms how people 
interact with technology”) in an attempt to change the relationship between the human, 
technology and space. Epistemological concerns about ubiquitous interfaces, like surveillance 
and privacy (i.e.	“who knows what about whom”), Hayles writes, can and are being 
addressed by both new media artists and theorists through strategies and tactics like 
regulation, informed consent, circuit bending or critique.935 Ontological issues, such as to 
what extent human subjectivity and bodies are being reconfigured by ubiquitous 
technologies, she tells us, are much more difficult to understand and address.936  Thus our 
reaction to them, she writes, mostly exists on the level of resistance (how do we stop this 
from happening/becoming the norm?).937  However, she states, if our reactions to the 
concerns ubiquitous technologies raise remain solely on the level of resistance –	as important 
as that reaction may be –	we “lose the opportunity to seize the initiative and explore the 
technologies potential for shedding the burden of long-held misconceptions about cognition 
and moving to a more processual, relational and accurate view of embodied human action in 
                                                
930 N. Katherine Hayles. “Radio-Frequency Identification: Human Agency and Meaning in Information-
Intensive Environments.” in Throughout: Art and Culture Emerging with Ubiquitous Computing. ed. Ulrik 
Ekman. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), p. 503.   
931 Ibid. In Hayles case these technologies are RFID tags. In the case of this thesis, these technologies are 
ubiquitous interfaces.  
932 Ibid. 
933 Ibid.  
934 Ibid., p. 505.  
935 Ibid., p. 503.   




complex environments”.938 Following on from Hayles, I argue that the challenge that 
ubicomp presents to us is how to use its potential as an interface in positive and constructive 
ways while still remaining critical of it.  Since the context in which this challenge presents 
itself to us is interactive new media installations, the question is: how might an investigation 
into the deployment of ubiquitous interfaces in interactive new media installations help us 
find alternative routes into, and different ways of thinking about and using, ubiquitous 
technologies in non-aesthetic realms? 
One way that an investigation like this may help, as Hayles points out, is that it enables us to 
start to unravelling and understanding the concerns and issues around ubiquitous technologies 
on a deeper level.939  For example, Hayles writes, fictional representations of ubiquitous 
technologies, engage us, “on other levels…	including embodied affectivity and the 
unconscious”.940  They do so, she posits, because these depictions “always mean more than 
they explicitly state”, and in doing this “they can address ontological questions as well as 
epistemological issues”.941 I suggest that new media artist Brian Knep’s Healing Pool (2006-
8), could provide us with one alternative route into addressing the questions and concerns 
raised by Hayles. 
Installed in the Milwaukee Museum of Art in 2008, Healing Pool is a large-scale interactive 
new media installation, consisting of multiple closed-circuit cameras, projectors, computers 
and a horizontal projection surface.942 The projection surface is located on the floor and takes 
up most of the gallery space. The surface is covered from edge-to-edge with neon yellow, 
cell-shaped patterns. The patterns are generative –	they are, to an extent, constantly 
reproducing themselves –	so Healing Pool has no evident start or end.  There is no perceived 
finality. Left alone, these patterns slowly pulsate and shift throughout the course of each day. 
When a viewer/participant walks across the projection surface, the patterns tear apart, 
revealing a trail of orange spaces or “wounds”. (Figures 92 & 93) 
                                                
938 Ibid., p. 503.  
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Figure 92: B. Knep, Healing Pool. (2006-8). 
 
 
Figure 93: B. Knep, Healing Pool. (2006-8). 
Placing an object on the projection surface, or standing still produces a similar effect –	a 
gaping orange hole appears.  After a certain period of time, the patterns rebuild or “heal”	
themselves.943 The healing process does not restore the patterns to their previous, untouched 
state. It creates “scars”	on the surface of the work. 944  The exact location of these scars is 
based on the placement of an object, or the trajectory of the viewer/participant walking across 
it.  The more viewer/participant interaction builds, the more scars appear, altering the visual 
appearance of the piece. Since the viewer/participant must walk across the patterns on the 
floor to reveal the full nature of the artwork, the digital interface, I argue, is her body. 
                                                




It is imperative at this point to address what could arguably be seen as a contradictory 
designation of the interface.  My designation of the viewer/participant’s body as interface in 
Healing Pool could be said to contradict my earlier argument around the designation of the 
user’s body as interface in the Kinect. To recap this argument: contrary to Microsoft’s claims, 
the avatar of the user and not the user’s body, is the interface in the Kinect. I argued as such 
because the avatar, not the user, is acting as a mediator between entities and allowing the user 
to navigate, communicate and engage with audio-visual information.  The difference in my 
designation of these two examples lies in the deployment of the interface, its exact purpose 
and positioning (Is it an object? a threshold? Does it mediate? translate? facilitate?) as well as 
how the relationship between computation, aesthetics and the interface is staged by the artist 
and performed by the viewer/participant in space (Is it relational, processual, entangled? Or is 
it determined and closed?).   
Should we make the mistake of confusing the staging of the relationship between 
computation, aesthetics and the interface Healing Pool presents to its users for the one 
Microsoft presents to theirs (appreciation and consumption of beautiful moving images), we 
learn that the purpose of Healing Pool is to provide, as Knep states, a space within which 
“interactions –	among people, between people and the piece, between people and the space 
they occupy”	occur.945 Here, Knep’s emphasis is on relationships between entities and the 
interaction that these relationships beget. Just as important to Healing Pool as its visual 
aesthetics, then, is the viewer/participant’s relationship with technology –	specifically how 
her conscious and unconscious interactions with the interface (her body) can alter, to an 
extent, the artwork. Rather than trying to erase the interface all together via false notions of 
invisibility, creativity and control as evidenced above via the Kinect, what is important in 
Healing Pool is the interface –	that is, the viewer/participant, her interactions and her creative 
experience within the installation.  In other words, by placing importance on relationships, 
Knep is emphasizing the experience and expression of the medium and the interface. He does 
this by making the alterations to the piece that the viewer/participant creates, visible to her. 
Thus notions of artistic production and creation can begin to shift away from 
representationalist modes of thinking and cybernetic modes of interacting, to a more 
performative and experiential exploration of, and reflection on, the possibilities and 
potentialities of the interface on behalf of the viewer/participant. 
                                                
945 Brian Knep. Healing Pool. (2008). Found online at: http://www.blep.com/works/healing-series/healing-pool/   
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Emerson argues that a move away from representation to performance is important when 
analyzing ubiquitous interfaces as it “works against the hermeneutic tradition [as it is applied 
in literature], for rather than peel away layers of meanings to arrive at an interpretation, 
critics have very little choice but to simply describe the unfolding experience”.946 By 
requiring the critic to describe the experience, Emerson contends attention (of the critic, and I 
would argue of the viewer/participant) “is turned to the poetic process itself”	resulting in an 
emphasis on the letters and words and the viewer’s interactions with them.947 While related to 
the ubiquitous interfaces and its use in digital texts and text-based installation art, Emerson’s 
theorization of the interface as both medium and relational poetic process assumes a 
particular importance in the context of Healing Pool.948  This is because her emphasis on 
processuality (of the viewer’s interactions and the media theorists critique of these 
interactions) and medium specificity (of the interface), moves us slightly closer towards 
exploring the ontological effects that ubiquitous technologies may or may not have –	
specifically Hayles’ question above around the extent to which human subjectivity, human 
bodies and our relationship with technology are being reconfigured.  
As mentioned earlier, when the viewer/participant walks diagonally across Healing Pool’s 
surface, the patterns split apart.  After a certain period of time, the trail knits itself back 
together, creating visible scars. The more the viewer/participant moves, the more scars she 
creates.  These scars, Knep states, “form a memory of all the interactions that have 
occurred”.949 Thus, Healing Pool “becomes a map of [viewer/participant] movement in 
space”	one that is not only visible to those located in the installation space, but one that they 
can physically change, to an extent, as well.950  In this way, I argue that Healing Pool does 
what the Kinect does not: it enables the viewer/participant to “explore her creativity”	by 
allowing her to become “the controller”	of the action occurring in the artwork.  It does this by 
simply making the effects that the viewer/participant’s embodied interactions have on the 
artwork visible.  By becoming visible, the viewer/participant has the opportunity to begin to 
critically explore the effects that her interactions with ubiquitous technology may have on the 
artwork as well as recognize connections between her movements and the movements of 
others.  In other words, emphasis in Healing Pool is on viewer/participant movement and 
                                                
946 Lori Emerson. Reading Writing Interfaces: From the Digital to the Bookbound. (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. 21.  
947 Ibid., pp. 21-22.   
948 Ibid.   
949 Brian Knep. Healing Pool. (2008). Found online at: http://www.blep.com/works/healing-series/healing-pool/      
950 Ibid.  
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experience, not on the response of the machine.  Since emphasis is placed on the 
viewer/participant’s experience rather than the end-product of her actions, as it is in the 
Kinect, I suggest that viewer/participant interactions in Healing Pool could be seen as 
performative artworks themselves. Furthermore, by emphasizing notions of performativity, 
processuality and visibility, I argue that Knep opens up a space, in Healing Pool, for 
viewer/participant intervention via critical reflection –	one in which the viewer/participant 
can think seriously about her experience with the work, the consequences that her alterations 
have on the surface of the patterns and how these alterations effect the other entities around 
her.  
“A Radically New Tool”: Interactivity and the Aesthetics of the Ubiquitous Interface  
The examples of ubiquitous interfaces that I have discussed so far describe, to an extent, 
distinct, physical objects. They are singular things (a shadow, an avatar), commercialized 
products (the Kinect) or biological entities (human bodies). Ubicomp however is not just 
about the subject’s interactions with a tangible object for some definite purpose (although 
sometimes it can be). It concerns the subject’s conscious and unconscious engagement with 
multiple, networked computational systems as well.  Given this, things like the Internet, 
RFID tags and motion-sensor lighting systems can be considered ubiquitous interfaces. They 
can be considered as such because ubicomp is, as Greenfield writes: “a distributed 
phenomenon: The power and meaning we ascribe to it are more a property of the network 
than of any single node.”951 Thus, ubicomp, he concludes: “isn’t so much a particular kind of 
hardware, philosophy of software design or set of interface conventions as it is a situation –	a 
set of circumstances.”952 In this way, Greenfield argues ubicomp is less of an instrumental 
black-boxed technology and more of a conceptual process –	one that is linked “not merely by 
a technical armature, but by a set of assumptions about the proper role of technology”.953 
Here, Greenfield is suggesting that ubicomp is less of a unified theory and more of a series of 
theoretical assertions –	semi-prophetic futuristic visions about what it should be and its 
function and purpose in our lives.954  
Greenfield’s theorization is important to this chapter as he positions notions of ubicomp and 
the interfaces that it creates, first of all as a problem, by referring to ubicomp as a set of 
                                                
951 Adam Greenfield. Everyware: The Dawning Age of Ubiquitous Computing. (Berkely: New Riders, 2006), p. 
16.  
952 Ibid., p. 31.  
953 Ibid., p. 32.  
954 Ibid., p. 16. 
264 
 
prophetic assertions.  As such, ubicomp could be understood with reference to the digital 
interface and interactive new media installations as performative. I say performative because 
ubicomp is a futuristic, ongoing and open-ended project that in its current iteration is 
surrounded by techno-determinist assumptions about human and nonhuman behaviors. 
Specifically how interfaces should be, how they should behave in the environment they are 
placed in and how users should interact with them.  A good example of how the assumptions 
around behaviors that ubicomp makes manifest themselves in interactive new media 
installations can be seen in Natalie Jeremijenko’s Live Wire (1995).955 Live Wire is an 
incredibly important piece to discuss in relation to ubicomp as it is widely considered to be 
one of the first artworks to incorporate ubiquitous technology or have a ubiquitous 
interface.956  It is considered as such, because Weiser, along with co-author John Seely 
Brown, use it in their essay “Designing Calm Technology”	(1995) to explain the concepts of 
ubicomp.957    
Live Wire is, in Weiser and Seely Brown’s words:	“a radically new tool…. Its output is so 
beautifully integrated with human information processing that one does not even need to be 
looking at it or near it to take advantage of its peripheral clues.”958 Commissioned by Xerox 
Research Center, Live Wire is an eight-foot long piece of red string that displays Internet 
traffic. Located below the string is a black and white sign that reads: “Caution Live Wire”.959 
(Figure 94) 
 
Figure 93: N. Jeremijenko, Live Wire. (1995). 
                                                
955 Natalie Jeremijenko. Live Wire. (1995). Found online at http://tech90s.walkerart.org/nj/transcript/nj_04.html 
Live Wire is also referred to as Dangling String. 
956 Mark Weiser and Jon Seely Brown. The Coming Age of Calm Technology. October 5, 1996. Found online at: 
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/acmfuture2endnote.htm Authors who consider Live Wire as such 
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The string and the sign are the only parts of the piece that the user can see. Live Wire, 
however, consists of many more hardware and software based components, which are 
embedded in the ceiling. They are imperceptible to the user, thus they are considered 
unimportant to the installation. These elements are so unimportant, that Weiser and Seely 
Brown state that Live Wire	“uses no software”	and “does not contain a computer at all”.960 
While Live Wire does not require a PC in its final iteration, it does contain a motor, an 
Ethernet cable and the Internet. These components are integral to Live Wire, as they allow it 
to function. Thus they are incredibly important to the artwork.961  For example, the string is 
attached to a small electric motor.  The motor is located in the ceiling and is connected via an 
Ethernet cable to the Internet. The string is pre-programmed to respond to network activity. It 
does this by twitching, or as Weiser and Seely Brown call it, “waving”.962 (Figure 95)   
 
Figure 95: N. Jeremijenko, Live Wire. (1995). 
In this way, the string could be considered to be the interface in this work because the string 
is the point of mediation and interaction between entities: the human (the viewer/participant) 
and the nonhuman (Internet). It provides the user with information (Internet activity) as well.   
My brief description of the artwork, provided above begs two questions: If all that is visible 
is a dangling string, then how exactly does a user interact with Live Wire? Moreover, what 
does interactivity imply in this context?   
All a user has to do to interact with Live Wire, according to Weiser and Seely Brown, is walk 
past it.963  For instance, Live Wire was originally installed in an unused corridor of a hallway 
                                                







in Xerox Paolo Alto Research Center’s Computer Science Lab.964 When an office worker, or 
user, walked through the corridor that Live Wire was located in, she saw it and, to an extent, 
heard it.  What she saw or heard depended on the amount of Internet traffic happening at that 
precise time. If a user passed through the corridor when the network was busy, then Live 
Wire twitched a lot.  So much so, that the user did not only see the string move, but she heard 
it move (via the grinding of the motor in the ceiling.)965  If the user happened to pass through 
the corridor during a lull in activity, Live Wire was programmed to twitch every few seconds. 
The user could then decide to stop and view the work and the information that it was 
presenting to her, or ignore it –	walk past it and carry on with her day.966  It does not matter 
what she did (if she stopped or continued). Simply passing by Live Wire, for Weiser and 
Seely Brown, implied interaction.967  This is because regardless of whether or not the user 
stopped, she was receiving a constant flow of information from the piece.  In this way, Live 
Wire, according to Weiser and Seely Brown, is a perfect physical or “real world”	
representation of the concepts of ubicomp and calm technology in the sense that it allows for 
“peripheral attunement”	on behalf of the user.968 By peripheral attunement, Weiser and Seely 
Brown mean that users can glean specific information from Live Wire (Internet traffic) 
without consciously interacting with it.969  Furthermore, unlike other screen-based displays of 
Internet traffic, the information it transmits does not require a lot of “interpretation and 
attention”	on behalf of the user.970 Thus Live Wire, according to Weiser and Seely Brown 
informs users without overburdening them, because, Live Wire, they argue, provides users 
with clues about their environment.971 
Simanowski (2013) finds the way in which information is presented to users in Live Wire and 
consequently analyzed by Weiser and Seely Brown, to be problematic.972 It is important to 
recognize, Simanowski states, that information in Live Wire is “not simply present in the 
                                                
964 Ibid. Roy Want’s Internet Stock Fountain (1999) was also installed at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center. 
Internet Stock Fountain, as Simanowski (2013) states, “indicates, by the rate of its water flow whether Xerox 
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972 Roberto Simanowski “Text as Event: Calm Technology and Invisible Information as Subject of Digital Art.” 
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background, moving to center stage when needed, but also that it has changed its nature 
through the specific way of presentation”.973 Information has changed via presentation, for 
Simanowski, because ubicomp, as represented by Live Wire,	“makes not only computers 
invisible –	so that they disappear into the environment –	but also information. Live Wire does 
so…by rendering information imperceptible”.974  Here, Simanowski is arguing that Live Wire 
is filtering information through the processes of selection, subtraction, translation and 
reflection as detailed in previous chapters. Therefore it is altering the information that it 
transmits to users.975 In this way information, for Simanowski, is rendered imperceptible 
because some of the information that Live Wire presents to users (specifically the information 
that is not relevant to the narrative of the artwork) is erased or obscured through the filtration 
process.976 
I suggest that Weiser and Seely Brown are participating in the same process of filtration in 
their theorization of Live Wire. In their article they are selecting, translating and then 
reflecting information back to readers about Live Wire and ubicomp that is relevant to their 
argument (Live Wire is a perfect example of ubicomp), while filtering out the information 
that contradicts their argument (ubicomp obscures information).977  In doing this, I argue that 
Weiser and Seely Brown are not only rendering interfaces and information imperceptible, but 
they are unintentionally using information and, to an extent, technology, as a way to fix 
user’s behaviors with ubiquitous interfaces.  They do this, I argue, by regulating, to the point 
that they are determining how a ubiquitous interface should look (invisible), what it should 
do (calm, inform) and how users should interact with it (constantly). 
Let me explain by way of example. A ubiquitous interface, according to Weiser and Seely 
Brown, should not only be invisible, calming and informative, but it should be effective –	it 
should provide the user with helpful information without being obtrusive.978  However, when 
a user walks past Live Wire, as Simanowski tells us above, she does not receive the “full 
                                                
973 Roberto Simanowski “Text as Event: Calm Technology and Invisible Information as Subject of Digital Art.” 
in Throughout: Art and Culture Emerging with Ubiquitous Computing. ed. Ulrik Ekman. (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2013), p. 191.   
974 Ibid., p. 192. 
975 Ibid.  
976 Ibid. 
977 Mark Weiser and Jon Seely Brown. The Coming Age of Calm Technology. October 5, 1996. Found online at: 




picture”, just blurred information.979 The user knows that if the string twitches a lot, if there is 
a lot of Internet traffic and if it is not twitching, there is minimal to no Internet traffic, but she 
does not receive specifics, she never gets exact measurements of Internet traffic at a 
moment’s flux. Given this, it could be argued that Live Wire is an ineffectual ubiquitous 
interface. I use the word ineffectual, because the interface does not perform the calming and 
informative functions Weiser and Seely Brown claim it does. The string mediates and 
translates information and then provides it to users but it does not inform, nor is it calming or 
effective. Instead the information parsed by Live Wire, as Simanowski writes, is “mapped 
only as movement”	and in being this way, he argues, the interface contradicts, to an extent, 
Weiser and Seely Brown’s theory of ubicomp by calling attention to itself. 980 Building on 
Simanowski’s analysis, I posit that the way that interaction is presented to the 
viewer/participant in Live Wire and consequently theorized by Weiser and Seely Brown is as 
ineffectual as the issues around information and their theorization of the interface. This is 
because the way Weiser and Seely Brown analyze user interaction with Live Wire 
contradicts, to an extent, their theory of ubicomp.   
Interactivity in interactive new media installations, as Stern tells us, is an embodied, 
relational and mutually emergent process that humans perform with and as technology, 
together.981 Interactivity is, he states, varied in its engagements and consists of multiple 
human and nonhuman entities (viewer/participants, technology, the artist) that slowly become 
confused over time.982 In doing this, viewer/participant interaction in interactive installations, 
Stern suggests, has the ability to “intervene in, and challenge, not only the construction of 
bodies and identities, but also the ongoing and emergent processes of embodiment, as they 
happen.”983  Thus interactivity is a process that he argues frames, articulates and amplifies 
“how the body’s inscriptions, meanings and matters unfold out while the world’s sensations, 
concepts and matters enfold in”.984 Given this, interactivity in interactive new media 
installations, for Stern is:	“a situation that accents embodiment and signification…It frames 
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how we move-think-feel with and…as an articulation of meaning.”985 Based on their 
theorization of human interaction with ubiquitous interfaces like Live Wire, Weiser and Seely 
Brown seem to agree, to an extent, with Stern’s theorization of interactivity. 
For example, users should, according to Weiser and Seely Brown, be able to interact with 
ubiquitous interfaces without being constantly bombarded with information.986 They write 
that ubiquitous interfaces enable this type of interaction in two ways: first by moving from 
the center of the user’s attention to the periphery and back in an easy manner, and then by 
enhancing the users “peripheral reach”, making information accessible that would otherwise 
be out of reach or inaccessible, thus increasing the user’s knowledge and ability to interact 
with information if they so choose, “without increasing information overload”.987  Here 
Weiser and Seely Brown are suggesting that ubiquitous interfaces should provide users with 
easy access to information. If the user requests information from the interface, then this 
information should come to the fore and the user should be able to interact with it in an easy 
and perhaps even fun manner.  If the user does not want to receive information, then the 
interface, and the information it is transmitting, should fade into the periphery.  
Live Wire, as Weiser and Seely Brown argue, is a perfect practical example of how a user 
should interact with ubiquitous technologies.988 As they write: “At first it [Live Wire] creates 
a center of attention just by being unique. But this center soon becomes peripheral as the 
gentle waving of the string moves easily to the background. That the string can be both seen 
and heard helps by increasing the clues for peripheral attunement.”989 Live Wire’s, ability to 
move from the center to the background of the user’s attention, they state,	“increases our 
peripheral reach to the formerly inaccessible network traffic”.990 Thus interaction with Live 
Wire allows the user to attend to and consequently interpret the information provided to her, 
as well as reflect on the experience of Live Wire without feeling overloaded.  In short, user 
interaction with Live Wire for Weiser and Seely Brown should be a mutually co-constitutive 
process, one that helps frame and articulate the information being presented to her and 
understand the world. They also believe that interaction with Live Wire offers the user more 
                                                
985 Nathaniel Stern. Interactive Art and Embodiment: The Implicit Body as Performance. Canterbury, UK: 
Gyliphi Limited, 2013), p. 4. Stern’s emphasis. 








choice and possibilities, in regards to the way she accesses information, via its ability to 
move from the center to the periphery of their attention.  
However, as mentioned above, interaction with Live Wire is positioned by Weiser and Seely 
Brown as compulsory. The user is required, by way of presentation, to act, or at least to view 
Live Wire. The user walks down the corridor of the office that Live Wire is located in and 
there it is –	moving, making sounds, bombarding her with a constant flow of semi-coherent 
information and forcing her to interact with it. By making interaction compulsory, I argue 
that Weiser and Seely Brown are taking away the user’s choice as to whether or not she 
would like to interact with Live Wire. In doing this, I argue that Weiser and Seely Brown are 
not allowing the user to make decisions around her experience with the artwork. Thus I posit 
that the notion that interactivity with Live Wire offers the user more choice and possibilities, 
as suggested by Weiser and Seely Brown, is false and counter-productive. I say false and 
counter-productive because Live Wire does not actually do what Weiser and Seely Brown say 
it does (offer the user more choice, thus possibility.)  Moreover, just because an interface has 
the ability to move from the center to the periphery of the user’s attention does not mean the 
user has any awareness of or fully comprehends the activity she is willingly or unwillingly 
participating in. The user might be able to freely access information that Live Wire provides 
them, as Weiser and Seely Brown suggest above, but I argue she does not have the ability to 
regulate the flow of, or understand, the information being provided to her. In this way, I posit 
that user interaction with Live Wire and Live Wire itself becomes the opposite of what Weiser 
and Seely Brown position it as –	it is an obtrusive, incomprehensible and determined, rather 
than an informative and calming, experience.  
Weiser and Seely Brown, as Simanowski notes, do not discuss the issue surrounding the 
incomprehensibility of information in their article.991  Nor do they address the contradiction 
around interaction, pointed out above.992 This lack of acknowledgement explains why they 
are able to present Live Wire as a perfect example of how ubicomp should be, without taking 
into account the extent to which Live Wire allows for informed actions on behalf of the user. 
It also provides some insight into their confusing description of Live Wire, as a tool, rather 
than a work of art.   
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In Conclusion  
I will conclude my exploration into the use of ubiquitous interfaces in interactive new media 
installations by examining the potential artistic experimentation with ubiquitous interfaces 
has in demystifying ubicomp claims.  My starting point for this exploration lies in 
Greenfield’s suggestion that ubicomp is a set of assumptions rather than a unified theory. I 
use Greenfield’s suggestion as a starting point because it indicates, in my mind, that there is a 
possibility for alternative versions and visions of ubiquitous interfaces –	versions and visions 
that open up a space for exploration and experimentation on behalf of the artist creating the 
interface and the viewer/participant interacting with it. It also suggests that we can employ 
different, less techno-deterministic approaches to analyzing ubiquitous interfaces.  In short, 
the ubiquitous interface may be limited in its responses and the information it gives to the 
viewer/participant (as this information and these responses are almost always constrained as 
they are almost always pre-programmed), but Greenfield’s statement suggests that there are 
limitless possibilities in terms of how we critically investigate and explore it.   
Following Greenfield, I suggest that artistic experimentation with ubiquitous interfaces in 
interactive new media installations, is important because through experimentation, new 
media artists are able to defamiliarize ubiquitous interfaces and intervene in the myths that 
surround them, making them, to an extent, recognizable and visible for critique. Furthermore, 
artistic experimentation with ubiquitous interfaces in interactive new media installations 
allows us to think seriously about what the relationship between aesthetics, computation and 
the interface possibly could become, rather than accepting what we are told it is or has to be.   
Throughout their article Weiser and Seely Brown refer to Live Wire as a “radically new tool”	
one that provides the user with “bits [of information] through motion, sound and even 
touch”.993 While I believe it was incredibly radical at the time it was created, Live Wire, I 
argue, is not a tool. It is a work of art.  It is a work of art because it was created by an artist –	
Natalie Jeremijenko.994  The fact that Live Wire is a piece of art, according to Simanowski 
reveals another issue in Weiser and Seely Brown’s theory of ubicomp.995 This issue, he 
writes is:	“the fact that an artwork logically contradicts the notion of ubiquity and invisibility 
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because by nature its aim is to call attention to itself as an intervention into the everyday life 
environment.”996  
Simanowski’s statement about Live Wire, foregrounds an important questions in terms of 
how we relate to, form relationships with and make meaning of technologically-based 
artworks and artistic practices.  As argued, via Jones (2000) in chapter 2, in its triparte role as 
“creator of social-space”, “actualizer of power”	and “site of resistance”, the human body is 
able to become explicitly “non-universal”	and “non-transcendent”, and in its ability to 
become this way lays the potential for radically dislocative practices.997 One of these 
radically dislocative practices, as demonstrated throughout this thesis, is a rethinking of the 
digital interface, as human body, in interactive new media installations.  However, by 
designating a form so intimate to us (the human body) as interface and then advocating for 
invisibility, as theories of ubicomp do, the interface, as a technical form that articulates, 
filters, facilitates and organizes activities between two or more entities, is naturalized. And in 
being this way, when designated as interface, the human body –	specifically its ability to act 
as “the actualizer of power”	and “the site of resistance”	–	is, to an extent, neutralized. So, 
what does this naturalization (of the interface) and neutralization (of the human body) mean 
for artistic experimentation with ubiquitous interfaces in interactive new media installations? 
What happens when an artwork used to epitomize the main tenants of ubicomp (invisibility, 
attractiveness, calm) like Live Wire negates it? And can this negation provide us with a 
framework for a different understanding a whole range of contemporary artworks that 
employ ubiquitous interfaces and the relationship between the body and technology that 
surrounds them?    
Taking these questions into account, I would like to provide a different interpretation of Live 
Wire than the one offered by Weiser and Seely Brown. Contrary to Weiser and Seely 
Brown’s claims that Live Wire is a perfect representation of ubicomp, I would like to suggest 
that Live Wire represents a very specific reaction to the three concepts of ubicomp that have 
been central to my discussion–	aesthetics (or attractiveness), invisibility and interactivity. 
Live Wire reacts to the notion of invisibility, by defamiliarizing information, presenting 
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information as a performative event –	information in motion or “data as movement”.998 It 
reacts to notions of interactivity, in a similar way.  Live Wire defamiliarizes common 
preconceived notions of interactivity in interactive new media installations through the lack 
there of it. Finally, it reacts to notions of attractiveness and aesthetics by existing as an 
artwork. 
I argue that Live Wire is defined by a refusal, on behalf of the artist, to turn information into 
aesthetically pleasing data.999 Jeremijenko reiterates these sentiments in her statements 
around the work: Live Wire, she tells us, “is tacit information, rather than more of the 
precisely graphed, data fetishism of information rhetoric”.1000 Thus, in contrast to screen-
based graphs of Internet activity, Live Wire, she writes,	“is a shared social display of 
information”.1001  The tacit information aesthetic and shared social display of information that 
Jeremijenko wishes to achieve is set against its own silence in the parts of Live Wire that are 
visible to the viewer/participant (the red string and the black and white printed sign).1002 This 
combination creates a sparse, uninteresting, uninteractive and uninformative environment –	
one that I posit provides the viewer/participant with the ultimate form of control: to critically 
reflect on and then to reject, to an extent, the artwork and the concept of ubicomp and walk 
away from it.  Live Wire then is not interactive in the way in which viewer/participants are 
normally accustomed to. Interactivity with this piece is not about viewer/participant’s 
clicking links, reading on-screen information, making a specific semiotic gesture or 
performing a choreographed dance.  Rather, by pushing the lack of aesthetics, information 
and interactivity to such an extreme, I argue that Live Wire acts as an intervention into 
normative assumptions around interactivity and aesthetics in interactive new media 
installations. For example, asking viewer/participants to critically reflect on and then to 
reject, to an extent, the artwork and the underlying concepts that it is based on, is a gesture 
made by Jeremijenko that turns notions of ubicomp against themselves and away from the 
mindless, repetitive and surface-level forms of HCI that it promotes. Thus, rather than 
fostering the illusion that Live Wire is a democratic tool, the absence of choice –	specifically 
the choice whether or not to interact with it –	is accentuated.  
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Live Wire also eschews the aesthetic and information-based conventions of ubicomp as laid 
out by Weiser in the foundational papers. Live Wire, I suggest, troubles Weiser’s notion that 
the invisibility of information is a good thing and that interfaces should not be attractive. It 
does this by unabashedly calling attention to itself through its messy, dissonant and difficult 
aesthetics.  The messy, found-object aesthetics of the work and its placement serves two 
purposes: it acts as a visual response to the “precisely graphed, data fetishism”; and it acts as 
a response to notions of invisibility and attractiveness in that it looks like it does not belong 
in the space it is located in, ultimately piquing viewer/participant interest, thus attracting 
viewer/participant attention.1003  Furthermore, the string is almost always in motion.  When 
Internet traffic is high, the motor the string is attached to makes a grinding sound, calling 
even more attention to the fact that it exists, rather than effacing it altogether as a means to 
better foster the illusion of invisibility.1004   
The exact meaning of the information that Live Wire is presenting to the viewer/participant is 
as confusing as the piece’s interface and aesthetics, simply because, the viewer/participant is 
receiving incomprehensible information. Thus, in opposition to Weiser and Seely Brown’s 
attempt to naturalize information to the point of invisibility, Live Wire, makes information 
confusing, unfamiliar and uncomfortable. In this way, I argue that Live Wire could be seen as 
an artwork that is simultaneously of, and not of, ubicomp. It works as a response to notions of 
invisibility, inaccessibility and interactivity –	notions that prevent any kind of informed 
action on behalf of the viewer/participant beyond surface-level interventions.  With its messy 
aesthetic, its minimalist interface and the constant low-level of obscured information that it 
transmits, Live Wire, works against, via defamiliarization, some of the main tenants of 
ubicomp, while simultaneously helping to define what a ubiquitous interface is, what it 
should do and how we should interact with it in interactive new media installations. 
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Conclusions: The Five Interfaces 
 
The main objective of my dissertation has been to propose an analytical framework for the 
digital interface in interactive new media installations. My aim has been to develop an 
understanding of how the digital interface can be seen as an important actor in positioning 
and (re)shaping specific ways of relating to the self, to technology, to artistic practice and to 
others. That is to say, in this thesis I have been interested in examining what a digital 
interface may be, and exploring potential ways of thinking, doing and making that it could 
possibly bring about when theorized in non-instrumental ways, from within aesthetic-based 
contexts. My main argument is that in the past decade a significant transformation has 
occurred at the boundary of media studies and art history regarding the way the digital 
interface has been understood. I suggested that this shift in understanding allowed what was 
previously thought of as a viewing subject to embody technology and become a 
“viewer/participant”. I then proposed that this shift in perception and positioning of the 
subject, combined with the subject’s ability to embody technology and become a 
viewer/participant, results in the “disappearance”	of the object-based digital interface and the 
emergence of the physical human body as the locus of interaction in interactive new media 
art installations.  The word disappearance does not mean that the interface, its functions, 
properties and the processes and entities that it encompasses are physically gone. Rather, 
disappearance allowed me to signal towards what I saw as an unresolved difficulty in texts on 
the interface that conflate, among other things, invisibility with perceptibility, agency with 
subjectivity, subjects with objects, and entities (subjects, plural) with individuals (the subject, 
singular). I used the terms “obsolete”	and “inadequate”	in relation to theories that advanced 
this type of thinking throughout my thesis to reinforce this point.  I turned to performance 
artist Stelarc’s critique of assumptions about the body –	specifically to his statement “the 
body is obsolete”	–	in order to theorize the inadequacy of theories of the interface that 
position it as such.1005  
In my dissertation, the term “digital interface” has not merely referred to the point of 
interaction between two or more parts of a technical system, or the symbolic software that 
enables humans to use computers, but also to a technology that mediates, and thus creates, 
relationships between viewer/participants, artists and artworks as well as influences the 
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movements and perceptions of those interacting with it. This definition has allowed me to 
conceptualize the interface as technical material, cultural form and artistic practice, 
something that has been constructed and designed in a specific way for a specific purpose, a 
procedure for mediating, translating and disseminating information, a way of relating, a form 
of embodiment and a mode of communication. I have been guided by Emerson’s (2014) 
understanding of the interface in a broad sense as a technology that mediates relationships 
between entities and the surface-level objects they produce, as well as the technical machine-
based processes that take place below the surface. 1006 I have used her definition as a primary 
analytical framework in which to understand the interface and to rethink it as a dynamic, 
hybrid, aesthetic and cultural process that emerges out of, shapes, and is shaped by, our 
interactions with it in interactive new media installations. Here, emphasis is placed on the 
aesthetic and the cultural processes that help shape the digital interface, not the technical and 
the mechanic ones (although these processes are important and I do discuss them as 
evidenced in chapters 3 and 4).  Thus my conceptualization of the interface differs, albeit 
slightly, from Emerson’s in that the interface is positioned, in my thesis, as form that 
mediates, and to an extent creates, relationships between entities (the artist, the 
viewer/participant) and the aesthetic objects that it produces (the artwork) as well as the 
aesthetic and creative processes that are hidden from view (artistic experimentation).  
In chapters 3 and 4, I have shown how the interface governs the interactions of the 
viewer/participant by restricting or reinforcing certain types of viewer/participant behaviors. 
It does this, I argued in two ways: through instruction provided to the viewer/participant by 
the artist via the digital interface; and through the deployment of metaphors and models (an 
interface shaped to look like a bicycle, an icon located on a desktop shaped to resemble a 
trash can or the use of the word invisibility to imply imperceptibility). I demonstrated how 
instruction and the concept of ubiquity function as important control mechanisms for what 
users are allowed to see (the artwork) or not see (the device itself), how they are to behave 
and how they should interact. My investigation into the use of cybernetic and ubiquitous 
interfaces in interactive new media installations offered a way to address the question of how 
the interface –	its processes, and relationships –	can be analyzed as potentially (re)shaping 
concepts of subjectivity, agency, the body, embodiment, ubiquity and aesthetics.  
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The designation of the viewer/participant as locus of interaction –	or interface –	as discussed 
throughout these chapters, means that the illusion that the artist has complete control over the 
action occurring in the installation is, to an extent, broken. Thus the interface in interactive 
new media installations, I suggested, can be said to be unstable, uncertain and, to a certain 
extent, open to reconfiguration.  Regardless of whether or not they are perceptible to us, 
digital interfaces permeate our environments and play an active role in the space they are 
located in. In chapters 1 and 2 I showed how the relationship between the digital interface, 
the viewer/participant and the artist not only supports interaction, but is what makes 
interaction in interactive new media installations possible in the first place. Although quite 
different in scope, the concepts of aesthetics and embodiment show how this relationship 
needs to be made visible and how integral it is to interactive new media installations.   
  
In the preface, I explained my motivation behind the selection of reviewed artworks found in 
my thesis. Drawing on Donna Haraway’s 1988 notion of Situated Knowledge, I argued that 
my selection process was informed, in part, by my curatorial and educational experiences. 
Situated knowledge, according to Haraway, is an approach to knowledge that requires us to 
become ethically and politically accountable for what we learn and how we see the world.1007 
In short, I argued that the claims to knowledge made throughout my thesis, were partial, 
located, embodied and situated relative to personal, social and geographic contexts – they 
were formed and informed by my situated knowledge. In doing this, I was able to show how 
knowledge about the digital interface, its processes and relationships emerge out of, shape 
and are shaped by, our personal interactions with it in interactive new media installations.    
I also discussed the non-chronological and non-linear approach I took to theorizing the 
artworks located throughout my thesis.  Non-chronological and non-linear approaches can 
seem, at times, confusing as the field of digital media art did not evolve in a straight line. The 
works that compose the corpus of digital media art run parallel to each other and are non-
sequential. Thus, I argued that non-linear and non-chronological approaches to art 
movements like digital media art function as an important mechanism for dispelling linear 
developmental narratives of technology and notions of finality. My use of this approach, I 
stated, was important as it offered a way to raise questions around traditional perceptions of 
digital media art as a medium – that is a linear outgrowth of technologically based art forms 
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(photography and cinema). It also presented me with a way to address the question “why 
does the digital interface matter in interactive new media installations?” in the sense it 
allowed me to examine, from different perspectives, the types of relationships that exist 
between artists, interfaces and viewer/participants in interactive new media installations.  
In what follows, I will elaborate on the main contributions of my dissertation. I will do this 
by relating my arguments in each chapter to the five digital interfaces commonly deployed in 
interactive new media installations. These interfaces, originally discussed in the preface and 
introduction, are: the aesthetic interface, the agential interface, the embodied interface, the 
cybernetic interface and the ubiquitous interface. These five interfaces directly relate to the 
five key concepts (aesthetics, agency, embodiment, cybernetics and ubiquity) that inform my 
thesis.  
 
In chapter 1, I theorized the aesthetic interface. Aesthetic interfaces, refer to devices that 
digitally encode, encompass or make reference to theoretical and aesthetic-based concepts, 
contents or techniques (the use of artistic tools (film cameras, paintbrushes) to signify 
creativity of the viewer/participant or co-authorship, again on behalf of the 
viewer/participant, of the work). They also refer to the appropriation of aesthetic perceptions 
and languages (the use of the word theme to describe the background of a website) used to 
drive the narrative of the work forwards and/or implied modes of reception and spectatorship 
used by curators and academics to legitimize artwork.1008 These aspects of the aesthetic 
interface (terms, tools, modes of reception), I argued, are simultaneously deployed in order to 
make the aesthetic aspects and processes of the interface visible and to make them disappear, 
as illustrated in my reading of Alexander Galloway’s 2012 interpretation of the interfaces 
found in Norman Rockwell’s iconic illustration Triple Self-Portrait (1960).1009     
In order to theorize the aesthetic interface, I questioned the dominant philosophical 
conceptions and definitions of the digital interface. These definitions and conceptions, I 
argued, substantially reduce the digital interface to an instrument, positioning it as an object, 
a tool or a thing in service of something or someone else.  I turned to the work of scholars 
(Andersen and Pold (2011), Hookway (2011), Galloway (2012)) who have distanced 
themselves from such deterministic understandings and have instead proposed different, non-
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binary readings of the digital interface, acknowledging and critically discussing the 
significance of the complex and sometimes contradictory aesthetic and cultural aspects.  
Andersen and Pold call this approach “interface criticism”	–	a term they argue aids in the 
development of critical discussions around “the computer and how it relates to art and culture 
today”.1010  I then argued for a rethinking of the digital interface in interactive new media 
installations –	one that positions it as a dynamic, hybrid, aesthetic and cultural process in 
interactive new media installations.  A pivotal role in my rethinking of the interface was 
given to the concept of obsolescence as theorized by the artist Stelarc in his critique of 
assumptions about the body and technology –	specifically his statement that “the body is 
obsolete”.1011 
Stelarc’s questioning of the idea of “the human”	and its obsolescence, I argued, dismantles 
naturalized and linear descriptions of the human body, technology and our relationship with 
technology, exposing their simplicity and in effect, their inadequacy. In doing this, Stelarc 
enables the relationship between the body and technology to be seen as what Hall (2002) 
calls “as an irruption of the other, the unforeseen disrupting the very criteria in which it 
would have been captured”.1012  When the relationship between the human and technology is 
theorized as the merger of one separate human entity and one separate and foreign 
technological object, what is at stake is neither futuristic ideology nor a linear repetition of a 
symmetrical past and future. Rather, what is created, as Hall terms it, is “undecidability”.1013  
Hall’s notion of “undecidability”, I argued, is what Cubitt (1998, 2005, 2016) is referring to 
when he writes that digital aesthetics is “unknowable”.1014 Highlighting what he considers to 
be the characteristics of digital artworks (non-identity, ephemerality, unknowability), digital 
aesthetics, Cubitt argues, is dependent on the mediation of the senses of vision and hearing –	
and these senses are always temporal and always rooted in the present.1015  Given this, the 
term digital aesthetics, he suggests, serves as a descriptor for the mediated experience of 
                                                
1010 Christian Ulrik Andersen and Søren Bro Pold. “Interface Criticism, Aesthetics Beyond Buttons” in Interface 
Criticism: Aesthetics Beyond Buttons. ed. Christian Ulrik Andersen and Søren Bro Pold. (Arhaus, DK: Arhaus 
University Press, 2011), p. 1.  
1011 Joanna Zylinska and Gary Hall. “Probings: An Interview with Stelarc” in The Cyborg Experiments: The 
Extension of the Body in the Media Age. ed. Joanna Zylinska. (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 114.   
1012 Gary Hall. “Para-Site” in The Cyborg Experiments: The Extension of the Body in the Media Age. ed. 
Joanna Zylinska. (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 140. 
1013 Ibid. 
1014 Sean Cubitt. Digital Aesthetics. (London, UK: Sage, 1998); Sean Cubitt. EcoMedia. (Amsterdam, NL: 
Rodopi, 2005); Sean Cubitt. “Aesthetics of the Digital” in A Companion to Digital Art, First Edition. ed. 




time.1016 Since digital aesthetics is a descriptor for the mediated experience of time and since 
this experience is always rooted in the present, any critical theory of digital aesthetics, Cubitt 
writes, must take into account the relationship between the artwork, its audience and “the 
social that forms both of them”.1017 Drawing on Cubitt’s theorization of digital aesthetics I 
suggested that the term “aesthetics”	when applied to the digital interface, not only describes 
the characteristics of the installation the interface is deployed in but also encapsulated the 
characteristics of the interface itself. Thus, I argued aesthetics does not only shape our 
experience of digital artworks, it also shapes our interactions with, and by extension, our 
experience of, the digital interface.  
 
Furthermore, Cubitt’s analysis of digital aesthetics emphasizes the confusion or 
“unknowability”	of the relationship between aesthetics, the human and the interface that I 
discussed throughout chapter 1. Digital aesthetics demonstrated the need to, not necessarily 
make the digital interface “knowable” and solve the problems that this relationship creates, 
but to draw these problems to the fore, to make them visible, and use them to critically 
question and rethink the interface.  Thus, I highlighted the importance of understanding the 
interface, not only in terms of how the viewer/participant “makes sense” of or understands 
the information being presented to her in the installation she is located in, but also how the 
aesthetic aspects of the digital interface, or the aesthetic interface, is an integral and important 
part of her experience in interactive new media installations.   
 
In chapter 2, I explored the agential and embodied interfaces.  I did this through an 
exploration of the relationship between the body and the interface.  Agential interfaces, I 
argued, set in motion in Stiegler’s (1999) notion of “originary knowledge” a theorization 
which suggests that agency is not merely confined to humans, but encompasses nonhuman 
entities as well.1018 While instrumental theorizations of the interface define it as a way of 
connecting two entities together (via its ability to facilitate communication and disseminate 
information), I argued its use in interactive new media installations sheds light on the agency 
of technical devices. Thus I showed how interfaces are a productive and important part of the 
phenomena that they create.  
                                                
1016 Ibid.  
1017 Ibid.  
1018 Bernard Stiegler. Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus. tr: Richard Beardsworth and George 
Collins. (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. ix.  
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The third interface is the embodied interface. Current interface aesthetics, as Jeong (2013) 
writes	“emphasizes that the material interface with digital code often remains meaningless 
until we access it through our physiological sensory organs”.1019 The embodied interface in 
interactive new media installations, I argued, augments this point of view, suggesting that the 
viewer/participant is not only accessing information, via participation, but contributing 
aspects of her own evolving material ontology to her experience through their engagement 
with and embodiment of technology.  I then argued that a study of the relationship between 
the body, embodiment and technology, or the agential and embodied interfaces, is important 
for a rethinking of the digital interface.  Following insights provided by theorists such as 
Barad (2007) and Hayles (1999), I set out to investigate how the use of the digital interface in 
aesthetic settings can illuminate the role technology plays in the co-constitution of the 
human. That is how the use of the interface in interactive new media installations positions 
the relationship between the body and technology as a mutually entangled and collaboratively 
produced experience. I also examined how the instrumental and deterministic 
conceptualizations of the digital interface (as an object or a thing) can still be said to be at 
work in theorizations of the relationship between the body and technology.1020  The 
relationship between the body and technology in interactive new media installations, I 
argued, is unstable, uncertain and to a certain extent open to reconfiguration by the 
viewer/participant. Instability signals the fact that the interactions that emerge out of the 
relationship between the viewer/participant and the digital interface are dynamic, open-ended 
and performed. From here, I was able to offer a more performative and entangled 
understanding of the relationship between the viewer/participant and the digital interface –	
one that allowed these relationships to come into view, not as pre-coded results of pre-
programmed cybernetic systems, but rather as in-process happenings that emerge out of, and 
with, the viewer/participants’ interactions with the interface in interactive new media 
installations. I then focused on the effects and events that this performance produced.1021 
Through a close reading of interactive artworks (Vesna (2005-7), Tmema (2006), Hemmer 
(2012)) I demonstrated that it is the specific events and effects that the relationship between 
                                                
1019 Seung-hoon Jeong. Cinematic Interfaces: Film Theory After New Media. (NY, NY; Routledge, 2013), p. 11.  
1020 Karen Barad. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglements of Matter and 
Meaning. (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2007). Katherine Hayles. How we Became Posthuman: 
Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999).  
1021 These effects include a possible creation of ruptures in traditional artistic practices and narratives, the 
destabilization of binary notions such as the division between the material and the informational, a rethinking of 
the boundaries between the artist and the viewer/participant and a renegotiation of social and private space. 
282 
 
the body and technology helps create, that bring the digital interface into being thus allowing 
it to actually “matter”	in interactive new media installations. 
The fourth and fifth types of interface, the cybernetic interface and the ubiquitous interface 
are viewed as a mode of transmitting instruction by the artist to the subject using it. They are 
often theorized in terms of the power that this instruction has in controlling the actions of its 
subjects and/or its own invisibility. The interface may be regarded, by the artist, the scholar 
or the viewer/participant as an invisible, cybernetic tool that simply controls interaction, 
limits access and regulates viewing habits. But its nature changes, to an extent, I argued, 
when deployed in interactive new media installations as viewer/participants have the ability 
to resist or intervene in the instruction given and generate moments of rupture in the spaces 
they are located in. The focus I suggested therefore shifts from the cybernetic transference of 
immaterial data to the embodied actions of the viewer/participant.  When this shift occurs, the 
viewer/participant, rather than the interface, becomes the locus of interaction in interactive 
new media installations. While cybernetic and ubiquitous interfaces emphasise the mutual co-
constitution of the human and technology and the embodiment of technology by the 
viewer/participant (or the embodied and agential interfaces), this shift in power from 
technical tool (the interface) to human being (the viewer/participant, the artist), can be 
problematic. This shift to human body, I argued, has led to theorizations of the interface that 
position it as “invisible”	or “user-friendly” when it is just imperceptible to the 
viewer/participant. This specific description of the “invisible”, “user-friendly”	interface is 
echoed in commercial interfacial products like Mircosoft’s Kinect –	a device that positions 
the user as creative and completely in control of their virtual experience.1022  The conflation 
of the claims of invisibility and user-friendliness with imperceptibility, I argued, is troubling 
because it alienates the user from the underlying computational processes of the device and 
ultimately the artwork itself.  
In chapter 3 and 4, I demonstrated how this shift in power and control from technical tool to 
human user occurs and the problems that come with it. I also provided examples of artworks 
that subvert and resist it (Knep (2006, 2008), Rokeby (2012), Jeremijenko (1995), Snibbe 
(1998, 2002), Karasic, (2008)). I began my investigation into the cybernetic and ubiquitous 
interfaces in chapter 3 through an exploration of the use of instruction and instructional 
processes. I focused specifically on the destabilizing effects that the resistance to, or the 
                                                
1022 Kinect. Found online at: http://www.xbox.com/en-GB/Xbox360/Accessories/kinect  
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subversion of instruction on behalf of the viewer/participant had on the way they both intra-
acted with, and thought about, the digital interface in interactive new media installations.1023 
My main argument was that resistance and subversion on behalf of the viewer/participant 
begins to shift focus away from theorizing the viewer/participant as an outside operational 
entity whose actions are structured and defined as exterior to technology, towards considering 
them an integral part of the installation –	an embodied and active subject whose intra-actions 
with the digital interface have consequences in interactive new media art installations.   
Instruction was understood, in this chapter, as a method of arranging and then transmitting 
explanatory or directional information to the viewer/participant by the artist via the digital 
interface.  In interactive new media installations, instruction was transmitted to the 
viewer/participant through the reappropriation and designation of common objects (bicycles, 
telephones, books, microphones) as interfaces. The viewer/participant then interprets these 
objects as instruction –	an action which I posit enables the viewer/participant to (re)orientate 
herself in the installation through the duplication and reconstruction of familiar processes, 
spaces and entities that they may encounter on an everyday basis in the physical world.1024  
These objects were employed, I suggested, to reinforce and regulate viewer/participant 
behaviors and viewing habits by providing her with something familiar and recognizable. 
This was done to manage and sometimes to limit communication between the 
viewer/participant and the other entities located in the same space.   
In Human Machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Actions, Suchman (2007) critiques 
the notion of instruction as a regulatory device that reinforces problematic modes of 
communication between humans and machines.1025  For Suchman, and others, Wiener’s 
notion of cybernetics and the instructional process, which positions instruction as a method of 
controlling a system by reinserting into it the results of its past performance, is the basis for 
how instruction is deployed through digital technology.1026  Wiener’s theorization of these 
                                                
1023 These destabilizing effects in interactive new media installations include, but are not limited to the possible 
creation of ruptures in traditional artistic practices and narratives, the destabilization of binary notions such as 
the division between the material and the informational, a rethinking of the boundaries between the artist and the 
viewer/participant, a renegotiation of social and private space and the rethinking of the digital interface.   
1024 The duplication and reconstruction of familiar processes, spaces and entities in this chapter include reading, 
cycling, human bodies, modes of communication (phones) and production (looms) as well as recording studios 
as exampled in the works of Small (2002), Courchesne (2011), Hemmer (2008), Dunning and Woodrow (2001) 
and Lubell (2009). 
1025 Lucy Suchman. Human Machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Actions. (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007)  
1026 Ibid., p. 251  
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concepts, Suchman argues, is troubling, because it is predicated on the assumption that there 
is symmetry between biological and technical entities. This assumption, she suggests, 
reinforces, among other things, the separation of the human and the machine.1027 It also strips 
the human entity of agency.  Given this, I suggested that when deployed in certain interactive 
new media installations, the digital interface can provide options for viewer/participant 
intervention, via resistance and/or subversion of instruction.   
In the second half of chapter 3, I explored how the resistance to and subversion of instruction 
can alter the dominant metaphors and models used in interactive new media installations.  My 
argument was that resistance has the ability to allow for certain destabilizing effects such as 
the creation of a different dialogue between the viewer/participant and the digital interface 
through the modification of the underlying frameworks that compose the relationship 
between the human and the machine.  The emergence of a different type of dialogue between 
the viewer/participant and the digital interface, I argued, does not occur because the actions 
that the viewer/participant makes with the digital interface are somehow different. Instead, 
drawing on Jones’s (2001) theorization of new technologies I argued that this dialogue has 
appeared because the conceptual frameworks for understanding the relationship between the 
body and technology have changed.1028  This change has led what theorists such as Weiser 
call “a shift in computing”.1029    
In chapter 4, I directly addressed this changing conceptual framework and the restructuring of 
interfaces in my analysis of the “invisible”	ubiquitous interface. My argument in this chapter 
was that the word invisible, when applied to the interface in interactive new media 
installations, represents the commodification of bodies and things as well as the erasure of the 
multiple agencies that contribute to and help allow the interface to work. The 
viewer/participant does not interact with others via invisible interfaces and interaction does 
not “just occur”	like magic; interfaces themselves also contribute to the creation of these 
interactions.  In this way, the “invisible” ubiquitous interface does not only represent the 
commodification of bodies and the erasure of things.  It also implies, I argued, a linear 
process of technology whereby relationships, entities and technological developments are 
linked together in a predetermined fashion and that the ubiquitous interface - which is 
                                                
1027 Ibid.  
1028 Amelia Jones. “The Body and Technology” in Art Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), p 20.  
1029 Mark Weiser. “The World is not a Desktop.” November, 1993. Found online at: 
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positioned as a natural, intuitive and creative device that will transform the way we interact 
with computers and with each other forever - is the final, thus best, iteration.  
 
The ubiquitous interfaces explored in chapter 4, however, are not the product of new 
technological developments. Most of the ubiquitous interfaces we currently interact with 
existed, in some shape or form, in interactive new media installations.1030 Therefore, I argued 
that an investigation into aesthetic experimentations with ubiquitous interfaces is important 
because these experimentations not only affect the interfaces used in art but they influence 
those developed elsewhere. In this way, interactive new media installations, I suggested, offer 
an important and much-needed critical perspective on ubiquitous technologies –	one that 
seeks to challenge the hegemony of ubicomp theories by intervening in normative 
assumptions concerning the interface. As was shown in the previous chapter on cybernetic 
interfaces, critically questioning, and then challenging and intervening in the dominant 
narratives that surround our relationship with technology, complicates the picture of how new 
technologies like ubiquitous interfaces work in the world. Ubiquitous interfaces do nothing 
by themselves, but once they become part of our artworks, communities and everyday lives, 
they become part of our discourse. Thus they become invested with the power to open up and 
make different things visible, but also to constrain, close down on and erase possibilities, 
modes of interaction and communication. Interactive new media installations, I argued, are 
invaluable in this respect because, in being artworks, they call attention to themselves, thus 
they allow us to critically evaluate the principal claims and question the foundations on 
which the concept of ubicomp is based. 
 
Ultimately, I believe much is to be gained from understanding the role the digital interface 
plays in interactive new media installations. My dissertation shows how the digital interface 
introduces different forms of thinking, doing and making in interactive new media 
installations by mediating, thus creating, relationships between viewer/participants, artists 
and artworks and influencing the movements and perceptions of those interacting with it. I 
have made the case for understanding the digital interface as an ongoing, dynamic, hybrid 
aesthetic and cultural process. I have suggested that such an understanding requires an 
analysis of the various aspects of the interface including how the viewer/participant relates to 
                                                
1030 The interfaces I speak of have been created by artists discussed throughout this thesis such as Rokeby, 
Snibbe, Shaw, Feingold, Penny and Hershman Leeson. 
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and thinks about the interface, how this thinking and relation are translated into 
viewer/participant interaction and how this interaction reshapes our relationship to 
technology in interactive new media installations. Through this analysis I demonstrated not 
only how the interface is used, but why its deployment in interactive new media installations 
matters. It matters, I argued, because the interface is representative of the increasingly messy 
relationship between bodies, spaces and technologies in our culture.  
There are as many ways of representing the relationship between bodies, spaces and 
technology as there are interactive new media installations.  Digital interfaces are but one 
way of representing this relationship, albeit one that provides a very useful example of 
showing how easily the relationship between bodies, spaces and technologies can be 
managed, controlled and sometimes commodified by both inside and outside forces (the 
technology industry, artists, academia, the viewer/participant).  For example, when embedded 
into interactive new media installations and rendered imperceptible, the interface allowed us 
to reimagine what a body, be it human or technological, may be and what the relationship 
between them may become, as represented through Karasic’s Hu^mann (2008) and Vesna’s 
Mood Swings (2005-7) in chapter 2. Given this, I argued that what is at stake in my 
investigation of the interface in interactive new media installations is not what an interface is 
or may be, but rather what bodies are, what they can become.   
 
Yet, the interface, when utilized as a device that regulates and dictates movements and 
actions –	as it so often is in interactive new media installations –	rapidly becomes an issue of 
power, control and regulation, as exampled by installations that rely on the cybernetic 
feedback loop of instruction discussed in chapter 3 (Hershman Leeson (1993-4); Lozano 
Hemmer (2008); Corchesne (2011-2012)).  The reimagining of what a body may be on behalf 
of the viewer/participant, however, does not imply a process whereby the interface (a 
technological form) suddenly disappears, and re-emerges as something else (a human body) 
or somehow changes something (a relationship, a viewer/participant’s movement, a visual in 
an artwork) in a predetermined, linear fashion. The interface may suggest a plan, but it does 
not determine anything, as the interface does not pre-exist its relationship with others as 
argued in chapters 2 and 3.  Rather, the digital interface, by virtue of its role in helping us 
reimagine what bodies can become, can serve as a potential site of intervention against the 
control and regulation that the interface exerts as illustrated by my (re)reading of 
Jeremijenko’s Live Wire (1995) in chapter 4. In this way, the use of the interface in 
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interactive new media installations reveals not just the regulatory, but also the transformative, 
aspects of HCI. Thus it shows the important role the interface plays in positioning and 
(re)shaping specific ways of relating to the self, to technology, to artistic practice and to 
others.  At the heart of this thesis, then, is the notion that the digital interface matters to 
contemporary society and that a critical exploration of it in aesthetic contexts can help us 
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